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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Soviet-Indonesian relations from 
1945 to 1968.The study is placed in the broader context of 
Soviet-Third World relations.lt analyses the major issues 
and charts the trends that dominated Soviet-Indonesian relations
during the period under survey.It begins with a background 
study of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1917 to 1945.This 
is followed by an examination of Soviet policies towards 
Indonesia under Stalin from August 1945 to March 1953.
The next two chapters examine relations between the two 
countries under the leadership of Khrushchev,the first tracing 
the developments leading to the growing warmth and the second 
towards the growing chill in relations.The fifth chapter 
examines relations under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership.
The thesis ends with a brief summary of Soviet-Indonesian 
relations from 1945 to 1968,the examination of Soviet gains 
and losses and the evaluation of the Soviet experience in 
Indonesia in the light of its Third World relations.
In the main,the study is issue-oriented, and purports 
to explain Soviet behaviour towards specific developments 
in Indonesia.lt examines Soviet policies towards Indonesia 
in the light of its competing global and regional needs on 
the one hand, and the competing, often conflicting,ideological 
and national interests priori t i e s ,on the other.The object 
is to show that Soviet foreign policy cannot simply be 
described as being ideological or national interest-oriented 
or that its goals are always viewed from the regional or 
global perspective.
( iii )
The study highlights the shifts in Soviet policies 
towards Indonesia in the context of the changing domestic 
and international alignments, interests and environment.
This in turn demonstrates how Soviet leaders have visualised 
developments in Indonesia and how changing priorities, 
policies and interests have called into question strongly 
held views.It also analyses the interplay of great power 
rivalries on a regional s c e n e ,on the one hand and the 
conflicting needs and policies of regional powers on the 
other and how these have been brought to bear on Soviet 
foreign policy as far as Indonesia is concerned.
The study also analyses the place of Indonesia 
in the context of the constant reassesment and revision 
of Soviet attitudes toward the Third World.When it became 
clear to Soviet policy makers that the policy of isolation 
was unsuccessful,how did they relate with Indonesia? When 
it became evident that neutralism and non-alignment were 
the bases of the foreign relations of many of the new states, 
how did these have a bearing on Soviet-Indonesian relations? 
When the weakness of the proletariat and local communist 
parties was recognised and the Soviet Union introduced 
the doctrines of national and revolutionary democracies,where 
did Indonesia stand in Soviet ideological thinking? Under 
Brezhnev and Kosygin, the goal of scientific socialism 
and workers' states was pushed into the future and the 
immediate task stated as the increase of Soviet influence 
in the Third World.How was this realised as far as Soviet-
( iv)
Indonesian relations were concerned? How exactly did these 
changes come to bear on Indonesia and as to whether Soviet- 
Indonesian relations conformed with the existing pattern 
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Abstract ( i i i )
(vi)
The phrases 'Soviet perceptions','Soviet perspectives' 
and 'Soviet attitudes',present methodological problems that 
must be at least briefly discussed here.As a closed society, 
which controls all forms of communication including publishing, 
the Soviet Union produces a vast amount of propaganda for 
external as well as internal purposes.In a way,since every­
thing published must pass the censor,except for the illegal 
samizdat (independent press),the foreign observer can be 
sure that the output represents what the leadership wants 
the public (domestic or foreign) to know.As Sergei Yakobson, 
Chief of the Slavic and Central European Division of the 
Library of Congress, has argued:
in a totalitarian  regime,such as prevails in the Soviet Union,neither 
the title of a publication nor its contents,point of emphasis,choice of 
audience, and focus of attention are left to chance.By itself, a specific  
item may sometimes look small and insignificant,but in context of a 
comprehensive bibliography of Soviet literature the mere fact of its 
release provides a clue as to the intent of the party and government 
and gives better understanding of the manipulation of mass media in 
Communist society.
An analysis of Soviet bibliographical listings provides not 
only information as to what has been published in the Soviet 
Union but also data for study as to why a particular body
2
of material was chosen for publication by the Soviet rulership. 
It does not mean that the published material represents the 
true perceptions of the decision makers.In fact,Soviet 
decision makers very often conceal their views to confuse 
their opponents and gain advantage by surprise.
Thus,great caution must be exercised in assessing 
the signals that emanate from d o s e d  soci eties. The first 
step,then,is to develop a classification scheme and a rating 
scale for the various kinds of signals. Some signals originate 
at the highest level, that is, from the Politburo and, most 
often, from the General Secretary.The occasions differ, but 
one should look at the guinquennial congresses of the Communist
1.Cited in Peter Berton,"Soviet Perceptions of the Republic of Korea and its 
Relations With the United States and Japan1’,presented at a Symposium on 
Changing US-Soviet Relations And the Emerging New Order in Asia:Continuity 
or Change?,Centre For American And Soviet Studies,Dankook University,Seoul, 
Korea,21-7U August,1985.
2.See the discussion of methodological problems in dealing with Communist 
document,ation:UJilliam DeB. h ills."Content Analysis of Communist Documenta- 
tion,Studies in Comparative C o m m u n is m ,Vol.XV111,No.1 .(Spring 1985).pp.81 -92.
PREFACE:A NOTE ON METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
V v i i )
Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU) as well as at speeches, 
interviews,statements,joint communiques and the like.Editorials 
and other authoritative statements in Pravda, Izvestia, 
broadcasts from Radio Moscow,and T A S S (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo 
Sovetskogo Soyuza) releases,all signify the official 
imprimatur.Pravda (Truth), the official Party daily, has remained 
by far the most authoritative and influential organ of the 
CPSU. Izvestia(News), the official government newspaper, has 
been described as "the Party's faithful assistant in the 
strengthening of Party ties with the masses in the development
o
of socialist democracy”. These two organs have been extensively 
utilised in the present study.
An entirely different function is served by the 
Soviet propaganda machine,whether for domestic political 
purposes or for moulding world public opinion.Here, we find 
mass circulation daily newspapers,weekly and monthly 
periodicals,pamphlets openly marked v pomoshch1 propagan­
d i s t  "to aid the propagandist", and general interest books 
for the lay public, issued in tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of copies.In this category,four publications have 
been used in this study whenever relevant:the national organ 
of the Young Communist League, Komsomol'skaya Pravda(Young 
Communist League Truth),the national organ of the trade 
unions,T r u d (Labour),the military newspaper,Krasnaya Zvezda 
(Red Star) and Literaturnaya Gazeta(Literary Gazette),the 
organ of the literary organizations.
In addition to radio broadcasts and such illustrated 
magazines as Soviet Life and Soviet Woman,the foreign public 
is provided with foreign-language editions of several Soviet 
journals.The most frequently published is the popular Novoe 
vremia - New Times:A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs - 
which is also published in English,French,German,Italian, 
Spanish,Portuguese,Polish and Czech editions.Next in 
frequency of publication is Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn - Inter­
national Affairs:A Monthly Journal of Political Analysis
issued by the All-Union 'Znanie' (Knowledge) Society in 
Russian,English and French, and the monthly Aziia i Afrika 
segodnia in its bimonthly foreign edition,Asia and Africa
3.Speech by N.V.Podgorny,reported in Izvestia.U  March 1967.
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Today:Bi-Monthly Scientific and Socio-Political Journal of
the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the Institute 
of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Africa of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences,published in English and French.Also 
of interest to us is the more recent (since the early 1970s) 
quarterly,Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka - Far Eastern Affairs:
A Quarterly of Social Science and Political Analysis - 
published by the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in English, 
Spanish and Japanese.There are also other official Soviet 
English-language journals such as Soviet Military Thought. 
There are no copyright restrictions whatsoever on this type 
of Soviet material designed for a foreign audience,as every 
publication includes the statement "Any articles and other 
materials in the journal may be reproduced with due acknow­
ledgement" .
It should be noted,however,that the foreign-language 
editions of Soviet publications do not contain all the 
material appearing in the Russian-language version.Some of 
the omissions,often in the book review section,may be due 
simply to space 1 imitations.At other times,there may be 
political considerations,such as the omission of a commentary 
on the results of Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United 
States.^ This clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of research 
on the Soviet Union which is based only on English-language 
sources.
Somewhat less p r o p a g a n d i s t s  are scholarly Soviet 
monographs and book reviews in scholarly journals.Outright, 
blatant anti-American propaganda seldom occurs,although it 
is d.e rigueur to start a scholarly article or monograph with 
an appropriate quotation from Lenin's Collected Works, 
followed by a quotation from a recent pronouncement on the 
subject by the current General Secretary of the CPSU.
While Soviet mass propaganda journals, such as New 
Times or Asia and Africa Today,do not, as a rule,provide 
an apparatus of bibliographical citations,articles in the 
more scholarly journals , do document many of the statements
A.I.A.Il'in and F.l .Likin,'Vashington-Prkin:novyi etap sotrudnichestva",Problemy 
Dal'nego V o stoka ,No. 1,198**,pp. 131 -136.
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and statistical data. Here, one has to be careful, as a 
very skillful game is played with quotations.To be sure,many 
sources are quite legitimate,such as the use of primary 
documentation for speeches and statements of Soviet leaders 
and some of their allies.The quoting of their antagonists 
is very selective and is done to suit the purposes of the 
Soviet writer,sometimes quoting a primary Chinese,Indian, 
Indonesian or American source,but often citing a Soviet or 
a Western newspaper.Given the diversity of the Western,Indian, 
Indonesian and Japanese press,it is not surprising that they 
are prominently cited to buttress a point made by the Soviet 
author.The Soviet articles will often cite a Western publica­
tion, without identifying it as such,thus giving credence 
to the Soviet position,as though it was supported by a non- 
Soviet newspaper. At times a statement in quotation marks 
authoritatively claiming/ for example, that the Chinese leaders 
"in their assessment of the situation in the world put an 
equation mark between the imperialist,militaristic policy 
of the United States and the peaceloving,essentially anti­
war policy of the countries of the socialist community"
5
turns out to be from Izvestia or Pravda.
Thus,Soviet sources should not be cited indiscrimina­
tely without assessing sources,their potential audience,their 
propaganda mission,and their likely meaning.This is often 
accomplished by reading between the 1ines,looking for what 
the Soviet sources do not mention.On the whole,Western studies 
of Soviet foreign relations have relied too much on analysing 
declaratory policy, and less on examining Soviet actions.
There is a definite limit on what can be made of Soviet 
pronouncements,whether official statements or unofficial 
writings.I therefore approach my task of trying to describe
"Soviet relations with Indonesia" with a great deal of trepida­
tion. Even if we leave aside the p r o p a g a n d i s t s  and self- 
serving statements,what are we to make of serious Soviet 
scholarly analyses?Do these writings reach the decision makers,
5.D.Petrov, Japanese-Chinese RelationsiProblems and Trends ,Far Eastern 
A ffa irs ,No.1,1985,p.27.
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and if they do,how much influence do they have?Can we ever 
be certain of what we read?I am afraid I do not have 
answers to these questions.Nonetheless, it is important to find 
out what the input is and how it has changed over time as 
far as Soviet-Indonesian relations are concerned.Nevertheless, 
it should constantly be borne in mind that every opportunity 
is taken by Soviet writings and publications to push forward 
the existing 'line’ of the time.The 'line' here being inter­
preted as the position adopted and pushed forward by the 
Soviet leadership or its propagandists at any one time on 
a specific issue or development.This is achieved by the 
various control mechanisms.Ultimately,the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU has the last word on any issue.
Officially,however,the State Committee on the Press of the 
Council of Ministers is the governing body for all publishing 
matters in the Soviet Union, and this body is constantly 
subject to Party direction.Despite this,the principal news­
paper censorship agency is the Main Administration for the 
Preservation of State Secrets in the Press.This agency is 
formally attached to the State Committee on the Press and 
the Council of Ministers,but actually works directly under
the guidance of the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department 
Press Sector.^
In recognition of this control mechanism,it is 
apparent that all publications are closely controlled and 
directed and hence we can expect to read the existing 
'line' at any one time.It is,therefore,highly unlikely that 
different publications in the Soviet Union would thrust 
forward conflicting views,even though there may be differences 
in emphasis,as with Pravda being more concerned with ideolo­
gical and party affairs, Izvestia with state-to-state relations 
and Krasnaya zvezda with military matters.As and when such 
difference in emphases are discovered , they will be high­
lighted in the study.Otherwise,Soviet works on Indonesia 
will be referred to largely to indicate the existing ’line’ 
on Soviet-Indonesian relations and the Kremlin's position 
and policy on various developments in Indonesia and others
6.For details,see Gayle Durham Hollander,Soviet Political Indoctrination: 
Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since S ta lin ,New York:Praeger 
Publishers, 1973),pp.29-9*4.
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related to it.At the same time,attention would be focussed 
on not just what is said but what is done.In the final 
analysis, Soviet relations with Indonesia would be judged 
on the basis of the K remlin’s words and deeds.
' x  1 1 .)
INTRODUCTION
Since 1945,fluctuating relations between the Soviet 
Union and Indonesia have been one of the most dynamic aspects 
of the foreign policies of these two countries.The friendship 
between them has manifested itself in numerous forms of 
cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and military 
fields. The relationship has, however, been plagued with 
problems, caused largely by the clash of national interests. 
Western study of Soviet international and domestic behaviour 
has carried the bias of these societies toward the Soviet 
Union, probing Soviet deportment with a view to discovering 
the motives for the spread of Communism and its power.It 
is not suggested that the Soviet Union does not pursue its 
foreign policy with these objectives in mind , but that such 
a point of view is inadequate for understanding the course 
of Soviet-Indonesian relationship, as the transactions are 
more likely to have served the national interests of both 
countries rather than that of the Soviet Union's alone.
Like any other state,the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy is shaped by its leadership's view of the world,its 
national interests and the international balance of power 
at any given time.It has to respond to unexpected problems, 
threats and opportunities thrown up by the course of develop­
ments in the international system.The Soviet Union emerged 
from the Second World War as one of the strongest military 
powers, but, unlike the United States, remained for many 
years a continental and not a global power.Soviet foreign 
policy underwent a major change in the mid-1950s, and under
2the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow expanded its 
political, economic and cultural ties with the newly indepen­
dent states of Asia and Africa.In the context of the changed 
Soviet foreign policy orientation, this thesis examines the 
evolution of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968, 
in the vortex of interacting decisions of both countries, 
as well as those of the United States, the Netherlands and 
the P e ople’s Republic of China (PRC) insofar as these affected 
Soviet-Indonesian relations.
It is also useful to highlight that since 1975, and
more so since 1978, it has become rather common to speak
of the 'Soviet offensive in Southeast A s i a’.^ This refers
basically to the growing Soviet involvement in Indochina
and of the alliance relationship with Vietnam, including
the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang.
Added to this, there is also a visible expansion of Soviet
'diplomatic offensive' in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) region, with more regular visits by various
2
Soviet delegations. While the expanding Soviet involvement
in the region at present is undeniable, it is, however,
1.Robert C. Horn,Vloscow 's Southeast Asian O ffensive”,Asian Affairs:An 
American Review,Vol.2,No.*«,March/April 1975,pp.217-240;Douglas Pike,"The USSR 
and Vietnam",in Robert H. Donaldson,(edn.),The Soviet Union in the Third 
UJorld:Successes and Failures,(Boulder.Colorado:liJestview Press,1982),pp.251 - 
266;Thomas L.liJilborn,"The Soviet Union and ASEAN",in Ibid,pp.267-293;K.S.Nathan, 
Detente and Soviet Policy in Southeast A sia ,(Kuala Lumpur:Gateway Pub. House, 
1984); and Likhit Dhiravegin,ASEAN And The Major Powers:Today and 
Tomorrow,(Bangkok:Research Center,Faculty of Political Science,Thammasat 
University),Monograph Series No.7,May 1984,pp.5-26.
2.See "Moscow seeks to bait ASEAN with trade o ffe r",The Stra its  Times,U Dec. 
1985;"Soviet relations in Asia",Ibid,13 Jan.l986;and "Moscow 's foray in Southeast 
Asia",Ib id,16 Jan.1986.
3erroneous to view this as something novel.lt is equally mistaken 
to maintain that the Soviet Union is a new actor in the region. 
In many ways, Soviet interests in Southeast Asia are long­
standing and its involvement predates 1975.This is most 
vividly demonstrated by Soviet Union's relations with 
Indonesia from 1945 to 1968,the focal period for 
this study.
The Study
This thesis examines Soviet-Indonesian relations 
from 1945 to 1968.It will analyse Moscow's relations with 
Jakarta and plot the course of bilateral relations in the 
context of domestic,regional and global developments.The 
study will concentrate mainly on state-to-state relations. 
However, where party-to-party relations do intervene in the 
affairs between the two countries,they will be accounted 
for, but state-to-state relations will still constitute the 
main component of this thesis.The rationale for this study 
will be best understood after a review of the existing litera­
ture on Soviet-Indonesian relations has been undertaken.
Review of the Literature
A review of the literature on Soviet-Indonesian 
relations during the period under study indicates that work 
has so far been confined to three broad areas: the development 
of Indonesian Communism, the Indonesian Revolution and 
relations in the context of specific crises faced by the 
Indonesian Government.The three main crises covered here 
are the West Irian dispute, the Malaysian Confrontation and 
the October 1965 ’coup'.
The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia,PKI) and its relations with the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Third International 
(Comintern) have been the focus of many studies for obvious 
reasons.Not only was it the largest communist party outside 
the Sino-Soviet bloc,but also the most powerful political 
party in the country.lt was also the first communist party 
in Asia. Ruth M c V e y 's study of the PKI's development "from
its birth in 1914 to its temporary eclipse in 1927 after
3
a disastrous revolt attempt” - was a major contribution to
our understanding of the CPSU/Comintern links with the PKI. 
She examined the factors leading to the birth and growth
of the PKI, its cooperation and conflict with the other
political parties, especially the Sarekat Islam (SI), its
cooperation and later defiance of the Comintern, leading
finally to the 1926/1927 uprisings - which nearly obliterated
the party.
Her next work, co-authored with Harry Benda, delves 
into the P K I’s 1926/1927 revolts, which were seen as ”a 
significant event which had a considerably greater impact 
on Indonesia's subsequent political development than the 
actual strength marshalled by the communists might suggest".^ 
This work elaborates on the rebellion as well as on the back­
ground factors that led to it.The writers concluded, in
dissension with the Dutch Governor-General's Reports,^
3.Ruth T. McVey.The Rise of Indonesian Communism,(Ithaca,New YorkrCornell 
University Press,1965),p.xi.
U.Harry J.Benda and Ruth T. McVey.The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in 
Indonesia:Key Documents,(Ithaca,New YorkrModern Indonesian Project,Southeast 
Asian Program,Department of Far Eastern Studies,Cornell University,1960),p.i.
5.The Governor General’s Reports blamed the Comintern for inciting the 
uprisings.See Ibid,pp.1-18.
4
that these revolts were "primarily Indonesian, internal 
uprisings in which international Communism and its spokesmen 
in the colony played tangential, rather than originating 
or causal, roles".^
7
Charles McLane, though in greater brevity and without 
the same documentary strength as McVey, covered the same 
ground, explaining the birth of the PKI, its love-hate relations 
with the Comintern andy finally, its eclipse after the 1926/
1927 uprisings. McLane, however, goes a step further in 
examining the fate of the PKI after the 1926/1927 disaster 
and traces the p a r t y’s activities through to the 1930s.
During this phase, the PKI was declared illegal and its members 
kept alive the p a r t y’s flame by joining political parties 
that had legal existence and which became the centres of 
the continuing efforts to overthrow Dutch rule.McLane maintained 
that "had M o s c o w’s tactics in Indonesia been more flexible, 
ex-communists might have been used to bring the nationalists 
greater into closer harmony with Soviet objectives.As it 
was,communists gained prominence with the nationalist move­
ment only in Perhimpunan Indonesia,the organization of 
Indonesian Students in Holland,an organization whose voice
g
in affairs at home was becoming limited". McLane is again 
alone in examining Soviet perspectives on Indonesia during 
the Second World War. Even though the Indonesian Communists 
were restricted by Soviet ’anti-fascist’ policies during 
6.1bid,p.xix.
7.Charles B. McLane,Soviet Stra teg ie s in Southeast Asia:An Exploration of 
Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Sta lin ,(Princeton,New Jersey:Princeton 
University Press,1966),pp.80-101.
8.Ibid,pp.191-192.
the war from open collaboration with the Japanese and 
were active only in underground anti-Japanese movements, 
on the whole, the PKI was a secondary force in Indonesian 
politics at this phase.It was thus not surprising that 
"Soviet wartime coverage on Indonesia was confined to surveys 
of the pre-war period, studies on local geography and at
9
rare intervals, description of naval battles in the vicinity".
The Indonesian Revolution, following on the heels 
of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, is covered by 
both McVey and McLane.The former elucidates the Soviet attitude 
towards the Indonesian revolt against Netherlands' rule and 
in the process examined the dilemma confronted by Moscow 
which it has generally faced in its Asian dealings: "Whether 
to sacrifice local communist interests in an attempt to gain 
the friendship of the nationalist movement, or to push 
communist efforts to gain power at the risk of alienating 
Asian nationalism" ^  This dilemma was vividly demonstrated 
during the various phases of the Indonesian revolutionary 
war and especially during the P K I’s 1948 Madiun revolt.
In another work, McVey maintained that "whatever may have 
been the role of later Soviet machinations in the Republic, 
there is little reason to suspect that the Calcutta meeting 
fomented the insurrection of 1948". McLane also alluded 
to the Soviet dilemma in Indonesia during the Revolution:
"The Kremlin was faced with two alternatives:should it
9.Ibid,pp.280-281.
10.Ruth T.McVey,The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,(Ithaca,New 
York:Modern Indonesian Reports.Southeast Asian Program,Dept, of Far 
Eastern Studies,Cornell University,1957),p.1.
11.Ruth T.McVey,The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian 
Uprisings,(Ithaca,New York:Modern Indonesian Reports.Southeast Asian 
Program,Dept, of Far Eastern Studies,Cornell University,1958),pp.23-24.
continue to accept the Indonesian Republic as constituted, 
not only under Sjariffudin but equally under Sukarno,Hatta 
and other decidedly non-communist nationalist leaders? Or 
should Moscow turn against the nationalist leadership... 
in favour of a more vigorous effort by communists to seize 
power in their own right?”12 On Madiun, McLane maintained 
that "Moscow perhaps bore some general responsibility for
the P K I’s strategies through its more truculent posture in 
world affairs since Zhdanov’s speech in Poland a year 
earlier".^
The literature on Soviet-Indonesian relations after 
the Dutch colony gained independence focussed on two aspects: 
the rise and fall of the PKI and the relations between the 
two countries in the context of the various crises.McVey 
examined P K I’s relations with both the Soviet Union and the 
PRC until 1954 in the broader context of strained relations 
with the two communist giants.She shows that by 1953 the 
PKI was veering more closely towards the Chinese, due in
14
part to the lack of Soviet interest in Indonesia as a whole. 
McLane confirmed this by arguing that "Chinese communist 
influence within the PKI, it is believed replaced Russian, 
early in the 1 9 5 0 s " . ^
After 1954,the literature on Soviet-Indonesian
12.McLane,Op cit,p.401.
13.Ibid,p.405:
14.Ruth T. McVey.The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and 
Its Relations UJith The Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic,




relations focussed increasingly on state-to-state aspects 
and even though relations with the PKI were examined, these 
were mainly to demonstrate the growing distance from Moscow, 
especially in the broader context of the emerging rift in 
the communist camp between the Soviet Union and the PRC.
The PKI's role at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress would 
indicate, according to Donald H i n d l e y , ^  an attempt to take
a middle path in the Sino-Soviet conf1ict.This was achieved 
by siding with Moscow on some issues and with Peking on others, 
and preferring to remain ’non-involved’ in other controversies.
By the early sixties, literature on Soviet-Indonesian 
relations focussed on the growing closeness of the two countries 
in the context of the various problems faced by the Sukarno 
Government.The overriding problem, which was a legacy of 
the 1949 Independence Agreement, was the West Irian dispute.
Guy Pauker argued that the growing commonality of interests 
between the two governments and the large scale Soviet 
economic and military aid to Indonesia was politically 
motivated.He maintained that "the Soviet Union is preparing 
a major political ’co u p’ by trying to win over the last 
significant anti-communist factor in Indonesia, namely, the 
Armed Forces". ^  In another work, Pauker warned of ’the Soviet 
challenge in Indonesia" and exhorted that the Soviet presence
is a force to be reckoned with , in every respect. He saw the 
West Irian crisis as representing a major boon for Moscow,
16.Donald Hindley,"The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second 
Congress",Asian Survey,Vol.2,No.1,March 1962,pp.23-26.
17.Guy Pauker, General Nasution’s Mission To Moscow",Ib id,Vol.1,No.1,March 
1961, p. H .
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providing it with an opportunity to make inroads in what 
was basically a Western sphere of influence and this was 
to be achieved in part by encouraging the Indonesian leader­
ship to embark on a ’military solution' of the West Irian
i i 18 
problem.
Nadia Derkach examined the Soviet attitude towards
the West Irian and Malaysian disputes.She argued that an
analysis of ’actual Soviet policy shows that in fact the Soviet
Union has not viewed the situations as identical.These
differing appraisals are reflected in 1. the official Soviet
statement of support in each case; 2. news media treatment;
3. Soviet treatment of Malaysia as an ’emergent s t a t e’;
and 4. the hesitant character of Soviet support for Indonesian
19claims in the Malaysian dispute”. Soejati’s work also 
examined the two disputes but with different emphasis: he 
evaluated the Soviet role in the two disputes in terms of 
the concept of a third party.He demonstrated that the position 
of the Soviet Union during Indonesia's confrontation over 
West Irian constituted a special and unique case of the use 
and role of a third party.It was a factor which induced 
mediation by the United States, a third party in the conven­
tional sense of the term.The Soviet role, however, may be 
referred to as that of an indirect third party or a fourth 
party. However, in its confrontation against Malaysia,
Indonesia failed to promote a corresponding Soviet role as a
18.Guv Pauker,"The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia",Foreign A ffa irs,Vo l.40,No.A,
July 1962,pp. 12-13.
19.Nadia Derkach,"The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the liJest Irian and 
the Malaysian D isputes",Asian Su rvey ,Vol.5,No.11 .November 1965,p.568.
means of soliciting American mediation in its favour.Instead,
Indonesia turned to the PRC,which led inevitably to a
20
deterioration in Soviet-Indonesian relations.
After 1965, the literature focussed principally on
the dramatic events of October 1965, which subsequently led
to the near total obliteration of the PKI, the fall of
President Sukarno and the rise of the military under General
Suharto.This also ushered in the 'New O r d e r '.Justus M. van
der Kroef examined the changes in the Soviet view of Gestapu
(the movement that originated the 1965 events) and concluded
that this can only be appreciated in the context of the
21
'running Sino-Soviet conflict’. Robert Horn, on the other
hand, examined Soviet-Indonesian relations since 1965 and
stated that M o s c o w’s policies steered between the extreme
of breaking relations with J akarta’s new regime as a response
to the crushing of the PKI and the country's swing to the
right,both internally and externally, and the extreme of
ignoring the hunting down of communists and banning of the
PKI and seeking to establish close and unqualified relations
22with the new regime. Examining the same developments, 
Rodolfo Severino,Jr.,concluded that for the Soviets "the 
overriding objective in Indonesia is to retain as much as 
they can of whatever influence they still have in the country
20.J.Soejati,"An Analysis of the use and role of a third party in the settlement 
of international disputes with special reference to Indonesian-Soviet 
relations".Unpublished PhD Thesis,London School of Economics and Political 
Science,University of London,1982.
21.Justus M. Van Der Kroef ."Indonesia's 'GESTAPU':The View From Moscow and 
Peking".The Australian Journal of Politics and History,Vol.14,No.2,August 
1968,pp.163-176.
22.Robert C. Horn,"Soviet-Indonesian Relations Since I965",Survey,Vol.17,No.1 
(78),Winter 1971,pp.216-17.
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and to keep Western influence down to the lowest possible 
level.And it is obvious that the way to do this is not by 
a clear-cut alignment with the ineffectual and unreliable 
Indonesian Communists but by showing goodwill toward the 
regime in power,supporting it against pressure from the
’ultra-Right' and the imperialists and stiffening it in its
23effort to remain non-aligned in foreign affairs".
Some Observations On Past Research
A review of the above research highlights a few
points:Firstly, whether the research is on Indonesian Communism
or on the various crises, it has been principally issue-
oriented, often focussing on one or two issues. No attempt
has been made to study Soviet-Indonesian relations coherently
by examining the full flow of relations over a particular
time period.Secondly, no attempt has been made to understand
Soviet relations with Indonesia in the broader context of
Soviet-Third World relations and especially with reference
to the changing Soviet perspectives on the Third World since
1945.Thirdly,the research has not benefitted from the recent
literature which has emanated from the Soviet Union on
Indonesia.Indeed, since 1978, the Soviet Union has shown
great interest in the study of Indonesia,not just on the
pre-1945 period , but also the revolutionary phase and the
period of Sukarno rule,until his ousting in 1968.Finally,
no attempt has been made to examine Soviet-Indonesian relations
in the special context of Soviet-Southeast Asian relations.
Here,it should be highlighted that the present Soviet interest
23.Rodolfo Severino,Jr.."Soviet Policy Toward the New Order in Indonesia",
Pacific Community,No.8,Autumn 1971,p.74.
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and involvement in Southeast Asia are in no way novel,as 
its past relations with Indonesia would testify.As this 
is the case,no attempt has been made to learn from the Soviet 
experience in Indonesia, in an effort to understand and 
explain Soviet behaviour in the region at present.Flowing 
from this, no attempt has been made to inquire whether there 
is anything unique in the Soviet experience in Indonesia 
within the broader context of Moscow's Third World relations.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is fourfold.Firstly,it aims 
to make a contribution to an improved understanding of 
Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968, that is, 
to analyse how Moscow related with what was basically Sukarno's 
Indonesia.Secondly,it aims to elucidate the position of 
Indonesia in Soviet-Third World relations and especially how 
Soviet theories and practises in the Third World as a whole, 
were specifically applied to Indonesia.Thirdly,it aims to 
highlight recent Soviet writing on Indonesia for the period 
under study and examine how these conformed to and differed from 
past Soviet writing .Finally, it aims to highlight how the 
Soviets viewed Indonesia and their experiences and analyse 
whether Soviet relations with Indonesia were in any way 
unique in terms of overall Soviet-Third World relations.
Scope and Delimitations
This study will be confined to the bilateral 
exposition of Soviet-Indonesian relations from the period
1 2
1 3
1945 to 1968. Extraneous factors will be brought in only 
insofar as they help to explain the course of relations 
between the Soviet Union and Indonesia.The reasons for 
limiting the thesis from 1945 to 1968 arc as follows:In August 
1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia 
from the Dutch and this marked the onset of the Indonesian 
Revolution which lasted until December 1949.It is useful 
to begin the study in 1945 as this not only marked the period 
of ’independent’ Indonesia, but more important,the beginning 
of the revolution, and in Soviet parlance, ’the national 
liberation struggle’.A study of the Soviet attitude during 
this phase is important as it will manifest M o s c o w’s policies 
toward Third World independence struggles in general and 
in Southeast Asia in particular.More pertinent, M o s c o w’s 
policies toward Indonesia after the formal transfer of 
independence were largely conditioned by its perception of 
developments in Indonesia during the revolutionary period.
While it is generally agreed that the turning point 
in the history of independent Indonesia occurred in 1965 
following the abortive ’c o u p’,1968 has been chosen as 
the cut-off point in the study for the following reasons:
First, the full impact of the abortive ’c o u p’ became apparent 
only by 1968,when General Suharto was proclaimed President, 
the surviving leaders of the PKI,Njono and Sudisman,executed 
and Sukarno,by then an ordinary citizen, was placed under house 
arrest.Second,for the Soviet Union, 1968 was also a critical 
turning point in its relations with Indonesia,largely caused 
by Suharto’s domestic and foreign policies,by the complica­
tions in the Soviet U n i o n’s international position brought
about by the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, 
President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North 
Vietnam and finally, the developments in Czechoslovakia.
The combination of these developments forced a change in 
Moscow's policy towards Jakarta which in the final analysis 
was its belated response to the full impact of the abortive 
'coup* of 1965.
Despite the delimitation of the scope from 1945 to 
1968,the thesis will also include brief background notes 
in order to introduce the state of relations before 1945, 
insofar as these had implications for developments in the 
post-1945 period.Similarly,some developments that occurred 
after 1968 will also be mentioned, especially those with 
bearings for the period under survey.
The Context of the Study:Soviet Views On the Third World 
from Lenin to Brezhnev
This section examines Soviet (Marxist-inspired)
theories on how underdeveloped societies change and of the
political theories of how the struggle against feudalism
and imperialism is to be conducted,with a view to moving
straight into the socialist phase ,without having to suffer
from a developed capitalist phase.Since 1917, the Soviet
Union has professed to conduct its diplomacy according to
24
the dictates of Marxism-Leninism. Theory is an essential 
component of political action from the Marxist standpoint; 
and of course,political action depends on the realities of 
the international system.When a new policy is adopted and 
implemented for empirical reasons, a new theoretical justifi-
24.See Nikolai Lebedev,The USSR in World Po litcs,(Moscow:Progress Pub.,1982), 
Chapter 3,pp.65-86;F.Petrenko and V.Popov,Soviet Foreign PoIicy:Objectives 
and Principles,(Moscow:Progress Pub.,1985),Chapter 3,pp.1/46-247.
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cation has to be found to explain it and in this regard,it 
is important to study the interplay of theory and action.
Marx did not develop any specific theory of imperialism. 
He depended on Capitalism spreading to countries with pre­
capitalist modes of production which/ once developed, would 
evolve into the next progressive phase of Socialism.lt was 
thus argued that,in view of the backward pre-capitalist mode 
of production in what was later to be called the Third World, 
colonialism was indeed a ’progressive development’.M a r x’s 
’positive’ interpretation of colonialism was accepted by 
European socialists right up to the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as shown by the Second International's approval of 
what was regarded as the development of backward areas by 
the 'civilised wo r l d’?
Lenin revised this view and formulated modern
Marxist theory on the development of imperialism and anti­
imperialism as well as laying the theoretical foundations 
of Marxist-Communist interest and involvement in the Third 
World.This was specifically stated in Lenin's Imperial ism, 
the Highest Stage of Capital i s m .26 The underdeveloped and
colonial areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America were
27
collectively referred to as the 'East' by the Soviets/
25.See Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby,Soviet-Third UJorld Relations,(Boulder, 
ColoradoiWestview Press, 1985),p.4;011e Torguist,Dilemmas of Third UJorld 
Communism:The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia,(LondonrZed Books Ltd.,
1984),PP-13-14;Harish Kapur,Soviet Russia and Asia,1917-1927,(Geneva:Michael 
Joseph Ltd.,1966),pp.19-21.
26.See Lenin,Imperialism,the Highest Stage of Capitalism,seventeenth printing, 
(Moscow:Progress Pub.,1978),pp.83-92.
27.According to Mikhail Pavlovich, "The East is the whole colonial world,the 
world of the oppressed peoples not only of Asia, but also of A frica and 
South America".Cited in McVey,The Rise of Indonesian Communism,p.1.
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and Lenin saw the region as the 'weakest link' in the
'imperialist-colonialist system' and credited it with
2 8
tremendous revolutionary potential. also saw the 'national
liberation movements' in the 'East' as constituting 'natural
allies' of the socialist s t a t e (s )* even if led ipso facto
29by non-proletarian bourgeois nationalist elements. At the 
Second Comintern Congress in July 1920,Lenin urged all 
communist parties to support the nationalist 'liberation 
movements' in the 'East*.The theses adopted at the Congress 
called for a two-pronged attack which would unite the forces 
of communist-led national proletariat of the capitalist 
countries with the national liberation movements in the 
colonies, indicating that Moscow was prepared to utilise
bourgeois democratic nationalists and other non-communist
30
elements in the campaign against Imperialism. Stalin, in
an article entitled "Our Tasks in the Orient", published in
March 1919,spoke of the need for a "bridge between the
proletariat revolution of the West and the anti-imperialist
movements of the Orient, creating in this way an all embracing
31ring around the expiring imperialism". This, however, only
28.See Roger E. Kanet,"The Soviet Union and the Colonial Question,1917-1953", 
in Roger Kanet,(edn.),The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations,(Baltimore:
The John Hopkins University Press, 1974),pp. 1-7.
29.See Alexander R.Alexiev.The New Sovie t Strategy in the Third World,(Santa 
Monica,California:Rand Publication Series,June 1983),p.3.
30.Geoffey Jukes,The Soviet Union in A s ia ,(Sydney:Aungus and Robertson Pub., 
1973),p.7;Kapur>Op c it ,pp.21-30.
31.Cited in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert North,Soviet Russia and the East: 
1920-1927,A Documentary Su rvey ,(Stanford,California:Stanford U niversity  
Press,l957),pp.15-18.
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applied to the areas in the East: even though strong 
nationalist and anti-colonial movements emerged in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus(in the former Tsarist Russia)with many 
declaring themselves independent and sovereign, the Red Army
brutally suppressed and reannexed these territories and
32
extirpated the national independent movements.
With Lenin's death in 1924 and Stalin's accession
to power, the Soviet policy of alliance with nationalist
movements was further refined.Stalin argued:
Of course this does not mean that the proletariat should 
support every national movement, always and everywhere 
in all separate concrete cases.Rather, this means that 
the proletariat should support national movements 
which are directed at the weakening or destruction 
of imperialism...33
This was most clearly demonstrated in S t a l i n’s attempt to
mediate between local communists and nationalists so as to
preserve the anti-colonial alliance as well as to protect
the fortunes of the local communists.The problem in this
approach was manifested in China where the Soviets attempted
to support both the Communists and the Nationalists and
urged them to forge a coalition.This, however, failed and
the nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek,
outmanoeuvred the Communists in 1927 and almost annihilated 
34
them. This defeat forced Stalin to change tactics, and the 
Comintern urged local communists to fight the nationalist- 
bourgeois, leading in reality to a change in strategy.
17
32.See Robert D. UJarth,Soviet Russia in World Po litics,(London:Vision Press, 
1963),Chapter 3,pp.55-96;Alvin Rubinstein,The Foreign Policy of Soviet Union. 
(New Vork:Random House,1972),pp.376-377.
33.1. V.Stalin,"Ob osnovakh Leninizma'(1924),5ochineneiia,Vol.6,(Moscow:Gospolit- 
izdat,l947),ppp.142-144;Saivetz and Woodby,Op c it ,p.6.
34.011e Tornguist,Op c it ,pp.21-24.
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On the whole, Soviet interest in the colonial world 
prior to the Second World War was confined to a few 
countries, mainly on its borders, and bore little in the 
way of results.By the late 1920s, Soviet concern for the 
’East’ deteriorated rapidly, as did the world-wide revolution­
ary ardour precipitated by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. 
Mosc o w’s interests in the colonial world were pursued by 
the Comintern and other instrumentalities such as the League 
Against Imperialism. By the mid-1930s, these activities 
were largely terminated as a result of the shift in the 
balance of power in Europe,caused by the emergence of Nazi 
Germany.In these circumstances,Moscow sought to enhance its 
security by advocating ’collective security' with the major 
Western powers, and to enhance its credibility with the 
would-be allies, who also happened to be the colonial powers, 
Moscow instructed the Comintern and its client parties to 
desist from efforts to foment revolution and national 
liberation movement in the colonial world.This was endorsed 
by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, meeting in July 
and August 1935, which called for a strategy of 'united
or
front' to confront 'Fascism'. Stalin favoured the formation 
of national fronts at the expense of the national liberation 
struggle and this had the effect of slackening Soviet interest
35.Alexiev,Op c it ,p.3;S.T.Possony,hThe Comintern as an Instrument of Soviet 
Strategy " in  M.M.Drachkovtich,(edn.),The Revolutionary Internationals,1864- 
1943,(Standford,Calif ornia:Standford University Press, 1966),pp.203-224.
36.Georgi Dimitrov,the Secretary  General of the Comintern, inaugurated the 
’united fro n t’ strategy  in July 1935 by declaring that ’’the f irst  thing that 
must be done is to form a united front, to establish unity of action...in 
every country all over the world.The Communists pledge...not to attack 
anyone, neither persons nor organizations nor parties that stand for the 
united front of the working class aga inst fascism".See VII Congress of the 
Communist International:Abridged Stenographic Report of Proceedings, 
(Moscow:Foreign Languages Pub. House,l939),p.172.
in the colonial world.Except for a short interlude between 
the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact (23 
August 1939) and the German attack on the Soviet Union (22 
June 1941),the Soviet disinterest in the colonial world 
continued throughout the Second World War.
The Soviet Union emerged from the war as a formidable 
military power,but lacked the means to project itself beyond 
its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and to a certain 
extent in North Korea and northern Iran.Economically, it 
was weak, partly as a result of wartime destruction and 
this prevented it from competing for influence on a wider 
scale.In the colonial world, the mood was to overthrow the 
colonial powers,but in the immediate post-war years Stalin 
had no intention of alienating his erstwhile allies by aiding 
the disintegration of their colonial empires,as he was seeking 
their acquiescence to his newly acquired sphere of influence 
in Eastern Europe.
To be sure, from August 1945 to August 1947, the
Soviet Union viewed the colonial world with a degree of
optimism.This was most clearly reflected in the writings
of Eugene Varga, a leading Soviet political-economic theorist
at that time.In 1946,he argued that the imperialist powers'
grip over their colonies was being weakened by the economic
and political changes in the colonies brought about by the
war.For instance, he declared:
A completely new fact,w ithout precedent in the h is to ry  of 
imperialism,is the almost un iversal lessening of the financial 
dependence of the colonies and dependent countries on the 
empire, converting some colonies from the debtors to the 
creditors of the imperialist metropolis.This course of 
development,which has been almost impossible to stop 
since the war,beai*w itness to far-reach ing changes in 
the relationships between the colonies and the metropolis.37
19
37.Eugene Varga, Izmeneiia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge mirovii vo in i,(Moscow: 
Gospolitzdat, 1946),p.219.Cited in McVev.The Soviet View of the Indonesian
Revolution,p.5: and in Roger Kanet,"The Soviet Union and the Colonial 
Question.I9l7-I953".0p cit,p.17.
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As for the political changes,especia11y in the South­
east Asian colonies which were occupied by Japan during the
war, Varga noted that four factors had brought about an 
upsurge of anti - imperialist movements:
1.The economic developments of the colonies strengthened the 
native bourgeoisie and the native pro le tariat - exactly 
those classes which generally take a leading position in
the struggle  for independence;
2.Both warring camps made wide use in the war of native armed 
forces,which heightened the self-confidence of the colonial 
peoples;
3.The defeat by the Japanese of the former rulers[English,
Am ericans,French ,D utchjshatte red  the b e lie f o f  the  
co lon ia l peoples in the d u rab ility  o f white rule;and
U.The war made it possible for a large number of natives to 
obtain weapons.38
V a r g a’a analysis was interesting in view of Soviet
Marxist belief,that the colonies were without hope,short
39
of revolution. More important, the reference to native 
bourgeoisie and proletariat as leaders in the struggle for 
independence, coupled with the belief that the metropolis' 
economic hold was being loosened, made it easier for analysts 
such as Varga to believe that it was also possible for the 
political grip to be weakened.In addition to the internal 
political and economic changes in the colonies, Varga saw 
external pressure on the metropolis, in the form of United 
States’ support for the independence movements,as an important 
cause for change in the colonies.In V a r g a’s view, Washington 
supported the decolonization of the Western empires in order 
to make economic inroads into the colonies and this would
38.Varga,Op c it ,p.224.
39.See "The Comintern in the East",The Communist International,Vol.6,Nos.9- 
10,1929,pp.273-292.
further force the metropolis to make political concessions
40
to the 'national liberation movements'. This optimistic 
outlook was manifested in the Soviet declaratory policies 
toward the Third World in gen e r a l .Though lacking in the 
wherewithal to pursue an active policy, the Soviet Union 
approved of the national liberation movements then being 
led by bourgeois-nationalists.41 One Soviet writer even spoke 
favourably of the Western powers which he said were "pursuing
a more progressive policy towards their colonies and depen-
42
dencies". ' More revealing, the bourgeois-led national 
liberation struggle was favourably reported in the Soviet 
press.^
With the enunciation of the Zhdanov ’two camps'
44theory in September 1947, the Soviet view of developments
in the Third World underwent a major change.This was largely
brought about by the failure of the French and Italian
Communist Parties to capture power in their respective
countries and in reaction to the decision of the Truman
Administration in August 1947 to 'contain' Soviet 'expansion'
in Europe and to undertake a global crusade against Communism.
In response to the United S t a t e s’ ideological challenge of
defending the ’Free W o r l d’, Moscow announced an equally
rigid ideological position which perceived the international
system as being divided into two hostile ’anti-imperialist’
40.See McVey.The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,pp.6-7.
41.See McLane's discussion of Soviet attitude towards national liberation 
movements,Opcit,pp.249-350.
42.G.Evgenyev,^Japanese Imperialism and the Peoples of A sia ",New Times,No.
10,15 October 1945,p.20.
43.McLane,Qp c it ,pp.261 -345.




and 'anti-democratic’ camps.This had direct consequences
for Soviet policies in the Third World/and Varga's optimistic
outlook was replaced by a more hardline posture.In the Soviet
45
Union, V a r g a’s theories were criticised, ancj commentators 
now argued that ”in the vast majority of the colonies, there 
was not created,even as a result of the Second World War,the 
basic pre-requisites for their economic independence:they 
lack every industry, do not produce the means of production 
[and]do not have machines’?^ The new position resulted in 
three policy decisions:
1.The independence of states such as the Philippines, Burma 
and India, was judged to be fictitious.
2.The leaders of these states were viewed as ’agents’ of 
imperial ism.
473.There was no room for non-alignment or neutrality.
The following statement by Zhukov clearly described the new
Soviet policy towards the national-bourgeoisie in the
colonies and the newly independent states:
...the Indian big bourgeoisie has become a specially trusted 
gendarme at the service of the Anglo-American imperialist 
masters.The development of h istorica l events in Indonesia 
a fte r the Second lilorld Ular shows that the Indonesian 
bourgeosis leaders like Sukarno and Hatta, who for the 
time being headed the Indonesian Republic,from the very 
beginning oriented themselves toward the attainment of 
a ’decent compromise’ with imperialism.48
45.See Frederick C.Barghoon/’The Varga D iscussion and its S ign ificance”,The 
American Slavic and East European Review,Vol.7,No.3,1948,p p .214-236.
46.V.Vasileva, Noveishie tendentsii v politika imperializma”,Mirovoe Khosis- 
iaistvo i M irovaia Politika.May 1947,p.64;Kanet,0p c it ,p.17.
47.Jukes,Op c it ,pp.1Q-11;J.M.Mackin tosh,Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign 
Policy,(London:Oxford University  Press,1962),pp.28-30.
48.E.N.Zhukov,"Sharpening C ris is  of the Colonial System A fte r World War Two", 
in C risis of the Colonial System:National Liberation Struggle  of the Peoples 
of East A sia ,(Paper presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute  of the Academy
of S c i e n c e s , U S S R . p . 16).Cited in David Dallin,Soviet Foreign policy A fte rS ta lin . 
(LondomMethuen and Co.,1960),p.292.
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Following the enunciation of the 'two camps' doctrine,
not only did Stalin fail to exploit the considerable reservoir
of anti-Western sentiments, he also roused the hostility
of Third World states by encouraging subversive activities
through the support of local communist parties.Professor
Ivan Potekhin,Moscow's leading Africanist,wrote in 1950 that:
Sta lin 's  theory of colonial revolution proceeds from the fact 
that the solution of the colonial problem,the liberation of 
colonial slavery is impossible without a proletarian 
revolution and the overthrow of imperialism.49
In addition to Stalin's belief in the inevitability of war 
between the capitalist and socialist systems,his perception 
of the newly independent states as neo-colonies,his over­
estimation of leftist strength (especially in Southeast Asia) 
and the under-estimation of nationalism and nationalist forces 
in the Third World in general influenced him to attach a 
low priority to these states.
Stalin’s hardline towards the Third World continued 
right up to 1952. In that year, at the Economic Conference 
held in Moscow in April,the Soviet leadership indicated its
willingness to increase trading relations with the Third
n 50
world and in October, at the Nineteenth Party Congress,
the groundwork for a more flexible policy towards it was
51laid. Although many Western studies have tended to give
49.Ivan Potekhin,"Sta lin 's Theory of Colonial Revolution and the National 
Liberation Movement in Tropical and South A frica ",Sovetskaia  E tnogra fiia ,
No.1,1950.Translated and reprinted in T.Thornton,(edn.),The Third World in 
Soviet Perspective,(Princeton,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1964).p.32.
50.Kanet,"Soviet Attitude towards Developing Nations Since Stalin", in Kanet,
Dp c it ,p.27.
51.See Marshall Shulman,Sta lin ’s Foreign Policy Reappraised,(New York:Athenum 
Press,1965).pp.258-274.
the impression that Moscow did not show any interest towards
Third World nationalism until after Stalin's death in March
52
1953, a more careful examination of the last few months 
of Stalin's foreign policy would reveal a more subtle and 
complex scenario.An important reason for the change in 
Stalin's attitude was his belated realization that not all 
Third World states were 'agents' of the Western powers:this 
had been clearly demonstrated in the differences in practical 
policies between independent Asian states such as India,Burma 
and Indonesia and their former colonial masters in the Korean 
War.However, it was left to Stalin's successors to implement 
the new policy.
Following the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union 
reassessed its Third World policies;modifying its past 
posture,it supported national liberation movements and the newly 
decolonised states.This change took place against the backdrop 
of a broader reassessment of Soviet foreign policy. t h e
summer of 1953, Moscow offered its first contribution to
the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.
In 1954, the USSR joined the International Labour Organization
(ILO) and United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural
Organization(UNESCO).Extended Soviet membership in international
organizations provided new opportunities for contacts with
representatives of the Third World.A number of events which
occurred in 1955 made it evident that interest in the Third
World was becoming a significant fact of Soviet foreign policy.
52.For example,see John S. Reshetar,Jr.,"The Soviet Union and the Neutralist 
UJorldM,The Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Sc iences,
Vol.362,November 1965, p. 104.
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The signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May^ , which 
provided for Austria's military neutrality, and the extension 
on 19 September of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for twenty years(reaffirming 
Finlands's neutral status) indicated that neutral and non- 
aligned states could serve Soviet interests under certain 
circumstances.The decision to effect a reconciliation with 
T i t o’s Yugoslavia in June 1955, after Stalin's expulsion 
of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948, was probably 
prompted in part by the desire to develop contacts of the kind 
that Belgrade had successfully established with such Third 
World countries as Egypt,Indonesia,Burma and India.The 
success of the PRC at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian 
states in April,to which Moscow was not invited, undoubtedly 
made the Soviet leaders aware of the desirability of operating 
in this area.On the whole,there were six reasons for the 
new Soviet leadership interest in the Third World: 
l.It acknowledged the lack of success of the past policies 
and strategies;
2.It realised the growing importance and strength of the 
nationalist movements and governments;
3.It recognised that the Third World had an important role 
to play in the world balance of power;
4 . It accepted that the future outcome of the struggle between 
the East and West, to a large extent,depended upon its 
actions in the Third World;
5.It was convinced that the breakup of the colonial system 
would weaken the West; and
25
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6.It was in response to the United States' efforts to create 
alliance systems in Asia as part of its 'containment'
policies after the Korean War.
The changing Soviet perception of the Third World 
led to the modification of its doctrines and this cleared 
the path for Soviet-Third World rapprochement.Firstly,the Third 
World was no longer viewed as an appendage to Western 
imperialism but rather as a 'zona m i r a ', a zone of peace, 
with interests and goals highly compatible with those of 
the Soviet Union.Secondly,Stalin's idea of the ultimate 
inevitability of war between the two systems was replaced 
by the possibility of 'peaceful coexistence'.Thirdly,the 
Soviet leadership rejected proletarian revolution as the 
only conduit to socialism, and recognised the possibility 
of peaceful transition.Finally,the Soviet Union realised 
that the Third World contained a number of states which had 
the capacity to act independently of the West, and this led 
to the abandonment of the 'two camp' theory.
The Soviet policy shift towards the Third World was
officially enunciated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party
Congress in February 1956:
The leading political circles of these [Third World] states rightly 
hold that to participate in closed military alignments would merely 
increase the danger to their countries of becoming involved in 
the aggressive fo rces ' military gambits and being drawn into 
the ruinous maelstrom of the arms race.
...As a result, a vast 'peace zone', including both socia list 
and non-socialist peace-loving sta te s in Europe and Asia, 
has emerged in the world arena...In contrast to the prewar 
period,most Asian countries now act in the world arena as 
sovereign states or states which resolutely uphold their 
right to an independent foreign policy.53
53.Pravda.15 Feb.1956.
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The new Soviet thrust in the Third World was aimed
54at achieving a number of objectives:
1.To prevent the participation of Third World states in the 
United States’ sponsored alliance systems and thereby 
disrupt those systems.
2.To reduce and then eliminate Western influence as part 
of the total effort to isolate the United States and 
Western Europe.
3.To establish contacts with the new states and to win their 
support for Soviet policies and especially for Soviet 
proposals in the United Nations.
4.To persuade Third World states to accept the Soviet Union 
as a model for rapid industrialization and modernization.
5.To encourage neutralism or the 'non-bloc policy'(vneblok- 
vaya politika).
6.To promote politico-socio-economic conditions thought to 
be conducive in the long run to the development of 
communist parties.
7.To build up a reservoir of goodwill and promote the image 
of the Soviet Union as a friend of the Third World.
The Soviet Union not only recognised the Third
World as an important factor in the international system
but hastened to enlist a number of key countries, such as
India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt and Afghanistan as its allies.
Theoretically, this was achieved through the formulation
of the 'zona mira' concept which envisaged the Third World
54.Reshetar,Op c it .pp. 109-110;Saivetz and Woodby.Dp c it ,pp.171-180;Alvin 
Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War Two:Imperial and Global, 
(Cambridge,Mass.:Winthrop Pub., 1981),pp.218-219.
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and the Socialist community acting together as a bulwark
against the 'warmongering imperialists'.In practical terms,
the new Soviet policy dictated important changes in attitude
towards the newly decolonised countries.Not only did the
Soviet leadership accept the notion that national independence
could be achieved through peaceful means,it also viewed the
establishment of a 'national-democratic state' as a positive
development even though it might at first be based on
capitalist principles.More important, political emancipation
of the Third World states was now considered as a pre-requisite
for the achievement of complete independence and eventual
transition to socialism. V.Semyonov, a leading Soviet
theoretician,pointed out in his article in Kommunist,the
ideological organ of the CPSU, in 1956 that:
The winning of state political independence is a revolution in 
the life of formerly colonial peoples.Unfortunately,this is not 
clear to all.Take for example,the fact that foreign capital 
still exerts very great influence on the economy of many 
countries in the East which have won political independence.
From this,some Soviet Orientalists have drawn the incorrect 
conclusion that after gaining independence these countries 
remain, in point of fact, colonial in status.The adherents of 
this incorrect view confuse two different questions: the 
question of political liberation and self-determination of the 
peoples of formerly colonial countries, and the question of 
achievement of economic independence by countries of the 
East which have only recently cast off the colonial yoke.55
Finally, the national bourgeoisie was recognised
as a progressive force deemed worthy of Soviet support.In
Khrushchev's words:
To what extent the national bourgeoisie there participates 
in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle has a considerable 
hearing on the firmness of the alliance between workers and 
peasants....Under modern conditions,the national-bourgeoisie not
55V.Semyonov, Raspad kolonial,noi sistemii imperializma i voprosi mezdunarodnoi 
otnosenii,,.Kommunist,IMo. 18, December 1955, p.99.
connected with the imperialists in the colonies,former colonies 
and dependencies is, from the objective point of view,interested 
in fulfilment of the basic tasks of the anti-imperialist,anti-feudal 
revolution and consequently,still retains its progressive role 
and its ability to participate in the solution of imminent 
national problems.56
The Soviet support for the national bourgeoisie was
also in response to the realization that in the Third World
as a whole, it was the national bourgeoisie which was holding
the reins of power and that the Communist Parties were either
weak or completely suppressed.As A.A.Guber pointed out:
The number of Asian and African countries which attained independence 
under the leadership of the bourgeoisie is much larger than the number 
of People’s Democracies in the East.This is explained by the actual 
correlation of class forces in these countries, and the degree of their 
working class organization and consciousness.In many of these countries 
there were no working-class parties before the Second UJorld Uar.and none 
even today.57
Thus, in order to facilitate its acceptance in the 
Third World, Moscow softened the rigidity of Stalinist 
doctrines.This did not mean that the Soviet Union abandoned 
its goal of seeing the Third World's transition to socialism: 
on the contrary,the new flexible position was only a means 
to the same end.In fact,the Soviet leadership hoped that 
the Third World bourgeois leadership would be impressed with 
the superiority of the Soviet model and gravitate towards
29
The ideological basis for Khrushchev’s new policy 
towards the Third World was provided by L e n i n’s strategy 
concerning the role which he thought national liberation 
struggles for independence in developing countries would 
play in the cause of world socialist revolution.In Leninism,
56.Cited in Tatsuo Urano/’The Soviet Union and A frica”,Review:A Quarterly 
Journal for the Study of Communism and Communist Countries,l\lo.41 .October
I975,p.19.
57.A.A.Guber,"Disintegration of the Imperialist Colonial System in the Post­
war Period",International A ffa irs ,(Moscow),No.3,March I959,p.73.
58.Alexiev,Dp c it .p.7.
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socialist revolution in colonies would undergo two stages: 
the national-bourgeoisie would lead the revolution against 
imperialism and feudalism and at the same time win popular 
support to its side.The first national and bourgeois- 
democratic revolution would lead to the rise of powerful 
class organization of workers and peasants which would over­
throw the rule of the national-bourgeoisie and with the 
help of the Soviet Union, inaugurate a non-capitalist develop­
ment, leading eventually to the construction of a socialist 
59
order.
Accepting Lenin's theory of two-stage revolution
in the colonies, Khrushchev launched his programme of economic
and technical aid to the developing countries on the conviction
that the revolutionary energy accumulated there during their
long colonial rule should be mobilised in the first stage
60
of the national liberation movement. He believed that the 
Soviet Union should support developing countries so long 
as they endeavoured to achieve political and economic indepen­
dence from the West,no matter what internal policies their 
governments pursued.According to Khrushchev, the second phase 
of the socialist revolution would be realised after the 
industrial proletariat, growing with the progress of 
industrialization,had taken hold of the country's leadership 
in alliance with the peasantry and the national intelligentsia. 
Khrushchev reasoned that the developing countries would take 
non-capitalist policies to expedite the realization of socialism 
and these policies would enable them to proceed from the 
state of economic backwardness directly to socialism without 
going through an intermediate stage of capitalism.The steps
59.See letsuyi Vashuhira,"Soviet Economic Aid to Developing Countries",
Review:A Quart.ellv Journal for the Study of Communism and Communist 
(Countries,f\lo. 59,1nhruary 19/5,p. /
60. Ibid,p .9.
contemplated by Khrushchev by which a Third World state would 
adopt the non-capitalist way and hence bring it closer to 
the final stage of socialism, included:Nationalization of 
all foreign monopolies,businesses and operations;nationali­
zation and state control of external trade;nationalization 
of all banking,insurance and other companies,transportation 
systems and key industries;drastic land reforms and abolition 
of all feudal and semi-feudal systems; national economic
planning in the public sector; and redistribution of national 
income for the promotion of national p r o d u c t i v i t y ^
Armed with a series of doctrinal justifications, 
the Soviet leadership began in 1955 to expand contacts of 
all sorts with Third World states, although the focus of 
that policy was on the creation of economic links as a prelude 
to broader political contacts.The decade from 1955 to 1965 
witnessed a five-fold expansion of Soviet trade with the 
non-communist developing countries, from 304 million roubles
(5.2 percent of the total trade turnover) to 1,743.6 million
6 2
roubles (11.9 percent).
Even though there was a general change in attitude, 
the initial Soviet thrust was focussed on regions and countries
of specific strategic significance,especially in the Middle
East and South Asia.The Soviet Union also took advantage
of a number of developments such as the civil war in Zaire
and the rise of anti-Western leaders such as Sukarno in
Indonesia,Nkrumah in Ghana and Sekou Toure in Guinea.
61.Ibid,pp.10-11.
62.See Roger Kanet and M.R.Menon,"Soviet Policy Towards the Third World",in 




By the late 1950s,however,it became evident that 
in many ex-colonies,the bourgeois-democratic revolution was 
not developing into a socialist one as Soviet theoreticians 
had optimistically predicted and there was no reason to expect 
that the proletariat in these countries would soon come 
to power and establish a dictatorship.At the same time,the 
Kremlin could not insist on the inevitability of such a 
development because it wanted to retain friendly relations 
with Afro-Asian states which it had so painstakingly developed 
since 1955.The Soviet dilemma was well expressed by Guber 
when he noted:
The experience of the Eastern non-Socialist countries which 
have taken the road of independent development after the 
Second World War reveals two aspects of the national 
bourgeoisie:on the one hand,its ability to continue to 
fight against imperialism,for an independent foreign policy 
and the consolidation of national economic positions ; on 
the other,the limited nature of its methods of struggle for 
real economic independence,dictated by its class interests, 
and its fear of the Socialist forces in its own country. 63
Having ’rehabilitated' leaders such as Nehru, U Nu,
Nasser and Sukarno at the Twentieth Party Congress, Moscow
was now compelled to make the continued existence of these
national-bourgeois states and regimes somehow fit Marxist
theory.This led to the introduction of the'national
democracy' (n a t s i o n a l 'naia demokratiia) concept, which was
conceived as a transitional stage from a bourgeois democratic
state to a dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of
a People's Democracy.The concept was introduced at the
Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow
63.Guber,"Disintegration of the Imperialist Colonial System in the Post-War 
Period",p.73.
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in December 1960.The new type of state was defined as one 
which:
consistently defends its political and economic independence, 
that struggles against imperialism and its military blocs, 
against military bases on its territory;a state that struggles 
against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of 
imperialist capital;a state  that rejects dictatorial and despotic 
methods of adm inistrations state  in which the people enjoys 
the broadest democratic rights and liberties(freedom of 
speech,of the press, of assembly,of demonstration,of 
forming political parties and social organizations) in which 
they have the possibility to strive for land reforms and for 
the implementation of other demands for democratic and 
social transformation and participation in shaping public 
policy.64
As for the priority tasks,the new type of state was
supposed to strengthen national independence;carry out land
reforms in the interest of the peasantry;abolish the remnants
of feudal ism;extirpate the economic roots of imperialist
rule;limit and oust foreign monopolies from the economy;
develop national industry;raise the standard of living of
the people;democratise public 1 ife;undertake an independent
and peace-loving foreign policy;and develop economic and
cultural cooperation with the socialist states. To be
sure, the national democracy formula was not novel in the
sense that it represented a two-stage theory of revolution
in the Third World, as formulated by Lenin, put in another
way,the national democracy model was meant only to be an
intermediate stage leading eventually to social ism.This was
made clear by Khrushchev when he said:
With an anti-imperialist,anti-feudal democratic revolution achievedt 
there emerge most1 favourable conditions for a shift to
socialism.What is important to many countries now is to have an 
extensive mass of people participate in such revolutionary
64.Pravda,6 December 1960. 
65.Ibid.
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creative activities.In this process, the masses approach their 
new goal,a socialist reform.Thus, through the process of 
dissolving a common democracy,which has no socialist 
character itself, there emerge preconditions for a 
drift to socialism.66
Cuba, Ghana, Congo(Brazzaville),Burma, Algeria,
Egypt, Mali and Indonesia were the first eight states honoured 
by Soviet theoreticians as national democracies.
Initially, it was clear that Soviet theoreticians
were optimistic about the prospects for national democracy,
and felt that they had found a formula for a Marxist programme
for the Third World which would take into account local
nationalistic aspirations, as well as local communist and
Soviet national interests.This was clearly reflected in
Boris Ponomarev's (the head of the CPSU Central Committee's
International Department) statement in 1961:
The strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they find 
new methods and forms of struggle which lead in the most 
positive manner to the realization of their vital interests.
The idea of the national democratic state is not the fruit of 
armchair cogitations,but has been engendered by life itse lf.67
Political developments in the national-democratic 
states, however, belied this assertion.In states such as 
Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Egypt, Burma and Algeria, one party 
states under authoritarian leaders made their appearance, 
and the communists, far from being included in the government, 
were persecuted or simply pushed into the background.Never­
theless, this did not prevent the leaders of these states 
from carrying out far-reaching social and economic reforms.
66.Cited in Urano,Op c it,pp.?1-22.
67.B.Ponomarev,"□ gosudarstve nastionalinoi demokratii",Kommunist,No.8,l961, 
p.43.
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At the same time, these states opposed 'imperialism' and 
supported the general aspects of Soviet foreign policy, 
especially those concerning the Third World.In this situation 
the Soviet leadership was faced with a choice between condon­
ing the behaviour of these 'national democrats' as ideologica 
lly erroneous in the light of the national democratic state 
doctrine on the one hand and accepting their stand as a 
revised form of the same doctrine on the other.Over this 
issue, two conflicting opinions emerged among Soviet ideolo­
gists. In 1964, G.Mirski came out with the argument that non­
communist leaders could perform functions which in the 
traditional Marxist-Leninist model would be exercised only 
by the communist proletariat.He held that it was possible 
for 'revolutionary democrats' to 'start a transition towards 
a socialist revolution' and that the world socialist system 
could serve as the vanguard of the proletariat in the revolu­
tionary process while the proletariat was not yet mature
6 8
in influence or leadership. This view was opposed by other
functionaries responsible for the Party's foreign policy
and having to do with the local communist parties abroad.M.A.
Suslov, B .N .Ponomarev and A.M.Lumiyantsev, for example,
spoke for the communists in the Third World states who had
often been oppressed by the 'revolutionary democrats’
69
supported by Mirski and others. Until late 1963, Khrushchev 
remained neutral between the two groups but by early 1964
68.For a full description of the debate,see Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarod- 
nyye Otnoshenye,No.4,1964,pp.116-113 and No.6,pp.262-81.
69.Ibid.
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and until his removal from power,he generally veered towards 
70
M i r s k i’s view. Moreover,at a time when the Soviet Union
was vying with the West and the Chinese for influence in
the Afro-Asian world and was eager to win the friendship
of the reformist leaders of the Third World,Soviet theoreticians
were compelled to abandon the concept of national democracy.
In 1964, the concept of ’revolutionary democracy’ (revolutsionaia
demokratiia) was introduced, preceded by favourable Soviet
commentaries on Third World regimes which were carrying out
social and political reforms, even though they were at the
same time suppressing the local communists, as in Algeria,
71
Burma and Egypt. For instance, I.Belyayev argued that
"the experience of the UAR (Egypt) has shown the successes
which a young state can achieve when its leaders base their
policies on the objective necessity for developing their
72countries along socialist lines".
K.Brutents formally introduced the concept, defin­
ing ’revolutionary democrats’ as those politicians "who were 
under the influence of the tremendous achievements of the 
world socialist system:those who were carrying out programme* 
going beyond the bounds of capitalism and those whose policies
included many important programmatic demands of the Communist
73
Parties of the liberated countries". The concept represented 
another ideological switch, aimed at reconciling Marxist
70.For an analysis of the debate and Khrushchev s position, refer to New 
Thoughts on the New StatesM,Nizan Newsletter,Vol.6,No.6,l964,pp.1-7.
71.N.Prozhogin,"Vibor Alizira-socializm>>,Kommunist,No.1D,1964,p.106.
72.1.Belyayev,"Obelinennaya apabskaya respublika na navom etape",Ibid,No.9,
1964,p.96.
73.K.Brutents,"Sovremennii etap nasionalino-osvobodii-tel'nogo dvizeniia",
Ibid,No. 17,1964,p.30.
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ideology with the developments in many Third World states 
which the Kremlin considered as progressive, but which had 
hitherto not been sufficiently taken into account by the 
national democracy formula.In some ways, the new concept 
was 'petty bourgeois' rather than M a r x i s ^ a s  it was tantamount 
to saying that the 'revolutionary democrats' could do without 
the communists as long as they were carrying out reforms 
insisted on by the communists.This was clearly brought out 
in a Pravda editorial on 31 January 1965:
With the present distribution of forces in the world arena,transition 
to the non-capitalist road can be achieved under the leadership of 
the revolutionary democrats, and not only under that of the working 
class.The former have come to power in a number of young states in 
which, although the bourgeoisie has become bankrupt,capitalism has 
become discredited and the people are leaning towards socialism, a 
powerful working class has not yet emerged - a low level of 
productive forces - so that conditions for the realization of 
proletarian leadership are absent.74
Egypt, Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Congo(Brazzavi1le), Zanzibar, 
Guinea and Mali were the first eight states described as 
'revolutionary democracies'.The theory of revolutionary 
democracy suggested that the Soviets had a very optimistic 
view of developments in the Third World.The distinction 
between the non-capitalist and socialist approaches to 
economic and political development became much less clear 
than it had been in the national democratic state doctrine.
The theory also provided the Soviets with an ideological 
ground for continuing economic aid to progressive but non­
communist leaders of the Third World,who at the same time, 
suppressed the local communists in their countries.
With the advent of the Brezhnev-Kosygin administration
74.P ravda ,31 January  1965.
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in October 1964, the Kremlin admitted that it had been
unsuccessful in its approach towards the Third World and
75
in applying Soviet prescription to it. The rejection of 
the Soviet model by Ghana, Mali and Algeria prompted Moscow 
to reflect on the excessive optimism indulged in by the 
Khrushchev administration in assuming that a non-capitalist 
road would lead directly to the road of Social ism.The new 
administration realised that the prospect for the introduction 
of socialism in the majority of the new states was bleak 
and that the instability of many of the regimes meant that 
leaders favourably disposed towards the Kremlin could be 
easily deposed by ’r i g h t i s t s I n  the light of this awareness, 
the new administration developed a more prudent policy line.
This appeared in the form of an editorial entitled, "The 
Highest Internationalist Responsibility of a Socialist State", 
published on 27 October 1965 in Pravda.Its salient features 
included:
1. The Soviet Union could best discharge its internation­
alist responsibilities by ensuring successful development 
of its economy.
2.That each country and its people have the supreme
76
responsibility for its own affairs.
It was a clear signal that there were limits to what the
Soviet Union can and should doy as well as the realization
that too close ties between themselves and the Third World
would hinder rather than help the national liberation movements.
75.See K.Ivanov,"National Liberation Movements and Non-Capitalist Path of 
Development",International A ffa irs ,(Moscou/),No.5,May 1965,pp.55-66.
76.Pravda,27 October 1965.
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The tone of Brezhnev's policies toward the Third World/ beginning 
*n 1965,was clearly one of caution.The optimism that 
prevailed during the Khrushchev years concerning revolutionary 
prospects in the Third World had declined,and it was pointed 
out that the non-capitalist process of development would 
take a very long time.No new ideological concept concerning 
the Third World was introduced until June 1969.At the Inter­
national Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 
Moscow, the general ideological framework for transformation 
of Third World states into 'socialist-oriented s t a t e s’ was 
restructured to allow the view that a country on a n o n ­
capitalist road might take the form of a national democracy 
but was also capable of taking other forms of government.
By 'socialist-orientation', Soviet ideologists refer to those 
Third World states which were attempting to bypass the 
capitalist stage of development and build the foundation
for socialism with the support and assistance of the socialist
4- • 77 countries.
Ample space has been devoted to the description of 
of Soviet views on the Third World:this is necessary because 
Soviet-Indonesian relations were conducted within the broader 
context of Soviet-Third World relations.Against this backdrop, 
this thesis will examine Soviet-Indonesian relations and 
analyse Jakarta's place within the broader framework of 
Moscow's world view of the Third World.
77.For details on the Soviet concept of 'socialist orientation',see V.Y.Chirkin 
and Y.A.Yudin,A Socialist-Oriented State:Instrument of Revolutionary Change, 
(Moscow:Progress Pub.,1978),pp.19-42;R.Ulyanovsky,Present-Day Problems in 
Asia and A fr ica ,(Mosco\A/:Progress Pub.,1980),pp.85-86;Sylvia UJoodby, 'The 




The thesis's point of departure is a historical 
presentation of developments from 1917 to 1945,with a view 
•Vo examining Soviet relations with the Dutch colony.Following 
this, relations during the Stalin period from 1945 to 1953 
are examined.The next two chapters will examine relations 
from March 1953 to late 1964, basically charting relations 
during the Khrushchev's period.The fifth chapter analyses 
developments during the Brezhnev-Kosygin period.The conclusion 
brings the discussion to a close with highlights of the main 
points of the study, analyses, Soviet gains and losses, 
and the uniqueness of the Soviet experience in Indonesia 
from 1945 to 1968.
CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND:SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND 
THE DUTCH EAST INDIES,1917-1945
This chapter outlines the course of Soviet foreign
policy from 1917 to 1945.It highlights the development
of Soviet relations with neighbouring states as well as
Moscow's policies toward the colonial world.It is within
this context that Soviet relations with the Dutch East
Indies will be e v a luated.The object of the chapter is to
illuminate relations between Moscow,especially through
its Comintern a r m / and the PKI,in an effort to
comprehend the Soviet view of Indonesia"^ before 1945.
Since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet foreign
policy has been determined by a combination of national,
2
geographical, historical and ideological elements. Some 
Western scholars have stressed the elements of continuity, 
arguing that geography and historical experiences have 
influenced the country's basic interests regardless of 
regime.Stressing such consistent goals as the desire for 
security, urge to the sea, manifest destiny in Asia and 
leadership of the Slav people, they contend that Soviet
3
foreign policy has been pragmatically power-oriented.
I.The word 'Indonesia' and the 'Dutch East Indies' will be used interchangeably 
in this study, even though technically the latter referred to the period 
of Dutch colonial control over the territory.However, even this is not 
entirely correct as the word 'Indonesia' began to replace the colonial 
'Indies' in political discussions in 1921 .This was in the context of the growing 
nationalist movements in the country,where in intellectual circles,people 
began to speak about an 'Indonesian state ' and 'indonesianNalay' - the 
future 'Bahasa Indonesia' - began to be spoken instead of Dutch by Indonesian 
delegates to the Volksraad.See Ruth McVey.The Rise of Indonesian Communism, 
(Ithaca,New YorkrCornell University Press,1965),p.112.
2.See Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov,"Factors Determining Soviet Foreign Policy" 
in Problems of Soviet Foreign Policy,(Munich:A symposium of the Institute  
for the Study of the USSR,24-25 July l959),pp.1-23;Charles Gatti,"History,
Social Science and the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy",in Erik P.Hoffmann 
and Fredrick J.Fleron,Jr.,The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy,(New York: 
Aldine Pub.Co.,1980),pp.11-17.
3.Samuel L.Sharp."National Interest:Key to Soviet Politics",in Ibid,pp.108- 
116;Adam Ulam,"Russian Nationalism",in Seweryn Bialer,(Edn.),The Domestic 
Context of Soviet Foreign Policy,(Boulder,Colorado:Westview Press, 1981),pp.3-
T8.
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Others,especial 1 y ex-communists, emphasised the paramountcy 
of Marxism-Leninism.They stressed that Russian leaders 
have sought to create a world communist system dominated 
and directed by the Soviet Union and view relations with 
the non-communist world as a protracted struggle lasting
4
until one side triumphs. Straddling in between the two 
dichotomous positions, middle-path scholars view Soviet 
foreign policy as combining traditional and ideological 
features:first revolutionary beliefs and ideology were 
uppermost;then pragmatic nationalism took leading place 
as Soviet leaders reverted to more conservative policies 
based on history, geography and power.This dualism - the 
promotion of revolution abroad and the quest for national 
security - has, according to this group, remained a salient 
characteristic of Soviet foreign policy?
Regardless of the various determinants, Soviet 
relations with the various communist parties and policies 
toward the colonial world were a function of its foreign 
policy.Between 1917 and 1945,Soviet foreign relations went 
through six distinct phases.
Revolutionary Era,1917-1920
During this phase, the new fledgling communist 
state was in constant crises.The Bolsheviks came to power 
while the First World War was still in progress.Burdened 
with Tsarist legacy of a despirited,disorganised army,a 
population weary of war and internal order on the brink
of collapse, Lenin's first task was to get out of the
U.Adam Ulam,"Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy”,in Ibid,pp.136-153. 
5.See C.Grant Pedill.Jr.," 'Bipartisan' in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making”,Ibid, 
PP.61-75;Alexander L.George,"The 'Operational Code':A Neglected Approach 
to the Study of Political Leaders and Decison Making",Ibid,pp. 165-190;Also
see W.W.KuIski, T ho Soviet Union in World Affairs:A Documented Analysis, 
1964-19/?,(Now VorkrSyracuse University Press.19/3).pp. 1B-?7.
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’imperialist world w a r’. On 15 December 1917, the Bolsheviks 
sued for peace with Germany at Brest-Litvosk.By this,they 
lost one-third of *tUn> population, industry and mineral 
resources but gained badly needed peredishka (breathing space).
The treaty was later anulled at the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919.Lenin also declared his ’Decree of P e a c e’ which 
called for the end of secret diplomacy.The Bolsheviks also 
published secret treaties which the former Tsarist Govern­
ment had entered into with Western governments.The aim 
of this was to ignite a revolution in Europe and to induce 
the allies to join the peace negotiations so that the
7
Bolsheviks need not face the Central Powers alone. The 
Bolsheviks faced a grave crisis in the summer of 1918 when 
the Allies militarily intervened in the Russian civil war.® 
Lenin and his cohorts saw the Allied aim as being to over­
throw Bolshevism, to set up spheres of influence and to
9
exploit resources of the country. But for the Allies,the 
stated aims were to restore an eastern front, to win the 
war and to keep their supplies out of German hands } The
Allied hostilities, however, fed the extreme policies of
6.See History of the USSR:hrom the Uctober Socialist Revolution to the 
Beginning of the Great Patriotic War,Part 2,second printing,(Moscow:
Progress Pub.,1981).pp.56-65.
7.David MacKenzie and Michael UJ.Curran,A History of Russia and the Soviet 
Union,(Homewood,Illinois:The Dorsey Press,1977),p.548.
8.See E.H.Carr,The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923,Vol.3,(London:Penguin Books, 
1977),pp.65-153.
9.See MacKenzie and Curran,Op Cit,pp.475-477.
10.See Lynn hontross.UJar Through the Ages,Third Edition,(New York:.
Harper and Row Pub.,1960),pp.683-790.
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the Bolsheviks.One major aim of Moscow during this phase 
was to foment revolutions abroad because the new leadership 
believed that otherwise 'world capitalism' would crush 
It.The massive destruction and war-wearinessy and the growth 
of revolutionary activities in Europe, especially in Germany 
and Hungary,made it appear that the continent was ripe 
for revolution.At the same time,the Allies ignored and 
refused to recognise the Soviet Government and preoccupied 
themselves with the settlement of the German question.
This further fed Bolshevik hostility towards the peace 
settlement and the League of Nations,which they saw as 
a capitalist coalition directed against the Bolshevik state.
It was in these circumstances that the Third International 
or Comintern was established in March 1919 with the purpose 
of acting as a nucleus for world communist movement,especially 
in Europe, even though it was too weak to organise revolutions. 
Lenin's strategy for the colonial world was based
on his evaluation of the role of imperialism in the maintenance
12
of the capitalist system. Because of the revolutionary 
sentiments in Europe and the nationalist activities in 
the Middle East and Asia, the new Soviet leadership made
appeals to the colonial world to overthrow the imperialist 
rulers.^ Nevertheless, the colonial question played an insigni­
ficant role at the founding of the Comintern even though
Lenin had previously emphasised the importance of the national
11.Op cit,pp. 170-271 ;Dilip Bose,World Communist Movement:Third
Communist International, 1919-1943.(New Delhi:Communist Party Publications,
1975),pp.1-7.
12.See Lenin,The National Liberation Movement in the bast,fifth printing, 
(Moscow.Progress Pub..1976).p p .83-84;H.Kapur,Soviet Russia and Asia,1917- 
1927.(Geneva:Michael Joseph Ltd,l966),pp.21-30.
13.For example, the first Bolshevik declaration on the colonial question 
was an Islamic appeal:"!o all Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East", made 
on 24 November 1917.See I.V.Stalin,Sochineniia,Vol.4.pp.90-92.
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liberation movements in the colonies for the proletarian
movements in Europe.For example, at the First Comintern
Congress/ resolutions,only the following reference had
relevance to As i a :’Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia!
The hour of proletariat dictatorship striking in Europe
will signal your liberation as wel l”.14 This was principally
due to Moscow's preoccupation with its own survival and
the paramountcy of European affairs for its national interest.
By the time the Bolshevik Revolution broke out
in Russia, the Dutch East Indies had an active Marxist
movement,and the nationalist struggle was well beyond its
15
embryonic stage. Before the First World War broke out, 
a number of political parties emerged in the Dutch colony.
Budi utomo (Noble Endeavour) was founded in 1908.According 
to a Soviet scholar, it was founded by "impoverished 
feudalistic and bureaucratic families" under "the influence
of the 1905 Russian R e v o l u t i o n " ^  In 1912, the Indies Party 
was established by Europeans living in the colony.More
significant was the establishment of Sarekat Islam in 1912.
It began as the Islamic Merchants' League in 1911 in Surakarta,
to protect Javanese batik merchants from competition by
Chinese traders.Following an outbreak of anti-Chinese riots
in Surakarta in 1911, the party was banned^but reemerged
in Surabaya under the leadership of Umar Said Tjokroaminoto.
The Sarekat Islam expanded rapidly, becoming in E.Gurevich's
U.J.Degras,(edn.),The Communist International,1919-1922,Vol.1 ,(London:C3xford 
University Press,1965),p.235;First Congress of the Communist International, 
Minutes,(Moscow:n. p.,1933),p.207.
15.For a good background,see George Kahin,Nationalism and Revolution in 
Indonesia,(Ithaca,New York:Cornell University Press,1952),pp.37-101;Jeanne
S.Mintz,Mohammed,Marx and Marhaen:The Roots of Indonesian Socialism, 
(London:Pall Mall Press, 1965),pp.i-46.McVey,Op_cit,PP-xi7^
16.Y.I.Zakaznikova,"The Early Spread of Leninism in Some Countries of 
Southeast Asia”,in B.G.Gafurov and G.F.Kim,(eds.),Lenin and National
Liberation in the East.(Moscow:Progress Pub. J978).p.3R4.
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words, the "first mass political body in Indonesia even
17though it was led by the national petty bourgeoisie".
At the time when the Party was expanding its activities
and gaining widespread support, Lenin described the "spread
of revolutionary democratic movement" in the Dutch colony
in the following terms:
First,the democratic movement is developing among the masses of 
Java,where a nationalist movement has arisen under the banner of 
Islam.Secondly,capitalism has created a local intelligentsia 
consisting of acclimatised Europeans who demand independence 
for the Dutch East Indies.Thirdly,the fairly large Chinese 
population of Java and the other islands have brought the 
revolutionary movement from their native land...
A national union of the native population has been formed in 
Java.It already has a membership of 80,000 and is holding mass 
meetings.There is no stopping the growth of the democratic 
movement. 18
More significant in terms of future Soviet-Indonesian 
relations was the formation of the Indische Sociaal-Democrat- 
ische Vereeniging (ISDV) or the Indies Social Democratic 
Association, in 1914.On 9 May 1914, a group of Dutch Social
19Democrats living in the Indies set up the ISDV in Surabaya.
This was the first Marxist organization in Southeast Asia,
20
and socialism took roots in the Indies only after this.
The ISDV was not a unified group.The right-wing faction 
wanted to turn the organization into a political debating 
society while the left-wing was more interested in spreading 
revolutionary propaganda among the Indies natives.Being 
a weak party, the ISDV sought strength through alliance 
with other parties.The ISDV utlised the strategy of ’bloc
17.E.Gurevich,"Indonesia", in E.Shchepilova,(edn.),Southeast Asia:History 
and the Present Day,(Moscow:USSR Academy of Sciences,1982),p.30.
18.Pravda,7 May l913:Reprinted in V.I.Lenin,The Awakening of Asia,(Moscow: 
Progress Pub.,1980),p.15.
19.A.A.Guber,"lndoneziia",Borshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia,(Hereafter as 
B.S.E.),Third Edition,(Moscow:Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia Pub. Flouse),Vol.
1 0 ,p . 240 .
20.Mintz,C)p cit,p.24.
within' whereby members of a Marxist organization joined
a mass movement and worked to seize control of it from
21
within. The ISDV's strategy was greatly influenced by 
the practice of multiple party membership in the Indies.22 
The ISDV's first alliance was with Insulinde, a party 
founded in 1907.This party absorbed the membership and 
characteristics of the Indies Party when the latter was 
dissolved in 1913.However, the alliance proved a mistake 
for the ISDV, as Insulinde was a European-centred party 
and its flirtations with Socialism were opportunistic, 
aimed at replacing the Dutch colonial rule with its own.The 
alliance ended on 30 August 1917.The ISDV looked for its 
next target at Sarekat Islam,which by then was the largest 
mass party with over a million and a half m embers.Sarekat
Islam's religious character and its wide-based structure,
23
however,imposed caution. Through its 'bloc within' strategy,
the ISDV succeeded in bringing into its organization
gifted and radical Sarekat Islam members.These were trained
along revolutionary lines and were to become the future
leaders of the PKI.Semaun and Darsono were two leaders
of Sarekat Islam who were inducted into the Marxist movement
in 1916. In that year Semaun was transferred from the Surabaya
branch of Sarekat Islam to Semarang,the home ground of
Sneevliet.One consequence of this was the rapid expansion
of the Semarang branch:from 1916 to 1917 it grew from
24
1700 members to about 20,000.





The ISDV and especially its allies from the Semarang branch
succeeded in influencing the direction of Sarekat Islam.At
its foundation,Sarekat Islam pledged its loyalty to the
Dutch, but the hardships caused by the First World War
and more important, the influence of the ISDV le<l it to
raise questions of self-determination and condemn foreign
25
capitalism. The growing radicalism of the Sarekat Islam 
was apparent in October 1917 and at its Second National 
Congress at which,for the first time,it demanded freedom 
of political organization, radically improved labour and 
agrarian legislation and free public education.
The March 1917 revolution in Russia,which ended
Romanov rule,gave further impetus to the leftward shift
27
in Indonesian political development. This was more the 
result of ISDV's activities,which became the primary vehicle 
for dissemination of Russian revolutionary ideas rather 
than any direct Russian involvement.The November Bolshevik 
Revolution was met with even greater enthusiasm and acted
as a further boost to ISDV attempts to spread Marxism in
28
the Indies. Indeed, attempts were made to follow the
'Bolshevik path':for example,in Surabaya,where the principal
Dutch naval base was located,moves were made to organise
29
'soviets' among soldiers and sailors. At the May 1918 
25. Ibid, p. ZU.
26.See Zakaznikova,"The Early Spread...",p.389. 
27.1bid,p.388;Guber,"lndoneziia",B.S.E.,p.240.
28.For example,on 25 November 1917,the ISDV daily,Flet Vrije UJoord(The Free 
UJord),wrote:"For us revolutionary socialists,these comrades[the Bolsheviksl 
with their great spirit of self sacrifice and matchless valour are a brilliant 
flame,a powerful radiant light,which gives us strength to weather the
hard times".Cited in Zakaznikova,Dp cit,p.390.
29.According to Zakaznikova,"the establishment of Soldiers and Sailors' 
Councils in Surabaya in November 1918 was one vivid expression of the 
direct influence exerted by the October Revolution on the Indonesian 
people's liberation struggle".See Zakaznikova.Dp cit,p.393.
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National Congress of the 1SDV, discussions were held on
how to encourage ’revolutionary defeatism’ in order to
persuade the colonial troops not to fight, as had been
done in Russia by the Bolsheviks.The colonial authorities,
alarmed by the movement,moved with speed:they ruthlessly
suppressed the ’soldiers and sailors’ councils and expelled
30
organisers. Also significant was the impact of the
Russian Revolution on Sarekat Islam,manifested at its
Fourth National Congress in 1919.During the debate on a
trade union central headquarters,the Congress declared:
If mankind is to attain general happiness and well being, it must 
destroy capitalist society by establishing a socialist social order 
in its stead.Recognising this outlook,the revolutionary socialist 
trade union centre is to work for a revolutionary overthrow of 
the old society.The working class should be prepared to tackle 
the task it will face in a socialist society.31
While it is undeniable that the Bolshevik Revolution 
played a great role in shaping the direction of the national 
liberation movement in the Indies, the developments were, 
however,not caused by any deliberate Soviet machinations.. 
While it is correct that Soviet Russia declared its goal 
of spreading world revolution, V\«.r weakness prevented her 
from translating this into policy goals in its foreign 
relations.Rather, the developments in the Indies were induced 
by domestic factors.In this regard, Soviet writers are 
emphatic in denying the ’fables of the colonizers and their 
agents who maintain that the rise in revolutionary anti­
imperialist movements in Indonesia was the result of the
32
exporting of revolution from Moscow”. On the contrary,
3Q.McVey,The Rise of Indonesian Communism,p.29 and p.366,fn.66.
31.Cited Zakaznikova,Dp cit,p.394.
32.0.1.Zabozlaeva,"Great October and the National Liberation Struggle of 




Zabozlaeva maintained that the rise in revolutionary activity 
was "due to the contradictions of the capitalist system 
in Indonesia that had reached a sharpness previously 
unknown as a result of which the country's backwardness
and its economic and political dependence began to be more
33noticeable to the population".
The increase of revolutionary activity in the
Indies, which was spearheaded by the ISDV, was accompanied
by a growing clash of factional interests in the ISDV,
culminating in the en masse withdrawal, in 1918, of the
right-wing group, which generally adhered to the platform
of the Second International:the group later founded the
Indies Social Democratic Workers' Party.Soviet writers
such as Zabozlaeva have maintained that the "main objective
of the new party was to paralyse the influence of the ISDV
in the national movement,especially in the ranks of the 
34
Sarekat Islam". The withdrawal of the moderates reduced 
the ISDV essentially to a group of communists.The influence
of the ISDV on Sarekat Islam also began to increase, as
35
was manifested in its growing radicalism. Zabozlaeva argued 
that it was the activity of the left-wing social democrats, 
that is, the ISDV,that helped to "transform in a relatively 
short space of time the position of the Sarekat Islam from 
one of cooperation with the Dutch authorities to that of







Following the formation of the Comintern, the 
Social Democrat label came to be identified with the now 
despised Second International, and consequently the ISDV
37
proposed a change in title. At the Seventh ISDV Congress,the 
organization’s name was changed to Perserikatan Komunis 
di India(Communist Party in the Indies,PKI).On 23 May 1920, 
the PKI became the first communist party in Asia.Even though 
Soviet writers have seen the birth of the PKI as an important 
force in the development of the colonial struggle and great 
importance has been attached to the party since it indicated 
that the working class began to operate as an active independent 
political force,on the whole the party was ignored by
Moscow and the Comintern.This can be explained by the following
reasons:after the Bolshevik Revolution,the new leaders
in Moscow generally ignored non-Tsarist Asia.Their lack
of information about the region,the Bolsheviks’ expectation
of an imminent revolution in Europe,the on-going civil
war and their attempt to gain control of Central Asia prevented
the new leaders from stating an interest in non-Bolshevik 
38
Asia. All this changed with the adoption of a more conciliatory 
foreign policy after 1920.
Accomodation Phase,1920-1927 
*
From 1920 to 1927,Soviet foreign policy entered 
the phase of accomodation.Following the Allied withdrawal 
from Russia and the defeat of the White Armies in the civil 
war, the basis for accommodation between the Soviet government 
and the West was laid.Lenin called for 'coexistence' between
37.See B.Lazitch and M.Drachkovtich,(eds.),Lenin and the Comintern,
Vol.1 ,(Stanford:Hoover Institute Press,1972),pp.50-88.
38.Kapur,Dp cit,p.38;Eudin and North,üp cit,p.5.
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the communist and capitalist systems. This was, in part, 
due to the realization that the capitalist system was far 
from doom,as had been expected:indeed, the Western economies 
were reviving rapidly from the wartime devastation.Added 
to this,the Western capitalist states’ desire for Russian 
markets struck a responsive chord to the Soviet appeal.
Internal Soviet determinants such as its weakened position 
caused by the Red A r m y’s defeat in Poland,the years of 
strife since 1917 and peasant uprisingsy as well as the 
collapse of revolutionary movements in Europe, marked the 
beginning of moderate Soviet/Comintern policy.In order 
to revive its near collapsed economy, Lenin implemented 
the New Economic Policy4^ in its foreign policy, the conciliatory 
policy was aimed at seeking diplomatic recognition,trade 
and credits from the West.The object behind all this was 
to strengthen the regime.The Bolsheviks felt that recognition 
would provide security against Western attacks.lt would 
also aid the Soviet efforts to divide capitalist countries 
and win trade concessions.Despite obstacles resulting from 
Comintern propaganda in the West and the colonies and 
problems over Russian debts, the West responded favourably 
because European industries lacked sufficient markets and 
their governments were never really committed to the over­
throw of the Bolshevik system.
This led to a recession in interest for world
revolutionary movement in Moscow.Instead,the Soviet Union
stressed the importance of attaining friendly diplomatic
39.See Andrei Gromyko and Boris Ponomarev,(eds.),Soviet Foreign Policy,1917-
1945,Vol. 1 .(Moscow.Progress Pub.,1981),pp. 154-253.
40.See Alec Nove.An Economic History of the USSR,(Gt.Britain:Penguin Books, 





relations.The focus of policy was Europe.This, however,
did not prevent the Soviet government from signing diplomatic
agreements with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in the hope
41
of weakening Franco-British influence in the Middle East.
At the same time,Soviet leaders moderated support for 
revolutionary activities throughout the colonial world 
as a corollary of their efforts to improve relations with 
independent Asian governments and governments of colonial 
powers.
The moderate Comintern policy after 1920 sought
collaboration with all types of nationalist governments
throughout Asia.It also marked a general decline in C o mintern’s
interest in colonial questions.Communist parties were told
42
to pursue the 'united front from a b o v e’ policy. On the 
whole,Asia remained secondary in Soviet policy.Even though 
Lenin recognised the revolutionary potential of colonial 
peoples in undermining Western imperial ism,the Soviet Union 
was too weak to exploit it.Its weakness on the one hand 
and its desire to win support from Western governments,on 
the other,caused it to ignore the colonial areas.The essentials 
of Soviet foreign policy during this phase can be summarised 
as follows:the primacy of the preservation of the Soviet 
state over revolutionary aspirations;the courtship of 
Germany;the normalization of relations with all capitalist 
countries and promotion of 'peaceful coexistence' as a 
norm for Soviet behaviour;the establishment of correct
41.Gromyko and Ponomarev,Dp c it ,pp.133-153,-Kapur,Op c it ,pp.87-246.
42.McVey,The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,pp.1-2.
relations and non-aggression pacts with the bordering Baltic 
and Eastern European states that had previously been wholly 
or partially subdivisions of the Tsarist empire;the quest 
for close ties with China to counter Japanese expansionism 
against the USSR and its client state,Mongolia; and finally, 
the use of Comintern and other non-governmental organizations 
to manipulate public opinion in support of Soviet policies 
and foment trouble in capitalist and colonial countries?^
After Lenin's death on 21 January 1924, a succession 
struggle followed between Stalin and Trotsky,with the 
former gaining the upper hand by 1925.The Stalin-Trotsky 
rivalry affected Soviet/Comintern policy towards the colonial 
world.This was clearly demonstrated in China ? 4 Stalin, 
convinced that China was entering her bourgeois-democratic 
revolution,favoured proletarian participation in a 'national 
b l o c’ including peasants and bourgeoisie and urged communists 
to enter the Kuomintang,the Chinese Nationalist Party.
Trotsky,however,advocated an armed communist uprising and 
a direct transition to social ism.Stalin's policy prevailed/ 
but during Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition,the 
communists were slaughtered in Shanghai.Soviet advisers 
were expelled,bringing to an end the communist-nationalist 
coalition.lt was only following disasters of this nature 
that Stalin began to deny the 'progressive' character of 
various nationalist movements. The main reason for the 
failure of the 'united front from a b o v e’ policy in the
43.See Alvin Z. Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy Since liJorld War II:Imperial 
and Global,(Cambridge,Mass.: Winthrop Pub.,1981),p.9.
44.Kapur,Op_cit,pp.79-81 ;V.I.Glumin,"Comintern Policy for China,1921-1927", 




colonial world was caused by the weakness of the local
communist parties, the dominance of nationalist forces
and the antipathy of the latter to the goals of the local
communists.The development of the Soviet/Comintern 'line'
and the problems they faced in the colonial world were
clearly demonstrated in their relations with the PKI.
In early December 1920,an Extraordinary Congress
of the PKI met to discuss the twenty-one points of the
Comintern and the question of joining it.On 24 December,
a resolution was passed favouring Comintern membership^
and this directly introduced the Soviet connection into
45
Indies colonial politics. The timing of the P K I’s decision
was also important in another sense:it was a time when
the Soviet leadership was beginning to ’look out'.This
was partly caused by the general decline in revolutionary
ardour in Europe,which in turn forced Moscow to pay more
attention to non-Bolshevised Asia and to divert the West
European's,especially the colonial powers' resources, away
from the socialist state following their,first,mi 1 itary
and la ter,diplomatic, efforts,to contain Bolshevism.
It was in these circumstances that the Second
Comintern Congress examined the ’National and Colonial
46
Question' in detail. A Commission on the subject was 
founded with Lenin as its Chairman and Sneevliet as Secretary. 
It was at this Congress that the famous Lenin-Roy debate 
took place over the strategy of national liberation struggle
45.Eudin and North,Op c it ,p.143;Kahin,Op c it,p.74.
46.A.B.Reznikov,"The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International
in the National and Colonial Question",in R.A.Ulyanovsky,(edn.),The Comintern 
and the East:The Struggle for the Leninist Strategy and Tactics in the 
National Liberation Movements,(Moscow:Progress Pub.,l979),pp.138-207;Also 
see "Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Question 
to the Second Congress of the Communist International",in Lenin,The 
National Liberation Movement in the East,pp.278-283.
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in the colonies. Lenin asserted that the communist parties
in all colonial countries must assist bourgeois democratic
liberation movements,while Roy opposed alliances with certain
bourgeois-democratic groups,having the Indian National
48
Congress in mind. As a consequence,the Comintern counselled
to support ’revolutionary liberation m o vements’ and not
49’bourgeois democratic liberation movements'.
At the Congress,Sneevliet endeavoured to secure 
approval of Sarekat Islam as a ’proletarian p a r t y’, contend­
ing that the ’Mohammedan religious tendency was only a
50
side i ssue’. Tan Malaka, a PKI leader, also appealed to 
the Congress to support and endorse Islam and Pan-Islamic 
movements ? 1 Sneevliet supported Lenin in his controversy 
with Roy and also supported the Comintern’s call for the 
communist parties to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie. 
However, both Tan M a l a k a’s and Sneevliet’s appeal for support 
for Islam and Pan-Islamic movements was rejected by the
47.Kapur,Dp c it,p.41 ;Eudin and North,Op c it .pp.41-42;Carr,Op c it ,p.252.
48.Kapur,Op c it,p.41 ;John Haitcox,"The Roy-Lenin Debate on Colonial Policy: 
a new interprétation”,The Journal of Asian Studies,Vol.23,No.1,November
1963,p.94.
49.Eudin and North,Dp c it ,pp.68-78;Carr,Op c it ,p.252;UJhile many scholars 
have argued that the change was tantamount to a 'modification' of Lenin's 
thesis on the national and colonial question,Soviet scholars have,however, 
denied this, arguing that it was Lenin's 'correction'that altered the 
wording and spirit of Roy's thesis to a considerable degree and Roy's 
stance was judged as 'left-opportunist'.See Reznikov.Dp c it ,pp.25-106.
50.See Carr,Dp c it ,p.256.
51 .NcVey,The Rise of Indonesian Communism,p. 162;Degras,Op cit,p.382.
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Congress, even though it had in the past viewed them with
favour? 2 a major consideration for its support in the past 
had been Bolshevik weakness in Central Asiay but with the 
strengthening of Soviet power there,Islam and Pan-Islamism 
had come to be perceived as centrifugal forces,In this 
regard,it is useful to note that recent Soviet writings 
on this matter have denied that the Comintern was in principle 
against Islam and Pan-Islamism.For instance,it has been 
argued that "the Comintern was by no means opposed to Muslim 
movements or the Mohammedans but to the policy of exploiting 
the dogmas of Islam and Islam bigotry,in order to replace 
foreign 'infidels’ oppression by ’co-religionist’ and to
conserve social backwardness and social oppression under
53
the mantle of one religion". This denial and defence of 
Comintern's past policies have been adopted largely to
criticise 'bourgeois writers' who have maintained that
the Comintern misunderstood the situation in Indonesia,knew
little about it,showed no interest in it and that the decisions
the Comintern took stemmed either from certain ’dogm a s’,
or from interests unrelated to the needs of the PKI.In
part,it is also a defence against charges by Western writers
that Marxist concepts are inapplicable to the analysis
of the situation in a colonial or dependent country and
that Marxist tactics and strategies are ill-suited for
the development of political parties in environment such
54
as was the Indonesian case.
52.Eudin and North,Op c it ,pp.43-44;On Islam,the Second Congress stated  
that "it is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and similar currents 
of opinions which attempts to combine the struggle for liberation from 
European and American nationalism with strnegthening of Turkish...imperialism 
and of the nobility,the large landowners and the clergy".The Second Congress 
of the Communist lnternational:Report of Proceedings of the Petrograd 
Session of 17 July and of Moscow Session of 19 July to 7 August 1920,p.U9U.
53.A Yu Drugov."Relations Between the Comintern and the Communist Party 
of Indonesia",in R.A.Ulyanov/sky,(Edn.)Jhe Comintern and the East:A 
Critique of the Critique.p.306.
5A.lbid.PP-383-305.
Tan Malaka's call for support of Islamic movements 
indicated that the PKI did not agree with the Comintern's 
resolution on Islam.The PKI also disagreed with the Comintern s
call for cooperation with the bourgeois nationalists and
55
the thesis on the 'National and Colonial Question'. In 
general,the Comintern’s 'line' in the colonies was in accordance 
with the general framework of Soviet foreign policy.The 
adoption of a more relaxed and pragmatic Comintern strategy 
of 'united front from above' was in consonance with Moscow s 
accomodative foreign relations with the West from 1920
A
to 1927.Because of the various crises, the preservation
of the Soviet regime and power base became paramount, even
if it was to be at the expense of foreign communists.lt
was in view of this realization,namely,that the Comintern
'line' was beneficial for Soviet interests but not necessarily
the interests of the Indies people/ that the PKI criticised
and even opposed the Comintern's directives and resolutions.
Baars,a leading member of the ISDV and later the P K I ,expressed
this sentiment clearly on the Comintern's resolution of
the 'National and Colonial Question’:
It is understandable and forgiveable that it is the Russians most 
of all who do this,since for them,the nationalism of the oppressed 
middle cless in India, Egypt and elsewhere,really is an enormous 
help in the struggle against England,the leader of the entente.56
The Comin t e r n’s position on Islam and cooperation
with 'bourgeois nationalism' created problems for the PKI
in the Indies.The Comintern's declaration on Islam intensified
PKI's differences with Sarekat Islam, as this gave fresh
ammunition to the opponents of the PKI in Sarekat Islam
55.See Mc\/ey,The Rise of Indonesian Communism,pp.59-62,67-68.
56.Cited in Ibid,p.67.
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to claim that the PKI was hostile to Islam and Pan-Islamism, 
at a time when such movements were gaining support in the
archipelago.Recent Soviet writings have,however, denied
that the Comintern's criticisms of Pan-Islamism created
any "appreciable difficulties for the communist movement,
contrary to the assertions of certain Western historians.
Secondly,the apprehensions of some Indonesian Communists
that the Comintern's stand on Pan-Islamism could push Muslim
masses away from the Communist Party turned out to be 
57groundless". Drugov based his case on the fact that the
Executive Committee of the Communist International(E C C I )
had urged the leadership of the PKI to cooperate with the
'national revolutionary mass organizations',including the
Sarekat Islam.Moreover,the fact that a number of Muslim
preachers and clergymen had taken part in the communist-
led uprisings in 1926/1927 is seen as an vindication of 
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this case. This,however,obscures the fact that the 1926/1927 
uprisings were more a nationalist revolt rather than a
merely communist one, even though the PKI organised it.
In view of the continuing differences between
the Sarekat Islam and the PKI,the Comintern's strategy
of 'united front from above' could not be realised.P K I 's
relations with the Comintern were further complicated by
internal developments in the Indies.In June 1920, Budi
Utomo revoked its previous practice of permitting members
to join one or more other political parties,and other parties
soon followed suit.The principal consequence was the tension
created between Sarekat Islam and PKI,especia1ly in view
59
57.Drugnv,Qp c it .p.387.
58.Jbid. pp. 386-308.
of the latter’s successes in winning over a sizeable
Sarekat Islam following.
In general,Soviet scholars have interpreted the
increasing tensions between Sarekat Islam and PKI as caused
by the growing ’rightist tendencies’ of Sarekat Islam's
leadership?^ Zakaznikova also maintained that the fear
of losing their importance in the movement provoked the
’right-wing elements of the bourgeois leadership of Sarekat
Islam to refuse to unite with the P K I’
The rivalry between Sarekat Islam and PKI split
the former and at the October 1921 Congress of the Sarekat
Islam, a showdown erupted between the moderates led by
Tjokroaminoto on the one hand and the PKI faction led by
Semaun and Tan Malaka,on the other.The moderates moved
a motion for party discipline and the PKI-oriented group
was defeated.The faction that supported the PKI stance
resigned on masse and set up the Sarekat Islam Association or the Re
61
Sarekat Islam. This was later reorganised as the P e o p l e’s 
League following the official expulsion of the communists 
during the February 1923 Congress of the Sarekat Islam.
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The Comintern watched anxiously as the PKI
and the Sarekat Islam parted ways.However, the Soviet U n i o n’s
weaknesses prevented the Comintern from doing anything more
than being a mere bystander.On the one hand,to intervene directly
would have complicated state-to-state relations with the
Netherlands and won the wrath of other colonial powers
that were already wary of Comintern activities.On the other
hand, to remain silent on the PKI-Sarekat Islam crisis
would have made mockery of the Comintern as a nucleus of
world revolution and encouraged the break-up of ’united
fronts’ in other parts of the world.In these circumstances,
the Comintern chose a middle path of counselling both parties
to continue their cooperation in their efforts to dislodge
’imperial i s m’.In early March 1923,the ECCI sent a letter
to Tjokroaminoto,emphasising the need for continued cooperation
with the P K I . ^  At the same time,the ECCI warned the PKI
not to turn its back on Sarekat Islam:
You are aware what great importance we [the Comintern] attach 
to the Sarekat Islam movement.There is no need to dwell upon it, 
for our Party wanted to cooperate with Sarekat Islam from the 
very beginning.The Third International is very much interested in 
this movement..The differences which two or three leaders of 
Sarekat Islarti create will be insignificant compared with that 
we stand to gain by winning over the masses of Sarekat Islam.63
In spite of this counsel, the PKI began increasingly to
64
stress its ’proletarian p u r i t y’. At a party meeting held 
from 11 to 15 December 1924 at Kutagede,near Jogjakarta, 
the PKI agreed to abandon the Sarekat Rakyat(the new name 
for Red Sarekat Islam),which constituted its primary
62.See Drugov,Op cit,p.387.
63.Cited in Ibid,pp.389-390.
64.The PKI claimed that its considerations were influenced by the Fifth 
Comintern Congress(in 1923) and the Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference, 
where a move towards greater proletarian purity was supposedly urged.
See Mintz.Op cit,pp.30-31;Kahin,Gp cit,p.77.
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peasantry base.This decision was taken in spite of the 
knowledge that the Comintern supported the existence of 
Sarekat R a k y a t ^  The decision to jettison its peasantry 
base was largely influenced by the PKI leadership's belief 
that it contained too many bourgeois nationalists who could 
not be counted upon to undertake revolutionary activities. 
There was also the general belief that the peasantry was 
not a revolutionary force compared to the industrial and 
urban proletariat.
The PKI's decision to abandon Sarekat Rakyat also 
went against the Comintern's strategy of 'revolution from 
above'.This has been further confirmed by recent Soviet 
works.Drugov,for instance,stated that "the advocacy of 
a united anti - imperialist front and of action to end 
sectarianism and seclusion is known to have been typical 
of the Comintern's entire work with the C P I .[However], 
the CPI leadership saw no point in working with the Sarekat 
Islam mass o r g a n i z a t i o n " . ^  On 6 April 1925, the Enlarged 
Plenum of the ECCI in ’Work of the Communist Party of Java'
resolved that ’the Sarekat Rakyat be developed into a mass
national revolutionary party,operating under the communist
6 7
leadership but not amalgamating with it". On 4 May, in 
its letter to the PKI leadership,the ECCI warned that 
"the experience of the International Communist movement 
has shown that there is not a single country in the world 
where the proletariat can count on success... unless it
65.Zakaznikova,"The Early Spread...".p .403-W ;D rugov,Up c it ,p.39Q.
66. Ibid,p.389.
67.1bid;'x',"lhe Revolutionary Movement, in the Fast",in Communist. In te rn a t ­
ional.(London). Nos. 18-19, pp. 113-115.
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obtain the active support of the majority of the peasantry". 
The letter also cautioned that "if you refuse to lead the 
struggle of the peasantry in Indonesia against the Dutch
imperialists,you will hold up the revolution for many
68
years". Largely as a result of this pressure from the
Comintern, the PKI leadership agreed upon a compromise:it
would not abandon the Sarekat Rakyat immediately but instead
allow it to wither a w a y . ^  The Comintern charged that the
PKI decision was a wrong one,which in turn forced the PKI
to protest to the ECCI for breach of international party
70
discipline. The P K I’s decision was rebuked in the latter’s 
reply:
The resolution of the last ECCI Plenum regarding the gradual 
separation of the Sarekat Rakyat from the Party and its 
transformation into an independent national revolutionary 
organization with close ties to the broad masses has not been 
carried out...if the Party does not take a correct line regarding 
the peasantry in time,the political movement of the peasants 
will pass over the party as has already been the case to some 
extent with the radical nationalist elements.Only the complete 
and unconditional execution of the resolution of the last ECCI 
Plenum can bring the Party out of its isolated position and 
unite it with all the active anti-imperialist forces of the 
Indonesian people.71
It was in view of the P K I’s refusal to heed the Comintern’s
advice on Sarekat Islam that on 8 May 1925,Stalin accused
the PKI of suffering from ’the infantile disorder of left-
wing comm u n i s m’.This consisted of:
...overrating the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation 
movement and underrating the importance of an alliance 
between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie 
against imperialism.The Communists in Java recently erroneously 
put forward the slogan of a 'Soviet Government' for their 
country,suffer.it seems from this deviation.lt is a deviation 
to the left,which threatens to deviate the Communist Party 
from the masses and to transform it into a sect.72
6 8. R e z n i k o v , Op_cit, p. 17 4; D r u g o v , Op_cit, p. 392.
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By the end of 1925 and at the Fourteenth Congress
73
of the CPSU,Stalin had won in his feud with Trotsky.
Stalin's position on the colonial question was also reflected
at the February 1926 ECCI Plenary Session which called
for a 'bloc w i t h i n’ strategy and the cooperation of communist
parties with non-communist and peasantry elements.The PKI's
decision to jettison the Sarekat Rakyat and to persist
in its proletarian drive opened it to charges of ’Trotskyism'.
Semaun objected to this,claiming that the P K I’s position
was not due to its defiance of the Comintern but rather
75
was compelled by local circumstances. This explanation
was, however,rejected by the ECCI which observed that the
party had committed errors,evaluating 'incorrectly the
correlation of class forces',which 'allowed certain sectarian
m i s t a k e s W r i t i n g  on the ECCI's rejection of the PKI's
decision to jettison the Sarekat Rakyat, a recent Soviet
work stated that:
It was typical of all the Comintern documents dealing with the 
CPI to combine a highly exacting attitude and an approach of 
principle with a friendly understanding of the entire complexity 
of the situation the budding CPI operated in.The Comintern's 
leaders realised that many of the predominantly le ftist 
difficulties and deviations in CPI activities had been engendered 
by the specific social climate of colonial Indonesia which 
obstructed the propagation of genuinely proletarian views 
and kept the Communists surrounded by all penetrating petty- 
bourgeois elements.77
This claim is, however, difficult to sustain in view of 
Stalin's condemnation of the PKI for its 'deviations' and 
the E C C I’s accusation of its 'Trostskyist' tendencies.
To Soviet analysts the principal event which highlighted
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the P K I’s ’sectarian mistake’ was its decision to launch 
revolts in 1926/1927.
The PKI leadership,especially Alimin and Musso/ 
were convinced that the Indies was ripe for revolution 
and that the Dutch could be overthrown.There was also the 
feeling that the Party had no choice but to revolt,which 
was largely contributed to by the successful Dutch reprisals
78
against its leadership. But, both Moscow and the Comintern
cautioned against the revolt.As early as 6 April 1925,
the ECCI advised the PKI that the situation in the Indies
was not propitious for the ’development of a straightforward
79
armed struggle to establish a worker-peasant government”.
M.N.Roy,who was in charge of colonial affairs in the ECCI
Presidium, similarly warned against ’adventures’ on 12 
80
June 1926. In this context,it was not surprising that
the Alimin-Musso mission to Moscow,to gain approval for
81
their revolt plans,proved futile. Their plea for support
was denied on grounds that not only was the revolutionary
situation in the Indies not yet ripe but also that the
PKI did not have a clear-cut political programme for an
uprising.Instead, the ECCI advised the PKI to adopt the
strategy of ’revolution from a b o v e’. In addition,’the
representatives of the Comintern drew the former’s[PKI
delegation] attention to the fact that in Indonesia a
democratic and not a socialist revolution was maturing".But
8 2
"the CPI leadership did not agree with the Comintern”.
78.Kahin,Op c it ,p.81.
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Within a week of its outbreak in Java,the revolt 
was crushed by the Dutch.Even though the ECCI had advised 
against the revolt,once the insurrection broke outfit gave 
its full support.A Manifesto of the ECCI on 20 November 
1926 read:"The Comintern welcomes the revolutionary struggle 
of the peoples of Indonesia and pledges its complete support" 
Bukharin,a politburo member and head of the Comintern from 
1926 to 1929,similarly declared,"We greet the proletarians 
and peasants of Indonesia,the broad working masses of this 
Dutch colony who are likewise engaged in a bloody struggle
84
against capital.Our full support to the Indonesian people".
Why did the Comintern support the 1926/1927 revolts 
Once it became a fait accompli, the Comintern may have 
decided that it would have done greater damage to itself 
if it did not support it.Drugov,for instance,was later 
to argue that the Comintern supported the revolt because 
its policy:
... was governed by the principles of proletarian internationalism  
and the mistakes of the CPI leadership did not exempt other 
communist parties from their moral obligation to come to the 
aid of any contingent of the International Communist movement 
that may find itself in trouble.85
Of greater significance was the failure of the
revolt and the manner the Soviet Union and the Comintern
analysed it.In its initial assessment, the Comintern observed
that the revolt failed because the PKI ignored the other
political parties,that it failed to make the necessary
concessions to nationalism and that it did not follow the
'bloc w i t h i n’ tactic with regard to Sarekat Rakyat.The
Q3.Degras,\/ol.2,Op c it .pJIZiUlyanovsku/'Bor'ba komintera za...".pp.10-11.
84.Cited in Mintz.Op c it ,p.40.
85.Drugov,Op c it ,p.394.
inadequacy of the PKI's organizational strength and power 
to carry the revolt off successfully,the launching of the 
revolt without taking account of the political and military 
realities of the time,the successful Dutch measures before 
the revolt and the Pa r t y’s failure to take full cognisance 
of the vigour of prevailing mores,especially of the role
O ^
of religion in Indonesia,ensured the revolt’s failure.
However,by November 1927,the ECCI argued that:
The whole course of the revolt betrayed the lack of earnest 
political and organizational preparation of this movement as 
a whole.It is extremely characteristic that the revolt was 
under the general slogan of the fight against Dutch 
imperialism, and without a concrete political and economic 
slogan which would have mobilised broad masses and would 
have made the revolt the last and deciding point of a 
general strike and a peasant insurrectionary movement.87
While the initial assessment blamed the failure on the
PKI's violation of the ’united front from a b o v e’ strategy,
the November 1927 E C C I’s assessment would tend to imply
that failure was assured due to the lack of adequate preparations.
While the initial assessment would tend to caution against
a revolt,the latter evaluation implied no such restraint.This
change in perspective was largely the result of the various
setbacks the Kremlin and the Comintern experienced in the
colonial world and China, which subsequently prepared
the ground for the reassertion of a more hardline,ideological
and inward looking foreign policy.
Ultra-revolutionary,neo-isolationism phase,1928-1933
This phase was the result of Stalin's predominance
86.McLane,Dp c it ,p.96.
87."The ECCI on the Tasks of the Communists in Indonesia",International 
Press Correspondence^  December 1927,p.1562.
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domestically and a return to autocracy at home as well
as Moscow's setbacks in foreign policy.Domestically,Stalin
eliminated his political rivals and stressed the danger
of imminent capitalist attack.At the same time,the onset
of the Great Depression was hailed as the imminent doom
of world capital ism.Despi te the alarmist tone of Stalin's
declarations,he was cautious and pacific, avoiding confrontation
with the capitalist powers.
There was, however, a clear shift in policy
as far as the colonial world was concerned.In 1928,Moscow
enunciated the policy of 'united front from below',which
88
was later sanctioned by the Sixth Comintern Congress.
The national bourgeois was accused of betraying their own
countries and having sough-v rapprochement with the imperialist
powers,which in turn led to a decline in the influence
of the national bourgeoisie over the masses,to the sharpening
of the revolutionary crisis,to the unleashing of the agrarian
revolution of the widest masses of the peasants and to
the creation of favourable conditions for the 'hegemony'
of the proletariat in the struggle for full national liberation.
On 1 September 1928, the Comintern Congress' theses on
the colonial question called for 'unity between socialist
world revolution and the proletariat of the colonies',but
89
ignored the national bourgeoisie. The ultra-revolutionary 
'line' called for the development of the communist party 
as the leading force of the revolution and the rejection of 
collaboration with the national bourgeoisie - This,however,ignored
88.See A.Lozovsky,"Results and Prospects of the United Front",Communist 
International, Vol. 5,IMo.6,1928,pp. 142-143.
89.See McLane.Op cit,pp.64-73.
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the fact that attempted communist revolutions in China 
and Indonesia had disastrously failed a year earlier.The 
Sixth Comintern Congress,showing its total subordination 
and subservience to Soviet domestic and foreign policy 
objectives, enunciated the following guiding principles 
for foreign communist parties:
1.The Soviet Union was the citadel of world revolution;
2. The preservation of the Soviet Union must be the 
primary concern of the international proletariat;and
3.All communist parties owed exclusive allegiance
90to Moscow.
Recent Soviet works have,however, been especially vocal
in rejecting Western scholars' charges that in all stages
of its work and the recommendations it offered to the communist
parties, including the PKI,were built,above all,on the national
interests of the Soviet Union,regardless of the local conditions
and requirements of the class struggle of the communists in
Indonesia and other countries.Some Western scholars have
also argued that after it became e v i d e n t ,following L e n i n’s
death,that there would be no proletarian revolution in
Europe in the foreseeable future and that the Kremlin could
not build socialism without the aid of a ’world revolution',
the Soviet leadership began provoking tension in the colonies
for the West to face so as to divert ’capitalist danger'
91
from her own borders. In defence,Drugov argued that:
the Comintern and the CPSU did not regard their interests as 
something isolated but saw them closely intertwined and 
combined.When the Comintern acknowledged the special position 
of Soviet Russia on the world scene as well as her role in the 
worldwide historical process.that was no concession to the 
national interests of the Russian Federation or the USSR,but 
an inference from an objective analysis of the prevailing 
situation without which the formulation of a precise and 
realistic policy would have been impossible.92
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Most scholars have seen the inward-looking,neo-isolationist 
phase of foreign policy as the result of internal Soviet 
politics and the problems confronting international
Q O
communism ? 0 This, however,had important consequences for
Soviet relations with other countries,especially those
in the colonial world.
In a way, the adoption of a hardline posture towards
Indonesia was already in the pipeline by late December
1926.Following the suppression of the revolts,one of the
PKI leaders,Semaun,entered into an agreement with Mohammad
Hatta,the leader of Perhimpunan Indonesia(PI), a student
organization in Holland which played an important role
in the Indonesian nationalist struggle,on 5 December 1926.
In essence,the Semaun-Hatta Convention recognised the Pi's
94
leadership over the PKI. Semaun was largely motivated by
the destruction of the PKI^while Hatta sensed that the
PKI had great influence over the masses. -.The convention
was seen as a convenient instrument to reduce this influence
and "bring them under the influence of our [PI] organiza- 
95
tion”. The E C C I ,however,repudiated the agreement,accusing
the PKI of 'l i q u i d a t i o n i s m w h i c h  encouraged it to 'surrender
96
some of the party's independence'. According to Drugov,
the Semaun-Hatta Convention:
in defiance of the guidelines of the second and subsequent 
congresses regarding united front tactics,left the leading 
role to a typically bourgeois-nationalist association,while 
the communist party,its allies and mass organizations 
pledged themselves to refrain from criticism of, and all 
opposition to, the leadership of the association.97
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Despite the suppression of the PKI during the 
1926/1927 revolts,in order to downplay its foreign policy 
setback ,Moscow (and the Comintern) sought to keep alive 
the fiction that the communist movement in Indonesia(and 
elsewhere)existed and was of significance.For instance, 
the Comintern press boasted in January 1930 that "the 
approaching revolt of the Indonesian masses under the leader­
ship of the PKI will prove that Indonesia is not only ripe
to take her fate into her own hands but is prepared to 
98
win". Other than optimistically representing the PKI,Moscow
and the Comintern excoriated the other nationalist parties
that came into existence after the 1926/1927 revolts,in
line with the adoption of a hardline 'united front from
below' strategy, which in general was critical of the
bourgeois-nationalists.Except for one incident, developments
in the Dutch colony were ignored.In February 1933,Dutch
and Indonesian seamen mutinied on the Dutch warship, De
Zeven Provincien.In the context of portraying the PKI in
positive terms,a Soviet writer described the mutiny "as
evidence that we are at the threshold of that revolutionary
upsurge...A rising of the PKI,with the genuinely Bolshevik
help of the Communist Party of Holland,is more than ever
99
the order of the day". Guber,similarly, saw wide-spread 
implications for the affair and called for a 'revolutionary 
solution of the crisis,the overthrow of Dutch imperialist 
domination and national freedom'f°° The optimism of these 
writers was,however,unfounded,as the mutiny was an isolated 
episode.In the first place, the PKI was not even involved
98.Gerald Vantes,"Terror,Famine and Pestilence in Indonesia",International 
Press Correspondence,9 January 1930,p.27.
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in planning and did not attempt in any way to make capital 
of it.If Soviet and Comintern spokesmen seized on the incident
as an indication of 'revolutionary upsurge' in Indonesia,
it was because they had no other events to focus their
attention on in the Dutch colony which was gripped with
nationalist struggle.Developments in Europe and East Asia^
however,effected a change in Soviet national security
considerations,and this called forth a new 'line' in its
foreign policy,which had implications for its policies
in the colonial areas.
Collective Security Era,1934-1937
The main beneficiaries of the Great Depression 
were not the Western colonial powers but the militarists 
in Germany and Japan.The Soviet Union was forced to abandon 
neo-isolationism and ultra-revolutionary policies because 
of the rising threat of Nazi Germany.A corollary of this 
was the abandonment of opposition to the Versailles system, 
in the hope of seeking reconciliation with the West.From 
1932 onwards,Moscow began to develop state-to-state relations 
with Finland,Estonia,Poland and France.The Soviet Union 
also attempted to set up an 'eastern Locarno' to protect 
its western borders but failed .1 ^ 1 By 1934, when the Nazi 
danger was seen as real,Moscow accelerated its shift towards 
the Western democracies.In September 1934,the Soviet Union 
joined the League of Nations and totally abandoned 
hostility towards the Paris Peace agreements.At the same 
time,Stalin sought security through mutual defence pacts;for 
example,in May 1935, a defence pact was concluded with
72
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France. The rising Nazi threat on the West and the concerted 
growth of danger from Japan in East Asia,forced Moscow
to seek security through better relations with Western
capitalist and colonial powers.Consequently,this led to
changes in Soviet policy towards Europe and the colonies.
Revolution was deemphasised in both Europe and the colonial
world.This led directly to the Seventh Comintern Congress,
adopting a new 'popular front' policy, urging "all progressive
forces to cooperate against Fascism,the most dangerous
103
form of capitalist imperialism". In its quest for Western 
governments' support against Germany,Moscow's interest 
in the colonial affairs waned,demonstrating once again 
that support for revolution gave way to the demands of 
Soviet domestic and foreign policies.In this respect,recent 
Soviet works have rejected Western wri t e r s’ interpretations 
of the Seventh Congress' decisions which boils down to
setting anti-fascism off,against the struggle with the 
'original' colonialists,for national 1 iberation.Rather,it 
is argued that the idea of popular front was to invite 
the attention of the communist parties to the fresh danger 
of Fascism and to work out a new tactic appropriate to 
the changed circumstances.The writer noted that "the struggle
for national liberation and for democracy was never stricken
104
off the agenda,but took on new forms". It,however, still 
does not explain why the opposition to the Western colonialists 
was downgraded and how the nationalist-colonialist cooperation 
against Fascism was supposed to assist the national 
liberation struggle.Regard 1 ess of Soviet claims,interest 
102.MacKenzie and Curran,Op cit,p..554.
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in the colonial world was only indicated when it would 
benefit Moscow's effort to gain support of the colonial 
powers or to check the danger of Nazi Germany and militarist 
Japan.
This was clearly shown in Soviet/Comintern policies
toward Indonesia during this phase.In 1935,Musso,one of
the leaders of the PKI's 1926/1927 revolts,returned to
105
Indonesia to set up the 'illegal P K I '. In the words of
a Soviet writer,the ECCI sent Musso "to organise work of
rebuilding the PKI as a national force capable of acting
106
as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle". This 
has been confirmed by many writers,and the 'i1legal-PKI's ' 
underground activities were relatively successful as seen 
in its penetration of a number of important political 
organizations such as Partindo(the Indonesian Party), 
Gerindo(the Indonesian Peoples' Movement) and Gapi(the 
Federation of Indonesian Political Parties).In May 1937,the 
leaders of Partindo and underground PKI members founded 
Gerindo,which Guber described as being established by 
"revolutionary representatives of the national bourgeoisie 
and the consistent fighters of the freedom of the Indonesian 
people - the Communists - [which in turn] gave expression
to the movement of the most decisive and patriotic 
.»107
forces". Zakaznikova also applauded the Gerindo for 
applying "in the most correct way the general line 
elaborated by the International Communist Movement to
105. Me Lane, Op_cit, p. 192.
1Q6.Drugov,0p cit,p.4Q8.
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Indonesian conditions". Soviet/Comintern's praise for 
Indonesian nationalists and communist activities was,however, 
shortlived.Following the intensification of tension in 
Europe and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in China,a 
new foreign policy line was adopted,which in turn called 
on the colonies to change their policies toward the colonial 
powers.
The Soviet-Nazi Pact,1938-1941
By mid-1930s,there was already growing Soviet 
disillusionment with the failure of the collective security 
system to check the expansion of the Nazis.In March 1936,
German troops marched into the Rhineland in violation of 
the Versailles and Locarno treaties.German refortification 
of the Rhineland shattered the collective security system 
as well as undermined the Franco-Soviet pact.The Western 
powers' apathy towards the Spanish Civil War which began 
in July 1936,reinforced Stalin's belief that he could not 
count on the West to check Hitler.Other ominous developments 
from 1936 to 1938 led to a reconsideration of Soviet priorities, 
leading finally to the Soviet-Nazi pact in 1939.The formation 
of the Axis Pact(between Germany and Italy)in October 1936/ 
and the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern pact with Japan 
in November,further aggravated antagonisms between Fascism 
and Communism.The Nazi gains in 1938 finally destroyed 
the remnants of the collective security system and totally 
alienated the Soviet Union from appeasement-minded West.




protest,confirming Stalin's belief that he could not rely 
on the West to save central and eastern Europe.His last 
straw was the Western capitulation to Hitler in Munich, 
in October 1938,on the question of Czechoslovakia.At the 
same time,the growing Soviet tension with Japan encouraged 
Moscow to seek peace with Hitler which culminated on 27 
August 1939 in the Nazi-Soviet pact.
The pact called for a revision of Soviet strategies 
in the colonial areas:the ’united front against Fascism'
was modified since the 'German fascists' were now allied 
. .. M 110
with Moscow. jn Indonesia,this led to M o s c o w’s call for 
the intensification of the ’national liberation struggle' 
against the 'Dutch colonisers and imperialists'.In real 
terms,however,there was no immediate change in Soviet 
policy towards Indonesia because of the outbreak of war 
in Europe and the German occupation of Holland.In this 
regard,the change in declaratory policy was significant 
only to the extent that the Soviet Union announced a modifica­
tion of its 'united front from above’ policy.This was later 
changed as a result of the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union and the latter’s joining the Allies to combat the 
Axis powers.
The Second World War,1941-1945
While Hitler was busy absorbing,through the 
Nazi blitzkrieg,Poland,Norway,the Netherlands,Denmark,
Belgium and France,Stalin wasted little time in claiming 
his booty:the Red Army occupied Eastern Poland,pressured
109.Gromyko and Ponomarev,Op cit,pp.374-379.
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the Baltic states into permitting Soviet troops to be
stationed on their territory,a prelude to their formal
incorporation into the Soviet Union in August 1940^ and
tried to intimidate Finland into surrendering territory
that would have strengthen^the defensive position of
/
Leningrad.Upon the Finns refusal,Moscow abrogated its 
treaty of non-aggression on 28 November 1939 and attacked 
the next day.The Finns only capitulated on 12 March 1940.Thus, 
between September 1939 and June 1941,Stalin took advantage 
of Hitler’s expansion,to expand at the expense of immediate 
neighbours.The Soviet-German 'honeymoon' ended abruptly 
following the German attack on the Soviet Union.This led 
to the formation of a Grand Alliance against Hitler.Upon 
this,the primary concern of Soviet domestic and foreign 
policies was the preservation of the Soviet state.All other 
goals were subordinate to this objective.In this context,the 
Soviet support for liberation movements in the colonial 
areas was almost non-existent unless such movements were 
connected with the successful conclusion of the war.The 
Soviet concern for world revolution and liberation struggle 
in the East was postponed.Even the Comintern was dissolved 
in 1943.
In Indonesia,the weakness of the PKI and the 
dominance of the bourgeois-nationa1ists such as Sukarno 
and Hatta made the Soviets ignore developments there.The 
Japanese occupation of the Indonesian archipelago was 
ignored throughout the period of the Second World War. 
Commentaries on Indonesia began to emerge only after the 
Japanese surrender.Guber,for instance, analysed the Japanese
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occupation of Indonesia from March 1942 to August 1945 
as follows:
The Japanese imperialists found conditions favourable for 
hood-winking the enslaved peoples of the countries they 
occupied [in Southeast Asia].This was to no little extent 
due to the colonial regime, that existed in Southeast Asia 
up to the war.The Japanese aggressors were able, 
particularly in the early period of their invasion,to 
create certain illusions among the colonial peoples 
by granting them the semblance of 'broad autonomy' 
by setting up local governments and so forth.This 
applies particularly to Indonesia...where under Dutch 
rule,the population was denied elementary rights.
But the plunder and violence practised by the 
Japanese aggressors revealed the utter falsity of 
these demagogic promises.lt roused the hatred of 
the peoples of Southeast Asia against the Japanese 
and prompted them to resistance.Not withstanding the 
reign of terror and oppression,the partisan struggle  
and the resistance movement grew and expanded in all 
the countries seized by the Japanese.111
Guber has stressed the negative aspects of the Japanese
occupation while the benefits that accrued to the nationalist
movement through Japanese creation of various mass movements,
the employment of locals in the administrative services^
and the training and establishment of a native army are 
112overlooked. At the same time,Guber emphasised the 
antagonistic aspects of Japanese-nationalists relations 
while ignoring the continous cooperation on various matters.
An Overview
The Soviet Union adopted two different types of 
policy towards Asia after the Bolshevik Revolution.The 
first can be described as diplomatic and this was applicable 
to countries which had attained political independence,
111.Guber,"UJhat's Happening in Indochina and Indochina?",New Times,No.11,
1 Nov.1945,p. 10.
112.See Joyce C.Lebra,Japanese Trained Armies in Southeast Asia,(Hong
Kong:Heinemann Educational Books, 1977);B.R.D'G. Anderson,Java in a Time 
of Revolutiun:Occupation and Resistance,1944-1946,(Ithaca,New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1972);H.J.Benda,The Crescent and the Rising 
Sun:lndonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation,(The Hague:Van
Hoe ve, 1958).
such as Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, China and Japan.The 
second type of policy can be designated as revolutionary 
diplomacy and this was applicable to the European colonies, 
such as the Dutch East Indies.The Soviet Union conducted 
its revolutionary diplomacy through the Comintern.
Between 1917 and 1945, the Soviet Union made a 
number of tactical changes in its revolutionary diplomacy.
It generally stressed ’revolution from below' from 1917-
1920,1928-1933,1938-1941 and 1941-1945. ’Revolution from
above' was emphasised during the periods from 1920-1927
and 1934-1937.Despite these tactical zigzags, M o s c o w’s
basic objective was to extend support to the various nationalist/
revolutionary forces,^ help them morally,not materially,to
become independent of European control.In this regard,
Moscow was freed from all the confines and limitations 
of classical diplomacy,since there were no independent 
states in these areas (the European colonies) with which 
diplomatic relations could be developed, no national govern­
ment to whom the Soviet leadership could turn in order 
to establish close political and economic relations.lt 
was also apparent that the primary concern of the Soviet 
leadership,from 1917-1945,was to consolidate its hold on 
power and establish a viable,functioning Soviet state.At 
the same time,lacking in economic and military capabilities, 
Moscow was constrained from playing a direct role in Third 
World affairs.
As far as Soviet-Indonesian relations were 
concerned, which during the period from 1917-1945 were 
mainly Soviet/Comintern relations with the PKI,from the 
very start,were plagued with problems.This can be largely
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explained by the clash between the needs of Soviet national 
interest and Marxist ideology as represented by the Comintern 
on one side and the realities of Indonesian life in which 
the PKI operated.The position of the Comintern on Islam,
Pan-Islamism,cooperation with the national bourgeoise and 
the peasantry and the strategy of ’united front from above', 
after the Second Comintern Congress in 1920,placed the 
PKI in an untenable situation.Operating in a predominantly 
Islamic environment, the PKI was counselled to commit political 
suicide by condemning Islam and Pan-Islamism.Though this 
suited Soviet national interests,for the encouragement 
of Islamic sentiments was not only anti-Marxist but could 
also weaken Bolshevik control over the Central Asian 
territories,it was an unsuitable prescription for the PKI 
which was then attempting to win over the Sarekat Islam's 
leadership and followers.This naturally caused tension 
between the Sarekat Islam and the PKI on the one hand and 
between the Comintern and the PKI on the other.The consequence 
was that the PKI was conveniently accused of ’leftist 
deviations’.The lack of communication between the PKI and 
the Comintern caused by geographical isolation of the Dutch 
East Indies from Moscow also created misunderstandings, 
as the main sources of information for the Comintern about 
the colony were the Dutch Communist Party and PKI exiles.
More often than not,the Comintern was not aware of the 
predicament of the Indonesian communists,especially the 
pressures and constraints they operated under.The P K I’s 
differences with Sarekat Islam and the ever-present threat
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of prosecution by the colonial authorities also limited 
the scope of activities of the Indonesian communists.lt 
was one thing for the ECCI to make declarations and issue 
instructions to the PKI but completely another matter for 
the PKI to implement them.This dichotomy explained the 
tense relations between the PKI and the Comintern from 
1920 to early 1927, when the PKI was decimated by Dutch 
repression.
Following the Second World War, changes in both 
Indonesia and the Soviet Union created a new set of 
circumstances,both domestic and international, and this 
had tremendous implications for relations between the two 
countries, which the next four chapters will illuminate.
SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER STALIN,1945-1953
CHAPTER TWO
This chapter examines the development of Soviet- 
Indonesian relations from August 1945 to March 1953.Unlike 
the pre-war period, it is now possible to speak of Soviet- 
Indonesian relations at a governmental level as the Indonesian 
nationalists declared themselves independent and sovereign 
in August 1945.Equally important was the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as one of the two leading powers in the world.
The victory in the Second World War and the occupation 
of vast areas in Europe and East Asia extended the physical 
frontiers of the Soviet heartland.Being the strongest land 
power in Europe,Soviet leaders demanded a safe and secure 
protective belt of countries with unquestioned loyalty 
to themselves in order to protect their vulnerable western 
borders.In this context, one of the earliest tasks of post­
war Stalin's foreign policy was to secure political control 
of areas under Soviet military occupation ,especially 
those contiguous to the Soviet state such as Poland,Rumania,Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia . *
At the same time,the Asian continent was seething
with nationalist activities/and the Soviet Union as a
revolutionary, anti-colonial power,was expected to respond
to developments there.Its great power status which was
convincingly established in the Second World War and its
role,along with the other Allied powers,in the establishment
of post-war peace gave Moscow a voice in international
affairs,including those affecting the colonies,something
which she did not have before 1945.In the pre-war period,
1.Zbigniew K.Br zezinski.The Soviet Bloc:Unity and Conflict,(Cambridge,Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1967),pp.3-21 ;Alvin Z.Rubinstein.Soviet Foreign 
Policy Since World War II:lmperial and Global,(Cambridge,Mass.:Winthrop Pub.
1981),pp.39-60 . 32
isolationism and remoteness characterised Soviet relations 
with colonial peoples,especially those under direct colonial 
administration,presenting ¡V with little opportuni 
to further its interests directly.Instead, H  had to rely 
on the communist parties in the metropolitan countries,on 
the local communists and sporadic contacts with its leaders, 
to maintain relations and exert its influence.However,in 
the post-war years, a new situation emerged as the prospect 
of decolonization,coupled with the growing international 
role and status of the USSR,raised the possibilities of 
direct diplomatic relations with new governments in the 
former colonial areas.
Against this backdrop,Soviet foreign relations 
with Indonesia will be examined in three parts:from August 
1945 to March 1947,from March 1947 to April 1952 and from 
April 1952 to March 1953, which also reflected the general 
oscillations in Stalin's foreign policy after the war until 
his death.
Phase 1: August 1945 - March 1947
Soviet policies toward the colonial world followed 
the general contours of its world-wide political conflicts 
with the United States and its allies.In the immediate 
post-war years,there continued lingering hopes for Big 
Power cooperation.However,the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and the fear of American power potential influenced the 
Soviet leaders to exploit their wartime gains to expand 
their territory,to increase the number of dependent territories 
and to raise the influence and power of communist parties.The 
first order of things was to secure a belt of buffer states
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on the periphery of the Soviet Union and adopt a policy 
of collaboration with nationalist forces for countries 
outside the reach of the Red Army.From August 1945 onwards,
the Soviet Union installed communist governments subservient
2
to Moscow in Eastern Europe. In other areas contiguous 
to the Soviet Union,attempts were made to establish buffers
3
under the control of local communists. The attempts to
detach Azerbaijan from Iran between 1945-1946, to exploit
the Greek civil war between 1946-1949,the installation
of a communist regime in North Korea and the establishment
of a Chinese communist base in Manchuria between 1945-
1946,were examples of this policy.These manoeuvres were,
however, restricted to regions on the borders of the Soviet
Union, where Moscow felt that it had a right to intervene in
what was perceived as its sphere of influence.At the same
time, there was still in existence the semblance of great
powers cooperation,especially between the United States
and the Soviet Union, as Moscow perceived,between 1945
and 1946,that the United States would not use its great
power potential to lead the non-communist world and that
Great Britain,which had been greatly weakened by the World
4
War,would be its principal adversary.
Europe was still the main focus of Soviet foreign 
policy and Soviet relations and policies elsewhere were 
a reflection of its interests in Europe.This was clearly 
evident in M o s c o w’s relations and policies towards the
national liberation movements in the colonial world,especially
2.Jonathan Steel,Eastern Europe Since Stalin,(London:David and Charles.
1974),pp.9-32;J.M.mackintosh,strategy ancTTactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, 
(LondomOxford University Press,1962),pp.1-17.
3.Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy Since World UJar I I ,pp.43-45.
4.Mackinstosh,0p c it ,p.60.
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those led by the communist parties.Because of the massive 
strength of the French and Italian Communist Parties,Moscow 
harboured hopes that these parties oouU assume power via 
the parliamentary route.It was this consideration that 
led Moscow to continue counselling communist parties to 
pursue the strategy of ’united front from above'.That there 
was still the semblance of cooperation with the other Allied 
powers, might have also played a role in the adoption of 
the above 'cooperative' strategy.Soviet relations with 
Indonesia’s revolutionary government reflected the broad 
parameters of its policies elsewhere in the colonial world.
On 17 August 1945,Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia 
independent, but the Dutch refused to recognise the newly
5
proclaimed republic. The August Revolution, as the procla­
mation of independence has been referred to, was largely 
effected by non-communist nationalist leaders.The PKI played 
a minimal role.It viewed the Revolution as one of a 'united 
national front', but its weakness in the 'political,ideological
and organization fields, at that time,made the Party incapable
6
of giving leadership in that very advantageous situation'.
The initial Soviet response was one of indifference.
This was despite Soviet expectations of change in Southeast
Asia after the defeat of the Japanese.On 21 August 1945,for
example,Radio Moscow,declared:
Just as Europe,liberated from the Hitlerite yoke, cannot be 
be the Europe of pre-war days, so Asia freed from Japanese 
tyranny can no longer be the old Asia...The lessons of the 
Pacific War cannot be discounted, especially as far as the 
colonial countries are concerned.Certain general principles 
to settle colonial problems are outlined in the United Nations
5.D.UJoodman,The Republic of Indonesia,(New York:Philosophical Library,1955), 
pp.208-209.
6.PKI 40 Years,1920-1960,(Jakarta:Central Committee,Dept, of Agitation and 
Propaganda, 1960),p.45.
06
Charter.The time has now come for the practical settlement of 
these urgent colonial questions in the spirit of respect for 
the vital interests and rights of dependent peoples, including 
the right of self-determination and full national independence.7
Reinforcing this broadcast,G.Evgenyev warned in October 
1945 that "it would be very deplorable from the point of 
view of international security if the status of colonial 
and dependent countries in Eastern and South Eastern Asia 
remained unchanged".^
However,the primary Soviet concern,following 
the defeat of the 'fascist powers’, was in Europe, and 
Asia was viewed as a secondary theatre with no vital interests. 
Mo scow’s main concern was to consolidate its wartime gains 
in Eastern Europe and to rehabilitate its war-ravaged society. 
The Soviet U n i o n’s indifference to nationalist revolutions 
in Asia was not limited to Indonesia,* even the communist- 
led revolution of the Vietminh in Vietnam was ignored.
There was an ideological aspect to this.The ’popular front 
strategy’ was still in force, even though the Comintern 
had been abolished in 1943.The CPSU thus viewed with suspicion, 
the declaration of independence by Sukarno and Hatta, especially 
since no role was being played by the communists.In this 
regard, Moscow had some reasons to believe with the Dutch that
the Republic of Indonesia was indeed a ’Japanese-inspired
10 
plot’.
/.Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraphic Services,
Radio Moscow in English,Part 1,No.2227,21 August 1945,p.3(b)ii.
8.G.Evgenyev,"Japanese Imperialism and the Peoples of Asia",New 
Times,No.10,15 October 1945,p.20.
9.See Charles McLane,Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia:An Exploration 
Of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin,(Princeton,New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1966),pp.261 -278;Allan U. Cameron,"The Soviet ilOS 
Union and the Wars in Indochina",in W.Raymond Duncan,(edn.),Soviet 
Policy in Developing Countries,(New YorkrRobert Kreiger Pub.,1981),pp.65-66
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The Soviet Union only changed its view about 
the new Republic gradually, and this was due as much to 
developments in Europe as in Indonesia.The growing tensions 
in the war-time alliance between the Soviet Union and 
the West, and the growing decline in opportunities for 
communist success in Western Europeyencouraged the Soviet 
Union to devote greater attention to Asia.The most obvious 
issue for attention,French Indochina,presented difficulties 
to Soviet foreign policy because in post-war France there 
was a large and powerful Communist Party,which might 
reach power and inherit control of Indochina,; it was
therefore desirable not to alienate French opinion in the 
interim by supporting the Vietnamese struggle.Moreover,unti1 
the spring of 1947, the French Communist Party supported 
the retention of Indochina as a colony.This operated to 
restrain overt Soviet support for the ’liberation of 
Vietnam’. ^  In the case of the Netherlands,no such complication 
existed,as the Dutch Communist Party was weak.
The birth of the Indonesian Republic finally 
came to be seen as providing the Soviet Union with an 
opportunity to make its influence felt in Southeast Asia, 
as well as to support,at least through proclamations,national 
liberation movements in the region.As more detailed and 
accurate information emanated from the new Republic,
Moscow must have realised that a genuine colonial revolution 
was taking place there.More importantly,Indonesian leaders 
directly appealed for Soviet assistance,and in October
11 .Sec Paul Kattenburg,"The Indonesian Question in World Politics,August 
1945 to January 1948”,Unpublished PhD thesis,Yale University,Dept, of 




1945 Sukarno sent a telegram to Stalin on the anniversary 
of the October Revolution. On 14 November,Radio Moscow 
reciprocated with a wish that "Allah grant that all the
noble aims of the Indonesian people be successfully achieved".
The unfavourable initial Soviet views of the
August Revolution were replaced by more favourable ones.
The Indonesian independence movement was said to be genuinely
revolutionary and to possess a national unity that cut
across class lines.A review of the situation in early 1946
found that what was ’undoubtedly a mass movement’ had been
developing in the second half of 1945.It was not uniform
in composition:but "all participants in the present movement,
whatever their shade of political opinion,are united by
13
a single aspiration to see their country free". At the 
end of the year,the point was made even more emphatically 
by a Soviet writer who quoted an Indonesian source to the 
effect that there was no difference between the extreme 
left and right on the question of independence and the 
republic.He maintained that radical sentiments were strong 
among non-communists and found the position of the Indonesian 
Prime Minister,Sutan Sjahrir 'very remarkable’.Sjahrir 
was credited with pointing to the connection between the 
internal liberation struggle and the world-wide struggle 
against imperial ism:"More than for any other people of 
the world,for us it is indispensable to change the basis 
of human society in order to drive capitalism-imperial ism 
from this e a r t h " . ^  In later Soviet writings,the Indonesian
12.Cited in McVey,The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,pp.3-4.
13.V.Vasileva,"Events in Indonesia .Mirovoe khoziastvo i mirovavaia politika, 
January 1946,p.6.
14.A.A.Guber,Kriziz kolonial'noi sistemy posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny,(Moscow: 
Izdatelstvo Pravda, 1947),pp.22-23.
1
declaration of independence was seen as ”a great event
which opened a new page in the history of the country", 
while Model, writing in 1960,saw it as being "provoked 
by the aggravation of one of the main antagonisms in 
Indonesian society - that between imperialism and the 
Indonesian n a t i o n " . ^  What is significant for our purpose 
is that the Soviet Union viewed the revolution in positive 
terms.Developments in Indonesia following the proclamation 
of independence provided Moscow with greater opportunities 
to involve itself,both directly and indirectly, in the 
revolutionary war and developments thereafter.
Following the Japanese surrender,Vice-Admiral 
Mountbatten,as the Supreme Allied Commander,Southeast Asia, 
was given the responsibility of disarming the Japanese
17and retrieving the Allied prisoners of war in Indonesia.
There was,however, a gap of forty-three days between the 
proclamation of Indonesian independence and the first landing 
of British forces on 29 September/ and this provided time 
for the new Republic to consolidate itself.The initial
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Allied landing in Batavia,mainly British and Indian troops,
encountered no major problems as the Republican leaders
accepted its presence as necessary to disarm the Japanese
and liberate Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees.
But, by mid-October 1945,tension mounted with the return
of Dutch troops to Java.The Republican leaders became
suspicious of British intentions and began to fear that
the Allied presence was intended to assist the Dutch to
19
reimpose colonial hegemony. The powder-keg ignited,following
the shooting of Brigadier Mallaby,in Surabaya on 29 October,
and the situation was worsened by the British decision
20
to use Japanese troops against the Republican forces.
The Soviet Union condemned the intervention
of British forces in Java as assisting the Dutch to reassert
control.On 24 October, Pravda reported that fighting was
in progress in the Dutch East Indies,between the British
forces and those under the leadership of Sukarno . ^  in
November 1945,Guber wrote:
... notwithstanding their announced intention not to interfere 
in the internal affairs,the British representatives of the Allied 
Command began at the start to support the forcible restoration 
of Dutch rule in Indonesia.Lord Mountbatten...issued an order 
that the Japanese forces were nowhere to surrender their arms 
to the newly formed National Government.A large part of the 
Japanese troops have not been disarmed to this day and the 
reason for this is not that the Allied forces in Indonesia are 
inadequate for the purpose but that the Japanese are being 
used to suppress the national movement.22
18.Ibid,pp.31-42;Vasileva,"Events in lndonesia",p.12.
19.0ey Hong Lee,Op c it,pp. 17-46.
20.The use of the surrendered Japanese troops by the Allied forces to 
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The Soviet view of the British troops as protectors of
Dutch colonial interests remained unchanged as long as
23they remained in Indonesia.
At a time'of severe Allied pressure on the Republic, 
the Soviet view of the Republic took a turn for the better,
and Guber argued that "Sukarno's government appears to
24
enjoy wide support in Java". The Dutch claim that S u k a r n o’s
government was a ’puppet' of the Japanese was dismissed.
Writing on the Indonesian nationalists' cooperation with
the Japanese during the occupation,Guber noted:
... a number of political leaders who head the independent 
movement,including Sukarno himself,were members of the 
'autonomous government' set up by the Japanese during 
the occupation.The Dutch are exploiting this circumstance 
to the utmost to make it appear that the movement headed 
by Sukarno has been inspired by the Japanese.25
26
This in G u b e r 's judgement was ’absurd and injudicious’.
Vasileva similarly dismissed charges of S u k a r n o’s wartime
27
collaboration with the Japanese. There is no doubt that 
Sukarno and other leaders such as Hatta did collaborate 
with the Japanese from 1942 to mid-1945.lt is,however, 
incorrect to claim that because of this the nationalist 
movement in Indonesia was inspired by the Japanese, for 
the movement preceded the Japanese arrival by some four 
decades.Moreover,Sukarno collaborated with the Japanese 
in order to hasten the independence of his country and 
not to become part of the Japanese empire.This was reiterated
91
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by R.A.Ulyanovsky,who argued in 1984 that during the Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia, Sukarno maintained outwardly 
'loyal relations' with the military authorities,reckoning 
at first to use the'links with Japan in order to prevent 
the country from returning to Dutch rule.At 
the same time,"he kept up contact with and assisted under­
ground national and patriotic organizations"?8The views 
of Guber,Vasileva and Ulyanovsky would therefore be justified.
Following the clashes at Surabaya in late October
1945,both the British and Dutch began labelling the nationalist 
forces as 'bandits and extremists'.This, according to the 
Soviet press was to convince "the world that there can
79
be no negotiations with people of this type"." In Soviet
commentaries, the British were the number one antagonists
in the region and it was 'British imperialism' that had
to be checked.lt was argued that the British needed the
huge resources of the region for military purposes and
that Indonesia's geographical position on the southern
flank of Malaya and Singapore drew L o n d o n’s attention to
30the archipelago. During this phase of Soviet foreign policy, 
Britain rather than the United States was viewed as the 
greater danger, and Soviet criticisms of British 
activities in the Dutch East Indies should partially be 
viewed from this light.
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29."The Situation in Indonesia",New Times,i\lo.16,15 August 1946,p.18.
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Allied and Republican forces, the Soviet Union raised the
Indonesian Question in the United Nations in January 1946,
and this 'internationalised' the issue:Moscow's incentive
for doing so being all the greater because the United States
31
did not support the Indonesian Republic. The Soviet
decision to raise the matter was, however, related more
32
to events in Europe and Iran rather than to Indonesia.
Britain had raised the question of the reluctance of the
Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran at the first meeting
of the Security Council in London on 17 January 1946.In
riposte, the Soviet delegate complained of the activities
33
of British troops in Greece and Indonesia. The Soviet 
initiative on Indonesia also partially undermined the United 
States' image as an anti-colonial power.As most of the 
independent Asian states supported the Indonesian case,it 
was an issue which provided the Soviet Union with support 
in the United Nations,at least in the General Assembly.At 
a time of increasing tension between the Soviet Union and 
the Western powers, the raising of the Indonesian Question 
portrayed the former as a 'moralistic' and ’principled' 
power and confirmed Moscow's anti-colonial credentials.
It also represented one of the first few cracks in the
ii. 34
wartime alliance.
The Soviet decision to support the Indonesian
case at the United Nations had immediate repercussions
31.Sec A.Gromyko and B.N.Ponomarev,Soviet Foreign Policy,1945-1980,Vol.2, 
(Moscow:Progress Pub. 1981),p.22.
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In v i e w  of the c o n t i n u i n g  c l a s h e s  b e t w e e n  the
in Indonesia.lt forced the hand of the P K I ,which,banned 
by the Dutch authorities in 1926,was legally reestablished 
on 7 November 1945 under the leadership of Mohammad Jusuf.
Under his stewardship,the PKI adopted a hostile attitude
35
towards S u k a r n o’s government. In many ways,this conflicted
with Moscow's position.Jusuf was arrested in February 1946
by the Republican Government,following a communist-inspired
attack on a government police barracks.In March,under the
new leadership of Sardjono,the party repudiated Jusuf's
hostile position towards the Sukarno government and pledged
36
to join "in the defence of the Republic of Indonesia".
The Soviet initiative at the United Nations 
was appreciated by the Republican Government.Sjahrir showed 
his government's gratitude towards Moscow when he remarked 
that "the Soviet Union was the most suitable in as much 
as it was the main power least of all directly interested
in Indonesia and best able,accordingly,to put the question
37
as a problem of moral order".
On 7 February 1946,D.Z.Manuilsky,the Ukrainian
delegate,introducing the Indonesian Question,argued :
UJe have a situation in Indonesia which...endangers the 
maintenance of international peace and security.The 
intervention of British and Indian troops in the internal 
affa irs of Indonesia is without doubt, in direct contra­
diction...of the United Nations Charter.38
In his view, "the use of British troops for the suppression
of the national movement of the Indonesian people is
inadmissible".Manuilsky further argued that "the most
35.McLane,Op c it ,p.283.
36.Ibid.
37. Information Bulle tin,(Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D.C.),Vol. 6, No. 42,
1 Nay 1946,p. 357.
38.United Nations Security Council,Official Records,12th Meeting,7 February 
1946,p. 177.
appropriate settlement of the Indonesian Question in its 
present stage would be the creation by the Security Council
of a special commission to investigate the situation on
39the spot and to establish peace". His proposal was, however, 
endorsed only by the Ukraine,Poland and the Soviet U n i o n . ^  
Sjahrir, however,felt that Manuilsky's proposal was "a good 
one because it would have the effect of putting Indonesia 
and her problem more squarely on the m a p " . ^  The British
/
Foreign Secretary,Ernest Bevin,saw the Soviet move as an
attempt to secure a foothold in Southeast A s i a . ^  Manui l s k y 's
proposal was not without significance.According to a United
States State Department Intelligence Report in January
1946, "the practical effect of the USSR-Ukrainian move
[was] to exert some additional pressure on the Netherlands
and Great Britain to achieve a speedy solution to the conflict 
43
in Java".
By mid-1946,the Dutch had gained full control
of the outer islands and had even landed troops in parts
of Java and Sumatra.On 19 July, Van Mook,the Lieutenant-
Governor of the Netherlands East Indies,organised for
the 'representatives of the Great East Indonesia and Borneo
Republics' a conference at Malino (Celebes) which adopted
a resolution demanding a federal Republic of Indonesia
consisting of Java,Sumatra,Borneo and the Great East Indonesian
44Republic. The resolution aimed to isolate the Republican
39.Ibid.
40.0ey Hong Lee,Op c it ,p.64.
41 .Ibid.
42.Cited in McMahon,Op c it,p.116.
43.Cited in Ibid,p.117.
44.I.Chaudhry,The Indonesian Struggle,(Lahore:Feroz Press,1950),p.119.
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Government in Java and to balkanise the archipelago,in
pursuance of the Dutch colonial policy of 'divide and rule'.
A Soviet writer maintained that "the purpose of the conference
45was to split the Indonesian nationalist movement". To 
be sure, negotiations between Van Mook and the Republican 
Government had been in progress since 31 October 1945, 
but no headway had been made.A Soviet editorial in August
1946 argued that "the Dutch deliberately brought about
I
the failure of the negotiations... in order to gain time
in which to transfer additional troops and armaments to
Indonesia"?^
On 14 October 1946, the Allied forces and the
Republican Government agreed on an armistice.Radio Moscow,
however, warned that the truce "only indicates a policy
of gaining time in order to make further preparations for
47
war of oppression". On conclusion of the truce agreement,
the British served notice that they would withdraw their forces
by 1 December 1946.On 25 October,Radio Moscow commented
on the British decision:
The generous gesture concerning the impending withdrawal 
of their troops is by now of no avail.The British troops 
there have done their job well.They have seriously hampered 
the Indonesian people's struggle for independence and have 
further enabled the Dutch to land substantial Dutch forces.48
Soviet criticism of the British role in Indonesia was not
without reason.The British assisted in Dutch reoccupation
of Indonesia after the Japanese surrender.The British refused
to hand over Japanese weapons to the nationalists and used
45."The Situation in Indonesia",p.18.
46.Ibid.
47.Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services,Part 1,
No.2652,25 October I946,p.3(b)i.
48.Ibid,Part 1,No.2654,27 October I946,p.3(b)ii.
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Japanese troops to maintain law and order,which meant their 
fighting the nationalists,but never the Dutch.
The British decision to withdraw their forces
from Indonesia stimulated the Dutch to end the fighting
and reach a negotiated settlement.The result was the 15
November 1946 Linggajati compromise,which recognised de
facto the Republic’s authority in Java,Sumatra and Madura.
The Republic and the Dutch authorities agreed to work towards
a United States of Indonesia (USI),which would be sovereign,
49
democratic and federal. On the whole,the compromise was
supported by all leading groups in the Republic,including
the PKI,which saw it as providing the Republic with "a
50
breathing space to consolidate itself”. However,the agree­
ment was ratified only in March 1947 by The Hague due to 
differences over interpretation of its clauses.
The immediate Soviet response to the Linggjati 
Agreement was one of caution and on 9 April,Alexei Belov, 
a Radio Moscow commentator stated:
The circumstances of the signing of and the conditions which 
the Dutch Government instructed the Commission-General to 
put. upon the signing of the Agreements are very important.Two 
days before the signing, the Dutch Command in Indonesia launched 
a powerful offensive on the neighbourhood of Surabaya.Another 
peculiar aspect of the signing of the Linggajati Agreements is 
that the Dutch laid down that they would be bound to their own 
interpretation of the Agreements.That one of the parties of the 
agreements should openly declare that he interprets and intends 
to apply an agreement according to his own light is something quite 
new in diplomatic history.Indeed.it is quite clear how the Dutch 
intend to apply the Agreement.Simultaneously,with the instructions 
to the Commission-General to sign the Agreements,new troop 
reinforcements left the Netherlands for Indonesia.This hardly 
tallies with a sincere intention on the part of the Dutch to 
onsider the Linggajati Agreements as the basis for a peaceful 
settlement between the Netherlands and Indonesia.51
69.George Kahin.Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,(Ithaca,New York: 
Cornell University Press,1952),p.196.
50.McVey.The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,p.37.
51 .Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services,Part 1,
No.2789,11 April 1947.p.3(b)ii.
While the Soviet Union did not indicate any hostility to 
the agreement itself,its scepticism of its success was 
apparent.This was largely the consequence of the growing 
tension between Moscow and the West, which was to usher 
in full-blown 'Cold War' in the next few months,in what 
can be described as the second phase of Stalin's post­
war foreign policy.
Phase 2 : March 1947 - April 1952
The escalation of rivalry with the United States 
was the principal factor underlying Moscow's adoption of 
a hardline foreign policy.Contrary to its earlier expectations,by 
March 1947 Soviet leaders saw great danger in the United 
States utilization of its economic and military strength 
to defend the capitalist system in Europe and to assume 
leadership of the 'Free World'.52 The post-war conflict 
of interests and purpose between Moscow and Washington,hereto­
fore partially concealed by the lingering aura of wartime 
cooperation,stood starkly revealed in all its dimensions 
and depth,as the United States moved determinedly and decisively 
at this time to join issues with the Soviet Union.The proclama­
tion of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the enunciation 
in June of the idea which became the Marshall Plan,the 
Soviet withdrawal from the all-European conference called 
to consider American proposals to aid Europe's reconstruction 
in June and the public adoption by the United States of 
the 'containment' strategy brought the issues out in the 
ope n .
52.Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II,pp.39-43;N.V.Sivachev 
and l\l.N.Yakovlev,Russia and the United States,(Chicago:The University 
of Chicago Press,1979),pp.214-218.
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This directly led to the adoption of 'ideological
purification' campaigns in the Soviet Union.As a remedy
to war-time developments which were now considered undesirable,
such as the exposure of a sizeable segment of the population
to alien influence and the general relaxation of doctrinal
exclusiveness which accompanied the alliance with the United
States and Great Britain,the CPSU now adopted a programme
53
of ideological tightening and rearmament. Beginning from 
mid-1947 onwards, a full elaboration of the ideological 
position of the Soviet Union towards the non-communist 
world emerged and all deviations from the new ’line’ laid 
down by the Kremlin were suppressed.This began with the
criticism of V a r g a’s 1iberal,optimistic views about the
54
outcome in the colonial world and culminated in the
spelling out of the 'two c a m p s’ ’line’ by Andrei Zhdanov
55at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947. This
led to three immediate results:the abandonment of communist
parties' support for the bourgeois coalition governments
in Western Europe;the tightening of Soviet control over
the areas it already occupied;and the engagement of the
Soviet Union in a major struggle against the non-communist
56world,especially in Europe and Asia.
Just as in the earlier phase,developments in 
Europe were of paramount importance for Moscow.The measures 
undertaken by the United States in Europe and the failure 
of communist parties to make progress,especially in Italy 
and France,partially encouraged Moscow to adopt a new
53.Br zezinski.Op cit,pp.42-44.
54.Frederick C.Barghoorn,"The Varga Discussion and its Significance",The 
American Slavic and East European Review,Vol.7,No.3,pp.214-236.
55.A.Zhdanov,"The International Situation",For a Lasting Peace,for a People's 
Democracy,No. 1.10 November 1947,pp.2-4.
56.Mackintosh,Up cit,pp.51 -58.
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'line' in the colonial world.The communist parties were 
now called upon to form broad revolutionary fronts under 
their leadership in order to overthrow the imperialists 
and bourgeois-nationalists.The corollary of this was the 
adoption of a policy of non-recognition of independent
Asian states and the encouragement of subversive activities
57
against the regimes. How exactly this 'line' was applied
to Indonesia is analysed next.
Moscow's growing apprehension of developments
in non-communist Asia was already evident at the Inter-
Asian Conference at New Delhi,sitting from 23 March to
2 April 1947.Here,the Soviet representatives from the Academy
of Sciences and the Soviet Republics in Transcaucasia and
Central Asia expressed support for the 'armed struggle'
launched by various nationalist movements against the
'imperialists', while independence achieved through 'peaceful
58
negotiations' was denigrated. In this regard,the Indonesian 
delegate present at the conference was applauded:Zhukov,who 
was to become the chief articulator of the new Soviet 'line' 
on the colonial question which was set down authoritatively 
at the founding of the Cominform, wrote in early 1948:"In 
his person [the Indonesian delegate] the conference greeted
the people of Indonesia,who with arms in hand fight for
59
their genuine independence". The difficulties experienced
by the Republican Government in its negotiations with the
Dutch might only have encouraged the Soviet view of Indonesia.
57.1shwer C.0jha,"The Kremlin and Third World Leadership:Closing the Circle?",in  
W.Raymond Duncan,Soviet Policy in Developing Countries,(Waltham,Mass: 
Ginn-Blaisdell Co.,1970),pp.10-11.
58.See l.Platov,"The Results of the Inter-Asian C(</nference".Izvestia,31 
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59.E.Zhukov,"Mezhaziatskii kongress v Indii(mart-aprel’ 1947 g.)",Obshchee 
sobranie Akademii nauk SSSR 10-13 iiunia 1947 g.,(Moscow-t eningrad,1948), 
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T h e  f o u r  an d  a h a l f  m o n t h s  d e l a y  b e t w e e n  the L i n g g a j a t i  
A g r e e m e n t  and' its r a t i f i c a t i o n  by the D u t c h  d i s s i p a t e d  
m u c h  of the g o o d w i l l  e n g e n d e r e d  in N o v e m b e r  1946. T h e  
a g r e e m e n t  f a i l e d  to h o l d  b e c a u s e  of t h e  D u t c h  d e c i s i o n  
to i n t e r p r e t  it to t h e i r  o w n  c o n v e n i e n c e ,  t h e i r  a t t e m p t  
to u n i l a t e r a l l y  c r e a t e  ' i n d e p e n d e n t  r e p u b l i c s ',t h e i r  
b l o c k a d e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  a n d  c r o s s i n g s  o f  t h e  d e m a r c a t i o n  
line, as w e l l  a s  the R e p u b l i c ' s  d e c i s i o n  to e s t a b l i s h  d i p l o m a t i c  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  M i d d l e  E a s t  c o u n t r i e s . I n  t h e  l i g h t  of t h e s e  
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s , I .P l a t o v ,  a S o v i e t  p o l i t i c a l  
a n a l y s t , a r g u e d  in I z v e s t i a  on 31 M a y  1 9 4 7  a l o n g  the f o l l o w i n g  
1 i n e s :
The Indonesian Republic was attempting faithfully to fu lfill the 
agreement that had been signed, but the actions of the Dutch 
authorities suggested that this agreement served them only as 
a smoke screen,under cover of which they are marshalling armed 
forces in Indonesia for a change over to a resolute offensive 
against the Republic.61
P l a t o v ' s  s t a t e m e n t  w o u l d  p r o v e  to be p r o p h e t i c .T h e  v i t i a t i o n  
of t h e  A g r e e m e n t  p a v e d  t h e  w a y  for the f i r s t  D u t c h  m i l i t a r y  
a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  the R e p u b l i c . O n  27 M a y  1 9 4 7 , t h e  D u t c h  i s s u e d  
an u l t i m a t u m  to th e  S j a h r i r  G o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h  a c c o r d i n g  
to K a h i n  " w a s  i n t e r p r e t e d  b y  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  G o v e r n m e n t  
as p o s i n g  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  c a p i t u l a t i o n  to t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
or a l l - o u t  w a r ”. W r i t i n g  in T r u d  o n  13 J u n e  1947, an 
'Obs e r v e r '  a r g u e d  that:
The Hague tendered the government of the Indonesian Republic 
a note that had all the distinguishing features of an ultimatum, 
even to the inclusion of a deadline within which a reply should 
follow.This deadline expired on June 10.Holland demanded the 
formation of a single government for all Indonesia,in which the
6n.l -F is c h e r .T he  S t o r v  o f  In d o n e s ia ,(Londorr.H .Hamilton,1959),p p .96-97.




republic of the puppet states would be included,the severing of 
direct relations between Indonesia and foreign countries,the creation 
of a joint police force,etc.The ultimatum further envisaged the 
virtual establishment of Dutch control over the armed forces of 
the Indonesian Republic.The economic section of the ultimatum 
provided for Dutch control of the importation and exportation of 
goods,the organization of a central monetary fund to be directed 
by a special council,in which the representatives of the Republic 
, would be in the minority.The note also demanded that all factories 
and plants in the territories of the Republic be returned to their 
Dutch industrialist owners.Thus,the ultimatum demanded,in essence, 
the reestablishment of unlimited Dutch control in Indonesia.63
On 20 J u l y  1947, a D u t c h  f o r c e  o f  1 2 0 , 0 0 0  i n v a d e d  t h e  R e p u b l i c ,
the i m m e d i a t e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  p o l i c e  m e a s u r e s
of l i m i t e d  p r o p o r t i o n s ’ b e i n g  the f a i l u r e  of th e  S j a h r i r
64
G o v e r n m e n t  to r e s p o n d  to the 27 M a y  u l t i m a t u m .  T h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  D u t c h  a c t i o n  b u t  Sa« t h e  U n i t e d  
States' p r e s s u r e  o n  J o g j a k a r t a  to b e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  c a u s e  
of the c o n f 1 i c t . T h i s  v i e w p o i n t  s h o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  in 
the c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  g r o w i n g  ' c o l d  war' b e t w e e n  M o s c o w  a n d  
W a s h i n g t o n . O n  21 J u l y  1 9 4 7  R a d i o  M o s c o w  b r o a d c a s t  o n  th e  
D u t c h  a t t a c k :
The answer [to the Dutch 'police action'l can be found in the 
Note which the United States' Consul-General in Batavia handed 
to the Indonesian Government in the name of the State Department.
This Note speaks of United States' interests in the position on the 
Indonesian islands and states that the United States Government 
insists that the Indonesian Government cooperate with the 
Netherlands Government without delay and that a provisional 
federated government be formed immediately.The US Note says that 
after this is done,the USA will agree to open negotiations with the 
Netherlands Government and the Provisional Government on financial 
assistance and in restoring Indonesia.This US Note is open inter­
ference in Indonesian a ffa irs  and presages the United States 
intention to expand the so-called Truman doctrine in lndonesia.lt 
is direct support of the Netherlands colonial regime.65
T h e r e  is e v i d e n c e  to s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  c h a r g e  is
63.Trud,13 June 1947.
64.Kahin,Op c it ,pp.211-212.
65.Summary of liJorld Broadcasts:USSR and Eastern Europe,(hereafter as 
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n o t  w i t h o u t  s u b s t a n c e . I n  a 5 J u n e  t e l e g r a m , t h e  A c t i n g
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e , D . G . A c h e s o n , i n s t r u c t e d  W . A . F o o t e , t h e
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  C o n s u l - G e n e r a l  in J a k a r t a , t o  d e l i v e r  the
f o l l o w i n g  m e s s a g e  v e r b a l l y , t o  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  G o v e r n m e n t :
The US Government considered that the Dutch proposals of
27 May had been offered in good faith in an e ffort to 
implement the Linggajati Agreements,that the proposals 
appeared to offer a reasonable basis for an effective  
interim government pending the formation of a sovereign 
RUSI [Republic of the United States of Indonesia] and the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union and that the Indonesian 
Republic would be well advised to respond promptly in a 
spirit of good faith and compromise,thus demonstrating the 
sincerity of its pledge undertaken at Linggajati.66
On 25 J u n e , t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  m a d e  p u b l i c  its s u p p o r t
67
for the D u t c h  27 M a y  u l t i m a t u m .  In the l i g h t  o f  the A m e r i c a n
i m p l i c i t  a n d  e x p l i c i t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  D u t c h  a n d  the g e n e r a l
t e n s e  E a s t - W e s t  r e l a t i o n s , M o s c o w  r e s o l u t e l y  c o n d e m n e d  th e
D u t c h  ’c o l o n i a l  b l i t z k r i e g’ in I n d o n e s i a  a n d  b e g a n  c r i t i ­
cs
c i s i n g  t h e  L i n g g a j a t i  A g r e e m e n t s .T h i s  w a s  b e c a u s e  M o s c o w
s a w  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , w h i c h
c u l m i n a t e d  in t h e  L i n g g a j a t i  A g r e e m e n t s , a s  m a n o e u v r e s  by
69
the D u t c h  ’f o r  g a i n i n g  t i m e  a n d  b r i n g i n g  u p  t h e i r  f o r c e s”.
M o r e  i m p o r t a n t  to S o v i e t  a n a l y s t s  w a s  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e
' i m p e r i a l i s t  p o w e r s ’,e s p e c i a l l y  B r i t i s h  a n d  A m e r i c a n , t h a t
70
m a d e  th e  D u t c h  ’p o l i c e  a c t i o n ’ p o s s i b l e .
T h e  c r i t i c a l  S o v i e t  s t a n c e  o n  d e v e l o p m e n t s  in 
I n d o n e s i a  w a s  p a r t l y  th e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  W a s h i n g t o n ' s  g r o w i n g  
p a r t i a l i t y  in t h e  D u t c h - I n d o n e s i a n  c o n f 1 i c t .B e f o r e  M a r c h
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1 9 4 7 , the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a d  a d o p t e d  a n e u t r a l  s t a n c e  in 
the c o n f l i c t . F o r  i n s t a n c e , i n  N o v e m b e r  1945, W a s h i n g t o n  
h a d  p r o h i b i t e d  the s h i p m e n t  to J a v a  of a m m u n i t i o n  s t o c k s  
p u r c h a s e d  b y  t h e  D u t c h  a n d  h a d  r e f u s e d  to e q u i p  s e v e r a l
t h o u s a n d  r e l e a s e d  D u t c h  p r i s o n e r s  of w a r  in t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,
71
w h o  w e r e  w a i t i n g  to b e  t r a n s p o r t e d  b a c k  to Java. In O c t o b e r
1 9 4 6 , th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e , J .F .B y r n e s , d e c l a r e d  t h a t  "no
a r m s  o r  e q u i p m e n t  h a v e  b e e n  s o l d  to t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  for
m i l i t a r y  u s e  in the N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t  I n d i e s ... F u r t h e r m o r e ,
it is c o n t r a r y  to the p o l i c y  of thi s  G o v e r n m e n t  to p e r m i t
A m e r i c a n  f l a g  v e s s e l s  o r  a i r c r a f t  to t r a n s p o r t  t r o o p s  of
a n y  n a t i o n a l i t y  to o r  f r o m  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t  Indies,
72
e x c e p t  for t h e  e v a c u a t i o n  o f  J a p a n e s e " .
B u t  a f t e r  th e  d e c l a r a t i o n  of the T r u m a n  D o c t r i n e  
in M a r c h  1 9 4 7 , t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a d o p t e d  a m o r e  p r o - D u t c h  
s t a n c e , n e c e s s i t a t e d  l a r g e l y  by the p e r c e i v e d  n e e d  to 
'contain' t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  in E u r o p e . W a s h i n g t o n 's s u p p o r t  
for the D u t c h  u l t i m a t u m  o f  27 M a y  w a s  a c l e a r  e x a m p l e  of 
t h i s . I n  th e  s a m e  v e i n , i t  w a s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  W a s h i n g t o n  
d i d  n o t  c o n d e m n  t h e  D u t c h  ' p o l i c e  a c t i o n ' . I n  c o n t r a s t ,
L o n d o n  w a s  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  D u t c h  a c t i o n s ,  w a r n i n g  t h a t  
"it m a y  be t h a t  m i l i t a r i l y  t h e  D u t c h  w i l l  g a i n  an i n i t i a l  
s u c c e s s ; b u t  the r e s u l t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  in S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  w i l l  
m a k e  the p o s i t i o n  o f  W e s t e r n  p o w e r s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  i n d e e d " .  
O t h e r  t h a n  b e i n g  c o n c e r n e d  f o r  its o w n  c o l o n i a l  p o s s e s s i o n s  
in S o u t h e a s t  A s i a , B r i t a i n  w a s  a l s o  d i s a p p o i n t e d  w i t h  the 
D u t c h  a c t i o n  s i n c e  it p u t  p a i d  to the L i n g g a j a t i  c o m p r o m i s e .
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an  a g r e e m e n t  in w h i c h  th e  B r i t i s h  h a d  p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
m e d i a t i n g  role.
V i e w e d  in thi s  c o n t e x t , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ’s d e p i c t i o n  
of  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  B r i t a i n  as b e i n g  th e  t w o  ' i m p e r i a l i s t  
p o w e r s ’ b a c k i n g  the D u t c h  ' a g g r e s s i o n *  in I n d o n e s i a  is 
o n l y  p a r t i a l l y  c o r r e c t . l t  is a r g u a b l e  t h a t  b y  its s i l e n c e ,
W a s h i n g t o n  i n d i r e c t l y  c o n d o n e d  the D u t c h  ’p o l i c e  a c t i o n '.M o r e ­
over, by p u b l i c l y  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  27 M a y  u l t i m a t u m  and, t h r o u g h  
its C o n s u l - G e n e r a l  in J a k a r t a ,  ’advising* th e  S j a h r i r  G o v e r n ­
m e n t  to ' p r o m p t l y  r e s p o n d  in a s p i r i t  o f  g o o d  f a i t h  a n d  
c o m p r o m i s e '  to t h e  D u t c h  d e m a n d s , t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o p e n l y  
t o o k  the D u t c h  s ide, a n d  o p e n  A m e r i c a n  s u p p o r t  m a y  h a v e  
e v e n  e n c o u r a g e d  t h e  D u t c h  to u s e  f o r c e  to s e t t l e  th e  issue.
T h e  same, h o w e v e r , c a n n o t  be s a i d  of th e  B r i t i s h ,  f o r  the 
L a b o u r  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  A t t l e e  w a s  in t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e c o l o n i -  
s i n g  its e m p i r e  in the r e g i o n , a s  the g r a n t i n g  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
to I n d i a , P a k i s t a n  a n d  B u r m a  pro v e d .
I n d i a  a n d  A u s t r a l i a  b r o u g h t  th e  c a s e  of D u t c h  
a g g r e s s i o n  in I n d o n e s i a  b e f o r e  the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  on 
30 J u l y  1 9 4 7 . D u r i n g  the d e b a t e  a t  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l , t h e  
S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e ,  A n d r e i  G r o m y k o ,  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  it w a s  ’n e c e s s a r y  
for the t r o o p s  o f  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  - H o l l a n d  a n d  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
R e p u b l i c  - to b e  i m m e d i a t e l y  w i t h d r a w n  to t h e  p o s i t i o n s
t h e y  h e l d  b e f o r e  the b e g i n n i n g  of m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  in
74
I n d o n e s i a”. T h i s  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  th e  n e c e s s a r y  s u p p o r t
in the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i  I . I n s t e a d , i t  p a s s e d  t w o  o t h e r  r e s o l u t i o n s .
T h e  first, j o i n t l y  p r o p o s e d  by C h i n a  a n d  A u s t r a l i a , s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r s  w h i c h  h a d  d i p l o m a t i c  r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e s  in J a k a r t a  [the S o v i e t  U n i o n  d i d  n o t  h a v e  one]
74.Cited in Current Digest of Soviet Press,(hereafter as CDSP),No.1764,
6 August 194/,p.?.
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s h o u l d  i n s t r u c t  t h e m  to p r e p a r e  a j o i n t  r e p o r t  for the
C o u n c i l ' s  i n f o r m a t i o n .T h e  s e c o n d ,  p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d
S t a t e s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  to o f f e r  its s e r v i c e s  to b o t h
t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  a n d  th e  I n d o n e s i a n  R e p u b l i c , b y  f o r m i n g
a s p e c i a l  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  t h r e e  o f  its m e m b e r s , t o  s e e k  a
p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e , a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  of the
75
b e l l i g e r e n t  p a r t i e s .  G r o m y k o , h o w e v e r , p r o p o s e d  the f o r m a t i o n
of a c o m m i s s i o n  c o m p o s e d  o f  m e m b e r - s t a t e s  o f  th e  S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l  to o b s e r v e  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  a c e a s e f i r e  a g r e e m e n t .
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T h i s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  v e t o e d  b y  F r a n c e .
T h e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  G o o d  O f f i c e s  (CGO) w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d
on 25 A u g u s t  1 9 4 7  a n d  c o m p r i s e d  d e l e g a t e s  f r o m  the U n i t e d
S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a  a n d  B e l g i u m . T h e  U S S R  o p p o s e d  its f o r m a t i o n ,
p r e s e n t i n g  it as an a t t e m p t  to c i r c u m v e n t  t h e  S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l  a n d  t h u s  " i n f l i c t  a g r a v e  b l o w  a g a i n s t  the U n i t e d
77
N a t i o n s  O r g a n i z a t i o n " .  G r o m y k o ’s view, t h e  C G O  w a s
" n o t  r e a l l y  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  e v e n
f r o m  th e  p o i n t  of v i e w  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  of
78
w h i c h  it w a s  s e t  up".
T h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  C G O  w a s  p l e a s i n g  to th e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  t h e  W e s t e r n  p o w e r s  as it e x c l u d e d  the 
S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  the o t h e r  c o m m u n i s t  s t a t e s  f r o m  I n d o n e s i a ,  
an a r e a  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  r e g a r d e d  a s  a W e s t e r n  
s p h e r e  of i n f l u e n c e .F o r  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n , w i t h  th e  f o r m a t i o n  
of t h e  C G O  a n d  its e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  i t , t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  Q u e s t i o n
vOaS.
w a s  r e m o v e d  f r o m  the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a n d  t h u s  lost
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powe r s '  a c t i v i t i e s  in I n d o n e s i a  but, m o r e  i m p o r t a n t , t o  
i n f l u e n c e  the f u t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  I n d o n e s i a  i t s e l f . T h i s  
w a s  all the m o r e  so s i n c e  no b i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  e x i s t e d  
b e t w e e n  M o s c o w  a n d  J o g j a k a r t a .W h e n  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  p u t  
b e f o r e  the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  f o r  th e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  the C G O , t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  a b s t a i n e d  a n d  d i d  n o t  e x e r c i s e  its veto, as 
it w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a c c u s e d  o f  i m p e d i n g  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of 
the I n d o n e s i a n  p r o b l e m ,  a p r o b l e m  w h i c h  w a s  f i r s t  r a i s e d  
by Mosc o w .
Th e  h e i g h t e n i n g  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  e m e r g i n g  
E a s t e r n  b l o c  led by the S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  t h e  W e s t e r n  c o a l i t i o n  
led by the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  a p p a r e n t  in the i n f l e x i b l e  
i d e o l o g i c a l  p o s i t i o n s  p r o p o u n d e d  by b o t h  W a s h i n g t o n  a n d  
M o s c o w . P r e s i d e n t  T r u m a n ' s  d e c i s i o n  to p l e d g e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  
m i l i t a r y  a i d  to G r e e c e  a n d  T u r k e y  in M a r c h  1947, the J u n e  
M a r s h a l l  P l a n  a n d  the ' c o n t a i n m e n t  d o c t r i n e '  in S e p t e m b e r ,  
w e r e  m e a s u r e s  to d e f e n d  ' d e m o c r a c y '  a n d  t h e  'free w o rld' 
a g a i n s t  'c o m m u n i s m '.T h e  c r e a t i o n  of t h e  C o m i n f o r m  ( C o m m u n i s t  
I n f o r m a t i o n  B u r e a u )  in B e l g r a d e  in S e p t e m b e r  1 9 4 7 , o s t e n s i b l y  
to c o o r d i n a t e  th e  c o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  of F r a n c e , I t a l y  an d  
E a s t e r n  E u r o p e , d e e p e n e d  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  r i f t s  w i t h  the 
W e s t . A t  its f o u n d i n g  c o n g r e s s  in W a r s a w , A n d r e i  Z h d a n o v  
a d v o c a t e d  a n e w  r a d i c a l  'line' in S o v i e t  f o r e i g n  policy, 
o f f i c i a l l y  s i g n i f y i n g  t h e  e n d  o f  the w a r t i m e  a l 1 i a n c e . T h i s  
w a s  the e n u n c i a t i o n  of th e  'two c a mps' t h e o r y , w h i c h  d i v i d e d  
internationcil p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  i n t o  two m a j o r  c amps: the 
a n t i - d e m o c m t i c  c a m p  led by t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  the ant.i- 
i m p e r i a l i s t  c a m p  led by t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n . I n  Z h d a n o v ' s  a n a l y s i s
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This [anti-fascist and anti-imperialist camp] is based on the USSR 
and the new democracies.lt also include countries that have broken 
with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic 
development such as Rumania,Hungary and Finland.Indonesia and 
Vietnam are associated with it;it has the sympathy of India,Syria 
and Egypt.The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labour and 
democratic movements and by the fraternal communist parties in all 
countries,by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and 
dependencies,by all progressive and democratic forces in every 
country.79
T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of Z h d a n o v ' s  e l u c i d a t i o n  w a s  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  
w a s  v i e w e d  as a n  a s s o c i a t e d  m e m b e r  o f  the S o v i e t - l e d  camp.
G u b e r  r e a f f i r m e d  t h i s : " T o d a y , I n d o n e s i a  b e l o n g s  to the a n t i ­
i m p e r i a l i s t  f r o n t : t h e  i d e a s  o f  L e n i n  a n d  S t a l i n  h a v e  d i r e c t e d
the I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e  in t h e  s t r u g g l e  for i n d e p e n d e n c e
80
a n d  t r u e  d e m o c r a c y " .
The Zhdanov 'doctrine' was significant because
it i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  ' p o p u l a r  front' t a c t i c s  a n d  a t t e m p t s
to w i n  p o w e r  t h r o u g h  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  e l e c t i o n s  w e r e  n o w  o u t m o d e d .
C o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  w e r e  n o w  to lead a n d  n o t  a c c e p t  s e c o n d a r y
p o s i t i o n s  in n a t i o n a l  f r o n t s . I n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 4 7 , Z h u k o v  e x a m i n e d
the implications of the Zhdanov 'doctrine' for the colonies:
In a number of colonial and dependent countries a people's 
anti-imperialist front has been formed, consisting of a 
coalition of parties having the struggle for liberation as 
their platform,under the leading participation of the 
communist parties(Indonesia,Vietnam).The political programme 
of such a coalition envisages complete independence from 
foreign imperialism and broad democratic reforms,laying the 
foundations for the economic and political independence of 
the country.Such a programme must be aimed not only against 
imperialism, but also against its internal social backers - the 
landlords and that national bourgeoisie which is connected 
with foreign capital.lt is well known that democratic forms 
have already been successfully put into practice in large 
areas of the liberated parts of China,in the unoccupied 
territory of the Indonesian Republic and in the inner regions 
of the Republic of Vietnam.81
79.Zhdanov,Op c it .p.Z.
80.Guber,"Velikaia oktiabr'skaia revolutsiia i strani vostoka", Vestnik 
Akademii Nauk SSSR,No. 1,January 1948,p.41.
81.Zhukov,"Obostrenie krizisa kolonial'noi sistemi",Bolshevik,No.Z3,15 December
1947,p.57.
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I n d o n e s i a  w a s  a c c e p t e d  as a m e m b e r  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  c a m p  d u e  
to t h e  R e p u b l i c ' s  o n g o i n g  c o l o n i a l  w a r  w i t h  the D u t c h . I t  
is a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  to a d d  t h a t  the d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  the 
I n d o n e s i a n  a n d  I n d o c h i n e s e  s i t u a t i o n s  w h i c h  s e e m  c l e a r  
w e r e  by n o  m e a n  o b v i o u s  a t  t h a t  t i m e . T h e  PKI e m e r g e d  f r o m  
th e  w a r  as a s m a l l  a n d  w e a k  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  b u t  the s t r e n g t h  
of C o m m u n i s m  in I n d o n e s i a  c o u l d  n o t  be j u d g e d  by t h a t  alone. 
T h e  PKI p a r t i c i p a t e d  in t h e  l e f t - w i n g  c o a l i t i o n  of p a r t i e s  
w h i c h  g o v e r n e d  the R e p u b l i c  u n t i l  e a r l y  1 9 4 8 . A 1 t h o u g h  a 
m i n o r  m e m b e r  o u t w a r d l y ,  its r e a l  s t r e n g t h  w a s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  
a p p e a r a n c e s  s u g g e s t e d , a s  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  s e c r e t l y  w e r e  
C o m m u n i s t s , h a d  g a i n e d  i m p o r t a n t  p o s i t i o n s  in o t h e r  p a r t i e s  
in t h e  c o a l t i o n . I n  a d d i t i o n , s o c i a l i s t s  s u c h  as S j a h r i r  
a n d  A m i r  S j a r i f f u d i n  h e l d  h i g h  o f f i c e s  in t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  
g o v e r n m e n t .F r o m  M o s c o w , t h e  s i t u a t i o n  m a y  h a v e  l o o k e d  a n a l o g o u s  
to t h e  o n e  in I n d o c h i n a ,  w h e r e  C o m m u n i s t s  in r e a l i t y  d o m i n a t e d  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t , t h e  V i e t m i n h ,  in s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  I n d o c h i n e s e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  h a d  b e e n  f o r m a l l y  d i s s o l v e d
o-p
in N o v e m b e r  1945. It w a s  in t h e s e  c o n f u s e d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t h a t  S o v i e t  c o m m e n t a t o r s  o v e r e s t i m a t e d  th e  s t r e n g t h  of
th e  P K I .Z h u k o v , f o r  i n s t a n c e , c l a i m e d  t h a t  in I n d o n e s i a  " t h e
a nt i  - i m p e r i a l i s t  f r o n t  h a s  b e e n  f o r m e d ... u n d e r  the l e a d i n g
83
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  th e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y " .  In J a n u a r y  1948, 
V a s i l e v a  c l a i m e d  t h a t  " t h e  p e o p l e  of I n d o n e s i a ... e n t e r i n g  
i nt o  th e  a d v a n c e  g u a r d  o f  th e  l i b e r a t i o n  s t r u g g l e  o f  the
o4
c o l o n i a l  p e o p l e s , h a v e  f o r m e d  a p e o p l e ' s  d e m o c r a t i c  r e p u b l i c " ?
82.McLane,Dp c it ,pp.261-278.
83.Zhukov, Velikaia oktiabr'skaia...,,.p.57.
84.Vasileva,"Bor'ba za demokratischeskoe razvitie Indonesiikoi respubliki",
Voprosi ekonnmiki.No.l,1948,p.81.
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T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  c o u l d  o n l y  h a v e  b e e n  d u e  to a m i s p e r c e p t i o n  
of t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  forc e s '  in the I n d o n e s i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t  
m o v e m e n t  a s  w e l l  as a g e n e r a l  i g n o r a n c e  a b o u t  the R e p u b l i c .
T h e  r e j e c t i o n  of r e f o r m i s m  as a p a t h  to i n d e p e n d e n c e  
a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the ' t w o - c a m p s '  v i e w  m i g h t  e a s i l y  
lead o n e  to t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  by D e c e m b e r  1947, th e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  h a d  d r a w n  a s h a r p  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  n o n - c o m m u n i s t  
a n d  c o m m u n i s t - c o n t r o l l e d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  m o v e m e n t s , r e s e r v i n g
its e n d o r s e m e n t  e x c l u s i v e l y  fo r  the l a t t e r . S u c h  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  
n e e d s  to b e  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  q u a l i f i e d  in t h e  c a s e  o f  
I n d o n e s i a . I n  m a n y  w a y s , I n d o n e s i a ’s p o l i t i c a l  c o u r s e  in 
th e  s p r i n g  a n d  s u m m e r  of 1947 a p p e a r e d  to be o p p o s i t e  of 
I n d i a ' s . F o r  i n s t a n c e , t h e  p e r i o d  b r o u g h t  a c o m p r o m i s e  s e t t l e ­
m e n t  w i t h  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  e x t e r n a l l y  and, a p o l a r i z a t i o n
b e t w e e n  th e  d o m i n a n t  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  a n d  t h e  w e a k  C o m m u n i s t
85
P a r t y  i n t e r n a l l y f '  in I n d o n e s i a ,  a r m e d  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  
D u t c h  e r u p t e d  in J u l y  a f t e r  the m o d e r a t e  l e f t i s t  S j a h r i r  
h a d  b e e n  r e p l a c e d  as P r e m i e r  by S j a r i f f u d i n ,  a r a d i c a l  
l e f t i s t  w h o  c l a i m e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  t h a t  h e  h a d  l o n g  
s e c r e t l y  b e e n  a C o m m u n i s t .T h o u g h  its i n f l u e n c e  in the I n d o n e s i a n  
g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  s t r o n g  a n d  a p p a r e n t l y  g r o w i n g , C o m m u n i s m  
d i d  n o t  w i n  a d o m i n a n t  p o s i t i o n ,  as e v e n t s  w e r e  s o o n  to 
s h o w . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of the ’t w o - c a m p s '  'line' 
s a w  the i n c l u s i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a  in the ' d e m o c r a t i c  c a m p ' . Indeed, 
an e f f o r t  w a s  m a d e  to g i v e  a t h e o r e t i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  
w h y  the I n d o n e s i a n  s i t u a t i o n  d i f f e r e d  f r o m  th e  I n d i a n : D u t c h  
i m p e r i a l  p o l i c y  h a d  p r o d u c e d  a n u m e r i c a l l y  a n d  e c o n o m i c a l l y
85.See V.Balabushevich,"Nov/yi etap natsinnal’no-osvohnditGl’noi bnr'by 
narodov Indii",\/oprnsi ukonomiki,No.8,l949,pp. 30-48.
w e a k  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  an d  a r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  
c r e a t i n g  e v e n  b e f o r e  " t h e  S e c o n d  W o r l d  W a r . . . t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
p r e c o n d i t i o n s  n o t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  of a b r o a d  n a t i o n a l  
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  f r o n t  b u t  a l s o  for th e  u n i t i n g  o f  th e
s t r u g g l e  for i n d e p e n d e n c e  w i t h  the s t r u g g l e  for th e  d e m o c r a t i c
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r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the c o u n t r y ”. it is i m p o s s i b l e  to d e t e r m i n e
w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  th e  c a u s e  of t h i s  o b v i o u s  a b e r r a t i o n .S o v i e t  
s p o k e s m e n  c o n c e i v a b l y  w e r e  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  d i s t o r t i n g  r e a l i t y  
w h e n  s p e a k i n g  o f  c o m m u n i s t  l e a d e r s h i p  in o r d e r  to p l a c e  
a s t a m p  of l e g i t i m a c y , w i t h o u t  a p p e a r i n g  to c o n t r a v e n e  the 
n e w  ’line' o n  a r a d i c a l  n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t  e n g a g e d  in 
a n  ' o b j e c t i v e l y '  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  th e  ' o t h e r  
c a m p O r  th e  p l a c i n g  o f  I n d o n e s i a  in the ' d e m o c r a t i c  camp' 
m a y  h a v e  r e f l e c t e d  a s e r i o u s  m i s r e a d i n g  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
by M o s c o w . S u c h  m i s r e a d i n g  s e e m s  the m o r e  p r o b a b l e  in v i e w  
of the e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p e r s i s t e n c e  of S o v i e t  o p t i m i s m , e v e n  
a f t e r  the m o m e n t u m  of C o m m u n i s m  had r e c e i v e d  its d e c i s i v e  
s e t b a c k  in J a n u a r y  1948 w i t h  the r e p l a c e m e n t  of S j a r i f f u d i n 's
c a b i n e t  by o n e  m u c h  f a r t h e r  to the right.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h i s  m i s r e a d i n g , t h e  S o v i e t  'two
c a m p s ’ d o c t r i n e  h a d  two s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s . F i r s t , i t
e n s u r e d  c o n t i n u e d  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  of the I n d o n e s i a n  c a s e
in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o r u m s  s u c h  as the U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .S e c o n d , i t
r e s u l t e d  in t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  a t t i t u d e
t o w a r d s  A s i a n  n a t i o n a 1 ism. In 1947 and 1948, I n d o n e s i a  [ o n l y
u n t i l  m i d - 1 9 4 8 ],V i e t n a m  a n d  C h i n a  w e r e  v i e w e d  by the S o v i e t
ri
86.Guber,"lmporialisty-dushiteli swobody i nezavisimosti narodov (k 
sobytiiam v Indoneziia)”,Bolshevik,No. 19,15 October 1947,p.52.
111
1 1 2
U n i o n  a s  g o o d  e x a m p l e s  for- t h e  c o l o n i e s  to f o l l o w  in t h e i r
f i g h t  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e 87 T h i s  r e s u l t e d  in th e  a d o p t i o n
of a h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  g a i n e d  t h e i r
i n d e p e n d e n c e  p e a c e f u l l y ,  s u c h  as I n d i a  a n d  B u r m a . T h i s  w a s
b e c a u s e  , as a r e s u l t  o f  Z h d a n o v ’s 'two c a m p s 't h e o r y ,M o s c o w ,
a d o p t e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  f o r m a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  f r o m  a c o l o n i a l
p o w e r  d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m e a n  t h a t  a c o u n t r y  h a d  'real
i n d e p e n d e n c e '  w h e n  the e c o n o m i c  p o w e r  w a s  s t i l l  in th e
h a n d s  o f  th e  f o r m e r  c o l o n i a l  p o w e r  a n d  its 'a g e n t s '.T h i s
88
w a s  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  the t h e o r y  o f  ' n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m ' .
T h e  W e s t e r n - d o m i n a t e d  C G O  s u c c e e d e d  in b r i n g i n g
b o t h  t h e  D u t c h  a n d  R e p u b l i c a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to the
c o n f e r e n c e  t a b l e / a n d  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  w a s  s i g n e d
’ 89
on 17 J a n u a r y  1948. F r o m  t h e  v e r y  s t a r t , M o s c o w  h a d
r e s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  i t . W h i l e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w e r e  in p r o g r e s s
a b o a r d  t h e  A m e r i c a n  w a r s h i p  ' R e n v i l l e ' ,  R a d i o  M o s c o w  w a r n e d
t h a t  " t h e  D u t c h  o l d  d i s g r a c e f u l  g a m e  [of m a k i n g  a g r e e m e n t s
90
and v i o l a t i n g  t h e m  s u b s e q u e n t l y ]  w a s  b e i n g  r e e n a c t e d " .
On 26 F e b r u a r y ,G r o m y k o  d e c l a r e d  at the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l
that t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  was:
... among the most shameful documents which have ever been 
published under the aegis of the United Nations and should 
be placed in a museum as proof of how shameful a document 
can be produced when some of the members of the United 
Nations betray the interests of the Indonesian people for 
benefit of the colonial powers.91
87>.SWB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,12-14 Nov.1947,p.2.
88. The Struggle of the Colonial Peoples",New Times,4-August 1948,p.3.
89.Kahin,Dp c it,p.26.
9Q.SbJB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,16-19 Dec,1947,p.26.
91 .United Nations Security Council,Official Records,Meeting No.256,26 Feb.p.40.
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T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a l s o  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  " t h e  
r e s u l t  of c o m p u l s i o n  a n d  t h a t  the CGO h a d  s i d e d  100 p e r c e n t
w i t h  t h e  D u t c h  i m p e r i a l i s t s  a n d  t h a t  its a c t i o n s  a r e  g l a r i n g l y
92
c o n t r a r y  to t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  C h a r t e r " .  T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n
93
wa s  c o n s i s t e n t  in its c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t .  
M o s c o w ’s n e g a t i v e  r e s p o n s e  c a n  be e x p l a i n e d  by a n u m b e r  
of f a c t o r s .  Its d i s a p p o i n t m e n t  w a s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  in v i e w  
of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  an a g r e e m e n t  ha d  b e e n  r e a c h e d  w i t h o u t  
S o v i e t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  b y  a U n i t e d  N a t i o n s - s a n c t i o n e d  
c o m m i t t e e , o n  a p r o b l e m  t h a t  w a s  f i r s t  r a i s e d  in the U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  by a S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e .M o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  p e r h a p s , t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n ’s p r i n c i p a l  a d v e r s a r y , t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  h a d  
p l a y e d  a c r u c i a l  r o l e  in s u c c e s s f u l l y  e f f e c t i n g  an a g r e e m e n t .  
M o r e o v e r , i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  e s c a l a t i n g  t e n s i o n  in E u r o p e  
and t h e  ’C o l d  W a r ’, a n  a g r e e m e n t  on th e  I n d o n e s i a n  Q u e s t i o n  
b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  t h e  t h r e e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  'a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  
c a m p '[t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a  a n d  B e l g i u m ]  c o u l d  o n l y  
h a v e  i n v i t e d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ’s w r a t h . F i n a l l y , I n d o n e s i a ,  
an ’a s s o c i a t e  m e m b e r ’ o f  t h e  'anti - i m p e r i a l i s t  c a m p ’ w a s  
a p p a r e n t l y  b e i n g  d r a g g e d  i n t o  the 'a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  c a m p ’ 
a n d  t h i s  w a s  s e e n  as a b l o w  to S o v i e t  p r e s t i g e  a n d  p o w e r  
in A s i a .D e v e l o p m e n t s  in I n d o n e s i a  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  R e n v i l l e  
A g r e e m e n t  o n l y  r e i n f o r c e d  S o v i e t  a p p r e h e n s i o n s .
92.SWB:US5R and Eastern Europe,Part 1,16-19 January 1948,p.41.
93.For example,three months after its signing,Krasnaya zvezda.the Soviet 
Army newspaper,criticised the agreement along the following lines:"The 
Republic had withdrawn its troops from various areas of Java and Sumatra, 
thus leaving the Dutch in control of all the most strategic areas.US 
monopolists,too had greatly benefited as a result of the agreement.Not 
content with persuading the Indonesians to yield at this point,the most 
strenous e fforts had been made to induce the Republican representatives 
to become part of the USI which had as its aim the final liquidation of 
the struggle being waged by the Indonesian people for its national 
independence".See Krasnaya zvezda, 17 April 1948.
T h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  c a u s e d  g r e a t  i n t e r n a l
d i s s e n s i o n s  w i t h i n  the I n d o n e s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t ,w i t h  th e  M u s l i m
M a s j u m i  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l i s t  P a r t y , w h i c h
i n i t i a l l y  s u p p o r t e d  the n e g o t i a t i o n s , w i t h d r a w i n g  f r o m  A m i r
S y a r i f f u d i n ’s c a b i n e t ,  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  o p p o s i n g  it as
long as h e  r e m a i n e d  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r .T h i s  w a s  d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e
for th e  fal l  o f  A m i r ' s  c a b i n e t  a n d  on 25 J a n u a r y  1 9 4 8 , he
r e t u r n e d  th e  m a n d a t e  to S u k a r n o . T h e  P r e s i d e n t  a p p o i n t e d
the V i c e - P r e s i d e n t , H a t t a ,  a n d  h e  f o r m e d  a p r e s i d e n t i a l
c a b i n e t .S o v i e t  s p o k e s m e n  a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  fal l  o f  A m i r ' s
c a b i n e t , i n  ' cold war' t e r m s , t o  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  ’US  i m p e r i a l i s t s ' .
V a s i l e v a  a r g u e d :
The latest events taking place in Indonesia - the resignation 
of the Indonesian Government and the formation of tfhe rightist 
Government under Mohammad Hatta,the majority of the members 
of which are pro-American in sympathy - bear witness to direct 
intervention of Wall Street into the internal a ffa irs of the 
Indonesian Republic.
The Americans are attempting to unite reactionary groups 
from the Masjumi and National Parties and are relying on them 
in their expansionist policy:but the mass of the people,the 
working class in Indonesia,is carrying on a struggle against the 
provocations of American imperialism.They are demanding the 
replacement of the pro-American Government and the return 
of the socialist Amir Sjariffudin.94
T h e  c r i t i c a l  S o v i e t  r e s p o n s e  to t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of t h e  H a t t a  c a b i n e t  i n i t i a t e d  a p e r i o d  o f  c o o l  g o v e r n m e n t -
t o - g o v e r n m e n t  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  M o s c o w  a n d  J o g j a k a r t a .
T h e  S o v i e t  Un i o n ,  h o w e v e r , c o n t i n u e d  to s u p p o r t  th e  ' R e p u b l i c '
a n d  'People' o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  t h o u g h  n o t  its 'G o v e r n m e n t ',w h i c h
w a s  v i e w e d  a s  b e i n g  m a d e  u p  o f  ' e x t r e m e  r i g h t - w i n g , p r o -  
9 e)
US e l e m e n t s ' .  T h i s  t h r e e - p r o n g e d  a p p r o a c h  p l a c e d  the 
U S S R  in a d i f f i c u l t y  in its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  R e p u b l i c .
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94. Vasileva,"Bor’ba demokratischekoe...",pp.84-85.
95.SUJB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,3-6 Feb.1948,p.32.On 7 February 1948 
Pravda wrote that Hatta's cabinet ’’was composed of pro-American 
elements,formed under the influence of the Three Power Commission[CG0X 
□ri 6 February the same paper wrote:"the situation in Indonesia has 
become strained since the American imperialists succeeded in removing 
the government of Amir Sjariffudin and creating a cabinet of extreme 
rightist pro-American elements".Pravda.6 Feb.1948.
W h i l e  M o s c o w  s u p p o r t e d  the I n d o n e s i a n  R e p u b l i c  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f o r u m s  on g r o u n d s  of p r i n c i p l e  [the n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  
s t r u g g l e ] ,  at t h e  s a m e  time, t h e  R e p u b l i c ' s  G o v e r n m e n t  
w a s  c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  its a n t i - c o m m u n i s m  a n d  its o r i e n t a t i o n s  
t o w a r d s  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
Th e  s p l i t  b e t w e e n  the lef t  a n d  r i g h t - w i n g  n a t i o n a l i s t  
forces, w h i c h  h a d  b e c o m e  m o r e  p r o n o u n c e d  f o l l o w i n g  the 
s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t , w a s  w o r s e n e d  by the 
d o w n f a l l  of A m i r  S j a r i f f u d i n ’s 'le f t i s t '  c a b i n e t . F r o m  J u l y
1947 o n w a r d s , t h e  S a y a p  K i r i  ( L e f t  F a c t i o n ) , a  c o a l i t i o n  
of th e  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y , t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  S o c i a l i s t  Youth, 
the L a b o u r  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  P K I , w a s  the p r i n c i p a l  p r o p  of 
A m i r  S y a r i f f u d i n 's p o w e r  b a s e . F r o m  J u l y  1 9 4 7  u n t i l  h i s  
r e s i g n a t i o n  in J a n u a r y  1 9 4 8 , A m i r  w a s  a l s o  t h e  D e f e n c e  M i n i s t e r ,  
an d  h e  s u c c e e d e d  in b u i l d i n g  u p  a p e r s o n a l  f o l l o w i n g  in 
b o t h  t h e  r e g u l a r  a r m y  a n d  the l a s k j a r s  (mi 1 i t i a s ) .T h e  
S a y a p  K i r i  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t .A f t e r  t h e  fall
of A m i r ' s  c a b i n e t , t h e  S a y a p  K i r i  w a s  d e n i e d  p o s t s  in t h e  
n e w  H a t t a  c a b i n e t .P a r t l y  to p r e s s u r e  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t , t h e  
S a y a p  Kir i  w a s  r e o r g a n i s e d  as the F r o n t  D e m o k r a s i  R a k y a t  
(FDR) o r  the P e o p l e ' s  D e m o c r a t i c  Front, on 26 F e b r u a r y  1948. ^
T h è  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w e l c o m e d  t h e  a m a l g a m a t i o n  o f  
the left p a r t i e s  i n t o  t h e  F D R . R a d i o  M o s c o w  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  
s o c i a l i s t - c o m m u n i s t  c o a l i t i o n  as 'a m i l e s t o n e  in the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t  a g a i n s t  
c o l o n i a l  r u l e ’ a n d  a s  ' e v i d e n c e  of the c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  
the d e m o c r a t i c  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  in I n d o n e s i a T h e  c o a l i t i o n  
w a s  a l s o  l a u d e d  a s  ' f r e s h  p r o o f  o f  the n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n
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96.Kahin,Op cit,pp.259-260.
m o v e m e n t ' s  v i t a l i t y  a n d  of th e  d e m o c r a t i c  f o r c e s ’ d e t e r m i n a t i o n
97
to f i g h t  fo r  t h e i r  c o u n t r y ' s  l i b e r a t i o n’. T h e  p r i n c i p a l
r e a s o n  f o r  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  of t h e  F D R  w a s  t h e  fall of A m i r ' s
c a b i n e t , w h i c h  w a s  i d e o l o g i c a l l y  a n d  p o l i t i c a l l y  v i e w e d
as b e i n g  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  the S o v i e t  d e f i n i t i o n  of the
'a n t i - i m p e r i a l  i s t  c a m p ',w h e r e a s  t h e  H a t t a  c a b i n e t  w a s  s e e n
as b e i n g  m o r e  in l i n e  w i t h  t h e  'a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  camp'.
In a d d i t i o n  to th e  d o w n f a l l  o f  A m i r ' s  c a b i n e t ,  S o v i e t -
I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  a f f e c t e d  by th e  P K I ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n
98
in t h e  C a l c u t t a  C o n f e r e n c e ^  t h e  f a i l u r e  to e s t a b l i s h  c o n s u l a r
r e l a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  o u t b r e a k  of th e  M a d i u n  r e v o l t .
B e t w e e n  17 a n d  21 F e b r u a r y  1948, a c o n f e r e n c e
of ’Y o u t h  a n d  S t u d e n t s  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  F i g h t i n g  F o r
F r e e d o m  a n d  I n d e p e n d e n c e ',s p o n s o r e d  b y  t h e  W o r l d  F e d e r a t i o n
of D e m o c r a t i c  Y o u t h  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  U n i o n  o f  S t u d e n t s ,
m e t  in C a l c u t t a , I n d i a . A  n u m b e r  of W e s t e r n  o b s e r v e r s  h a v e
c r e d i t e d  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  w i t h  b e i n g  th e  v e n u e  w h e r e  ’o r d e r s
f r o m  M o s c o w ’ w e r e  t r a n s m i t t e d  f o r  r e v o l t s  in S o u t h e a s t  
99
Asia. I n d o n e s i a  w a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  b y  M a r u t o
D a r u s m a n , a  M i n i s t e r  of S t a t e  in A m i r ' s  c a b i n e t  a n d  a l e a d i n g
PKI m e m b e r ,  a n d  S u r i p n o , a  s e c o n d - e c . h l e o n  P K I  leader. T h e
c o n f e r e n c e  d e n o u n c e d  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t , w h i c h  h a d  b e e n
s i g n e d  b y  t h e  A m i r  c a b i n e t  o n l y  a f e w  w e e k s  e a r l i e r . l t
97.SWB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,2-6 March 1948,p.40.
98.For details,see McV/ey,The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian 
Uprisings,(Ithaca,Cornell Modern Indonesian Project,1958).
99.See Selig Harrison,The Widening Gulf:Asian Nationalism and American 
Policy,(New York:Free Press, 1978),p.57;Frant Träger,Marxism in Southeast 
Asia,(Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,1959),pp.262-273;Brian 
Crozier,Southeast Asia in Turmoil,(London:Cox and UJyman,1965),p.64.
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a l s o  n a m e d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  as the p r i n c i p a l  e n e m y  o f
the d e m o c r a t i c  f o r c e s  . T h i s  c r e a t e d  a n  a n o m a l o u s  s i t u a t i o n
for the PKI as r e g a r d s  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e , f o r  it w a s
the D u t c h  w h o  w e r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e i r  m a i n  e n e m y . I t  t h u s  o p e n e d
the PKI a n d  t h e  F D R  to c h a r g e s  o f  b e i n g  ’t o o l s ’ of t h e
S o v i e t  U nion.
T o  t h e  g r o w i n g  S o v i e t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t ' s
p o l i c i e s  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  F D R , n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  D u t c h , r e l a t i o n s
w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c i e s  w a s  a d d e d
th e  c o n t r o v e r s y  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  c o n s u l a r
r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  M o s c o w  a n d  J o g j a k a r t a . I n  D e c e m b e r  1947,
P r e s i d e n t  S u k a r n o  a n d  t h e  A m i r  G o v e r n m e n t  a p p o i n t e d  S u r i p n o ,
a l e a d i n g  PK I  m e m b e r ,  as A m b a s s a d o r - P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y , w i t h
full p o w e r s  to e s t a b l i s h  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e
S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e . j n
J a n u a r y  1 9 4 8 , S u r i p n o  m a d e  c o n t a c t  w i t h  M . A . S i  1 i n , t h e  S o v i e t
A m b a s s a d o r  t o  P r a g u e , C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ,  a n d  b o t h  s i d e s  a g r e e d  in
1 0?
p r i n c i p l e  to e x c h a n g e  c o n s u l s .  ^ H o w e v e r , A m i r ’s G o v e r n m e n t
w a s  t h e n  n e g o t i a t i n g  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  a n d  as A m i r
ha d  no i n t e n t i o n  o f  a b o r t i n g  o r  r u i n i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s
w i t h  t h e  D u t c h , h e  i g n o r e d  t h e  S u r i p n o - S i 1 in u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
W h e n  H a t t a  r e p l a c e d  A m i r , h e  t o o  f a i l e d  to p u r s u e  t h e  m a t t e r
as he w a s  m o r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in m a i n t a i n i n g  g o o d  r e l a t i o n s
w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  t h e  D u t c h . T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ’s
100.Hands Off Southeast Asia,(Conference of the Youth and Students of 
Southeast Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence,Calcutta,19- 
2B February 1948),No. 1,April 1948,pp.4 and 32.
101 .Ali Sastroamidjojo,Milestones On My Journey,(St.Lucia,Queensland:University 
of Queensland Press,l979),p.161;R.Kreutzer,The Madiun Affair:Hatta 's 
Betrayal of Indonesia's First Social Revolution,(James Cook University 
of North Queensland,Southeast Asian Studies Committee,occasional Paper 
No.10,I981),p.16;Pravda,8 June 1948. •
102.McVey,The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,p.48.
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c r i t i c i s m  o f  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t  as ’r i g h t - w i n g '  m a y  a l s o  h a v e  
i n f l u e n c e d  H a t t a  to g i v e  M o s c o w  the c o l d  s h o u l d e r .
In e a r l y  M a y  1 9 4 8 , A l i m i n ,  a m e m b e r  of the PKI 
P o l i t b u r o ,  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  th e  p a r t y  w a s  w i l l i n g  to p a r t i c i p a t e  
in a ' n a t i o n a l  c o a l i t i o n ’ to c o n f r o n t  t h e  D u t c h  in g r e a t e r  
unity, a n d  t h i s  c r e a t e d  s o m e  h o p e  t h a t  a ’N a t i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t ’
m i g h t  be r e a l i s e d .  Then, on 22 M a y  1 9 4 8 , t h e  S o v i e t
E m b a s s y  in P r a g u e  * i n f o r m e d  S u r i p n o  t h a t  t h e  C o n s u l a r  T r e a t y
104
h a d  b e e n  r a t i f i e d .  On 26 M a y , R a d i o  M o s c o w  u n i l a t e r a l l y  
a n n o u n c e d :
As a resu lt of the negotiations that were held in Prague, 
an agreement has been signed for the establishment of 
consular relations and for the exchange of consuls 
between Moscow and Jogjakarta.105
W h y  d i d  M o s c o w  t a k e  the u n i l a t e r a l  d e c i s i o n ?  N o  d e f i n i t e
a n s w e r  c a n  b e  g i v e n  to t h i s  q u e s t i o n  b u t  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l
p o s s i b l e  r e a s o n s . l t  w a s  p a r t l y  to c o m p e l  th e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t
to e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n . I t  w a s  a i m e d
at d a m a g i n g  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  w h i c h  w a s  b e i n g  i m p l e m e n t e d
by t h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  p u s h i n g  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
a n d  the N e t h e r l a n d s  a w a y  f r o m  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n
G o v e r n m e n t . l t  c o u l d  a l s o  h a v e  b e e n  a i m e d  a t  p r o v i d i n g  the
F D R  w i t h  a f r e s h  i s s u e  to c o m b a t  the H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t .
F i n a l l y , i t  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  a i m e d  a t  a b o r t i n g  t h e  F D R ' s  p l a n
of c o o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  the G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h u s  a t  k e e p i n g
the R e p u b l i c  in c o n s t a n t  c r i s i s . T h e r e  is a l s o  a n  i d e o l o g i c a l
e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  A l i m i n ' s  s u g g e s t i o n  w o u l d
1Q3.Kahin,0p c it ,p.231 ;Antonie C.A.Dake,In the Spirit of the Red Banteng,
(The HagueiMouton and Co.,l973),pp.9-10;Kreutzer,Dp c it ,pp.12-15.
1Q4.Kahin,Dp c it ,p.268.
105.SWB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,25-27 May 1948,p.30;Pravda,26 May
1948.
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h a v e  b e e n  t a n t a m o u n t  to th e  a d o p t i o n  of a s t r a t e g y  o f  ' u n i t e d  
f r o n t  f r o m  a b o v e ' . T h i s  w o u l d  h a v e  c o n t r a d i c t e d  t;he ' u n i t e d  
f r o n t  f r o m  b e l o w '  'line' a d o p t e d  s i n c e  t h e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  
of t h e  'two c a m p s '  t h e o r y .H ence, the a t t e m p t  to c o m p r o m i s e  
t h e  g r o w i n g  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  th e  l e f t  a n d  r i g h t -  
w i n g  n a t i o n a l i s t  f o r c e s  a n d  the i n t e n d e d  c o a l i t i o n ,  m a y  
h a v e  b e e n  p a r t  o f  the m o t i v a t i o n  b e h i n d  t h e  r a d i o  b r o a d c a s t .
T h e  ' c o n s u l a r  a f f a i r *  w a s  e m b a r r a s s i n g  to the
H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e , i t  w a s  c l e a r  that
the H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  n o t  k e e n  on e s t a b l i s h i n g  c o n s u l a r
107
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  
d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  t h e  S o v i e t  i n i t i a t i v e  w a s  b o t h  
e m b a r r a s s i n g  a n d  a n n o y i n g  to M o s c o w ,  t h e  m o r e  s o  s i n c e  
the S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  t h e  o n l y  g r e a t  p o w e r  t h a t  h a d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
s u p p o r t e d  t h e  R e p u b l i c  in t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  s i n c e  F e b r u a r y  
1946.
O n  8 J u n e  1948, Y . V i k t o r o v ,  a p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s t  
w i t h  P r a v d a ,a n a l y s e d  t h e  c a u s e s  a n d  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of th e  
' c o n s u l a r  a f f a i r ' . H e  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  the c o n s u l a r  a g r e e m e n t  
w a s  ' g r e e t e d  w i t h  g r e a t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  by I n d o n e s i a n  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n , w h i c h  i n t e r p r e t e d  it a s  an i m p o r t a n t  step, c o n t r i b u ­
ting to t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  a n d  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of f r i e n d l y
108
r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the p e o p l e  o f  t h e  U S S R  a n d  I n d o n e s i a ' .
T h i s  c l a i m  is h i g h l y  e x a g g e r a t e d ,  as the o n l y  s u p p o r t  fo r  
the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  c a m e  f r o m  the FDR.
A g u s  S a l i m , t h e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  in the H a t t a  c a b i n e ^ m a i n t a i n e d
106.Dey Hong Lee,Gp c it ,p.177. ^
107.This was evident in the intimation by Abdul Gafar Pringgodiqo.the Chief 
Secretary of President Sukarno,to Coert DuBois.the Chief American 
delegate to the CGD.that "as long as Hatta remained Prime Minister, 
there would be no exchange of consuls with the Soviet Union".Cited
in Ibid,p.197;Also see Michael Leifer,Indonesia's Foreign Policy,(London:




that S u r i p n o  d i d  n o t  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  to s i g n  the a g r e e m e n t .
V i k t o r o v  a r g u e d  t h a t  S a l i m ’s c l a i m  w a s  a ’m y t h ’.He is
c e r t a i n l y  c o r r e c t  as S u r i p n o  h a d  b e e n  g i v e n  t h e  m a n d a t e
by S u k a r n o  a n d  A m i r , a s  w a s  l a t e r  a c k n o w l e d g e d  by the H a t t a  
110
G o v e r n m e n t .  T h e  D u t c h  l a t e r  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  R e p u b l i c  
had v i o l a t e d  t h e  R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  t h r o u g h  its d e c i s i o n  
to e x c h a n g e  c o n s u l s  w i t h  the S o v i e t  U n i o n . I n  V i k t o r o v ' s  
a n a l y s i s :
... it appears that the representatives from Holland[in Indonesia] 
with the support of the ever present USA, are attempting to 
interpret the Renville Agreement in such a way as to mean that 
by virtues of this agreement, the Indonesian Republic allegedly 
does not have the right to establish independent relations with 
the outside world.It is extremely significant that this far-fetched  
argument was not advanced until it became a guestion of establishing 
consular relations between Indonesia and the USSR, although the 
Indonesian Republic had established diplomatic relations with Egypt,
Syria,Lebanon,Iran and Afghanistan,which had recognised it; and 
although it had been recognised de facto by Holland,the USA,
England,Australia,India and the Philippines,who have their own 
consuls in Indonesia.111
In the f i n a l  a n a l y s i s , V i k t o r o v  b l a m e d  t h e  " D u t c h  a n d  US
'masters' in I n d o n e s i a "  f o r  p u t t i n g  ’s e r i o u s ’ d i p l o m a t i c
p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  to d e s i s t  f r o m  e s t a b l i s h i n g
112
c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the S o v i e t  U n ion. it w a s  c e r t a i n l y
t ru e  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  the D u t c h  o b j e c t e d  to th e
113
S u r i p n o - S i 1 in e x c h a n g e  of n o t e s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
n o t  to r e c i p r o c a t e  th e  S o v i e t  i n i t i a t i v e  w a s  t a k e n  b y  H a t t a  
a n d  his c a b i n e t , w h i c h  h a d  n o  i n t e n t i o n  of a n t a g o n i s i n g  
the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e n  in its 'cold w a r ’ r i v a l r y  w i t h  
the S o v i e t  U n i o n . T h e  R e p u b l i c a n  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  c a s h i n g
109
109.Cited in Ibid.




in o n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ g o o d w i l l  to p r e s s u r e  the D u t c h  to 
w i t h d r a w  f r o m  I n d o n e s i a . T h i s ,  m o r e  t h a n  a n y  o t h e r  f actor, 
e x p l a i n e d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  of th e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  if 
t h e r e  w a s  a n y  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o r  D u t c h  p r e s s u r e ,  it w o u l d  
o n l y  h a v e  r e i n f o r c e d  the R e p u b l i c a n  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  o w n
inci i n a t i o n .
T h e  g r o w i n g  c h i l l  in S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  
was, h o w e v e r ,  k e p t  u n d e r  r e s t r a i n t  b y  M o s c o w . T h u s ,  s i x  
m o n t h s  a f t e r  t h e  fall o f  S j a r i f f u d i n ’s g o v e r n m e n t ,  o n e  
w r i t e r  w a s  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  " I n d o n e s i a  a n d  V i e t n a m  a d h e r e  
to t h e  a n t i - i m p e r i a l  ist c a m p ’. A f t e r  s p e a k i n g  o f  th e  s t r e n g t h  
of th e  a n t i  - i m p e r i a l i s t  f r o n t  a n d  the c o m m u n i s t - o r i e n t e d  
p a r t i e s  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  he f i n a l l y  g o t  a r o u n d  to m e n t i o n i n g  
the H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  b u t  s e e m e d  to d i s m i s s  it as o n l y  a 
b r i e f  i n t e r r u p t i o n  of an i r r e s t i b l e  t r e n d . " I n  the I n d o n e s i a n  
R e p u b l i c , t h e  p o p u l a r  m a s s e s  u n a n i m o u s l y  d e m a n d  the r e t u r n  
to p o w e r  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  l e f t  p a r t i e s”. 
B e s i d e s  p o p u l a r  b a c k i n g ,  he s e e m e d  to feel c e r t a i n  o f  s t r o n g  
s u p p o r t  in t h e  a r m y : " I t  is i n d i c a t i v e  t h a t  t h e  a t t e m p t  
to r e p l a c e  t h e  c o m m a n d  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  a r m y  w h i c h  is 
d e v o t e d  to t h e  p e o p l e ,c a l l e d  f o r t h  s u c h  i n d i g n a t i o n  a m o n g  
the m a s s e s  t h a t  the g o v e r n m e n t  had to r e f r a i n  f r o m  it". 114
It w a s  o n l y  a f t e r  the d i s a s t e r  of the a b o r t i v e  C o m m u n i s t  
u p r i s i n g  in S e p t e m b e r  194 8  t h a t  S o v i e t  c o m m e n t a t o r s  
u n e q u i v o c a l l y  a s s i g n e d  I n d o n e s i a  to the ’o t h e r  camp'.
In A u g u s t  1 9 4 8 , th e  P K I  o u t l i n e d  a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
s t r a t e g y  for t a k i n g  p o w e r . I t  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  b y  Mu s s o ,  l o n g
in .A .Kheifets/'Natsional’no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v kolonial'nykh i 
zavisimykh stranakh",Molodoi bolshevik,No.7,1948,pp.50-51.
121
a p r o m i n e n t  m e m b e r  of t h e  PKI, w h o s e  a r r i v a l  in J o g j a k a r t a  
on 11 A u g u s t  m a r k e d  an e n d  o f  a r e s i d e n c e  of m o r e  tha n  
t w e n t y  y e a r s  in th e  S o v i e t  U n i o n , i n t e r r u p t e d  o n l y  in 193 5  
for a b r i e f  v i s i t  to h i s  n a t i v e  c o u n t r y .I m m e d i a t e l y  on 
r e t u r n i n g  h o m e , M u s s o  a s s u m e d  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  the PKI, 
had t h e  P o l i t b u r o  i n c o r p o r a t e  h i s  v i e w s  i n t o  a r e s o l u t i o n  
c a l l e d  ’T h e  N e w  R o a d  f o r  th e  I n d o n e s i a n  R e p u b l i c '  a n d
115
set a b o u t  e x p l a i n i n g  h i s  p l a n s  to I n d o n e s i a ’s c o m m u n i s t s .
M u s s o ' s  p r o g r a m m e ,  o r  'G o t t w a i d  Plan* as h e  c a l l e d  it,
e n v i s a g e d  a c o m m u n i s t  t a k e o v e r  s o m e w h a t  a l o n g  t h e  l i n e s
of the t h e n  r e c e n t  c o u p  in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . T h e  G o v e r n m e n t
of H a t t a  w a s  t o  b e  s u b j e c t e d  to p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  f r o m
a f u t u r e  c o m m u n i s t - l e d  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  f o r c e d
to a b d i c a t e  to a n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  r e g i m e . M u s s o  a t t e m p t e d
to a p p l y  th e  'two c a m p s '  d o c t r i n e  to I n d o n e s i a n  c o n d i t i o n s
and a r g u e d  t h a t  " f o r  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n , t h e r e  is
no o t h e r  p l a c e  t h a n  in t h e  a n t i  - i m p e r i a l  ist c amp' T h i s
wa s  c l e a r l y  e l u c i d a t e d  b y  B u r u h  ( L a b o u r ) , t h e  n e w s p a p e r
o f S O B S I , t h e  l a r g e s t  t r a d e  u n i o n  f e d e r a t i o n  in the c o u n t r y
and u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  P K I , o n  3 S e p t e m b e r :
The world is divided into two fronts,the anti-imperialist front 
and the imperialist front.Who rally behind the imperialist front?
All countries with colonies...Imperialist America is the leader of 
of the imperialist front.Uie cannot remain neutral;we must choose 
one of the two fronts.The talk about a 'third force' is nonsense...
The Republic of Indonesia faces not only Dutch imperialism;it faces 
an international imperialism...UJe must find our friends among the 
New Democratic States of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and 
we must immediately exchange consuls with Soviet Russia.We must 
not only make friends with Russia, but we must have a strong 
relationship with Russia.117
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115.The fullest discussion on this aspect can be found in McVey.The Soviet
View of the Indonesian Revolution,pp.59-66;Hartono,"The Indonesian Communist 
Movement, 1965-19^*8:1 ts Development and Relations with the Soviet Union", 
Master's Thesis,Columbia University,1959),pp.85-88.
116.Cited in McVey,The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,p.68.
117.Cited in Kahin,Dp cit,p.279.
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M u s s o 's p r o g r a m m e  h a d  as its i m m e d i a t e  a i m  a c o m m u n i s t
d o m i n a t e d  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  to r e i g n  o v e r  the b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c
1 1 B
r e v o l u t i o n , n o t  a d i c t a t o r s h i p  of th e  p r o l e t a r i a t .  C a n  
it be t a k e n  as i n d i c a t i v e  o f  M o s c o w ' s  t h i n k i n g  on I n d o n e s i a ?
T h e  Link, in t h e  p e r s o n  of Mu s s o ,  b e t w e e n  M o s c o w  a n d  t h e  
n e w  c o u r s e  fo r  the PKI a p p e a r s  m u c h  c l o s e r  t h a n  a n y  k n o w n  
tie b e t w e e n ,  s a y , t h e  S o v i e t s  a n d  th e  I n d i a n  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y ' s  
p r o g r a m m e . A f t e r  h i s  p r o l o n g e d  s t a y  in t h e  S o v i e t  Union,
M u s s o  p r e s u m a b l y  w a s  c o n v e r s a n t  w i t h  S o v i e t  a t t i t u d e s  o n  
the A s i a n  s i t u a t i o n : b u t  it c a n n o t  be r u l e d  o u t  t h a t  the 
S o v i e t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  d i d  n o t  e x t e n d  b e y o n d  a g e n e r a l  s a n c t i o n  
or t h a t  M u s s o , i f  h e  c a r r i e d  s p e c i f i c  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  m o d i f i e d  
t h e m . T h e r e  a r e  n e v e r t h e l e s s  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  to s u s p e c t  
t h a t  M u s s o  w a s  t r y i n g  h i s  u t m o s t  to k e e p  in c l o s e  s t e p  
w i t h  M o s c o w . F o r  o n e  th i n g ,  I n d o n e s i a  w a s  a c o u n t r y  in w h i c h  
the S o v i e t  U n i o n  c l e a r l y  m a n i f e s t e d  its i n t e r e s t  in v a r i o u s  
ways, i n c l u d i n g  its s t a n d s  in t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  a n d  its 
a t t e m p t  to e s t a b l i s h  c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  t h e  p r e v i o u s  M a y . A l s o ,  
in v i e w  o f  t h e  o p e n  S o v i e t  s p l i t  w i t h  Y u g o s l a v i a  the p r e v i o u s  
June, it is an e x t r e m e l y  u n p r o p i t i o u s  t i m e  f o r  a f o r e i g n  
c o m m u n i s t  p a r t y  o r  its l e a d e r  to s h o w  i n i t i a t i v e .M u s s o  
d i d  s e e m  to g o  o u t  o f  h i s  w a y  to d e m o n s t r a t e  h i s  o r t h o d o x y .
T h e  p a r t  of the P o l i t b u r o ’s r e s o l u t i o n  d e v o t e d  to o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
r e f o r m s ,  for e x a m p l e ,  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  ’g o o d  n o t i c e  of t h e
119
l e s s o n  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  e v e n t s  in Y u g o s l a v i a ” h a d  b e e n  taken.
Its c a l l  for t h e  m e r g e r  o f  s e v e r a l  c o m m u n i s t  o r  c o m m u n i s t -  
i n f i l t r a t e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n t o  o n e  c o n s o l i d a t e d
118.Musso/'Sifat Revolusi K ita>,,Revoiusioner,5 September 1948.Cited in McVey,
The Soviet View of the IndoTiesian Revolution>p.64.
119.Djalan Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia,(Jakarta,I953),p.1 1.
c o m m u n i s t  p a r t y  [ h e r e a f t e r  as P K I - M u s s o ]  a n d  for the p a r t y
to a p p e a r  u n d e r  its o w n  n a m e  s o u n d e d  l i k e  t h e  c r i t i c i s m
tha t  M o s c o w  w a s  t h e n  d i r e c t i n g  a t  the Y u g o s l a v  c o m m u n i s t s
for a l l e g e d l y  s u b m e r g i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  in a n a t i o n a l  f r o n t
120
and l o s i n g  t h e i r  ide n t i t y .  T h e  'New R o ad' r e s o l u t i o n  
a l s o  i n c l u d e d  a r i n g i n g  d e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  n e u t r a l i s m  in i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  a n d  an u n c o n d i t i o n a l  c o m m i t m e n t  o f  I n d o n e s i a  
to the S o v i e t  c a m p . G i v e n  the h e a t e d  s t a t e  o f  t h e  C o l d  
War, the g e o g r a p h i c  i s o l a t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a  f r o m  th e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  a n d  t h e  W e s t e r n  n a v a l  p r e d o m i n a n c e  a l o n g  th e  a p p r o a c h e s  
to I n d o n e s i a ,  s u c h  p a r a d i n g  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i s t  a s p e c t  of 
the p r o p o s e d  r e v o l u t i o n  is d i f f i c u l t  to c o m p r e h e n d . l t  a l s o  
c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  the b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  V i e t n a m e s e  c o m m u n i s t s ,  
w h o  in s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  i s o l a t i o n  w e r e  p l a y i n g  d o w n  
the c o m m u n i s t  n a t u r e  o f  t h e i r  r e v o l u t i o n . T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
s t a n c e  m a y  w e l l  r e p r e s e n t  a n  o b e i s a n c e  to M o s c o w . H o w e v e r ,  
g r o w i n g  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  n a t i o n a l i s t s  a n d  c o m m u n i s t s  p r e v e n t e d  
the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  M u s s o ' s  p l a n s . T h i s  e p i s o d e  in t h e  
h i s t o r y  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  C o m m u n i s m  e n d e d  w i t h  t h e  c r u s h i n g  
of the c o m m u n i s t  a r m e d  u p r i s i n g  a t  Madi u n ,  in S e p t e m b e r  194 8  
an u p r i s i n g  a p p a r e n t l y  n o t  i n s p i r e d  b y  lon g  t e r m  s t r a t e g y
b u t  h a s t i l i t y  i m p r o v i s e d  to m e e t  th e  e x i g e n c i e s  o f  t h e  
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m o m e n t .  x
W h a t  w a s  the S o v i e t  r e s p o n s e  to t h e  M a d i u n  r e v o l t ?  
A c c o r d i n g  to a r e p o r t  by a m e m b e r  of t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  O f  
120.See Ibid.
121.See S.Soerjono.On Musso's Return,(Jakarta:Yayasan Pembaruan,1963); 
McVey.The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution,pp.58-70.
the CGO, M o s c o w  H o m e  S e r v i c e  in R u s s i a n , o n  19 S e p t e m b e r ,  
s t a t e d :
There has been a People's Government set up in Madiun and 
People's Committees are being established in other leading 
towns.This was a popular uprising against the Government 
of tfce Fascist Japanese Quislings,Soekarno and Hatjta.122
B e t w e e n  25 a n d  27 S e p t e m b e r ,  th e  S o v i e t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a g e n c y ,
T A S S  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  "a c o m m u n i s t  G o v e r n m e n t  s e t  u p  in M a d i u n
w a s  e n j o y i n g  a s t r o n g  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  a m a s s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n
123
had p r o c l a i m e d  l o y a l t y  to t h e  M a d i u n  G o v e r n m e n t " .  C h a r l e s  
M c L a n e  has, h o w e v e r ,  q u e s t i o n e d  th e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  t h e s e  
r e p o r t s ,  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  "it is w h o l l y  u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
S o v i e t  n e w s  m e d i a  to r e s p o n d  s o  p r o m p t l y  to r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  c h a r g e s  r a i s e d  
in the b r o a d c a s t  a g a i n s t  S u k a r n o  a n d  H a t t a  h a d  n o t  b e e n  
m a d e  p r i o r  to M a d i u n " f  ^
M c L a n e ’s c l a i m  c a n  b e  o b j e c t e d  to o n  a n u m b e r  
of g r o u n d s .G e n e r a l  A . H . N a s u t i o n , t h e  f o r m e r  C h i e f  of S t a f f  
of the I n d o n e s i a n  A r m e d  F o r c e s  a n d  M i n i s t e r  fo r  D e f e n c e  
a n d  I n t e r n a l  S e c u r i t y ,  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  he w a s  t o l d  by a g o v e r n ­
m e n t  m e m b e r  o n  20 S e p t e m b e r  t h a t  M o s c o w  h a d  e x p r e s s e d  s u p p o r t
125
for th e  ' M a d i u n  c o u p 1. T h i s  c o u l d  o n l y  h a v e  b e e n  t r a n s m i t t e d
t h r o u g h  a r a d i o  b r o a d c a s t .K a h i n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h
a s i m i l a r  b r o a d c a s t  w a s  n o t  b e a m e d  in I n d o n e s i a n  o r  in
a n y  o t h e r  l a n g u a g e , t h e  " r e p o r t  o f  t h i s  b r o a d c a s t  w a s  a l m o s t
126
i m m e d i a t e l y  m a d e  k n o w n  to t h e  t o p  R e p u b l i c a n  l e a d e r s " .
122. Kahin, 0p_cit, p. 294;McLane, 0p_cit, p. A10.
123.SWB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,24-27 September 1948,p.80.
124.McLane,Op_cit,p.410.
125.Interview with Gen.Nasution on 14 April 1984,Jakarta.
126.Kahin,Op c it ,p.294,fn.68.
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S e c o n d l y ,  it is c o r r e c t  t h a t  the c h a r g e s  m a d e  a g a i n s t  S u k a r n o  
an d  H a t t a  h a d  n o t  b e e n  m a d e  p r i o r  to t h e  e v e n t s  in M a d i u n , e v e n
t h o u g h  M o s c o w  h a d  b e e n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  h o s t i l e  t o w a r d s  the
H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  s i n c e  its i n s t a l l a t i o n  in J a n u a r y  1948.
It is h i g h l y  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  th e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  d e s i s t e d  f r o m
c o n t i n u i n g  w i t h  t h e s e  c h a r g e s  f o l l o w i n g  the s u c c e s s f u l
p u t t i n g  d o w n  o f  t h e  r e v o l t . H o w e v e r ,w i t h i n  a f e w  m o n t h s
of the M a d i u n  u p r i s i n g s , t h e s e  c h a r g e s  w e r e  r e p e a t e d  a n d
this l e n d s  c r e d e n c e  to t h e  v i e w  t h a t  th e  19 S e p t e m b e r  r a d i o
b r o a d c a s t  f r o m  M o s c o w  w a s  a u t h e n t i c . l t  is a l s o  w o r t h w h i l e
n o t i n g  t h a t  t h e  M a d i u n  r e v o l t  o c c u r r e d  a t  a t i m e  o f  t e n s e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s :t h e  C h i n e s e  c o m m u n i s t s  a n d  n a t i o n a l i s t s
w e r e  l o c k e d  in a c o n f l i c t  in Ch i n a ,  a n d  in E u r o p e , t h e  B e r l i n
c r i s i s  d o m i n a t e d  E a s t - W e s t  r e l a t i o n s . T h i s  w a s  t h e  h e i g h t
of the ’C o l d  War '  p h a s e  o f  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  s u p e r p o w e r s .
A c o m m u n i s t  c o up, as it m a y  h a v e  a p p e a r e d  in M o s c o w  a n d
led by M u s s o ,  w a s  thus to b e  s u p p o r t e d . T h e  19 S e p t e m b e r
r a d i o  b r o a d c a s t  s h o u l d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  b e  v i e w e d  a g a i n s t  t h e
b a c k d r o p  o f  t h e s e  d e v e l o p m e n t s .
In g e n e r a l ,S o v i e t  c o m m e n t a t o r s  h a v e  i n t e r p r e t e d
the M a d i u n  u p r i s i n g  as a n  e v e n t  'pro v o k e d '  b y  th e  H a t t a
127
G o v e r n m e n t .  This, later, b e c a m e  the 'line' o f  t h e  r e v a m p e d
128
PKI u n d e r  A i d i t ' s  l e a d e r s h i p .  p Q r i n s t a n c e ,  M o d e l  d e s c r i b e d
th e  e v e n t  as f o l l o w s "
... the Indonesian people's struggle for freedom was complicated 
by the activities of internal reactionary forces such as the 
Hatta Government, the leaders of the Masjumi.the Right
127.Guber,"lndoneziia">B.S.E.,p.242;Zakaznikova,"The Early Spread...".pp.408- 
409.
128.See 40 Years PKI,p.45.
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Socialist Parties and the Trotskyists.These groups frightened 
by the rapid rise in the liberation movement and particularly
the role played by the PKI, set out to destroy the democratic 
camp.In September 1948,they provoked the Madiun revolt and 
in the reign of terror that followed, the liberation movement 
was severely weakened.129
M o d e l  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  r e v o l t  w a s  ’p r o v o k e d  b y  r e a c t i o n '
in o r d e r  to ' s e r v e  a s  a p r e t e x t  for t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  r e p r i s a l s
a g a i n s t  M u s s o  a n d  o t h e r  c o m m u n i s t s  a n d  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n  
130
l ea d e r s ' .  In h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  M o d e l  p o r t r a y e d  M u s s o  as
131
b e i n g  a ' v i c t i m  o f  r e a c t i o n ' .
A s s e s s m e n t  o f  th e  r e v o l t  h a s  v a r i e d :  s o m e  h a v e
m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  f o r
it ' o r d e r e d’ t h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  to c a r r y  o u t  the 
132
’p r o v o c a t i o n ’. O t h e r s  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  u p r i s i n g
133
w a s  ’o r d e r e d ’ b y  M o s c o w .  B o t h  t h e s e  e x t r e m e  'cold war' 
p o s i t i o n s  i g n o r e  the l o c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  w h i c h  in t h e  f i n a l  
a n a l y s i s ,  w e r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  for t h e  M a d i u n  u p r i s i n g . T h e  d o w n ­
fall o f  t h e  A m i r  G o v e r n m e n t  in J a n u a r y  1 9 4 8 , t h e  d e c i s i o n  
of H a t t a  n o t  to i n c l u d e  a n y  c o m m u n i s t s  in h i s  c a b i n e t ,  
the r e f u s a l  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  to e s t a b l i s h  c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n , t h e  t h r e a t s  e n v i s a g e d  to the P K I -
o r i e n t e d  m i l i t a r y  a n d  l a k s j a r  u n i t s  by t h e  ' r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n
134
p r o g r a m m e ’ l a u n c h e d  b y  the H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  g e n e r a l
t e n s i o n  c a u s e d  b y  M u s s o ’s r e t u r n  a n d  h i s  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n
of t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  i n t o  a s i n g l e  i n t e g r a t e d  p a r t y
a n d  th e  m i l i t a r y  c l a s h e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  l e f t - w i n g  g r o u p s  a n d
the G o v e r n m e n t  f o r c e s  in S o l o  a n d  M a d i u n , t o g e t h e r , c o n t r i b u t e d
129.Model,Op c it ,p.26.
13D.Ibid.
131. Ibid, p.27.
132.See Harrison,Op c it ;Crozier,Op c it .
133.See 40 years of PKI;Model,Op c it ;Guber,,,IndoneziiaM,B.S.E.
Kahin.Op cit,pp.261-266.
to the M a d i u n  a f f a i r .  it is a l s o  w o r t h w h i l e  n o t i n g  tha t
it w a s  n o t  the PKI l e a d e r s h i p  t h a t  i n i t i a t e d  th e  r e v o l t : r a t h e r ,
it w a s  s t a r t e d  by the r e g u l a r  u n i t s  o f  B r i g a d e  25, a n d
o n c e  th e  r e v o l t  b r o k e  out, t h e  PKI l e a d e r s h i p  d e c i d e d  to
136
s u p p o r t  t h e  f a i t  a c c o m p l i .
Of g r e a t e r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  w«.ct. th e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
of t h e  r e v o l t . I t  r a i s e d  t h e  s t a t u s  of S u k a r n o  an d  H a t t a  
w i t h  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  the n o n - c o m m u n i s t  w o r l d . A t  
a t i m e  w h e n  t h e  c o m m u n i s t  m a r c h  in C h i n a  a p p e a r e d  i r r e s i s t i b l e  
and w i t h  th e  o u t b r e a k  o f  c o m m u n i s t - l e d  r e v o l t s  in S o u t h e a s t  
Asia, I n d o n e s i a ' s  s u c c e s s f u l  e x t i n g u i s h i n g  o f  its c o m m u n i s t  
t h r e a t  w o u l d  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  to the S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  t h a t
the R e p u b l i c  c o u l d  be an a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  b u l w a r k  in S o u t h e a s t  
137
Asia. in fact, o n e  r e a s o n  f o r  H a t t a ' s  f u l l - b l o o d e d
r e s p o n s e  w a s  to p r e v e n t  t h e  D u t c h  f r o m  e x p l o i t i n g  t h e  e v e n t
as e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c ' s  p o w e r l e s s n e s s  a n d  s o f t n e s s
t o w a r d s  C o m m u n i s m  a n d  u s i n g  it as a n  e x c u s e  to i n v a d e . T h e
fac t  t h a t  t h e  D u t c h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a t  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , v a n
Roijen, r a i s e d  t h e  i s s u e  of t h e  c o m m u n i s t  t h r e a t  a f t e r
J 138
the M a d i u n  u p r i s i n g  h a d  b e e n  s u p p r e s s e d  l e n d s  c r e d e n c e
to t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  the R e p u b l i c a n  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  o u t
to p r o v e  the p o i n t  t h a t  it c o u l d  c o n t r o l  t h e  c o m m u n i s t
t h r e a t . I n  s p i t e  o f  R o i j e n ' s  a t t e m p t  to r a i s e  t h e  ' c o m m u n i s t
b o g e y ’, it w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  in t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  B r i t a i n
t h e r e  w a s  a b e l i e f  t h a t  the c o m m u n i s t  t h r e a t  in I n d o n e s i a
ha d  s u b s i d e d  t r e m e n d o u s l y .In t h i s  r e g a r d ,  it c a n  be a r g u e d
135.This view was confirmed by Nasution during his interview with the writer 
on 14 April 1984,Jakarta.
136.See A.Reid,The Indonesian National Revolution,1945-1950,(Hawthorn,Victoria: 
Longman,l974),P.143.
137.McMahon,Op c it ,p.244.
138.United Nations Security Council,Official Records,No.388/389 Meeting,
22 December 1948,pp.17-18.
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tha t  W a s h i n g t o n  w a s  c u r e d  of an i 1 l u s i o n , c a r e f u l l y  c u l t i v a t e d
by the Du t c h ,  t h a t  the R e p u b l i c ' s  l e a d e r s  w e r e  c o m m u n i s t
e x t r e m i s t s  d e s e r v i n g  A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  n o n - i n v o l v e m e n t ,  a n d
thus " t h e r e  is r e a s o n  to b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  e a s e  w i t h  w h i c h
the R e p u b l i c  p u t  d o w n  the r e v o l t  h a s  d i s a p p o i n t e d  n o n e
139
m o r e  t h a n  t h e  D u t c h  a u t h o r i t i e s " .  A n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  th e  r e v o l t  w a s  t h a t  the P K I  c o m p l e t e l y  l o s t  
its r o l e  in t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n ,  o t h e r  t h a n  a n e g a t i v e  
o n e . F r o m  b e g i n n i n g  to end, th e  R e v o l u t i o n  w a s  led b y  t h e  
' b o u r g e o i s  n a t i o n a l i s t s '.It is a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e  
M a d i u n  u p r i s i n g  o c c u r r e d  in the c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  D u t c h  a n d  w a s  r e g a r d e d  a s  a 'stab 
in the b a c k ' , w h i c h  p a r t l y  e x p l a i n e d  its f a i l u r e . l t  w a s  
l a r g e l y  d u e  to thftie. n e g a t i v e  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  t h a t  S o v i e t  
c o m m e n t a t o r s  w e r e  l a t e r  to c r i t i c i s e  t h e  P K I  f o r  c o m m i t t i n g  
e r r o r s . F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  in F e b r u a r y  1 9 4 9 , R a d i o  M o s c o w  p o i n t e d  
o u t :
The PKI was given the possibility of carrying on a legal existence.
The weak spot of communist activity in Indonesia at that time was, 
however,the fact that they clung to their tactics developed at 
the time of the underground organization, and this dissipated their 
strength.They even went so far as to form a Socialist Party,thus 
enabling the Right-wing socialists, including...Soetan Sjahrir.to play 
a leading role.140
S i m i l a r l y ,  a t  t h e  J u n e  1949 A c a d e m y  o f  S c i e n c e s  C o n f e r e n c e ,
A . A . G u b e r  d e l i v e r e d  a r e p o r t  o n  the I n d o n e s i a n  s i t u a t i o n
h i g h l i g h t i n g  the P K I ' s  e r r o r s  as f o l l o w s :  t h a t  it f a i l e d
to lea d  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n , t h a t  it s p l i t  t h e  c o m m u n i s t  s t r e n g t h
by t h e  f o r m a t i o n  of the S o c i a l i s t  a n d  L a b o u r  P a r t i e s  i n s t e a d
of c o n c e n t r a t i n g  s t r e n g t h  in t h e  P K I , t h a t  it t o o k  a c o n c i l i a t o r y
a t t i t u d e  r e g a r d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  D u t c h  a n d  a p p r o v e d
the Linggajati Agreement, and that it refused to participate
139.News Bulletin,(New Delhi.indonesian Information Service),No.102,8 Dec.
m srp.i.--------
140.SUIB:1JSSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1.15-17 Feb.l949,p.38.
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o p e n l y  as a p a r t y  in th e  f i r s t  t h r e e  R e p u b l i c a n  g o v e r n m e n t s  
an d  t h e i r  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  o n l y  m i n o r  p o s t s  in t h e  S j a r i f f u d i n  
c a b i n e t .T h e s e  m i s t a k e s ,  a r g u e d  Guber, w e r e  o n l y  c o r r e c t e d  
in l a t e  s u m m e r  o f  1948, u n d e r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Mu s s o ,  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  e a r l i e r  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  M u s s o 's a c t i o n s  
w e r e  p r o b a b l y  in l i n e  w i t h  S o v i e t  t h i n k i n g  o n  I n d o n e s i a .H o w ­
ever, b y  t h e n  it w a s  a l r e a d y  t o o  l a t e : t h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  
r e s p o n d e d  w i t h  ’p o l i c e  m e a s u r e s '  w h i c h  c o u l d  o n l y  b e  a n s w e r e d  
by r e v o l t . S i n c e  th e  p r e v i o u s  w e a k  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i s t s  
ha d  l e f t  th e  p o p u l a c e  u n p r e p a r e d  to t a k e  a r m s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  s i n c e  t h e  u p r i s i n g  w a s  b a d l y  o r g a n i s e d ,
141
the r e v o l t  w a s  e a s i l y  c r u s h e d  b y  t h e  f o r c e s  o f  ' r e a c t i o n ' .
By O c t o b e r  1948, t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  l o o k i n g
a t  I n d o n e s i a  w i t h  a n  e x t r e m e  'two c a m p s '  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  w i t h
I n d o n e s i a  b e i n g  p l a c e d  in t h e  ' i m p e r i a l i s t  c a m p ' .
D e v e l o p m e n t s  in I n d o n e s i a ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o m p l i c a t e d  M o s c o w ' s
c l e a r  c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c . O n  19 D e c e m b e r  1948,
the D u t c h  l a u n c h e d  t h e i r  ' s e c o n d  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n '  a g a i n s t
the R e p u b l i c ,  its t i m i n g  o f  a t t a c k  b e i n g  p a r t l y  i n f l u e n c e d
by th e  w e a k n e s s  a n d  d i v i s i o n  w i t h i n  th e  R e p u b l i c , c a u s e d
by the M a d i u n  r e v o l t  a n d  the f a c t  t h a t  the U n i t e d  N a t i o n s
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  w a s  g o i n g  i n t o  its C h r i s t m a s  r e c e s s i ^ ^
T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e s p o n d e d  b y  c a l l i n g  on the
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  to i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the
r e n e w a l  of h o s t i l i t i e s ' ,  b u t  w h i c h  S o v i e t  c o m m e n t a t o r s
s a w  as an A m e r i c a n  m a n o e u v r e  to " g i v e  t i m e  f o r  th e  D u t c h
141.See Guber,"Indonesiiskii narod v bor'be za nezavisiost",in Krisis kolonial' 
noi_sisterm,(Moscow:Izdatel'stvo Akademii (\lauk SSSR,1949),pp.151-177.
142.See Zhukov,"Sharpening Crisis of the Colonial System A fter World War 
Two",in Crisis Of the Colonial System:National Liberation Struggle of 
the Peoples of East Asia,Paper presented in June 1949 to the Pacific 
Institute of the Academy of Sciences,p.16.Cited in David Dallin,Soviet 
Foreign Policy After Stalin ,(London^ethuen and Co.l960),p.292.
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i m p e r i a l i s t s” to ’c r u s h  th e  I n d o n e s i a n  R e p u b l i c " .
W r i t i n g  in P r a v d a  o n  26 D e c e m b e r ,  V . V i k t o r o v  a r g u e d :
This attack,which can only be defined as an act of unprovoked 
aggression,was the beginning of large scale military operations 
undertaken by the Dutch colonisers in accordance with a plan 
carefully conceived and prepared long ago.The purpose of these 
military operations is obvious:to crush the Indonesian Republic 
and to restore the colonial regime that formerly existed in 
Indonesia. 145
T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  v e h e m e n t l y  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  a t t a c k  c l a i m i n g
t h a t  t h e  " n o t o r i o u s  A m e r i c a n  d o m i n a t e d  'good o f f i c e s ’
c o m m i t t e e  w a s  b u t  a s c r e e n , c o v e r i n g  i n t e n s i v e  p r e p a r a t i o n s
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fo r  r e n e w e d  a g g r e s s i o n " .  M o s c o w  s a w  t h e  D u t c h  a t t a c k  
as b e i n g  c o n d o n e d  b y  the ’i m p e r i a l i s t s '( r e a d :t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  c o l o n i a l  p o w e r s ) . :
" B e h i n d  it s t a n d s  t h e  b i g  i m p e r i a l i s t - r o b b e r s , a l a r m e d  b y  
th e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  o f  the n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t  n o t  
o n l y  in I n d o n e s i a ,  b u t  l i k e w i s e  in C h i n a , M a l a y a , B u r m a  
a n d  I n d o c h i n a " ^
T h e  S o v i e t  c l a i m  t h a t  W a s h i n g t o n  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  
D u t c h  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  R e p u b l i c  i s , h o w e v e r ,  
q u e s t i o n a b l e .T h e r e  is e v i d e n c e  to s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  s t r o n g l y  d i s a p p r o v e d  o f  t h e  D u t c h  a c t i o n . O n  23 D e c e m b e r
1 9 4 8 , t h e  A c t i n g  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e , R .A . L o v e t t , s e n t  a t e l e g r a m  
to P h i l i p  J e s s u p , t h e  A m e r i c a n  D e p u t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  at 
the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  e x p r e s s i n g  the S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t ’s 
c o n c e r n  a t  t h e  D u t c h  a c t i o n :
144.Pravda,27 December 1948.
145.Ibid,26 December 1948.





The Dutch handling of the Indonesian situation has been 
lamentable whether we consider its effects on the Dutch 
themselves,its effects on their future relationship with 
Indonesia,the jeopardy thereby presented to the US 
cooperation with Western Europe on such matters as 
the European Recovery Programme and the North Atlantic 
Pact or in the United Nations' support for the maintenance 
of peace.UJe have no desire to condone or wink at the 
Dutch actions in Indonesia. 148
Lovett also sent the following message to United States
consuls abroad:
By the attack on the moderate Republican Government of 
Sukarno and Hatta,which is the only Government in the Far
East to have met and crushed an all out communist offensive, 
the Dutch may have destroyed the last bridge between the 
West and the Indonesian nationalists, and have given the 
Communists everywhere a weapon of an unanswerable mass 
appeal. 149
These were very strong statements of disapproval of the 
Dutch action.The United States disapproval was influenced 
by two main considerations.First,embarrassment that one 
of its allies had flouted the United Nations and resorted 
to force to settle an issue in an important Asian state. 
Second,it feared that the ’national communists' would fill 
the political vacuum created by the Dutch arrest of Sukarno 
and Hatta.This was something Washington would not have 
tolerated as any form of Communism was anathema to the 
United States.The critical American reaction started a 
process that was to wind up the Dutch colonial empire in 
Indonesia.
Of greater significance was the Soviet decision 
to defend the Republic at the United Nations in spite.of 
the crushing of the communists at Madiun three months earlier 
and the placement of Indonesia in the ’imperialist camp' 




for t h i s  p r o v i d e d  it w i t h  an o p p o r t u n i t y  to r e b u t  p o s s i b l e  
c h a r g e s  t h a t  its ' p r i n c i p l e d '  s t a n c e  on d e c o l o n i z a t i o n  
wa s  h y p o c r i t i c a l .T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a n t e d  to p r e s e n t  i t s e l f  
as a d e f e n d e r  o f  all n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t s  - n o t  
just t h o s e  w h i c h  w e r e  c o m m u n i s t - l e d .T h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a 
c o n v e n i e n t  p r o p a g a n d a  p o i n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
in t h a t  t h e  Dutch, an a l l y  o f  W a s h i n g t o n , w e r e  t h e  c u l p r i t s .
E v e n  t h o u g h  the ' R e p u b l i c '  w a s  d e f e n d e d  a t  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , t h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  u n e q u i v o c a l l y
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c o n d e m n e d . H a t t a  w a s  d e s c r i b e d  as a ' p u p p e t  o f  W a s h i n g t o n ' ,
a n d  in D e c e m b e r  1948, th e  S o v i e t s  a c c u s e d  s o m e  m e m b e r s
of h i s  G o v e r n m e n t  of t r e a c h e r y : " T h e  r e l a t i v e  e a s e  w i t h
w h i c h  t h e  D u t c h  o c c u p i e d  J o g j a k a r t a  a n d  tooV^. t h e  G o v e r n m e n t
p r i s o n e r  ,a l s o  g i v e  r i s e  to s u s p i c i o n  t h a t  t r e a c h e r y  a n d
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b e t r a y a l  in th e  G o v e r n m e n t  h a v e  p l a y e d  a p a r t " .  in 
D e c e m b e r  1 9 4 9 , t h i s  'line' o f  a c c u s a t i o n  w a s  r a d i c a l l y  
a l t e r e d . W r i t i n g  in I z v e s t i a , E . P h y s h e v s k y , a  f e a t u r e  a r t i c l e  
w r i t e r , c l a i m e d :
The Government of Sukarno and Hatta found itself prisoner, 
although it had ample opportunity,together with the Republican 
troops,to evacuate the capital.But the agents of the American 
imperialists did not even give this thought.The farce of the 
imprisonment' staged by them was necessary to camouflage their 
treachery so as to deceive the people,before whom the Government 
hoped to play the role of champion of the Republic'.The imperialists 
needed the further services of these traitors to the Indonesian 
people,in as much as neither the Dutch imperialists nor their 
masters from Wall Street harboured the illusion that the Indonesian 
people would cease to fight for their independence and for a 
free Indonesia. 152




T h e  o b j e c t  o f  t h i s  n e w  ’line' o f  d e n u n c i a t i o n  w a s  to h i g h ­
light t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  the m o d e r a t e  R e p u b l i c a n  
l e a d e r s h i p  a n d  the 'i m p e r i a l i s t s ’.T h i s  w a s  l a r g e l y  f u e l e d  
by the R e p u b l i c ’s d e c i s i o n  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the R o u n d  
T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e ( R T C )  in T h e  H ague, a c o n f e r e n c e  w h i c h  
f i n a l l y  c u l m i n a t e d  in t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  I n d o n e s i a  in 
D e c e m b e r  1949.
T h e  s e c o n d  D u t c h  ’p o l i c e  a c t i o n '  w a s  a t u r n i n g  
p o i n t  f o r  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t  s t r u g g l e  in t h a t  it 
s e t  in m o t i o n  a c h a i n  o f  e v e n t s  t h a t  f o r c e d  t h e  D u t c h  to 
r e l i n q u i s h  t h e i r  c o l o n i a l  p o s s e s s i o n s  in S o u t h e a s t  A s i a . N o t  
o n l y  d i d  t h e  D u t c h  a t t a c k  a n t a g o n i s e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
b u t  t h e  s u p p o r t  t h e  R e p u b l i c  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  t h e  n e w l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  
c o u n t r i e s  in A s i a  a n d  A f r i c a  w a s  a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t . O n e  
c o n s e q u e n c e  of t h e  D u t c h  a c t i o n  w a s  t h e  N e w  D e l h i  C o n f e r e n c e  
o n  I n d o n e s i a  h e l d  in J a n u a r y  1 9 4 9 , w h i c h  c o n d e m n e d  D u t c h  
a c t i o n s  in I n d o n e s i a  a s  b e i n g  r e p u g n a n t  to t h e  p r i n c i p l e s
o f  the U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  C h a r t e r ,  a s  s u p e r s e d i n g  th e  c l a i m s
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of I n d o n e s i a n  n a t i o n a l i s m  a n d  e n d a n g e r i n g  w o r l d  peace.
By all a c c o u n t s , t h e  D u t c h  e m e r g e d  t h e  l o s e r s  f r o m  t h e i r
s e c o n d  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  the R e p u b l i c .T h e y  f o r f e i t e d
t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s , t h e  l e a d e r  o f  the ?F r e e
W o r l d ’ a n d  a n a t a g o n i s e d  t h e  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s .E v e n  the
’i n d e p e n d e n t  R e p u b l i c s ’ t h e y  h a d  s e t  u p  in G r e a t e r  I n d o n e s i a ,
B o r n e o  a n d  W e s t  J a v a  , d i d  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  D u t c h  a c t i o n  a n d
154
r e s i g n e d  e n  m a s s e  f r o m  t h e i r  ' f e d e r a l  p o s t s ’. T h e




g u e r i l l a  w a r  t h a t  b r o k e  o u t  p r o v e d  c o s t l y  f o r  th e  Dutch. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  D u t c h  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  d i v i d e d  o v e r  the e n t i r e  
a f f a i r . T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  of t h e s e  f a c t o r s / a n d  p r i n c i p a l l y  the 
p r e s s u r e  f r o m  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s , f o r c e d  th e  D u t c h  to b e  
m o r e  c o n c i l i a t o r y ,  a n d  t h i s  p a v e d  th e  w a y  f o r  t h e  n e g o t i a ­
ti o n s  l e a d i n g  to the i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  I n d o n e s i a .
T h e  f i r s t  s e r i e s  o f  m e e t i n g s  w a s  h e l d  in J a k a r t a
in M a r c h  1 9 4 9 . W h e n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w e r e  in p r o g r e s s  a n d  the
D u t c h  a n n o u n c e d  t h e i r  r e a d i n e s s  to f o r m  a U n i t e d  S t a t e s
of I n d o n e s i a  [USI], the S o v i e t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a t  t h e  S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l ,T a r a s e n k o v , w a r n e d  o n  16 Ma r c h :
The Netherlands Government's statement concerning the 
establishment of the so-called USI cannot be treated 
seriously.Such statements are a deception.Attempts are 
being made to find a new form to justify the Netherlands ? 
colonial domination over the Indonesian people.It is trying 
to set up a puppet state with a puppet government having 
illusory sovereignty and illusory power. 155
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  the n e g o t i a t i o n s ,
M o s c o w ' s  v i l i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  R o u n d  T a b l e  A g r e e m e n t ( R T A )
t o o k  a n e w  h i g h  p i t c h . O n  13 D e c e m b e r , t h e  S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e
to th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i  1 , S e m y o n  T s a r a p k i n , d e c l a r e d :
The Hague agreements form a shameful page in the record of 
the United Nations...the shackles of colonial slavery have again 
been imposed on the Indonesian people with the assistance of 
the Sukarno-Hatta clique.It is clear from the text of the 
agreements of The Hague that Indonesia's freedom and 
independence are being sacrificed to the political and 
economic interests of a bloc of colonial powers.namely, the 
USA,the Netherlands,the UK and allies.For the Indonesian 
people,these agreements signify their return to their former 
colonial slavery under new and more subtle form...any serious 
talk of the transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands to the * 
Government of the USI is a gross deception.A glance at the 
contents and nature of the agreements signed...is enough to 
to show that they do not even, bestow a vestige of 
sovereignty upon Indonesia.On the contrary,their whole
155.United Nations Security Council,Official Records,419 Meeting,16 March
1949,p.26.
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object and purpose is to reaffirm the authority of the Dutch 
Crown over Indonesia and its people in a new form and to 
obtain possession of that country's inexhaustible wealth.156
A n u m b e r  of f a c t o r s  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  the j a u n d i c e d  S o v i e t  v i e w  
of t h e  R T A  a n d  o f  the f i n a l  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  
i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e  fac t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  n o t  c o n s u l t e d  
or i n v o l v e d  in the n e g o t i a t i o n s  m u s t  b e  c o u n t e d  as o n e  
r e a s o n ; t h e  p r o m i n e n t  r o l e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  as a n o t h e r . T h e  
'two c a m p s '  d o c t r i n e  a l s o  p a r t l y  e x p l a i n e d  t h e  S o v i e t  
a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  the a g r e e m e n t s .T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  d i d  n o t  
r e c o g n i s e  t h e  ' i n d e p e n d e n c e '  o f  t h e  n e w  s t a t e s  as g e n u i n e  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  ' i m p e r i a l i s t '  e c o n o m i c  s t r a n g l e ­
hold, w h i c h  in t h e  c a s e  o f  I n d o n e s i a  w a s  in t h e  h a n d s  o f  
t h e  D u t c h , A m e r i c a n s  a n d  B r i t i s h . I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t , I n d o n e s i a
w a s  p e r c e i v e d  a s  h a v i n g  o n l y  a ' f i c t i t i o u s  i n d e p e n d e n c e
157
a n d  s o v e r e i g n t y ' .  It is a l s o  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  d i d  n o t  r e a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  a c t u a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t s  w hich, fo r  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n s , i n  s p i t e  o f  
t h e i r  d e f i c i e n c i e s , r e m o v e d  t h e  c o l o n i a l  p o w e r  t h a t  m o r e  
t h a n  t h r e e  c e n t u r i e s  r u l e d  a n d  e x p l o i t e d  p a r t s  of I n d o n e s i a .  
T h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a p o l i t i c a l  m o t i v e  as f a r  as t h e  d o m e s t i c  
b a l a n c e  o f  p o w e r  in I n d o n e s i a  w a s  c o n c e r n e d . F o l l o w i n g  th e  
r i s e  o f  t h e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  t h e  
s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  M a d i u n  r e v o l t ,  I n d o n e s i a  w a s  p e r c e i v e d  
a s  b e i n g  led b y  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t , U n i t e d  S t a t e s - o r i e n t e d  
' a g e n t s ' . I t  w a s  thu s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  M o s c o w  a d o p t e d
156.Ibid,456 Meeting,13 December 1949,pp.10-12.
157.SUJB:USSR and Eastern Europe,Part 1,8-10 November 1949,p.21.
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a h i g h l y  h o s t i l e  p o s t u r e  t o w a r d s  the R e p u b l i c ^  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  
its G o v e r n m e n t .F o r  i n s t ance, on 8 D e c e m b e r  1 9 4 9 , I z v e s t i a  
d e s c r i b e d  S u k a r n o  a n d  H a t t a  as ' t r a i t o r s  to t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
p e o p l e '  w h o  w e r e  ’c a r r y i n g  o u t  the w i l l  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  
i m p e r i a 1 i s t s ’.T h e  S o v i e t  G o v e r n m e n t  n e w s p a p e r  a l s o  p o i n t e d  
o u t  t h a t  " t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  f o r c e s  of the I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e ,  
h e a d e d  b y  t h e  P e o p l e ’s D e m o c r a t i c  F r o n t , [ t h a t  i s , t h e  FDR], 
w h i c h  w a s  c o n t i n u i n g  to w a g e  s t u b b o r n  b a t t l e s  a g a i n s t  th e  
i m p e r i a l i s t  e n s l a v e r s  in J a v a , S u m a t r a  a n d  B o r n e o , a r e  
r e s o l u t e l y  d e m a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w i t h d r a w . M a s s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  
by t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e  a g a i n s t  the d i s g r a c e f u l  d e a l  
c o n c l u d e d  a t  T h e  H a g u e  a t t e s t  to the f a c t  t h a t  n o  m a t t e r  
w h a t  m o n o e u v r e s  th e  D u t c h  c o l o n i z e r s  m a k e , t h e  I n d o n e s i a n
1 Rft
p e o p l e  w i l l  n o t  c e a s e  t h e i r  s t r u g g l e  fo r  n a t i o n a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e " .  
T h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  of t h i s  h o s t i l e  p o s t u r e  
a g a i n s t  t h e  R e p u b l i c  l i e s  in th e  f a c t  t h a t  it w a s  n o w  
c l e a r l y  v i e w e d  to be l o c a t e d  in t h e  ’i m p e r i a l i s t  c a m p  
a n d  w h e r e  r e v o l u t i o n  w a s  to b e  e n c o u r a g e d  a n d  p r o m o t e d .
T h i s  ’l i n e ’ w a s  p u r s u e d  in s p i t e  of the f a c t  t h a t  t h e  F D R  
a n d  t h e  M u s s o - P K I  h a d  b e e n  d e c i s i v e l y  c r u s h e d  a n d  t h a t  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  w a s  r e c e i v e d  e u p h o r i c a l l y  b y  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n s .
I n d o n e s i a  b e c a m e  i n d e p e n d e n t  o n  27 D e c e m b e r
1949, a n d  o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d a y  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e c o g n i s e d  
i t . T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  d i d  n o t  d o  so u n t i l  25 J a n u a r y  1950, 
b u t  w h e n  it d i d  s o , i t  a l s o  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  U S S R  o r  R U S I  




e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s .  T h e  H a t t a  c a b i n e t
a c c e p t e d  the s u g g e s t i o n ,  a n d  a n  I n d o n e s i a n  d e l e g a t i o n  w a s
160
d e s p a t c h e d  to M o s c o w  on 15 A p r i l  1950. T h e  S o v i e t  d e l a y
in r e c o g n i t i o n  c a n  be v i e w e d  as an a t t e m p t  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e
its u n h a p p i n e s s  w i t h  the n e w  R e p u b l i c  o v e r  it s  p r o - W e s t e r n
s l a n t , i t s  s u p p r e s s i o n  of the PK I  in 1 9 4 8 , its d e c i s i o n  to
a c c e p t  a n d  i m p l e m e n t  t h e  R T C  A g r e e m e n t s  a n d  f i n a l l y , i t s
a d o p t i o n  of a W e s t e r n  s y s t e m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t . * On 15 J a n u a r y
1950, I z v e s t i a  c l e a r l y  m a n i f e s t e d  M o s c o w ’s d i s p l e a s u r e
w i t h  the J a k a r t a  G o v e r n m e n t :
The first steps by the so-called 'government' of Hatta-Sukarno  
after the Hague deal prove that this clique is ready to serve 
its real master - American imperialists - faithfully and well.
Feverish military preparations on the part of the imperialists 
! and their parasites have been brought about by the fact that 
they have not succeeded in deceiving the Indonesian people by 
false 'self-determination' which Indonesia received in The Hague 
and the people are continuing the struggle  for their genuine 
1 independence.162
Here, it is u s e f u l  to n o t e  t h a t  e v e n  t h o u g h  J a k a r t a  r e c o g n i s e d  
the P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c  of C h i n a ( P R C )  in O c t o b e r  1949, P e k i n g
1 C O
d i d  n o t  r e c i p r o c a t e  u n t i l  3 J u n e  1950. T h i s  d e l a y  c a n  
be e x p l a i n e d  b y  the d o m e s t i c  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  a b s o r b e d  t h e  
n e w  l e a d e r s h i p ' s  a t t e n t i o n  in C h i n a  as w e l l  a s  the c r i t i c a l  
S o v i e t  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  J a k a r t a  s i n c e  J a n u a r y  1948.
L . N . P a l a r , t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  A m b a s s a d o r - d e s i g n a t e  
to t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , l e d  a s i x - m a n  d e l e g a t i o n  to the S o v i e t  
U n i o n  in m i d - A p r i l  1 9 5 0 . T h e  m i s s i o n  h a d  t w o  o b j e c t i v e s : t o
159.See J.Wibisono,Karang Pi Tengah GeIombang,(Jakarta:Gunung Agung,1980),p.85.
160. Ibid.
161.Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung,Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945- 
1965,(The Hague:Mouton and Co.,1973),p.181.
162.Izvestia,15 January 1950.
163.Agung,Dp c it,p.181;Mc\/ey,The Development of the Indonesian Communist 
Party and its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's' 
Republic,(Cambridge,Mass.:Centre for International Studies,MIT,1954),p.66.
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d i s c u s s  t h e  e x c h a n g e  of a m b a s s a d o r s  a n d  to e l i c i t  S o v i e t
v i e w s  o n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  d e c i s i o n  to j o i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s
164
in S e p t e m b e r  1950. On 3 M a y , t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  m e t  S o v i e t  
F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  V y s h i n s k y . l t  w a s  a g r e e d  in p r i n c i p l e  to 
e x c h a n g e  a m b a s s a d o r s ,  a n d  t h a t  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  w o u l d  n o t  
v e t o  J a k a r t a ' s  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  m e m b e r s h i p .
On 19 M a y  1950, t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  E m b a s s y  in W a s h i n g t o n  a n n o u n c e d
t h a t  P a l a r ' s  m i s s i o n  to the S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  b e e n  'very 
165
s u c c e s s f u l ’. T h i s  a s s e s s m e n t  a p p e a r s  to h a v e  b e e n  d i p l o m a t i c
r a t h e r  t h a n  d e s c r i p t i v e ,  in v i e w  of t h e  d e l a y  t h a t  a c t u a l l y
o c c u r r e d  in th e  e x c h a n g e  o f  a m b a s s a d o r s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o
c o u n t r i e s .M o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  w a s  the cool, e v e n  u n d i p l o m a t i c ,
t r e a t m e n t  g i v e n  to t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  d e l e g a t e s  d u r i n g  t h e i r
s h o r t  v i s i t . P a l a r  a n d  t h e  e n t i r e  m i s s i o n  w e r e  h u m i l i a t e d
at the b o r d e r  b y  c u s t o m s  o f f i c e r s  w h o  d i s r e g a r d e d  t h e i r
d i p l o m a t i c  s t a t u s . W i b i s o n o ,  a m e m b e r  o f  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n ,
w r o t e  t h a t  t h e  c u s t o m s  o f f i c e r s  c a l l e d  " t h e  m e m b e r s  o n e
166
by o n e  f o r  c l o s e  e x a m i n a t i o n " .  T h i s  g r e a t l y  o f f e n d e d  the
I n d o n e s i a n s ,  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  a s  S o v i e t  d i s r e s p e c t
a n d  d i s r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  R e p u b l i c ' s  s o v e r e i g n t y .In W i b i s o n o ’s
a s s e s s m e n t , " th e  a r r i v a l  o f  o u r  m i s s i o n , i t  s e e m e d , w a s  of
no s i g n i f i c a n c e  to t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  of t h e  S o v i e t  Union.
C o n c e r n i n g  o u r  a r r i v a l  a n d  o u r  m e e t i n g  w i t h  V y s h i n s k y , t h e r e
167
w a s  o n l y  b r i e f  m e n t i o n  in t h e  o f f i c i a l  d a i l y " .  It c a n
be a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  d e l e g a t i o n
w a s  an i n d i c a t i o n  of S o v i e t  d i s p l e a s u r e  w i t h  a n d  i n d i f f e r e n c e
164.Wibisono,Dp c it ,p.83;Report on Indonesia,(Information Dept, of RUSI),
Vol.1,No.43,May 1950,p.4.
165.Ibid.
166.Wibisono,Bertamasya Pi Belakang Tabir Besi,(Bandung:Van Hoeve,l953),p.125.
167. Ibid, p. 123. ~
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to the n e w  R e p u b l i c .T h i s  h e l p s  to e x p l a i n  I n d o n e s i a ’s p o l i c y  
t o w a r d s  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  in the n e x t  f e w  years.
F o l l o w i n g  the R T C  A g r e e m e n t s , t h e  RUSI, a f e d e r a t i o n
of 16 a u t o n o m o u s  s t a t e s , w a s  f o r m e d , b u t  o n  17 A u g u s t  1950,
a u n i t a r y  s t a t e  w a s  p r o c l a i m e d .T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  had b e e n
c r i t i c a l  of the e n t i r e  R T C  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a n d  h e n c e  of th e
R U S I ,d e s c r i b i n g  it as a ’t o t a l l y  a r t i f i c i a l  c r e a t i o n '
Nor d i d  it a p p r o v e  of the u n i t a r y  s tate, a r g u i n g  t h a t
it w a s  c r e a t e d  to b e n e f i t  ' A m e r i c a n  i m p e r i a l  i s m '.O n  22
A u g u s t  1950, P r a v d a  d e c l a r e d :
Now having consolidated its position in Indonesia,with the 
aid of local reaction,the USA hopes to drive both the Dutch 
and the British out of the c o u n t r y -A m e r ic a n  imperialism now 
emerges as the champion of a unified Indonesian state,hoping 
in this event to subordinate the entire Indonesian archipelago 
to its dictate.169
At t h e  s a m e  t i m e , t h e  R e p u b l i c ’s G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  v i e w e d  w i t h
r e s e r v a t i o n s .P r a v d a , for i n s t a n c e ,  w r o t e  o f  t h e  ’s o - c a l l e d
H a t t a - S u k a r n o  G o v e r n m e n t ’, i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  K r e m l i n ’s n o n -
a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  its l e a d e r s . I n
a d d i t i o n ,  M e r l e  C o c h r a n , t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  A m b a s s a d o r  to
J a k a r t a , w a s  d e s c r i b e d  as t h e  " c l a n d e s t i n e  m a n a g e r  of a f f a i r s
170
for th e  p u p p e t  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  H a t t a - S u k a r n o " .  A f t e r  1951, 
h o w e v e r ,  M o s c o w  b e c a m e  m o r e  s u p p o r t i v e  o f  t h e  u n i t a r y  s tate.
T h i s  w a s  l a r g e l y  the r e s u l t  o f  g r o w i n g  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
b e t w e e n  th e  n e w l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e s  a n d  t h e i r  f o r m e r  c o l o n i a l
m a s t e r s , u n d e r m i n i n g  th e  b a s i s  o f  the ’tw o  c a m p s '  t h e o r y .S o v i e t
c o m m e n t a r i e s , h o w e v e r ,  a d h e r e d  to the b a s i c  'two camps'-
f r a m e  o f  r e f e r e n c e , n o t  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  t h e  a i m s  of n o n -
a l i g n m e n t  o r  n e u t r a l i t y  p r o f e s s e d  by s e v e r a l  o f  the n e w
168.Izvestia,4 November 1949.
169.Pravda,22 August 1950.
170.Ibid;L.Poitier,"Indonesia Today",New Times,No.50,12 Dec.1951,p.18.
g o v e r n m e n t s  h a d  a n y t h i n g  to d o  w i t h  t h e i r  a c t i o n s . I n s t e a d ,  
r e s o r t  w a s  n o w  m a d e  to the h e r e t o f o r e  n e g l e c t e d  t h e m e s
of ’i n t e r - i m p e r i a l i s t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s '  a n d  ' p r e s s u r e s  f r o m  
L , , 1 7 1
b e l o w  . F o r  i n s t a n c e , i n  D e c e m b e r  1951, N e w  T i m e s  d e s c r i b e d
the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a u n i t a r y  s t a t e  as b e i n g  the r e s u l t
of ' I n d o n e s i a’s d e m o c r a t i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n s " T h e y  s h o w e d
up th e  c o n f e r e n c e  a n d  th e  d e s i g n s  o f  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t s  w h o
had s p o n s o r e d  it a n d  r o u s e d  the m a s s e s  to f i g h t  for g e n u i n e
i n d e p e n d e n c e , f o r  a b o l i s h i n g  th e  R T C  d e c i s i o n s , w h i c h  p e r p e t u a t e d
I n d o n e s i a’s s e r v i t u d e  a n d  f o r  d r i v i n g  all i m p e r i a l i s t s
172
f r o m  th e  a r c h i p e l a g o ”. F o r  M o s c o w , t h e  P K I ’s l e a d e r s h i p ’s
d e c i s i o n  to s u p p o r t  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  w a s  e v i d e n c e  of
the ’p r e s s u r e s  f r o m  b e l o w ’.
T h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  th e  H a t t a  G o v e r n m e n t  d u r i n g
the p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p e r i o d  h a s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  as o n e
173
of ’p r o - W e s t e r n  n e u t r a l i s m ’. T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  e s t a b l i s h e d
d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  a n d  o p e n e d  e m b a s s i e s  in th e  m a j o r
W e s t e r n  c a p i t a l s  as w e l l  as m o s t  ’n o n - c o m m i t t e d ’ c o u n t r i e s .
No d i p l o m a t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w e r e  e x c h a n g e d  w i t h  the
c o m m u n i s t  s t a t e s ,  a n d  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  P R C  s e n t  a n  A m b a s s a d o r
to J a k a r t a  o n  14 A u g u s t  1 9 5 0 , J a k a r t a  d e s p a t c h e d  a c h a r g e
174
d ’a f f a i r e s  to P e k i n g  o n l y  on 14 J a n u a r y  1951. A p a r t  f r o m  
H a t t a ' s  p e r s o n a l  a n t i - c o m m u n i s m , t h e  n e e d  to o b t a i n  e c o n o m i c  
a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  t h e  W e s t  w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
It w o u l d  b e  o v e r s t a t i n g  th e  c a s e  to a r g u e  t h a t  the H a t t a  
G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  t o t a l l y ,  o r  e v e n  to a l a r g e  d e g r e e , p r o -
171.See lzvestia.22 Jan.l95Q;Ibid,6 June 1950.
172.Poitier,Op c it ,p.18.
173.H.Feith,The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,(Ithaca,New 
Vork:Cornell University Press,1964),p.87.
174.McVey,The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party...,p.66.
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W e s t e r n ,  for it c o n t i n u e d  to a d h e r e  to the b a s i c  p o l i c y
175
of n o t  t a k i n g  s i d e s  in the 'cold war'. ‘ R a t h e r , i t  m a i n t a i n e d
that I n d o n e s i a  p u r s u e d  a n  a c t i v e  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  f o r e i g n  
i . 176
policy. T h i s  p o s i t i o n  w a s  d e c l a r e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  to s o u n d
o u t  the g r e a t  p o w e r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a s  the
s e i z u r e  of p o w e r  in C h i n a  by t h e  c o m m u n i s t s  in 1949 c r e a t e d
a p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  t h a t  a d v o c a t e d  t h e  d a m m i n g  of the
' C h i n e s e  t h r e a t '  in A s i a . M o r e  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e  b i r t h  o f  th e
P R C  w a s  v i e w e d  as a 'v i c t o r y '  f o r  ' S t a l i n ' s  e x p a n s i o n i s m *
a n d  I n d o n e s i a  f e a r e d  t h a t  t h i s  l e a d  to t h e  s p r e a d  o f
177
the 'cold war' i n t o  Asia. T h e  B a g u i o  C o n f e r e n c e , c o n v e n e d
in th e  P h i l i p p i n e s  in l a t e  M a y  1 9 5 0  b y  P r e s i d e n t  Q u i r i n o , w a s
s e e n  in J a k a r t a  to h a v e  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  in m i n d . T h e  H a t t a
G o v e r n m e n t  d e s p a t c h e d  A c h m e d  S u b a r d j o ,  a f o r m e r  F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r , w i t h  i n s t r u c t i o n s  to " t h w a r t  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  in
t h e i r  h o p e  o f  a r r a n g i n g  s u c h  a p e r m a n e n t  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t
178
b o d y  of c o o p e r a t i o n " .  T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n , s t i l l  r e e l i n g  
u n d e r  S t a l i n ’s 'two c a m p s '  a p p r o a c h  to i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  
s a w  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  s u c h  
as I n d i a , C e y l o n  a n d  B u r m a  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  to "the p r o c l a m a ­
tio n  o f  a n y  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  s l o g a n s "  a n d  t h e i r  r e f u s a l  to 
" d i s c u s s  the q u e s t i o n  o f  a n y  p e r m a n e n t  U n i o n  o r  a l l i a n c e  
of t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of S o u t h e a s t  A s i a "  as i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
t h e s e  g o v e r n m e n t s  w e r e  u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e i r  " n a t i o n a l
l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t s "  a n d  " d i d  n o t  d a r e , a t  l e a s t  o p e n l y , t o
179
p u t  o n  th e  h a r n e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  i m p e r i a lists.'..".
^.M .H atta/'lndonesia’s Foreign Policy",Foreign A ffa irs,Vol.31,IMo.3,April 
1953,pp.444-445.






Th e  K o r e a n  W a r  b r o k e  o u t  in J u n e  1 9 5 0 . I n d o n e s i a
s a w  it as a 'cold war' i s s u e  and, t o g e t h e r  w i t h  India,
180
w o r k e d  a c t i v e l y  for a truce. T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  d e l e g a t i o n
a t  the U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  r e j e c t e d  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h e s i s
t ha t  t h e  P R C  w a s  the a g g r e s s o r ,  b u t  s u p p o r t e d  the ' U n i t i n g
fo r  P e a c e  R e s o l u t i o n '  s p o n s o r e d  by the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a
r e s o l u t i o n  w h i c h  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  o p p o s e d  o n  l e g a l  a n d
181
p o l i t i c a l  g r o u n d s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e  w a r  w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
in t e r m s  of f u t u r e  A m e r i c a n  p o l i c i e s  in A s i a  as w e l l  as 
c o m p e l l i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  to r e c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a n d  i d e o l o g i c a l  s t a t u s  of t h e  n e w l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e s  
s u c h  as India, B u r m a  a n d  I n d o n e s i a .
M o h a m m a d  N a t s i r  f o r m e d  t h e  f i r s t  c a b i n e t  in t h e  
u n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  I n d o n e s i a . l t  a d o p t e d  a p r o - W e s t e r n  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  w h i c h  w a s  m o t i v a t e d  b y  t h e  n e e d  to a c q u i r e  f o r e i g n  
a i d  a n d  i m p r o v e  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  an d  w a s  a l s o  a c o n s e q u e n c e  
of the c o n t i n u e d  S o v i e t  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  n e w  s t a t e s  w h i c h  
ha d  p u r s u e d  an ' u n c o m m i t t e d '  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a n d  its v i l i f i c a ­
tio n  of I n d o n e s i a n  l e a d e r s  s i n c e  1 9 4 8 . In s p i t e  of its 
W e s t e r n  o r i e n t a t i o n , t h e  N a t s i r  G o v e r n m e n t  a t t e m p t e d  to
18
p r e s e n t  a b a l a n c e d  o u t l o o k  t o w a r d s  the tw o  ' c o l d  war' c a m p s .
N a t s i r ' s  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  n o n - a l i g n e d  c r e d e n t i a l s  w e r e  e n h a n c e d
w h e n  it r e j e c t e d  in O c t o b e r  1 9 5 0  an o f f e r  of A m e r i c a n
m i l i t a r y  a i d . I n  the s a m e  m o n t h , h o w e v e r , i t  s i g n e d  an e c o n o m i c
183
and t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
180.Feith,The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.p . 176- 
Peristiwa Korea dan K ita,(Jakarta Rava:Bagian Perhnhunc^n 
Masyarakat Angkatan Perang,l950),p.15.
181.Report on Indonesia.Vol.Z.No.19.9 Feb. 1951 ,p.4.
182.See T.wilbornjndonesia and the United Nations, 1945-1961 .(Ann Arbor 
Michigan:Univ/ersity Microfilms.1970),p.66.
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D e s c r i b i n g  t h e  N a t s i r  G o v e r n m e n t  in D e c e m b e r  
1951, a S o v i e t  p o l i t i c a l  c o m m e n t a t o r  w r o t e :
the people expected that now following the resignation of 
the Hatta Government on 17 August 1950 a government would 
be formed of men who had led the national liberation movement.
But as the outcome of fresh machinations by the imperialists 
and Right-wing parties which they backed,the new government 
was made largely by leaders of the Muslim Masjumi Party. 184
D e s p i t e  it s  h o s t i l i t y  t o w a r d s  t h e  N a t s i r  G o v e r n m e n t , t h e
S o v i e t  U n i o n  e n d o r s e d  t h e  R e p u b l i c ' s  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  U n i t e d
N a t i o n s  a s  h a d  b e e n  a g r e e d  u p o n  d u r i n g  P a l a r ' s  v i s i t  in
M a y  1950, a n d  o n  27 S e p t e m b e r  I n d o n e s i a  b e c a m e  t h e  s i x t i e t h
m e m b e r  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ? ^
A c o n s e r v a t i v e  a n d  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  g o v e r n m e n t  h e a d e d
by S u k i m a n  s u c c e e d e d  N a t s i r  in m i d - 1 9 5 1 . I t s  a n t i - c o m m u n i s m
tfas c l e a r l y  m a n i f e s t e d  in A u g u s t  1951 w h e n  it b e g a n  a c r a c k
d o w n  o n  t h e  r e c o n s t i t u t e d  P K I  u n d e r  the l e a d e r s h i p  o f  D.N.
A i d i t . T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  P a r t y  w a s  p l a n n i n g
a ' s e c o n d  M a d i u n '  w i t h  o u t s i d e  a s s i s t a n c e ,  a c l a i m  t h a t
w a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  j u s t i f y  in v i e w  o f  th e  p a r t y ' s  w e a k n e s s ,  Vf
w a s  s t i l l  r e c o v e r i n g  f r o m  t h e  b l o w  it r e c e i v e d  in S e p t e m b e r
1948.186
U n l i k e  N a t s i r , S u k i m a n 's G o v e r n m e n t  c o n d u c t e d  a n  
a c t i v e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ^ a n d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  P R C  r e a c h e d  a low p o i n t . T h e  C h i n e s e  A m b a s s a d o r ,W a n  
Y e n - s h i n ,  a f o r m e r  I n d o n e s i a n  C h i n e s e ,  w a s  a n  o u t s p o k e n  
c o m m u n i s t .C o n t r a r y  to d i p l o m a t i c  p r a c t i c e , h i s  E m b a s s y . c o m m e n t e d  
p u b l i c l y  a n d  o f t e n  c r i t i c a 1 l y ,on I n d o n e s i a n  a f f a i r s , p u b l i c l y  
c o n d e m n e d  t h e  m a s s  a r r e s t  o f  t h e  PKI m e m b e r s  in A u g u s t  
1951 a n d  g a v e  s a n c t u a r y  to A l i m i n ,  a p r o m i n e n t  PKI l e a d e r . A t
184.Poitier,Op_cit,p.18.
185.Report on Indonesia,Vol.2,No.7,6 Oct.l950,pp.1-5.
186.Feith,The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,pp.187-192.
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the s a m e  t i m e , C h i n a  w a s  a n n o y e d  w i t h  S u k i m a n  G o v e r n m e n t ’s 
a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  p o l i c i e s , i t s  r e f u s a l  to p e r m i t  the c e l e b r a t i o n s  
of C h i n a ’s N a t i o n a l  D a y  on 1 O c t o b e r  in I n d o n e s i a  a n d  
d e n i a l  o f  e n t r y  r i g h t s  l a t e r  t h a t  y e a r  to 50 C h i n e s e  d i p l o m a t s  
a n d  c o n s u l a r  o f f i c i a l s , w h o  a r r i v e d  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  c l e a r a n c e
i on
f r o m  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y .
As t h e  K o r e a n  W a r  p r o g r e s s e d ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
a t t e m p t e d  to i s o l a t e  th e  P R C  p o l i t i c a l l y  a s  w e l l  as to
a p p l y  e c o n o m i c  p r e s s u r e  t h r o u g h  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s - s p o n s o r e d
s a n c t i o n s . O n  1 F e b r u a r y  1 9 5 1 , it i n i t i a t e d  a r e s o l u t i o n ,
d e c l a r i n g  the P R C  the a g g r e s s o r  in t h e  K o r e a n  W a r  a n d
188
e m b a r g o i n g  e x p o r t  of s t r a t e g i c  m a t e r i a l s  to it. I n d o n e s i a
di d  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  a g g r e s s o r  r e s o l u t i o n ,  b u t  it a g r e e d
189
to a b i d e  by t h e  e m b a r g o .  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t ’s a c t i v e  p r o -
W e s t e r n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  w a s  c l e a r l y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  by its
d e c i s i o n  to s i g n  the P e a c e  T r e a t y  w i t h  J a p a n  o n  8 S e p t e m b e r
1951, a n d  to a c c e p t  e c o n o m i c  a i d  u n d e r  t h e  M u t u a l  S e c u r i t y
A c t ( M S A )  a r r a n g e m e n t s  o n  5 J a n u a r y  1 9 5 2 . T h e  s i g n i n g  of
the J a p a n e s e  P e a c e  T r e a t y  w a s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  in I n d o n e s i a , w h e r e
it w a s  v i e w e d  a s  an A m e r i c a n - s p o n s o r e d  d o c u m e n t ,  e n d o r s e m e n t
of w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  t a n t a m o u n t , s o  its o p p o n e n t s  m a i n t a i n e d , t o
190
j o i n i n g  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c a m p  in th e  ’c o l d  w a r ’. T h e
G o v e r n m e n t ’s d e c i s i o n  to d e s p a t c h  S u b a r d j o  to S a n  F r a n c i s c o
w a s  all the m o r e  d i s p u t a t i o u s  in v i e w  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t
In d i a  a n d  B u r m a , t h e  two p r i n c i p a l  ’u n c o m m i t t e d ’ s t a t e s
187.Report on Indonesia,Vol.2,No.30,31 July 1951,p.7.
188.Sastroamidjojo,Op_cit,p.231.
189.Report on Indonesia,Vol.2,No.19,9 Feta.1951,p.4;Ibid,Vol.2,No.26,25 May
1951,p.1.
19Q.Sastroamidjojo,0p c it ,pp.233-244.
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In assessing the Government's decision to endorse 
the Peace Treaty, a Soviet commentator argued that "it 
was contrary to the will and desire of the Indonesian people 
to sign the infamous event in the history of the country".
The 'Americanised ruling clique' and Ali Sastromidjojo,the 
Indonesian Ambassador to the United States,were described 
as "well known agents of the United States' State Department". 
The Treaty,claimed the Soviet writer,was 'dictated' by
the State Department,and it was supposed "to have exasperated
191the various segments of the Indonesian people". Moscow's 
condemnation of Sukiman Government's endorsement of the
treaty was understandable in the light of its own refusal
192to participate in the San Francisco Conference.
The opposition in Indonesians well as Soviet
condemnation of the Sukiman Government,reached its climax
after Subardjo signed an agreement with the State Department
to accept aid under the 1951 MSA arrangements which stipulated
that aid could only be dispensed provided it benefited
193the 'Free World'. Subardjo signed the agreement with 
the concurrence of Sukiman alone/ and it was only a month 
later,in February,that the agreement was leaked to the 
press, which accused the government of forfeiting the nation’s 
treasured independent foreign policy.The opposition to 
the agreement was so intense that Subardjo resigned in 
the second week of February 1951,followed by the entire
191.Literaturnaya Gazeta,22 January 1952.
192.Rubinstein,boviet Foreign Policy Since World War II,p.135.
193.Feith,The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,pp.198-2Q7.
in Asia, had decided not to attend.
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cabinet on 23 February.This event demonstrated how much 
some Indonesian political circles valued the principle 
of an independent foreign policy and the cost a party 
or government would incur if it appeared to be taking sides 
in the 'cold w a r '.
In March 1952, a Soviet political analyst argued
that "officially , the agreement was to provide Indonesia,
American aid under the so-called Mutual Security A g r e e m e n t .That
the purposes of that Act are aggressive and extortionate
is no secret".On the resignation of the Sukiman Government,
the analyst noted:"the resignation was the sequel to an
American attempt,made with the help of Sukiman’s Foreign
Minister,Achmed Subardjo,to force a military and economic
agreement on Indonesia and with the Cabinet resignation,that
„ 194agreement becomes a big question mark .
The fall of the Sukiman Government came at a 
time when the Soviet Union under Stalin was beginning to 
reconsider the place of the newly independent states in 
its world view.This reconsideration,which led to the initial 
interest for constructive relations with the newly independent 
states,marked the final phase of Stalin's foreign policy.
Phase 3 : April 1952 - March 1953
By April 1952,Soviet foreign policy under Stalin 
underwent a subtle change.The outright hostility towards 
the capitalist camp and the Third World in general gave 
way to attempts to improve relations with selected states.The
194."Sequel to a Secret Deal",New Times,No. 10,5 March 1952,pp.18-19.
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stalemate in the Korean War, the lack of success of revolutions 
in the Third World, the beginning of competition with the 
PRC in the Third World, and the attempts by the United States 
to move into Asia in order to forestall further communist 
expansion might have influenced Moscow to partially soften 
its stance on cooperation with Third World states.At the 
same time,the Korean War clearly showed the lack of credibility 
of the ’two camps' doctrine,while vindicating the position 
of the neutralists when countries such as Burma and India 
refused to join the 'imperialist bloc’.In this context, 
the convening of an economic conference in Moscow in April 
1952 can be regarded as the beginning of a Soviet reconsidera­
tion of relations with Third World states.At the conference,
Soviet leaders indicated their willingness to increase
195trading relations with Third World states.
Stalin's changed world view was clearly enunciated
in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", an
article which appeared in Bolshevik on the eve of the Nine-
196
teenth Party Congress in September 1952. Stalin advised 
caution and realism, emphasising the contradictions within 
the capitalist world, leading possibly to the outbreak 
of wars between individual capitalist countries but down­
grading the likelihood of military conflict between the 
capitalist and communist countries,that is, undermining 
the very basis of the 'two camps' doctrine.lt can be argued 
that Stalin was warning against any assumption that the 
rigidly bipolar international situation would continue
195.See J.Cardew,"Eastern European Trade with Asian Countries",
Eastern World,Vol.7,April 1952,p.50.
196.Mackintosh,Op_cit,pp.69-70;Bruce Franklin,The Essential Stalin:
Major Theoretical Writings, 1905-1952,(London:Croom Flelm,1973),pp.445-481.
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indefinitely implying as a corollary that Soviet foreign 
policy should reject direct confrontation in order to exploit 
future splits within the capitalist camp.Such a conclusion 
would provide the basis for a more active diplomacy towards 
the individual capitalist states including those in the 
Third World.A1though no changes in Soviet policy were 
publicly announced before Stalin's death,the new attitude 
laid the groundwork for a more flexible Soviet approach 
towards the Third World soon after Stalin's death.The 
emergence of a more flexible Soviet international posture 
was evident in its relations with Indonesia.
197In April 1952,Wilopo formed the next Government.
This period also saw the rise of the 'new PKI', which
reconstituted itself,adopting a new strategy to gain
influence and to break out of its isolation from Indonesian
politics.The revival began under the triumvirate of Aidit,
Njoto and Lukman, and the PKI's political strategy was
to fit its programme into the mainstream of the country's
politics.This 'new road' was to bring the party tremendous 
198success.
In April 1952, the Soviet Union convened an economic
conference in Moscow,where the 'Stalin Plan',a programme
for Soviet trade with the newly independent states in return
199for raw materials, was announced. This represented an 
important turning point and change in Soviet attitude'towards
197.Feith.The UJilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953:A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary 
Indonesia,(Ithaca,New Vork:Cornell University Press,l9Sfl).
198.See G.Pauker,"The PKI’s Road to Power",in R.Sealipino,(edn.),The Communist 
Revolution in Asia,(Englewood Cliffs,New JerseyiPrentice Hall,1965),pp.256-
260.
199.Cardew,Dp eit,p. 50;R.Kanet,"Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations 
Since Stalin",in R.E.Kanet,(edn.),The Soviet Union and the Developing 
NaUons,(Baltimore:The John Hopkins University Press,1974),p.27.
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the Third World states and this was largely a belated 
recognition that the Third World did contain a number of 
states that had the capacity to act independently of their 
former colonial masters, as had been demonstrated during 
the Korean War.
The Wilopo cabinet despatched a mission headed
by Suchjar Tekjasukmana, the Secretary General of the
Indonesian Economic Council.The Wilopo Government maintained
that the mission was 'a purely private group’ attending
as ’observer’ and would maintain a ’strictly neutral’ position?^
but the fact that it was sent at all was an indication
that the Government was attempting to strengthen its ties
with the Soviet Union in order to make credible its independent
foreign policy.The need for this was all the more urgent
because of the previous policies of the Sukiman Government.
On 6 May, T e k jasukmana broadcast over Radio Moscow as
’a private citizen’, declaring that ’’the Soviet regime had
done a lot for the material welfare of the Soviet citizens,
201
and Indonesia could take it as an example”. This can 
be regarded as an important step in the growing ’detente’ 
between Moscow and Jakarta.
The Army-Government crisis,also referred to as
the ’October 17 Affair’,which began during the Sukiman
period,exploded in October 1952 when a group of officers,with
the support of Colonel Nasution,the Army Chief of Staff,
attempted to overthrow the parliamentary government and
200.Report on Indonesia,Vol.3,No.19,7 April 1952,p.5.
201 .Ibid,Vol.3,No.21,6 May 1952,p.2.
reconstitute a presidential system,in what Sukarno later
called a 'half c o u p ' . 202 su^arno succeeded in talking the
officers out of their plan,so that the attempt ended in
total failure and Nasution was dismissed from the Army.In
his place as Chief of Staff, the Defence Minister appointed
Colonel Bambang Sugeng, and this appointment split the
Army into two groups - those for and those against the
203overthrow of parliamentary government.
A Soviet political commentator was later to argue
that:
... acting on the instigation of the imperialists, the reactionary 
forces are trying to abolish the Parliamentary system in favour 
of a military dictatorship.To do that,they are endeavouring to 
throttle the democratic and anti-imperialist movement.That was 
the purpose of the putsch staged in Jakarta on October 1952.
Hie Right-wing Socialists had a big hand in this venture,which 
was foiled by the masses.204
The crisis weakened the Government,which fell in June 1953.
Soviet political analysts have, however, blamed the Masjumi
for this, Guber,for instance, arguing that "the reactionary
Masjumi Party leaders sabotaged the progressive policies
of the Wilopo government and maintained secret contacts
with bandit detachments of Darul Islam, groups of armed
Muslim extremists who resorted to terror and violence in
205an attempt to make Indonesia a theocratic Muslim state". 
Kruglov similarly blamed the Masjumi for the fall of the 
Wilopo Cabinet.In August 1953,he argued:
... its Masjumi members had tried to return the Sumatran 
plantations,taken over by the peasants,to the Dutch 
planters, and to restore the rights of Bataafsche
151
202.Cited in C.Adams,Sukarno:An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams, 
(Indianopolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1965),p.266.
2Q3.Feith,The Decline of Constitutional Demcracy in Indonesia,pp.246-273;
S.Tas,Indonesia:The Underdeveloped Freedom,(Indianapolis:Bobbs-MerrilI,1974), 
pp.242-245.
204.N.Kruglov,"The Situation in Indonesia",New Times,No.32,5 Aug.1953,p.30.
205.Guber,"lndoneziia",B.S.E.,p.242.
Petroleum to the Sumatran oil fields.Masjumi also resisted the 
popular demand for the punishment of the organisers of the 
□ctober 17 Putsch and for measures against the Darul Islam 
bands.Lastly,Masjumi sabotaged the parliamentary decision 
adopted in April to open an Indonesian diplomatic mission 
in Moscow.206
Formed in November 1945,the Masjumi Party has been viewed 
by Soviet scholars as a 'reactionary, pro-imperialist' 
organization, a view which remained consistent throughout 
the existence of the party.The party has also been accused
207of attracting supporters by means of 'religious propaganda', 
while A.I.Ionova accused the 'religious socialists' of
'bloody violence against the communists and democratic
208organizations in 1948.
The importance of these criticisms was not 
so much its nature and content, but rather its focus:the 
Wilopo Government was not vilified but its opponents were.
In this regard, of significance was the fact that Soviet- 
Indonesian relations were now entering the phase of proper state- 
to-state relations.Relations between Wilopo's Indonesia 
and Stalin's Soviet Union can be described as correct insofar 
as past Soviet denunciations of the Indonesian Government's 
links with 'Imperialism' were now downplayed as well as 
genuine attempts being made on the part of Jakarta to put 
relations with Moscow on a proper footing.This was most 
vividly demonstrated by the Wilopo Government’s attempts 
to exchange diplomatic representatives with Moscow.
The understanding on the exchange of diplomatic 
missions reached in May 1950 was not implemented until
206.Kruglov,"The Situation in Indonesia",p.31.
207.L.Skomorokhov,"Indonesia's Guided Democracy Programme",New Times,
No.29,July l959,pp.U-15.
208.A.I.Ionova,"The Historical Destinities of 'Muslim' and 'Democratic'
Socialism in Indonesia".Narody Azii i A frik i,No.5,1964,pp.36-46.
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April 1954.The Masjumi Party,which was dominant in Indonesian
politics in the first three years after independence,opposed
209the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Moscow.
The first three cabinets,those of Hatta,Natsir and Sukiman,
showed no interest in implementing the Palar-Vyshinsky
accord because they were pro-Western,especially pro-United
States and were angling for American aid.At the same time,
Moscow was overtly critical of the three governments, and
had nothing attractive to offer in the way of economic
assistance.lt was only during the term in office of the
PNI-led Wilopo cabinet that the first steps were taken
ain the direction of establishingAdiplomatic mission.Otto
Rondonuwu,the Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs
Committee,tabled a motion on 23 February calling for
210the establishment of an Embassy in Moscow. The Masjumi
211Party opposed it but was defeated. On 10 Apri1,Parliament
passed Rondonuwu's motion by 82 votes to 43 and specified
that the Embassy be established in Moscow before the end 
212of the year. In support of his motion,Rondonuwu maintained
that "Indonesia’s policy will lack strength and our national
prestige will suffer as long as our country has not established
213an Embassy in Moscow". Others argued that to establish
an Embassy in Moscow would strengthen the country’s
214independent foreign policy. it was also noted that even
adversaries of the Soviet Union such as the United States
209.See Editorial,"Indonesia dan Rusia",Basis,Vol.2,Oct.1952-Sept.1953,pp.291.
210.Politik Luar Negri Bebas Aktif Republik Indonesia,(Jakarta:Ceremah 
Kepala Direktorat Research Department Luar Negri,l973),p.11.
211 .Report on Indonesia,Vol.4,No.13,27 Feb.1953,p.2.
212.Ibid,Vol.U,No. 17,23 April 1953,p.5.
213.Ibid,Vol.4,No.23,29 May 1953,p.3.
214.See Editorial,Sumber,29 May 1953.
and Britain , had embassies in Moscow,while the PKI argued
that the step would benefit the Republic economically and
215politically. However, the Wilopo cabinet was not able 
to implement the decision in its term of office because 
of the shortage of funds and trained personnel.Nevertheless, 
these efforts by the Indonesian Government were not lost 
&n Moscow,especially at a time when the Kremlin itself 
was reconsidering the role and importance of 'uncommitted' 
states in the Afro-Asian world.
Summary
Broadly speaking, Stalin’s approach to the nationalist 
movements in Southeast Asia as a whole, and Indonesia in 
particular, from the years 1945 to 1953 oscillated from 
tentative acceptance, to total rejection and opposition,to 
reconsideration. While the Soviet Union did not have any 
vital interest in Southeast Asia as a whole,the region, 
which was experiencing drastic political change/ could not 
be ignored,especially by an emerging world power which 
at the same time presented itself as the centre of a 
universalistic ideology.However,it was the end of the Stalin 
era that led to his successors totally revamping their 
perceptions and conceptions of the Third World.It was in 
the wake of this reconsideration that Indonesia became 
a major target for Soviet policy in the Third World,which 
the following chapters will examine in detail.
215.See Pidato Ketua Fraksi PKI Ir. Sakirman Dalam Pembitjaran Mosi Rondonuwu 
Pada Sidang Terbuka Tanggal 15 April 1953,(n.p.,n.d.),pp.62-72.
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SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER KHRUSHCHEV, 1953-1962
CHAPTER THREE
This chapter examines Soviet-Indonesian relations 
from March 1953 to August 1962. It traces developments -C<\m 
the death of Stalin through the Malenkov-Khrushchev period 
until the resolution of the West Irian dispute.Soviet- 
Indonesian relations should be understood against the backdrop 
of the broader Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Third 
World;it was during this phase that relations between Moscow 
and Jakarta reached 4h!$ pinnacle.
The course of Soviet foreign policy underwent a 
dramatic change after the death of Stalin.Under Malenkov 
and later Khrushchev,Moscow introduced doctrinal changes 
which made possible practical policy reversals and this 
in turn had great consequences for its Third World policy. 
Changes were necessitated by a number of factors.The first 
of these was the new leadership’s desire to distance itself 
from Stalinist domestic and foreign policies.The second 
factor was the general failure of Stalin’s past strategies 
and tactics.The changing international c 1imate,especially 
in Asia, caused by the introduction of American 'containment' 
policies and the growing importance of the PRC as a world 
power, was another factor. The final factor was the growing 
importance of the Afro-Asian countries,especially the 
opportunities provided by their desire to remain non-aligned 
and neutral.The adoption of ’p e a c e f u l  coexistence' as a 
principal tenet of its foreign policy at the Twentieth 
Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 meant the
1repudiation of the ’two camps’ theory. it also affirmed
the possibility of a ’peaceful transition to socialism'
as well as a recognition of the Third World as an
'autonomous' actor in its own right. The corollary of
l.See Pravda,15 February 1956;Stephen T.Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe,Soviet 
Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflict.(I exinciton.Mass:! exinatnn
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this was that Third World 'national bourgeois' leader-
2ship was recognised as a 'progressive' force. These
&rchanges provided the rationale^and gave incentives to,
Soviet leaders to expand ties with Third World states.
While it is not unusual to refer to the Twentieth
Party Congress as the beginning of the 'new course' in
Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World, many signals
of change were apparent even before this.In August 1953,
Malenkov noted that "after a long period of mounting tension,
one feels for the first time since the war a certain easing
3of the international situation". In February 1955, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, gave expression to the 
changing situation in the newly independent states:speaking 
of India,he observed that "there is a great historical 
significance in the fact that colonial India no longer 
exists, but the Indian Republic.This is an important turning 
point in events characterising Asia's post-war development".
In August 1955, the theoretical publication of the Soviet 
Communist Party, Kommunist, analysed the changes in Asia
5since 1945.It divided post-war Asia into four categories.
2.See Alexander R. Alexiev.The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World.
(Santa MonicaiRand Publication Series,June 1983),pp.5-7;Ishwer C.Ojha, ’The 
Kremlin and Third World Leadership:Closing the Circle?",in W.Raymond Duncan, 
(edn.),Soviet Policy in Developing Countries,(Waltham,Mass.:Ginn-Blaisdell,
1970),pp.14-16.
3.Cited in Myron Rush,(edn.),The International Situation and Soviet Foreign 
Policy,(Columbus,Ohio:Charles Merrill, 1970),p.60;J.M.Mackinstosh,Strategy  
and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy,(London:Uxford University Press,1962),
PP. 72-87.
4.Pravda,9 February 1955.
5.V.Mikheev,"Novaya Aziay",Kommunist,No. 12,August 1955,pp.80-94;In December 
1956,V.Semyonov put forward a similar categorization less the colonies.See 
"Raspad kolonial'noy sistemi imperializma mezhdunarodnii ot.nosenitii",Ibid,
No.18,December 1956, pp. 97-114.
The first comprised the ’socialist camp^ and this included
four countries:Outer Mongolia,Communist China,North Korea
and North Vietnam.The second comprised the ’regenerated
states' which were the chief object of Soviet foreign policy
in the area at that time.This group included countries
such as Burma,India and Indonesia/ defined by their
strictly 'neutralist foreign policy' which served preeminently
to block the extension of American military alliances into
Asia.The third category was made up of 'formally independent
states’, that is,states which were fully sovereign but
belonged to US military ’b I o c s '.Pakistan,Thai land,the
Phi 1ippines,Iraq and Japan were included in this group.The
final category consisted of the 'colonial areas' and this
included Malaya and New Guinea^
For the purpose of this thesis, it will be useful
to look in greater detail at the 'regenerated st a t e s ’ and
in particular Indonesia,in order to elucidate the Soviet
thinking on these countries.The countries in this group
were characterised as politically independent but economically
dependent entities - ’’former colonies which have achieved
state independence and are now acting independently in
the international arena: but which in view of historical
conditions have not yet been able to extricate themselves
7fully from economic dependence on foreign capital".Mikheev 
set forth two major shortcomings of the ’ regenerated s t a t e s ': 
first,their dependence upon 'foreign capital' was viewed 
as a prime hindrance to their efforts to solve the tremendous 




of such ’reactionary classes and groups as the feudal land­
owners, powerful capita 1ist-campradores and the direct
agents of foreign imperialists' impeded economic and political 
(i8
progress". The article, however, advised that this group 
of governments was no longer to be opposed indiscriminately 
on the ideological grounds that they were ’semi-colonial' 
countries under ’foreign c o n t r o l I n s t e a d ,  Mikheev argued 
that the Communist Parties in these countries were to 
"support all progressive measures of the national governments 
and strive for a more resolute onslaught on the positions 
of foreign colonisers and land-owners;they were to favour 
national unity against the imperialists and their agents, 
remaining mindful that the role of the working class demands 
continued pressure for profound social reforms,land reforms,
9and the liquidation of the economic positions of imperialism’’. 
Thus, by mid-1955, it was clear that theoretically the 
Soviet Union had adopted a new posture toward Third World 
states, and the domestic and foreign policies of these 
states were the primary yardstick by which Moscow categorised 
them.
The changing Soviet view of the Third World climaxed 
in November 1955,with Khrushchev's and Bulga n i n ’s visit to 
Afghanistan,India and Burma, launching in earnest the Soviet 
diplomatic offensive in the Third World.At the same time, 
Soviet arms began appearing in the Middle East. It also
t>. Ibid, pp. 86-87.
9.Ibid,p.87.
ULHosmer and Wolfe,Op c it,p.11;Roger F.Pajak,"The Effectiveness of Soviet 
Arms Aid Diplomacy in the Third World",in R.H.Donaldson,(edn.), The Soviet 
Union in the Third World:Successes and Failurest(BouIder,Colorado:WestvievA/ 
Press,1982),pp.384-408;Saadet, Deger,"Soviet Arms Sales to Developing Countries: 
the Economic Forces",in Robert Cassen,(edn.),Soviet Interests in the 
Third World,(London:The Royal Institute of International A ffa irs,1985), 
pp.159-176.
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signalled the emphasis of state-to-state relations while 
downplaying the party-to-party links, though not necessarily-
downgrading them totally.The countries on the periphery
of the Soviet Union/and a few others which were deemed
important, were the object of Soviet foreign policy,and
Indonesia was one of these earmarked for special attention
by the Kremlin.
Soviet relations with Indonesia during this period 
should be understood within the broader context of its 
objectives in the Indonesian archipelago,which can be 
generalised as follows:to prevent the Republic's participation 
in American-sponsored military alliance systems in Southeast 
Asia and thereby disrupt these systems; to reduce and 
eliminate the influence of Western powers as part of the 
total effort to isolate the United States and Western Europe; 
to establish contacts with the Republic’s leadership and 
win its support for Soviet p o 1icies,especially in the United 
Nations;to persuade the Republic to accept the Soviet Union 
as a model for its industrialization and modernization; 
to encourage the Republic's policy of non-alignment and 
neutrality;to promote political and social conditions thought 
to be conducive in the long run to the development of the 
PKI; and to build up a reservoir of goodwill and promote 
the image of the Soviet Union as a friend of I n d o n e s i a ^
11.These objectives draw on the following accounts,among others:Orah 
Cooper and Carol Fogarty,"Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less 
Developed Countries,1954-1978", in LJ.Raymond Duncan,(edn.),Soviet Policy 
in Developing Countries,pp.11-32;Justus M.van der Kroef,"The Soviet Union 
and Southeast Asia ,in R.E.Kanet,(edn.),The Soviet Union and the Developing 
Nations,(Baltimore:The John Flopkins University Press,1974),pp.96-105;Bernard 
Gordon,"Southeast Asia",in Kurt London,(edn.),The Soviet Union in World 
Politics,(Boulder,Colorado:UJestview Press,1980),pp.173-194;Charles McLane, 
Soviet-Asian Relations,Vol.2,(London:Central Asian Research Centre,1973), 
pp.78-82;G.Jukes,The Soviet Union in A sia ,(Sydney:Angus and Robertson, 1973), 
PP.156-176;Guy Pauker.The Soviet Union And Southeast Asia,(Santa Monica:
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Rand Paper Series,P-5080,July 1973),pp. 1 -30.
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The doctrinal and po I icy changes in the Soviet
Union after Stalin's death coincided with policy changes
in Indonesia.W i l o p o 's Government was replaced by Ali Sastroam-
idjojo's on 1 August 1953.F o 1 lowing his inauguration,
concerted efforts were made to implement the W i lopo cabinet's
decision to establish an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow.
On 21 December 1953,the Soviet Foreign Minister,Molotov,
agreed to the appointment of an Indonesian Ambassador to
12
Moscow. On 13 April 1954, Jakarta’s first Ambassador,
Subandrio, presented his credentials to President Voroshilov
of the Soviet Union and Moscow in return despatched a senior
13diplomat, E . Zhukov,to Jakarta on 14 September 1954. Zhukov’s 
arrival,five months after the despatch of Subandrio, was 
not the result of any political misunderstandings but more 
the consequence of 'technical difficulties' in establishing 
an embassy in Jakarta and finding the right candidate for
the job. of significance was the exchange of diplomatic
missions, four- years after agreement to do so, which in return.
placed both governments in a better position to relate
to each other on a government-to-government basis.
The increasing warmth of relations between the
two countries during this period was principally the result
of the various policies announced and implemented by the
Ali Government.One of the most important decisions taken
by the Ali cabinet was to dissolve the Dutch-Indonesian
15
U nion  formed in  December 1949. In  JuLy 1954, the  J a k a r ta  
12.See Report on Indonesia,Vol.5,No.8,7 Jan. 1954,p.5.
13 .Indonesia,(Bangkok:Information ServiceJndonesian Legation),Vol.6,No.281.
20 April 1954,p.2.
14.Interview with Prof.S.H.Sunario,former Foreign Minister,on 16 April 1984,Jakarta.
15.At the Round Table Conference,the agreement for the transfer of sovereignty 
stated that the Netherlands-lndonesian Union would be established for 
"mutual consultations on matters of common interest”.However, it was 
largely a paper institution without real substance and powers.See George 
Kahin,Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,(Ithaca,New York:Cornell 
University Press, 1952),pp.433-434.
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Government decided to abrogate the Union,due to differences
over West Irian and the economic and political clauses
of the RTC Agreements.Sukarno, in defending the government’s
decision, stat€id that the "Union kept too much alive the
memory of the unhappy past"} Soviet commentators viewed
the abrogation of the Union as a positive development,with
Y.Yegorov praising it as "a new and significant victory
17
in Indonesia’s struggle for independence". Radio Moscow
hailed it "as another blow to colonialism in Asia',’^  while
Pravda welcomed it as "a new stage towards the strengthening
19of Indonesia's independence". It was, however, only in
March 1956, during Ali's second cabinet [from March 1956
to March 1 9 5 7 ] , that the entire RTC arrangements were
abrogated.This also involved the repudiation of a debt
20of 3.6 billion guilders.These actions were described by
Radio Moscow as 'rightful','just' and ones which "would
strengthen the country's independence and eradicate colonialist
21
aspirations". Ali's actions,however, brought differences
with the Dutch to a new height.
Another decision which was supported by the Soviet
Union was the 'Indonesianization' of the economy,which
began in November 1953.This involved the nationalization
of foreign enterprises, mainly Dutch, and by November 1954,
22some 2000 enterprises were placed in native hands. A
16.Cited in A.Vandenbosch and R.But well,Southeast Asia Among World Powers, 
(Lexington:University of Kentucky Press,I957),p.63.
17.Y.Yegorov,"The Enemies of Indonesian Independence",New Times,No.35,
28 August I954,p.9.
18.5WB:Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,Part 1,17-19 Aug.1954,p.13.
19.Pravda,26 February 1956.
20.Tas,Qp c it ,pp.222-223.
21 .SWB:Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,Part 1.17-2U August 1956,p.19.
22.AU Sastroamidjojo,Milestones On My Journey,(St.Lucia,Queensland:University 
of Queensland Press,1979),p.268.
Soviet economist,A.Baturin,saw the nationalization as an
Indonesian ’’attempt to eliminate all relics of colonialism
23and build a national economy". In Soviet writings, all
the obstacles which impeded Indonesia's economic development
were attributed to the ’foreign monopolies' and the 'heavy
24legacies of colonialism'. In this regard, another Soviet
economist, D.V.Bekleshov7opined that the most important
achievement of the Ali Government was to limit the influence
of foreign capital and to lay the foundation of the 'state
25s e c t o r ',which was seen as a 'progressive phenomenon'.
In this context, the Five Year Plan,1956 to 1960, introduced
by the Ali Cabinet,was fully endorsed; in Baturin's analysis,
it ’’would not fully solve the problems of converting the
colonial economy into a national economy.But it will undoubtedly
create important requisites for further progress:it will
strengthen the state-owned sector and national capital,
provide essential financial resources and raise the national
2 6living standards".
It was in the field of foreign policy that 
Ali's cabinet made its presence felt most markedly.Its 
actions included the establishment of an embassy in Moscow, 
rejection of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), 
revocation of the embargo against the PRC, signing of trade 
agreements with Eastern European countries,endorsement 
of the five principles of 'peaceful coexistence' and the 
hosting of the Bandung Conference.
23.A.Baturin,"New Economic Trends in Indonesia",New TimestNo.37,6 Sept.1956,p.12.
24.See "The Economic Situation of Some Underdeveloped Asian and African  
Countries in 1962",Narody Azii i A frik i,No.4,1963,pp.63-65.
25.D.V.BekIevshov,Indonesia:Economy and Foreign Trade,(Moscow:Izdaterstvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR,1956),pp.12-16.
26.Baturin,Op c it ,p.11.
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The signing of trade agreements with East Germany, 
Hungary and Czeschoslovakia, and later the PRC in 1954, 
was interpreted by a Soviet political analyst as "the
Indonesian Government's anxiety to break free of Washington's
7 1economic dictation which is causing so much damage". The 
five principles of 'peaceful coexistencef,v i z . mutual respect 
for territorial integrity and sovereignty,non-aggression, 
non-interference in internal affairs,equality and reciprocal 
advantage and peaceful coexistence,embodied in the Sino-
Indian agreement of June 1954,were endorsed by the Ali
28government on 1 July 1954. The endorsement was praised
29by Soviet political analysts, but it was only on 9 February
1955 that the Supreme Soviet declared its open support
30
for the five principles. jn june 1956, the Ali Government 
lifted its embargo against the sale of rubber to the PRC, 
on the grounds that "it wanted to put an end to the great 
damage it was causing to the Indonesian economy and to 
contribute to the cause of peace and human well being".
Pravda welcomed the decision, declaring that "the Indonesian 
move was quite different from what Washington had apparently 
expected.It shows that the Asian people are firmly and
32
confidently taking to the path of full national independence".
27. Yegoro v , Op_cit, p. 11.
28.Ibid.
29.See A.Heifets/'Asia and the Five Principles",Ibid,No.44,30 Oct.1954,p.14.
30.For instance,N.A.Bulganin declared that "we deeply respect these principles, 
as being in accord with the principles of Soviet foreign policy,and consider 
that the greater the number of countries that adopt and guide themselves 
by themselves by them,the more effective will international confidence 
develop,and the more rapidly will tension be lessened and peace be 
strenthened".Cited in V.Avarin,"Asia in the Modern World",Ibid,No.4,19
Jan.1956,p.4.
31.Quoted in SWB:Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe,19-21 Jan.1956,p.23.
32.Ibid,10-12 July 1956,p.36.
The Ali Government’s policies vis-a-vis the 
West Irian issue, the formation of SEATO,the Bandung 
Conference,Sukarno’s visit to the Soviet Union,the Suez 
Crisis and the separatist movements further cemented 
Soviet-Indonesian relations.
The West Irian Issue
At the RTC, agreement was reached on all matters 
except one:the issue of West Irian.In order to save the 
agreement that had already been reached on the transfer 
of sovereignty, a compromise resolution was agreed upon 
which stipulated that within a year of the date of transfer
of sovereignty, the question of the political status of
33West Irian would be determined through negotiations.
However, negotiations ended in a deadlock.To the Indonesian
leaders, the continued presence of the Dutch in West Irian
was a smudge on their country's sovereignty and which rendered
34
the national revolution imcomplete. The Dutch had also
used Boven D i g u l ,in West Irian, as a camp for holding Indonesian
nationalists who were exiled from Java and Sumatra/ and
in this regard,the territory acquired an emotional
significance as a reminder of the oppression Indonesians 
35had to endure. The Ali Government also maintained that
its security was threatened by the presence of Dutch troops
in West Irian, as well as by the use of the territory as
36
a base by various rebel groups.
In its strategy to regain West Irian, the
33.A.M.Taylor,Indonesian Independence and the United Nations,(London:Stevens 
and Sons,1960),p.239.
34.1de Anak Agung Gde Agung,Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy,
(The Hague:Mouton and Co.1973),pp.70-108.
35.C.Mason,Sukarno’s Indonesia,(Sydney:Horwitz Pub.,1966),p.37.
36.Sukarno,Pi Bawah Bendara RevoIusi,\/ol.2,(Jakarta:Panitiya Penerbit Di
Bawah Revolusi,l96M,p.159.
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Government initially resorted to bilateral negotiations.As 
no progress was made,the Ali Government introduced two 
additional strategies: The first was to mobilise support 
within the country; and second, to internationalise the 
issue by placing it on the agenda of the United Nations 
General Assembly(UNGA) in 1954,hoping that with the support 
of the Soviet bloc and the newly independent countries, 
the Dutch would be pressured to relinquish West Irian.
Though the Republic received majority votes in the UNGA,
it failed to muster the two-thirds majority needed to pass
37its resolution. This greatly embittered the leadership
and was principally responsible for the adoption of a more
hardline attitude towards the Dutch.
An important factor in accounting for Dutch ,
intrasigence was the support the Netherlands received,
directly and indirectly,from Australia and the United States.
With the accession to office of the Liberal-Country coalition
in December 1949,Canberra adopted a strongly anti-communist
foreign policy,supporting the Dutch retention of West Irian,
for two reasons.First,it hoped that the Dutch presence
there would act as a bulwark against the spread of Communism
from Indonesia, and second, it feared that in view of the
ethnic affinities between the populations of West Irian
and Australian New Guinea,Indonesia’s possession of the
territory would lead to a claim to the adjacent Australian
38trust territory.
Officially,the United States adopted a position
37.Report on Indonesia,Vol.11,No.3,Jan.1962,p.6.
38.Robert Bone,The Dynamics of the West New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem,(Ithaca. 
New York:Cornell University Press, 1962),p.78.
1 65
of neutrality in the dispute, but this meant supporting
the maintenance of the status quo.After the conclusion
of the RTC Agreements,the Americans had no intentions of
antagonising their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
ally and arousing Dutch nationalism against themselves.After
conclusion of the Australia,New Zealand and United States
(ANZUS) Treaty,Washington had two allies which were against
Indonesia's control of West Irian.American support for
the status quo,however, worked to Dutch advantage,as Jakarta
39was only too well aware. Howard Jones,the American Ambassador
to Indonesia from February 1958 to May 1965, admitted later
that "although the official position was one of neutrality,
American government sympathies were with the Dutch.We would
support what the Dutch wanted to the extent consistent
40with our public position of neutrality on the issue", while 
this encouraged the Dutch,the Indonesian bitterness towards
the Netherlands and the United States increased and this/
played an important role in the Ali Government's decision
to practise its 'independent foreign policy' more vigorously
and thus pursue closer ties with the Soviet bloc countries,
especially the Soviet Union.In this regard, Howard Jones
was correct when he admitted that "the West Irian problem
contributed greatly to the genesis of the long, steady
movement of Indonesia away from the West and toward the
Communist bloc".
From the very beginning of the issue,the Soviet
Union supported the Indonesian claim.Soviet commentators
emphasised the legality of the claim and the ties supposed
to exist between the peoples of West Irian and Indonesia.
39.3.N.v.A.Kroef,The West New Guinea Dispute,(New York:lnternational 
Secretariat,Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950),p./9.
40.Jones.Op c it .p.178.
41.Ibid.
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L.Dadiani maintained that the Dutch authorities themselves 
admitted that the two territories comprised one state,for
they were ’legally confirmed’ in the Linggajati and Renville
42Agreements. N.F.Bulygin asserted that ties existed as
far back as the Middle Ages when West Irian was part of
43the Majapahit empire, while G .Kesselbrenner dated the ties
44back to the Srivijaya period of the eighth century. Soviet
writers have also stressed that, even though the Dutch
maintained that the colony had little economic importance,
it was nevertheless rich in raw materials and minerals,
and this explained the eagerness of the Dutch to hold on
to it.The Soviets also criticised the United States for
exploiting the resources of the territory and suggested
45that it was attempting to set up military bases. In April 
1951, Krasnaya zvezda stated that "the United States 
monopolies were paying special attention to the Western 
part of New Guinea which occupied an important strategic 
position in the Pacific and was rich in large deposits
of useful minerals". Writing in Izvestia,Yuri Zvyagin 
argued on 2 February 1952 that "despite the fact that New 
Guinea was an inalienable part of the national territory 
of Indonesia,the United S t a t e s ’ monopolies were more 
interested in exploiting the territory.This was because
167
42.L.Dadiani,Review of G.Kesselbrenner's "West Irian - An Inalienable Part 
of Indonesia",International A ffa irs,(Moscow),No.4, April 1959,p.120.
43.N.F.Bulygin,"Concerning Reunion of UJest Irian with Indonesia",Sovetskoye 
vostokovedeniye,No.1,1957, pp. 129-134.
44.G.Kesselbrenner,Irian Barat - UJilayah Yang Tak Terpisahkan Dari Indonesia, 
(MoscowrKantor Penerbitan Institut Hubungan-Hubungan International,
1960),p.23.
45.Y.Yegorov argued that "the United States is eager to retain Dutch control 
of UJest Irian,where the Dutch administration,under Pentagon pressure
is erecting military installations".Y. Yegorov,"The Enemies of Indonesian 
Independence",New Times,No.35,28 Aug.1954,p. 10.
46.Krasnaya zvezda,13 April 1951.
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as a source of raw materials,New Guinea is certainly a
4 7tasty morsel for Wall Street". During the debates in
the UNGA in 1954,the Ukrainian delegate,Palamarchuk/defended
the Indonesian case:
The dispute about the political status of West Irian constituted 
a latent threat to peace and security in that particular area.
Indonesia has recently,after a long struggle for independence, 
become a sovereign state.However,a part of Indonesia - lilest 
Irian - remained under the colonial domination of the Netherlands, 
although it was an integral part of Indonesia.1 he Netherlands, 
which had formerly administered the colony, had never treated 
West Irian as an administrative area separate from the rest of 
the colony.Indeed,the administrative unity had been 
reinforced by long established economic and cultural ties 
between West Irian and the other islands of Indonesia.48
In spite of support from the Soviet bloc and the Afro-
Asian countries, the phase of 'beggar-diplomacy'(that is,
where the Republic resorted to bilateral negotiations
to recover the territory}from 1950 to 1957 brought no postive
results, and this was the main reason why the Government
adopted the strategy of brinkmanship.
The formation of SEATO
On 8 September 1954,SEATO was founded in Manila,
with the principal aim of containing the southward spread 
49
of Communism. Like India, Burma and Ceylon, Indonesia
declined to join the pact.The Soviet Union condemned the
50formation of SEATO. on 15 September 1954, Pravda declared
that the pact was "directed against security in Asia and
the Far East and, at the same time, against the freedom
51and national independence of the Asian peoples". Another
47.1zvestia,2 February 1951.
48.United Nations General Assembly.Official Records.First Committee,728th
49.George Modelski.(edn.).SEATD:Six Studies.(Melbourne:F.W.Cheshire, 1962), 
pp.3-42.
50.I.01eshenko."The Export of Capital to Southeast Asia".International 
Affairs,(Moscow).No.8.August 1958;M.Markov,"SEATO’s Future and NEATO", 
Project".Ibid,No.6.June 1962:V.Pavlovsky.The Road to Stable Peace in Asia, 
(Moscow:Progress Pub., 1977).pp.36-48.
51.Pravda, 15 September 1954.
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Soviet writer stated that "as a sector in the military 
encirclement of the socialist countries,SEATO is meant 
also to reinforce colonialism and to suppress liberation 
movements.lt imperils the independence of the neutralist 
countries and furthers the enslavement of the Asian states 
involved in it” . ^ it was therefore not surprising that 
Moscow praised Indonesia’s decision not to be a party to 
it.In August 1954, Yegorov argued that "a dominant feature 
of Indonesian policy is the desire to keep out of aggressive 
blocs in A s i a ” . j n  addition to its own condemnation of 
American attempts to establish military alliance systems 
in Asia,Indonesia's rejection of SEATO was supported as 
this would not only encourage other neutralists to do so 
but also create gaps in American containment policies and 
hopefully weaken SEATO and American defence strategies 
in the region.
The Bandung Conference
The conference opened on 18 April 1955 and was
54attended by 340 delegates from 29 countries. The conference 
was the first attempt to unite the newly independent Afro- 
Asian states, especially those which had adopted non-alignment 
as their foreign policy.Among the great powers,only the
PRC was invited, and this was partly to draw it away from
55
the Soviet Union and closer to the Asian countries. At
52.V.Israelyan,(edn.),Soviet Foreign Policy:A Brief Review, 1955-1965,(Moscow: 
Progress Pub.,1967),p. 108.
53.Yegorov,Dp cit,p.1Q.
54.A.Appadorai, The Bandung Conference",India Quarterly,Vol.11 ,No.3,July- 
September 1955,pp.2Q7-235;Kahin,The Afro-Asian Conference:BandungtIndonesia, 
April 1955,(Ithaca,New York:Cornell University Press,1956),Ruslan Abdulgani, 
Sejarah.Cita-Cita dan Pengaruhnya Konperensi Asia-Afrika,Bandung, 
(Jakarta:Idayu Press,1977),
55.Interview with Prof.Sunario on 16 April 1984,Jakarta;Sastroamidjojo,0£ 
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the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947,the 
Soviet Union had been represented by delegates from its 
Asian Republics.At Bandung, however, Nehru,the Indian Prime 
Minister, made it clear that the USSR would not be invited 
’’for the simple reason that it was not an Asian power". ^  
Even though publicly the USSR welcomed the 
conference,in private, its Foreign Minister Molotov 
expressed his displeasure not being invited. He is said 
to have protested that ’’geographically speaking, the Soviet
Union is an Asian power, the greatest part of its territory
57
indeed situated in the Asian mainland". On 16 April 1955,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov welcomed
the holding of the conference and declared Soviet support
58for the five principles of ’peaceful coexistence’. Although 
Moscow supported the convocation of the conference, its 
initial reactions contained some reservations.Thus Ye Zhukov 
observed:
The contemporary anti-imperialist, anti-colonial movement in 
Asia and Africa is not a uniform movement of revolutionary- 
minded masses.People who are opposed to revolutionary 
measures are also taking part in it[the conference].What is 
more, even direct agents of imperialism and adventurers of 
all kinds are tagging along.59
Similarly N.Sergeyeva argued:
The feverish activity of the diplomats from the Philippines,
Iraq,Thailand,Turkey and Pakistan,who have come to Bandung 
on Washington's orders.is supplemented by the backstage 
manipulations of American agents,trying to influence the 
representatives of countries which have not yet determined 
their position.lt is known in journalistic circles that there is 
a special lobby campaigning against the principles of peaceful 
co-existence.It distributes literature which furnishes the cue 
for statements in defence of the US 'policy of strength .60
56.Cited in Agung,0p cit,p.217.
57.Quoted in G.H.Jansen,Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States,(New York: 
Praeger Pub.,1966),p.177.
58.1zvestia,17 April 1955.
59.Ye Zhukov,"The Bandung Conference",International Affairs,(Moscow),No.5, 
1955,p.22.
60.N.Sergeyeva,"The Bandung Conference”,New Times,No.17,23 April 1955.P.23.
Despite these initial reservations, the results 
of the conference were generally pleasing to Moscow, and 
Soviet writers have viewed them as marking "a new era for 
the Asian and African peoples".For instance,Sergeyeva 
observed:
It branded colonialism as an evil which should speedily be brought 
to an end and deplored the policies and practices of racial 
segregation and discrimination.lt explicitly decided in favour of 
general disarmament and prohibition of experimentation and use of 
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war.
The decisions of the Bandung Conference are another blow at the 
decaying and insolvent imperialist system.For the delegates' 
condemnation of colonialism was in fact a condemnation of the whole 
policy of imperialism with its drive for colonial conquest and enslave- 
i ment and exploitation of the Asian and African peoples.61
The final communique listed ten articles [the
Ten Bandung Principles], which Babojan Gafurov,the Director
of the Institute of Oriental Studies,USSR Academy of Sciences,
maintained "embodied Lenin's ideas of peaceful coexistence
62
of states with different social systems". The Soviet Union
has continued to view the conference as "a historical milestone
ft ^in the anti-imperialist struggle of the Afro-Asian people".
It was in this regard that one of the most important 
consequences of the conference was the rapid improvement 
in Soviet-Indonesian relations.Following the exchange of 
diplomatic representatives, the rejection of SEATO and 
the convocation of the Bandung Conference, Moscow began 
to perceive the Republic as an 'anti-imperialist state'. 
Sukarno’s Visit to the Soviet Union
Sukarno’s first visit to the Soviet Union from
23 August to 12 September 1956 represented another step 
in the expanding Soviet-Indonesian r e l a t i o n s . ^  It was 
61 .Ibid,No.18,1 May 1955,p.25.
62.B.Gafurov,"ideas of Bandung and the Present Times",in Shashi Bhushan,(edn.),
Twenty Years of Bandung and Problems of Peace and Security in Asia,
(Bombay:Allied Pub.1978),p.38.
63.See Y.Etinger and O.Melikyan,The Policy of Non-Alignment,(Moscow:Progress 
Pub., 1967), pp. 46-74.
64.For details,see Ganis Harsono,Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat 
in the Sukarno Era,(St.Lucia,Queensland:University of Queensland Press,
1977),p p . 141-161.
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preceded by a visit to the United States,during which
Sukarno made an unsuccessful attempt to change Washington’s
65policy towards the West Irian dispute. The Soviet Union
made a great attempt to impress its guest:the mass media
heralded the visit as an event of utmost importance to
the growing relations between the two countries, and the
entire Soviet Politburo went to Moscow Airport to receive 
66
him. While the Soviet Union saw in Sukarno an important
leader of the Afro-Asian movement, who pursued a foreign
policy of anti - imperial ism and anti-colonial ism, Sukarno
hoped by his visit to demonstrate the country's independent
foreign policy, as well as to examine at first hand what
6 7Socialism had to offer to Indonesia.
Throughout his visit, Soviet leaders repeatedly
declared their support for Indonesia’s fight for the
'liberation of West Irian'.In addition,two important events
took place:the Soviet commit ment to supply US$100 million
in long-term credits, and the signing of a joint communique.
The acceptance of long term credits posed no problems,as
to accept Soviet as well as Western aid was evidence of
non-alignment.But the signing of the joint communique
unleashed a political storm in Indonesia because Sukarno,
as Constitutional-Head of State, sought no clearance
for it from the Government.On 10 September, in discussions
in the Kremlin, Sukarno proposed a joint communique,in
order to manifest 'a deeper and more c o n c r e t e ... bond of
68
friendship',which the Soviet leaders found agreeable.
65.Ib id , p p . 134-135.
66 .Ib id , p . 145.
67 .Ib id .
68 .Ib id , p p . 148-149.
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A joint communique was issued on the following day/ but 
Indonesian parliamentary leaders in Jakarta were enraged 
by point two of the communique which read:
With regard to such international questions as disarmament, 
the struggle against colonialism,prohibition of the use and the 
testing of atomic and thermonuclear weapons,etc.,the USSR and 
the Republic of Indonesia are guided by the spirit and 
principles of the Bandung Conference.Moreover,the Soviet 
Union and the Republic of Indonesia have declared that the 
existence of military pacts will not fac ilitate  the e fforts to 
lessen international tensions,which are in turn essential for 
the establishment of world peace.In this connection,the 
admittance of the PRC to her rightful place in the United 
Nations Organization was recognised not only as a natural 
act but also a constructive contribution to the cause of 
world peace.69
Four main objections were raised in Jakarta to the communique. 
First,no clearance was sought from the Government;this 
was interpreted as defiance of the authority and power 
of the Parliament and Government.Second,despite its generality, 
point two would tend to imply that the Republic was siding 
with the Soviet Union against the United S t a t e s .Third, 
all the issues raised were of consequence for the Soviet 
Union,not Indonesia, and hence a Soviet diplomatic victory. 
Finally,the issue of West Irian,which was the foremost 
concern of the Government,was not mentioned, and this 
incensed the Indonesian p a r 1iamentarians.For Sukarno,however, 
even though the communique made no mention of West Irian, 
he may have been satisfied with the numerous Soviet 
declarations made in support of the Indonesian claim.More 
important,Sukarno saw the communique as an instrument to 
force the hands of the United States and the Netherlands, 
for, by identifying more closely with the Soviet Union,
69.Pravda,12 September 1956.
he hoped to achieve concessions on West Irian.
The Suez Crisis and the Soviet Invasion of Hungary
The second Ali cabinet faced two international
crises almost simultaneously.The first was the Suez crisis
which began with Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
The Indonesian Government supported Egypt's decision/ and
on 7 August 1956 the cabinet stated that "the government
recognises the complete right of Egypt as an independent
and sovereign nation to nationalise the Suez Canal Company,
71which is an Egyptian Company". in his Independence Day
address in 1956, Sukarno also declared his solidarity with
72the Egyptian people and government. on 29 October,Israel
invaded Egyptian Sinai, and on the following day,French
and British forces invaded the canal zone.The Indonesian
Government condemned the invasion as 'an aggression' and
called on the governments of Israel, the United Kingdom
and France "to cease their attacks immediately and to
withdraw their forces from the territory under the
73sovereignty of Egypt". The second crisis was the Soviet
invasion of Hungary on 5 November 1956.On the following 
day,the Ali Government passed a resolution 'regretting' 
that 'the process of democratization' in Hungary haJ been 
'arres t e d '.It also 'regretted' the 'intervention of the 
Soviet Army' and 'urged that peace be quickly restored' 
so that 'the Hungarian people be given complete freedom
74to determine the form and composition of their government'.
70.This was most clearly indicated when he defended his actions in Moscow 
by arguing that the object was "to lead us to the satisfactory  completion 
of this thus far unfinished task of ours to build our nation from Subang 
to Merauke,....remember this part[Uest Irian] of Indonesia is still smarting 
under Dutch colonial rule".See Harsono.Op c it ,p.154.
71 .Sastroamidjojo.Op c it.p.33Q.
7?.Sukarno.Pi Bawah Bendera Revolusi,Vol.2,p.267.
73.Sastroamidioio.Op c it.p.332.




statements is evident: the Indonesian Gover nment saw the
75Suez crisis as a colonial issue, while the invasion of
Hungary was interpreted as a 'cold war' development.A
similar dichotomy could be discerned in debates in the
United Nations,where the Indonesian representative described
the attack on Egypt as a 'flagrant aggression' not only
against Egypt but against the principles and purposes of
the United Nations Charter-but only 'regretted' the Soviet 
r 76invasion of Hungary. The two crises demonstrated the dilemmas 
of the 'uncommitted' nations - while both Egypt and Hungary 
were invaded by external powers, the Egyptian case was 
seen as 'aggression' by Israel,Britain and F rance.However, 
the Soviet invasion was not* Th'S
was largely influenced by the non-aligned countries7 
wish to stay out of the Cold War.For Moscow,however,this 
was another proof of Jakarta's 'independence',which further 
assisted the development of their bilateral relationship.
The Separatist Challenge
S ukarno’s belief in the need for a strong central 
executive authority(which was later to crystallise into 
the system of Guided Democracy) coincided with the period 
of severe problems between the Ali Government and the military 
commanders in the outer islands.The issue of smuggling,which 
had existed since 1949,became a major problem for the govern­
ment in 1956.The opposition parties,especially the Masjumi,
accused the Government of treating the outer islands as
75.That the United States opposed the invasion of Egypt by its allies.that 
is,France and Britain,made it above all, a''colonial',not h 'cold war' issue. 
.76.Wilborn.Gp c it ,p.223.
The difference in substance and tone between the
’step c h i l d r e n ',seen only as providers of foreign exchange
77for Javanese consumption. in 1956,two 'smuggling a f f a i r s ’ 
broke out involving Army Commands in the outer islands.
The first was the 'Teluk Nibung Affair' in East Sumatra, 
which involved the smuggling of rubber and second,the
78’Bitung Affair' which involved the smuggling of copra.
While the controversy between the Ali Government 
and the regional commanders was raging, Sukarno dropped
a bombshell, when he declared on 28 October that all political
79parties should be 'buried'. Later, in a speech in Surabaya
in November,he declared that 'Western Democracy' was
unsuitable for Indonesia and advised that Indonesia should
revert to its ’indigenous d e m o cracy’,which was later formalised
8 0into the system of ’Guided Democracy’. Sukarno's attempt
to introduce a strong central a u t h o r i t y ,provoked the regional
commanders to seize power in their respective territories:
military commanders in North,Central and South Sumatra
as well as in Sulawesi declared their independence and
81non-recognition of the Ali Government. These developments
indicated that the Ali Government had lost control over
the regional Army commanders.While on the one hand,Sukarno's
Guided Democracy proposal sounded a death knell of Parliamentary
Democracy and with it,of Ali's Government, on the other,the
actions of the regional military commanders demonstrated
that the Government had no power to control them.In view
of these developments, A1i returned the government mandate
77.Sastroamidjojo,Op c it,p.330;Jones,Dp c it ,pp.71-72.
78.Sastroamidjoj,Op c it ,p.338.
79.H.Feith and L.Castles,(eas.), Indonesia Political Thinking, 1945-1965,(Ithaca,
New York:Cornell University Press,1970),pp.81-83.
80.Tas.Qp c it ,pp.269-3Q2;Mason,Op c it ,pp.93-106.
81 .Sastroamidjoyo,Op c it,p.346.
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to Sukarno,who in turn announced the formation of a 'gotong- 
royong cabinet' under the prime-ministership of Juanda, 
in April 1957.62
On the whole,the policies of the Ali Government 
caused a coolness in relations with the United States, 
which saw them as indications of Jak a r t a ’s drift into the 
Soviet camp.The situation was exacerbated by the Ali Govern­
ment's perception of United States foreign policy under 
Dulles and Eisenhower as 'militaristic' and 'hostile' towards 
'uncommitted states' such as Burma and I n d o n e s i a . ^3 Q n  
the other hand,the Soviet Union viewed J a k a r t a ’s policies 
with favour.The decision to establish a diplomatic mission 
and despatch one of its most capable ambassadors to Moscow, 
the rejection of SEATO,Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union, 
domestic policies such as 'Indonesianisation', abrogation 
of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the RTC Agreements 
were all perceived as evidence of Indonesia's 'progressiveness’
in line with Mikheev's prescription of a movement towards
, 84an 'anti - imperialist and anti-colonial Asian state . This 
was greatly assisted also by the change in the political 
climate in Moscow following the death of Stalin,where,there­
after, the newly independent states were no longer regarded 
as vestigial semi-colonial countries and instruments of 
’neo-colonialists’.
The Soviet Union's approval of the Ali Government 
and its policies was clearly evident in its changing
1 77
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assessment:in 1952,a Soviet writer had described Ali as
85an ’agent of the State D e p a r t m e n t anc* Yet after 1954 
a complete reversal could be discerned.In July 1954,A.
Kholopova argued that ’’the active struggle of the Indonesian
people for full national independence and the efforts of
the present government to pursue an independent foreign
policy have aroused the ire at home and abroad”? on 17
A
August 1955, Izvestia argued that ’’the government of
Sastroamidjojo...had done a lot to stabilise the c o u n t r y ’s
economic situation,to improve the life of the people and
to ensure industrial progress ” . 87 Arguing ¡n the same
vein,Radio Moscow announced in February 1957 that "the
Western powers,grossly interfering in Indonesia's internal
affairs,are using every means to overthrow the present
government headed by Sastroamidjojo.The fact is that this
Government is pursuing in the sphere of foreign and internal
policy a course aimed at strengthening the coun t r y ’s
88sovereignty and national independence". These positive 
assessments of the Indonesian Government can be explained 
by the favourable reading of its policies by the Kremlin 
as well as the changing Soviet views of the newly independent 
Afro-Asian states.
Notwithstanding its support and approval of the 
policies of the Ali Government,the Soviet Union endorsed 
S u k a r n o ’s programme for a strong central executive.This 
was clearly evident from the various Soviet commentaries.
85.Literaturnaya Gazeta,22 January 1952.
86.A.Kholopova, In Indonesia”,New Times,No.28,10 July 1954,p.27.
87.Izvestia,17 August 1955.
88.SWB:The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,Part 1,2-5 Feb.1957,p.24.
In March 1957,V.Zharov argued that "trouble in Indonesia
has been brewing since the end of last year when the Lubis
conspiracy was exposed.Though the attempted coup failed,
Col.Lubis' accomplices, with foreign imperialist support,
succeeded in organizing separatist rebellions in various
89parts of the country". At the same time, Soviet political
analysts took great pains to deny allegations that the
revolts were caused by antipathy in the outer islands to
Javanese 'imperial ism'.Rather,they have insisted that there
was collusion between the regional commanders and the
Western powers.For instance, Model maintained that "the
revolts were led by reactionary army officers who had close
liasion with the Right-wing political parties and the
imperialists,particularly those who belonged to the SEATO 
„90bloc". As for the introduction of Guided Democracy, a 
Soviet writer argued that it was necessary to 'strengthen 
the state system and unite the people' as well as to 'end 
the opposition's obstructionist tactics in Pariiament'.This 
would:
overcome the elements of political anarchy existing in the country 
and put an end to bickering and strife  so that all the e fforts of 
the people might be concentrated on economic reconstruction and 
raising the living standard.But this would have spelled an end to the i 
big profits of the American and Dutch companies which are pumping 
fabulous wealth out of Indonesia.lt would have meant too an end to 
all hopes of restoring colonial oppression in Indonesia and turning 
her into an instrument of imperialist policy in Asia.91
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91 .Zharov,Op c it ,p.11.
On the whole, Moscow's endorsement of Suka r n o ’s
foreign and domestic policies, including the introduction
of Guided Democracy, was related to its perception of the
Indonesian Republic as an ardent critic of ’neo-colonialism’,
as an opponent of American military security pacts in the
region, and as a major sponsor of Afro-Asian solidarity.
Added to this, Sukarno’s proclamation of a ’socialist
future for Indonesia’ and the introduction of ’democracy
Indonesian s t y l e ’ which included the participation of the
PKI;placed S ukarno’s Indonesia high in Moscow's categorization
of Third World ’progressive’ states.
Therefore,it was not surprising that Soviet-Indonesian
relations improved with Sukarno's acquisition of executive
powers under Guided Democracy.On 5 July 1959,Sukarno decreed
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and restored
the 1945 Constitution, marking the return to a presidential
92form of government. Following this, Sukarno introduced
93 94the doctrines of Manipol-USDEK and NASAKOM, which in
the process succeeded in bringing the PKI into the mainstream
of Indonesian politics, but which in American eyes was
merely another name for ”a type of Communism guided by
a would-be dictator whose leftist leanings and personal
95peccadilloes were becoming more widely known". On 5 March 
1960,Sukarno dissolved Pariiament/and on 17 August banned
92.J.D.Legge,Indonesia,(Englewood Cliffs,New Jersey :Bobbs-Merrill, 1974),pp.
145-146;Tas,Dp c it ,pp.269-273;Agung,Op c it ,pp.248-267.
93.On 17 August 1959, Sukarno declared that the struggle must be waged 
on the basis of unity, as expressed in the 1945 Constitution,Socialism  
a la Indonesia,guided democracy,guided economy and the personality of 
the Indonesian nation.The speech was subsquently proclaimed a political 
manifesto(manipol) and together with the initials of the five principles 
of Pancasila.gave rise to a vehicle labelled Manipol-USDEK.
94.NASAKOM is the acronym for Nasionalis(Nationalist),Agama(Religious) and 
Komunis(Communist)groups in Indonesian society.
95.Jones,Op c it,p.181.
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the Socialist and Masjumi parties for their role in the
96separatist movements.
The implementation of the Guided Democracy system 
and with it, the strengthening of Sukarno's executive powers 
were welcomed by Moscow. Trud, for instance, argued that 
"Sukarno’s plan to improve and strengthen the state 
administration by the foundation of a 'collegiate' cabinet 
of representatives of all the national parties would strike 
one more blow at the USA Soviet growing support for 
the Indonesian Republic,especially Sukarno can be explained 
by the following reasons:The elevation of Sukarno as the 
most powerful leader in Indonesia, and one who pursued 
anti-Western policies was one important factor.In addition, 
the size, population and prestige of the Republic in the 
Afro-Asian world made Indonesia an inviting target.There 
was also the increasing role of the PKI,the most powerful 
and the largest Communist Party outside the Sino-Soviet 
bloc,with which Sukarno was willing to cooperate.Following 
the 1955 Bandung Conference, Indonesia and Sukarno were 
emerging as leaders of the Afro-Asian bloc and Khrushchev, 
after the 1956 CPSU Congress.was only too keen to establish 
a working relationship with the 'progressive' forces in
181
96.H.Kosut,Indonesia:The Sukarno Years,(New York:Facts on File,1967),pp.81- 
82.
97.Trud,6 March 195?r; Later Soviet writings were to reverse this assessment.
For example,A.Drugov and A.Reznikov,examining the country's political 
life in 1960-1962 argued that in that period negative trends grew stronger 
in all aspects of 'guided democracy'."In home policy,the regime was rapidly 
transformed in the interests of the bureaucratic stratum.In these conditions, 
the trend to restrict the democratic rights and political activity of 
the working masses becomes increasingly clear.Indonesia's foreign policy 
also underwent negative changes:nationalism had acquired hegemonsitic 
tendencies, and the struggle for consolidating the nation's political and 
economic independence was increasingly substituted for foreign policy 
adventures".See A.Drugov and A.Reznikov,Indonesia in the Period of 
"Guided Democracy",(Moscow:Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury.1969), 
pp.32-58.
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the Third World.Indonesia’s relations with the Western
powers, especially the United States, were strained by
Western support for the Dutch over the West Irian issue
and implication in the separatist movements.Finally, there
was also a growing personal rapport between Sukarno and 
98Khrushchev. The Soviet Union's high regard for the Republic
99was demonstrated by the visits of President Voroshilov
from 6 to 19 May 1957 and Khrushchev^?rom 20 February
to 1 March 1960, to Indonesia.In addition to committing
aid, Moscow’s support for Indonesia's position on West
Irian was reiterated.
In June 1961, Sukarno was again invited to the
Soviet Union, and the close relations between the two countries
were clearly exhibited by Sukaro’s remarks in the Kremlin:
And why shouldn't we be friends with the USSR? Isn't the 
Soviet Union assisting us? Isn't the Soviet Union waging and 
leading the struggle against imperialism? And in the United 
Nations, isn't it helping us? And isn't the Soviet Unionjielping 
us built our industry and our armed forces?That is why^Soviet 
Union is our friend...You gentlemen [Western journalists! do not 
however, like our struggle for world peace, but the Soviet Union 
does.Then, why shouldn't we be friends with the Soviet Union?101
The Soviet Union lavishly committed economic and military
aid to Indonesia, which between 1956 and 1964 received
more than US$1.5 billion in Soviet credits - more than
1 02any other Third World country except Egypt. While Indonesian 
leaders saw American aid as rendered in too business-like
98.See Khrushchev Remembers:The Last Testament,(London:Andre Deutsch, 
1974),p.313.
99.See K.E.Worosjilov Pi Indonesia,(Djakarta:Kedutaan URSS,1957).
100.See Dua K Pi Indonesia,(Surabaya:Penerbitan 'Grip',1960);I.Pajawan, 
Chrusjtov Pan Indonesia,(Jakarta:Yayasan Pembaruan,1960).
101.Cited in Editorial, Soviet Indonesian Friendship",New Times,No.25,21 
June 1961,p.2.
102.C.B.McLane,Soviet-Asian Relations,Vol.2,(London:Central Asian Research 
Institute,1973),pp.80-81 ;Uri Ra'anan.The USSR Arms the Third World:Case 
Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy,(Cambridge,Mass.'.M.I.T.Press, 1969),pp. 
175-246.
a fashion, COntrast they/ and especially Sukarno, spoke
of their Soviet experience with approbation.For example,
Sukarno narrated his experience with Khrushchev:
I asked Khrushchev for $100 million in September 1956.It was 
bitter cold, vet he came out of the Kremlin into the street 
to embrace me, welcome me with warm words, and walk me 
inside personally.There were no long,cold negotiations.His 
finance men deliberated just long enough to determine our 
rate of repayments arid grace period.Two minutes later,every­
body said 'da1, and that was it.Nor did they dictate my future 
behaviour before giving me my crust of bread. 104
In addition to aid, Soviet ideologues saw Indonesia as
a 'National Democracy’, a concept that was first introduced
at the December 1960 Moscow Conference of Eighty-One Communist
0  4- ’ 1 0 5Parties. This meant that by 1960 Soviet ideologists saw 
Indonesia as a new type of post-colonial state which was 
in transition from a bourgeois democratic state to a dictatorship 
of the proletariat.It was also a codeword for a Third World 
state that was defending its political and economic independence, 
struggling against ’Imperialism' and its military blocs, 
rejecting military bases on its territory and undertaking 
social,politica 1 and economic policies for the benefit 
of the masses.
It was in this regard - its receipt of Soviet 
aid, its acceptance as a state ideologically compatible 
with the Soviet Union and its approbation of the Soviet 
Union - that a number of observers believed in the early 
1960s that Indonesia,for all intents and purposes, was 
an 'ally' and in the 'Soviet c a m p G u y  Pauker,for instance, 
argued:
103.See M.Hatta,"Indonesia Between the Power Blocs",Foreign A ffa irs,Vol.
36,No.3,April 1958,p.486.
•104.Cited in Gindy Adams,Op c it ,p.296.





Since Premier Khrushchev's visit in February I960,Indonesia 
has become a major target of Soviet aid and influence and 
only massive Western efforts can now prevent its gradual 
incorporation into the communist bloc.All the instrumenta­
lities available to the Kremlin - overt and covert,domestic 
and international - are concentrated on the elimination of 
Western influence from Indonesia, its isolation from the new 
nations of Asia and Africa, erosion of the will of domestic 
anti-communist political forces to resist capture of the 
government by the Communist Party and eventual alignment 
with the Soviet Union.What the West faces in Indonesia is 
not simply har assment from a group of conspirators from 
a great power.Indonesia has become a testing ground for 
the new technique of power politics, with the local 
Communist Party only one of the various instruments used 
by the Soviet state to supplant Western influence. 106
The Soviet Union’s 'honeymoon' with Indonesia during the
Khrushchev period was clearly evident in its support for
the Republic in the latter's conflict with the PRC over
the issue of Overseas Chinese,with the United States over
the separatist movements and with the Dutch over West Irian.
Sino-Indonesian Crisis
Following the Bandung Conference, Sino-Indonesian
relations took a turn for the better.This was epitomised
by the Sino-Indonesian Agreement on Dual Nationality on 22
April 1955, which stipulated that "anybody who at the same
time has the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia and
of the PRC shall choose between the two citizenships on
107the basis of his or her will”. This represented Chinese 
renunciation of the principle of jus sanguinis, by which every 
Chinese, no matter where he is born or chooses to live, 
retains his original nationality and hence represented 
an important Chinese concession.lt was aimed not merely
106.G.Pauker,"The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia”,Foreign A ffa irs,Vol.40, 
July 1962,p.612.
107.Doak Barnett,"A Choice of Nationality:Overseas Chinese in Indonesia”, 
American Universities Field S ta ff Reports:Southeast Asia Series,Vol.
3,No.14,1955,p.158.
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at improving Sino-Indonesian relations, but also at reducing
the suspicions of Chinese political intentions in the region
as a w h o l e .However, due to economic, political and cultural
factors, the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia continued to
be viewed as foreign interlopers, squandering the Republic’s
1 ORwealth at the expense of the pribumis(natives). In May
1959, two government decrees, aimed at eliminating Chinese
economic and political influence in the rural areas,
. . . , . . 109precipitated a major Sino-Indonesian crisis. These measures
received S ukarno’s blessing when he warned in his Independence 
Day address that ’’vultures capitalists of our nation" and 
"foreign non-Dutch capital”, which illegally supports the 
'counter-revolutionaries’ or "carries out its acts of economic 
sabotage’’ would be c r u s h e d ^
The Chinese Government was placed in a dilemma, 
as the decrees,if not contested, would entail a surrender 
of the right to defend the interests of the Overseas Chinese 
which was unacceptable on nationalistic grounds but, if 
opposed, would mean defending capitalism abroad while 
condemning it at home, as well as straining relations with 
Jakarta.The Chinese dilemma was aggravated by the non­
ratification of the Dual Nationality Treaty by Jakarta, 
and the Soviet wooing of Indonesia at a time when the Sino- 
Soviet rivalry was emerging into the open.
On 16 November 1959,Sukarno signed the decrees 
into law and the West Java Military Commander immediately
108.See Assat,"The Chinese Grip on our Economy",in Feith and Castles,
(eds.),0p c it,pp.343-346.
109.David Mozingo,Chinese Policy Towards Indonesia,1949-1967,(Ithaca,New 
York:Cornell University Press,1976),p.158.
110.Sukarno,The Rediscovery of Pur Revolution,(Jakarta:Ministry of Information, 
1959),pp.27-85.
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began to remove Chinese traders from the villages in his 
111
region. It was apparent that the Army was using the issue
to check the PKI's activities and to disrupt the p a r t y ’s
112
scheduled Sixth National Congress. The PKI was placed
in a dilemma:to support the anti-Chinese measures would
bring about a break with Peking, and to oppose them would
mean isolation on an issue where the Government enjoyed
widespread popular support.As a way out, the PKI condemned
the Army's forcible removal of Chinese as a ’’plot of the
counter-revolutionaries to disrupt Sino-Indonesian relations”
/
but at the same time stated that the Government had the
113sovereign right to issue the decrees.
Once the Army began forcible removal of the
Chinese, Peking publicly condemned the action/ and the
Chinese Embassy in Jakarta encouraged rural Chinese to
ignore the removal order.Soviet writers were later to
describe this as Peking's attempt to incite 'civil
disobedience ' }  ^ On 10 December,Peking launched a campaign
to recall the Chinese home, in an apparent attempt to
115'punish' Indonesia economically. By mid-1960, some 136,000 
had left for the PRC and Taiwan:this caused severe economic 
problems in rural Indonesia, as the Chinese had a near 
monopoly of retail activities'^* However, by April 1960, 
the PRC started a diplomatic retreat, as it realised that 
it could not win.Apart from the economic burden caused
by resettling the returned Overseas Chinese, Peking realised
111.Mozingo,0p cit,p.167.
112.Ibid,p.16Z 
113.Agung,Qp c it ,p.43Q.
11U.G.V.Astafyev and A.M.Dubinsky,(eds.),From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-
Socia1ism:The Evolution of Peking’s Foreign Policy,(Moscow:Progress Pub.,
1974),p.76.
1 1 s  M n z in u o .O P  c i t ,pp-171 -173.
116. Ibid,p. 175.
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that continued friction over the issue would only harm
its position in Indonesia, the PKI, and the Overseas Chinese,
and benefit the anti-communist elements in the country.
It also realised that it had very little leverage on Indonesia,
as it could not influence Jakarta to rescind the anti-
Chinese measures.At the same time,following the 'Tjimahi 
p f  f  i r '  117 Sukarno intervened and forced the Army leadership 
to cease its anti-Chinese pogroms.In April 1960,the Chinese 
Embassy in Jakarta dropped the repatriation c a m p a i g n  and 
on 10 April Chou En-lai announced that "a reasonable all­
round settlement of the Overseas Chinese question could 
■ . , .„ 118oe arrived au . Even though formal agreement was reached
only in April 1961,the crisis ended by August 1960 when
Sukarno exhorted,that for the sake of national economic
programmes and progress, no groups in the country should
do anything to harm the atmosphere of c o o p e r a t i o n ^ ^
Even though Sukarno ' later dismissed the Sino-
120Indonesian crisis as merely a psychological war , it 
marked an all time low in relations between the two countries 
since 1949.At the height of the crisis Khrushchev visited 
Indonesia, displaying the growing warmth between the 
two countries.In addition to declaring Soviet support for 
the ’liberation of West I r i a n ’, Khrushchev extended US$250 
million in credits to shore up the Indonesian economy,
at a time when Peking was attempting to sabotage it by
117.On 3 July 1960,two Chinese women in Tjimahi were killed by soldiers when 
they resisted being forcefully evicted from their homes.Sensing that 
the Army Command had gone too far, Sukarno had the UJest Java Military 
Commander transferred to Central Sumatra.
118.Peking Review,Vol.3,12 April 1960,pp.7-9.
119.Mozingo,Dp c it ,pp.178-179.
120.Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 1984 in Jakarta.During the 
Sino-Indonesian crisis, Roeslan was the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme 
Advisory Council.
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recalling the Overseas Chinese.lt is reasonable to hypothesise
that one important consideration influencing Peking to
terminate the crisis was the prevention of further Soviet
inroads into Indonesia at its expense.Even though no mention
was made of the Sino-Indonesian crisis, Soviet declaration
of support for the people and government of Indonesia was
121implicitly support against Peking. For instance, Khrushchev
declared in Bandung, ”Our sympathies are with the Indonesian
people who are striving to strengthen their independence,
to be full masters in their own house, to dispose of all
122
that they have created with their own hands” . it is also
revealing that on 16 April 1960 'Peking released "Long Live
Leninism”, the Chinese interpretation of Marxism-Leninism,
which officially precipitated the, open challenge to Moscow
123for leadership of Third World Communist Parties. In this 
context, since it was more important to maintain good relations 
with Indonesia,to have united goals in expelling Western 
influence in Southeast Asia and to check the growth of 
Soviet influence and presence in Indonesia, Peking decided 
to forgo its efforts to protect the Overseas Chinese.At 
a time when Jakarta was confronted with Western support 
for the Dutch over West Irian and the separatist movements, 
and P e k i n g ’s hostility due to the Overseas Chinese question, 
the net result was to push Indonesia closer towards the 
Soviet Union.
121.This appraisal was brought up in the writer's discussion with Rop^slan Abdulgani 





The separatist revolts which began in 1956 climaxed
after the introduction of Guided Democracy.In addition
to financial and autonomy considerations, the inauguration
of Guided Democracy was regarded as further evidence of
the growing centralization of power in Jakarta and Java,
at the expense of the outer islands.On 10 February 1958,
the rebellious commanders in Sumatra delivered an ultimatum
to the Juanda Government, demanding that 'communists’ be
expunged from the Government.The Government rejected this
and began military preparations to quell the rebellion?^4
A new dimension was added to the crisis when the
United States Secretary of State, J.F.Dulles, indirectly
125expressed his sympathy for the rebels' cause. In a
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on 26 February 1958, he declared:
...we would be very happy to see the non-communist elements 
who are really in the majority there exert a greater influence 
in the a ffa irs  of Indonesia than has been the case in the past, 
where Sukarno has moved towards his so-called 'guided 
democracy', which is a nice sounding name for what I fear would 
end up to be Communist despotism...I think that there is a fair 
chance that out of this revolt will come a curtailment of the 
trend toward Communism .126
This amounted to encouraging the rebels against the Central
Government and was seen in Indonesia as a blatant interference
in its internal affairs.This was also the start of a series
of developments that were to link the United States with
124.Interview with General Nasution on 14 April 1984,Jakarta.
125.lt is important to outline the American connection because this was 
an important consideration in Jakarta's decision to seek closer ties 
with the Soviet Union as a counter to United States' support for the 
rebels' cause.
126.Statement of J.F.Dulles,US House of Representatives,Congress 85, 
Session 2,Committee on Foreign Affairs,Hearings,Mutual Security Act 
l955,Part. 2,26 Feb.1958,(Washington,D.C.),p.219.
the rebels.D u l l e s ' testimony was also revealing as it
indicated the frame of mind in the State Department on
the developments in Indonesia.First, it was believed that
the communist influence was predominant and that Indonesia
was moving towards Communism.Second,the revolt was interpreted
as a clash between communists and anti-communists.In the
words of Howard Jones, ’’the fact that Sukarno was sheltering,
even nurturing the expansion of the Communist Party, that
the base of Communist strength was in Java, and finally
that the rebel leadership was solidly anti-communist, lent
colour to the conviction widespread in Washington that
127the major issue was the communist issue’’. This American 
perception was largely responsible for the dual approach 
of maintaining formal relations with Jakarta and7 at the 
same time,emphasising its support for the anti-communist 
forces in the outer islands. This, according to Jones ,"would 
have the advantage of enabling communications to be established 
with those elements in the outer islands opposing the central 
government, so that in the event of Java being suddently
1 OO
lost to Communism,the outer islands might be salvaged".
At the same time, Dulles toyed with the idea of offering
129belligerent status to the rebel government.
On 5 March 1958, the government forces under the
command of General Nasution launched their operations
against the rebels/ and on the tenth, the rebels' capital fell
to the Government forces, effectively putting an end to
the movement in Sumatra, even though the insurgency
127 Jones,0p_cit,pp.76-77.
128.Ibid,p.78,




continued until March 1960.The focus of the separatist 
movement shifted to Sulawesi when the rebels declared a 
government in Menado in May 1958;and this rebellion continued 
until June 1960^30 ,j.^e Q0vernment forces scored a double 
victory in operations in Central Sumatra, for not only 
was the back of the rebellion broken, but more important, 
fresh evidence of United States' assistance to the rebel
forces was acquired.According to General Nasution, American
^ u . I31arms and ammunition had been airdropped, but this was
13denied by the American Ambassador in Jakarta and by Washington.
In view of the insurgencies, the Indonesian Government
urgently requested arms from the United States in mid-
1958 but this was rejected on grounds that it would "not
contribute to a peaceful solution of the internal problems 
„133[in Indonesia]". This rejection exacerbated the deteriorating
United States-Indonesian relations and forced Jakarta
to look for alternative sources of arms.Hence, on 7 April,the
Government announced that it had signed agreements with
Poland,Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for the purchase of
134small arms, jet fighters and Soviet-built bombers.
T h e  State Department condemned the transaction, 
accusing Jakarta of turning to "the Communist bloc to buy 
arms for possible use in killing Indonesians who openly
135oppose the growing influence of Communism in Indonesia".
13Q.Tas,Dp c it ,p.278.
131.Interview with General Nasution on 14 April 1984 and Roeslan Abdulgani 
on 18 April 1984 in JakartajDeshpande,0p_cit,p.116.
132.Jones,Op c it ,pp.116-117.
133.Testimony of Id.S.Robertson,US Senate,Congress 85,Session 2,Committee 
on Foreign Relations,Hearings,Review of Foreign Policy of 1958,Part 2, 
(Washington,D.C.,1958),p.443.
134.Deshpande,Op c it ,p.119.
135.Daily News Conference,Off ice of News,Dept, of State,Vol.13,No.DPC 85,
7 April 1958,p.20.
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On 16 May,Sukarno stated that "we have ample proof
that foreign states are illegally supplying the North
136Sulawesi rebels with arms, instructors and pilots".
The Foreign Minister, Subandrio, was more specific:
The United States’ intervention in the domestic affairs of 
Indonesia is against the interests of the US itself because 
this kind of intervention will lead to similar actions by 
other countries.137
Even though this was denied by the State Department, enough 
circumstantial evidence was acquired to implicate the United States 
modern American weaponry that was airdropped to the rebels; 
the American-made anti-aircraft systems that were recovered 
in the Pekanbaru area [Central Sumatra] and later, the 
shooting down and capture of Allen Pope,an American pilot
who had flown from Clark Air Field in the Philippines,
138on 17 May 1958. Of greater significance was the direct
implication of the United States Central Intelligence
139Agency(CIA) in the rebellion. This was later confirmed 
by Roger Hilsman,the Director of the State Department,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research and later Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Kennedy 
Administration, who admitted that ’’when you considered things 
like C I A ’s support to the 1958 rebellion, Sukarno's
140frequently anti-American attitude was understandable".
136.Cited in V.Blinov,"Aggression in Indonesia",NewJHrnes,No.25,June 1958,p.6.
137.Quoted in Agung.Dp c it,p.379.
138.Interviews with Gen.Nasution on 14 April,Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 
and Adam Malik on 16 April 1984 in Jakarta.
139.See R.J.Barnett,Intervention and Revo lu tion ise  United States in the 
Third UJorId,(New York:Uorld Pub.,1968),p.225;J.B.Smith,Portrait of a Cold 
Warrior,(New York:Putnam and Sons,1976),p.244;R.McGhee,"The CIA and 
the White Paper on El Salvador",The Nation, 11 April 1981,p.423.
140.R.Hilsman,To Move a Nation,(New York:Doubelday,1967),p.363.
1 93
The regional revolts, and the United States 
implication in them, marked a low point in United States- 
Indonesian relations and greatly contributed to the 
Republic's tilt towards the Soviet Union.This was because 
in contrast to Washington Moscow fully supported Jakarta 
diplomatically and with ma t e r i e l .The Soviet Government 
was alarmed by the regional revolts, fearing a direct 
American involvment in them.On 14 March 1958, Khrushchev 
declared:
The Soviet people cannot but pay attention to the imperialist 
intrigues in Indonesia.Why are the imperialists interfering in 
the domestic affairs of this country and organising plots?
That cannot be tolerated.The Indonesian people should be 
left alone to do as they see fit and no one has the right to 
impose his will or way of life on them.141
On the same day, the Soviet Government released a statement
expressing concern and support for Indonesia:
Expressing the unanimous view of the Peoples of the USSR, 
the Soviet Government resolutely condemns the interference 
of foreign powers in the a ffa irs of the Indonesian people 
and their aggressive actions against the sovereign Republic 
of Indonesia, and declares that all responsibility for the 
dangerous consequences of this will wholly and completely 
fall upon the governments of these powers.The Government 
of the USSR expresses the hope that the powers which are 
responsible for the situation that has developed in the area 
of Indonesia,the United States first and foremost.will heed 
the voice of reason,and will cease to interfere in the 
internal affa irs of the Indonesian Republic. 142
At a time of great anxiety in the Republic, 
especially when it was widely believed that the United
143
States was out to bring about the downfall of the Government, 
Soviet statements of support were reassuring and largely
explained the growing sympathy the Indonesian leaders had
141.Cited in V.Perov/'The Situation in Indonesia”,International A ffa irs,
(Moscow),No.5,May 1958,p.47.
142.Pravda,15 May I958;lzvestia,15 May 1958.
143.Interviews with Gen.Nasution on 14 April and Roeslan Abdulgani on •
18 April 1984 in Jakarta.
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for the Soviet Uni o n .Moreover, it was the American refusal 
to supply arms in the first place which provided Moscow
with its first opportunity to transfer arms to the Republic
through its Eastern European allies.Finally. United States'
implication in the regional revolts provided the primary
impetus for the ratification of the September 1956 agreement
with the Soviet Union to provide Indonesia with credits
worth US$100 million, indicating explicitly that the growing
Soviet-Indonesian cooperation was to a considerable extent
a reaction against Washington's policies toward Indonesia.
The West Irian Crisis
On 29 November 1957, the UNGA rejected for the
fourth time an Indonesian draft resolution on West Irian and
this was an important factor influencing Jakarta to consider
'other m e a n s ’ to regain the territory.On 2 December 1957,
J u a n d a ’s Government ordered a twenty-four general strike
to demonstrate its displeasure at Dutch policies and continued
144occupation of West Irian. On the following day,workers 
in the Central Office of the Dutch shipping 1ine,KPM,took
over the company, and similar action was repeated at a
145Dutch trading comapny,Geo Wehry. On 5 December,the Government
closed all Dutch consulates in Indonesia and expelled their
staff, froze all profits of Dutch companies and requested
all Dutch citizens,numbering 40,000, to leave the country,
146except for those involved in essential services. On




13 December, all the seized Dutch enterprises were placed
under the A r m y ’s control.Taken as a whole, the measures
marked a turning point in Indonesia’s policy towards the
Netherlands in its struggle over West Irian.These measures
were lauded by Soviet commentators who argued that ’’control
was established over the Dutch enterprises in order to
prevent attempts by the Dutch companies to disorganise
economic life.The Dutch companies shared in the subversive
machinations against Indonesia and control over them will
147
undoubtedly strengthen her security".
At the same time, a National Front for the Liberation 
of West Irian, was established in February 1958 under the 
command of General Nasution.The Dutch had been building
up their military strength on the island and had 2500
148ground troops and 1500 marines. In April 1960, the Dutch
Government despatched the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman
to West Irian:this was interpreted by Indonesian military
leaders as ’gunboat diplomacy ’^ but to Sukarno represented
, 149a ’very hot-headed and provocative action . In July 1960, 
in an address to the Supreme Advisory Council, Sukarno
announced that the struggle against the Dutch would have
150to be waged ’with all m e a n s ’. On 17 August, Jakarta 
severed diplomatic relations with The Hague, and at the
same time the President belittled the previous governments





151. UJil bo r n, 0£_cit, p. 315.
In October 1960, Nasution left for the United
States to purchase arms, in order to make credible the
152
policy of ’other m e a n s ’. The United States was Nasution's
first choice because of his anti-communism, his desire
to procure modern armaments, his wish to balance the growing
Soviet-Indonesian relations and to use the United States
153to pressure the Dutch. However, the mission was a failure, 
as the United States refused the Indonesian request, largely 
to avoid antagonising the Dutch and to indicate neutrality 
in the dispute.This only reinforced J a k a r t a ’s belief that 
Washington was siding with the Dutch, as all the latter’s 
weaponry emanated from the United States.The net consequence 
of the United St a t e s ’ decision to reject the Indonesian 
request was to force the latter further into a dependency 
relationship with the Soviet Union.As Howard Jones admitted 
later, "Indonesia never approached the Communist bloc for
either economic or military aid until it had exhausted
154
the possibility of help from America".
During Khrushchev’s visit in February 1960, the
Soviet leader publicly pledged only economic and technical
aid to Indonesia.Privately, however, discussions were held
on military aid/and it was agreed that arms would be supplied
155when the need arose. Following Nasution’s failure in the 
United States, he led an arms buying mission to Moscow
on 28 December 1960, and successfully negotiated an
152.Interview with General Nasution on 14 April 1984,Jakarta.
153.Ibid.
154.Jones,Op c it ,p.122.




agreement, in which the Soviet leaders reiterated their
support for Indonesia's 'liberation of West Irian'.For
example, Mikoyan declared:
Ue are principled enemies of colonialism...We quite understand 
the concern of the Indonesian people over the fact that 
colonialists still hold UJest Irian under their sway and we 
understand the Indonesian peoples' determination to eliminate 
this sore from the body of freedom loving and independent 
Indonesia.All progressive mankind is indignant over the 
breach of trust which the colonialists showed and continue to 
demonstrate, particularly as concerns UJest Irian.156
Following the arms agreement, Nasution declared that, "we
Indonesians met real friends in Russia and an agreement
highly satisfactory to both sides was reached precisely
as scheduled". He also warned that the agreement would
be "an instrument for defending peace and friendship in
Southeast Asia:it will be a means of frustrating the
i57
activity of the colonialists threatening peace". On 6 
January 1961, the joint communique read in part:
The mission had been sent to the Soviet Union by the Government 
of Indonesia in accordance with measures taken to build up the 
armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia, mainly in connection 
with the special situation which has arisen as a result of the 
tension increasing of late on the question of UJest Irian.The 
Government of the Soviet Union met the requests of the 
Nasution's mission concerning the purchase of new items 
urgently needed by the armed forces of Indonesia.158
An important aspect of the Nasution mission was 
the widespread publicity given to it by the Indonesian 
and Soviet media.Asked why this was so, Subandrio said 
on 29 December 1960, "we regard as very serious the military 





Minister also stressed that "Indonesia has to make this
arms purchase because other countries cannot sell us the
159
type of: arms which Indonesia needs". it was also an
Indonesian way of announcing to the United States that
an alternative source was available, from its adversary,
and demonstrated Indonesia’s determination to pursue its
policy of ’other m e a n s ’ even if it meant moving closer
towards the Soviet Union.At a time when the Soviet Union
was increasing its activities in the Third World and competing
with the Chinese, the agreement with Indonesia represented
a great diplomatic victory, which at the same time, enhanced
its credentials as a supporter of anti-colonialist and
anti - imperialist causes.
In June 1961, Nasution led another successful
arms buying mission to the Soviet U n i o n i ^  In addition
to arms deliveries, Moscow and its Eastern European allies
trained Indonesian military personnel, while Moscow maintained
a military mission in S u r a b a y a ,under the command of Admiral
C h e r n o b a y z \ s a result of the agreement on Soviet arms,
Sukarno was able to declare on 17 August 1961:
At this moment, the Indonesian people feel itself strong enough 
to defy the Dutch imperialism in UJest Irian in all fields - in 
whatever field.The Dutch challenge in the political,economic and 
financial fields, we will answer promptly with an equal counter­
challenge.The Dutch military challenge we will answer with a 
military challenge too.162
The President went on to declare that ’’West Irian should
159.D.jakarta Despatches,(Information Division,Embassy of Indonesia,Washington,D.C.), 
Vol.2/1 ,4 Jan.1961,p.A.
160.Interview with Gen.Nasution on 14 April 1984,Jakarta;McLane,Soviet- 
Asian Relations,Vol.2,p.86.
161.Pauker,"The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia”,p.615;Agung,Op c it ,p.298.
162.Sukarno,Pi Bawah Bendera RevoIusi,Vol.2,p.A77.
be liberated from the Dutch colonial rule in 1962".
For the first time, a deadline was set, clearly indicating
that the Indonesian Government was preparing to wrest the
territory by force and the Dutch, realising that their
forces were outnumbered, began to look for a political
solution,but their efforts were rebuffed by the Indonesians?6^
Pursuing the momentum of brinkmanship, Sukarno announced
on 17 December 1961 the formation of the P e o p l e ’s Triple
Command for the Liberation of West Irian under the command
of Major-General Suharto, charged with conducting a military
165campaign against Dutch-held West Irian. By the end of
1961, military tension had increased rapidly^ climaxing 
on 15 January 1962 with the sinking of two Indonesian Navy 
gunboats in the Arafura S e a ? 66 Tension was further escalated 
by Indonesian combat units' infiltration into West Irian
and a potentially explosive military conflict was in the
, . ,. . 167making in the region.
On 8 February 1962, the Soviet Government 
released a statement on the crisis:
The Soviet Government is proceeding on the basis of the 
irrefutable premise that West Irian is an inalienable part 
of the Republic of Indonesia.The Soviet Union has supported 
and continues to support the lawful demand of the Indonesian 
people and their government for the immediate reunification 
of West Irian with Indonesia,for the abolition of Dutch 




16A.Agung,0p c it ,pp.300-302.
165. Ibid, p. 302; Harso no, Og_cit, p. 237.
166.Ibid,p.238.
167.On 17 August 1962, Sukarno stated that "the 2000 volunteers we landed 
in West Irian were soon joined by thousands of local inhabitants and 
the colonialists were driven out of a considerable part of the territory". 
Cited in Editorial,"Reunited",New Times,No. 17,28 April 1963,p.U.
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The Soviet people regard it as their duty to help all the 
people who are fighting for the overthrow of colonial 
oppression and for the consolidation of national 
independence.The Soviet people are following the just 
struggle of the Indonesian people for the liberation of 
West Irian.The Government of the Soviet Uni.jn finds it 
necessary to point out to those circles in Holland which 
are responsible for the country's policy that by taking 
to the road of provocation against Indonesia,they are 
assuming a grave responsibility for the consequences 
which may result from this policy.In our days where a 
single spark may be sufficient for a big conflagration  
to break out,their playing with fire.no matter in what 
part of the world it tkaes place,is highly dangerous.168
This was a strong Soviet commit ment to the Indonesian
Government and a warning to the Dutch.
Sukarno's decision to increase the political and
military pressure placed the United States' Government
in a d i l e m m a .Since 1950, successive administrations had
found it prudent not to give prominence to the issue, as
there was a strongly held belief that they had nothing
169
to profit from it. There was also strong attachment to 
the Dutch but no such close ties existed with the Indonesians 
But once the Kennedy Administration realised that the 
Indonesian Government was committed to taking over West 
Irian, it feared that increasing tension would completely 
force Indonesia into the Soviet bloc.According to Howard 
Jones,the Administration was convinced by June 1962 "that 
war was just around the corner,for we in the embassy knew 
what was happening as a result of an operation that was
168.Pravda,9 February 1962.
169.This sentiment was clearly expressed,in an interview with the writer,by 
Alphonse Laporta,Deputy Director for Indonesia,Burma,Malaysia and 
Singapore,Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,Department of State, 




then top secret - direct observation by U-2 planes". The
Kennedy Administration feared that a new war in the Pacific
would not only provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity
to extend its influence but, more dangerous, could lead
to a confrontation between it and the United States, as
an ally in NATO of the Netherlands.Continued tension and
possibly a military clash over West Irian would only strengthen
the PKI's domestic support and make the country veer towards
Communism.In view of these considerations, Washington was
forced to change its policy.It was stimulated to do so
by two other incidents ¡-first, fol lowing the sinking of the
Indonesian gunboats by the Dutch, Sukarno sent Subandrio
to Washington to warn that Dutch aggression would make
the communists the most powerful political force in the
country;jsecond, Subandrio relayed to Kennedy Khrushchev’s
pledge to send Soviet military personnel to man Soviet
supplied ships, planes and weapons against the Dutch Navy 
172if war occurred.
In Howard J o n e s ’ analysis, "only a clear threat
to peace of the area,of such a nature as to force American
involvement in a conflict in which we had no interest,
173would move Washington , ancj that situation emerged after 
the sinking of the gunboats, the Indonesian infiltration 
into West Irian and the massive inflow of Soviet arms into 
Indonesia.In these circumstances, the American President 
171 .Ibid,p.210.
172.Cited in Harsono,0p c it ,p.238;This was later confirmed by Mikoyan who 
said that "Soviet training personnel were prepared to play a combat 
role had the issue not been settled".See Stephen Hosmer and Thomas 
UJolfe,Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Countries,(Lexington, 
Mass.:Lexington Books,1983),P.25;Also see Khrushchev Remembers:The 
Last Testament,pp.328-338.
173Jones,Op c it ,p.191.
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sent his younger brother and Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, 
on 12 February to Jakarta and The Hague;this was followed 
by the mediation by Ellsworth Bunker at Middleburg (Virginia), 
which led to the agreement transferring West Irian to 
Indonesia.
In the final analysis, it was American intervention
and pressure on the Dutch that solved the West Irian dispute.
Despite its statement of 8 February, the Soviet Government
privately encouraged the Republic to seek a military
174solution. In fact, on 1 January 1962, a Soviet political
commentator,Lev Skomorokhov exhorted that:
the Indonesian people were preparing for the decisive 
storming of the colonialist positions in West Irian.These 
steps are justified both morally and legally.The 
liberation of West Irian would be an act implementing 
United Nations Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples.
Before this declaration was voted,the colonialists 
were warned that if they refused to abide by it,the 
¡people would implement it by force.175
This can be seen as some form of public encouragement for
the Republic to use force.In Washington, however, it was
reasoned that once hostilities broke out, it would be a
no-win situation for the United States and its Dutch ally.
According to Robert Kennedy:
... if  hostilities were begun by Indonesia...the line would end up 
appearing as a struggle between the colonial nations,supported 
by the United States, against the new nations of the world, 
supported by the Communists.This was a conflict which would... 
over an extended period of time,be virtually impossible for us 
to win.The Communists would become far more entrenched in 
Indonesia, the anti-communists would have their position 
undermined, and Southeast Asia would have been encircled by
174.Interviews with Gen.Nasution on 14 April and Adam Malik on 16 April 
1984,Jakarta.
175.L.Skomorokhov,"West Irian UJill be Freed”,New Times,No.1,Jan.1962.pp.22-
23.
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the Soviet Union and China.For these reasons, the US was 
vitally interested in the result of the UJest Irian dispute. 176
In the settlement of the dispute, it should be noted that 
the arms supplied by the Soviet Union were not utilised 
and that it was principally due to Washington that the 
territory was transferred to Indonesia.lt would be an over­
statement to conclude that the Soviet Union was pleased 
with the peaceful incorporation of West Irian with Indonesia. 
In fact, the Soviet Ambassador to Jakarta, Mikhailov, 
expressed privately,his disappointment to the Indonesian 
Government that in spite of the massive supply of Soviet
weapons, the Indonesian Government 'chose an easy way out
177of the conflict'. At the same time,the Soviet Union played
down the efforts of the United States in bringing about
the final solution to the problem.On 18 August 1962,Radio
Moscow claimed that "the victory for Indonesian policy
was brought about by the extremely widespread international
support for its just struggle - the sympathy of the Afro-
178Asian countries and the states of the Socialist camp".
Similarly, in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1980,edited by
Gromyko and Ponomarev, the settlement of the problem was
described as follows:
The staunch stand adopted by Indonesia, which relied on 
Soviet assistance and the solidarity of the anti-imperialist 
forces,compelled the Netherlands to. renounce its claim 
to West Irian. 179
176.Cited in C.Stasty,"US Mediation in the Dutch Dispute Over West Irian",
Asian Profile,Vol.2,No.1,Feb.1974,p.81.
177.Pauker,"The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia",p.613;Agung,Dp c it ,p.396. 
178.SWB:The Soviet Union,Part 1,SU/1024/A3/1,18 August 1962.
179.A.Gromyko and B.N.Ponomarev,(eds.),Soviet Foreign Policy,1945-1980,Vol.2, 
(MoscowrProgress Pub.,1980),p.274.
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In the final analysis, the West Irian dispute, which dominated 
Indonesian politics for more than twelve years after 
independence, had widespread implications for the Republic.
It was the single issue that Sukarno utilised to mobilise 
mass support for himself, bring down the system of 
parliamentary democracy and strengthen his personal power 
to a near dictatorship.The issue was principally responsible 
for the deterioration of Dutch-Indonesian relations and 
with the nationalization of Dutch enterprises, not only 
did the Republic los«, Dutch goodwill but with it, much 
needed capital and technical know-how.With American failure 
to assist the Republic and its continued professed neutrality 
until the last eight months, the issue provided Moscow with 
an opportunity not only to identify closely with the 
Indonesian Government and hence harvest its goodwill, 
but at the same time to fuel its desire to liberate the 
territory with the massive supply of arms.The peaceful 
solution of the dispute, which represented a victory for 
American diplomacy, meant that the Soviet Union lost not 
only an issue on which to support Indonesia against the 
West, but also troubled waters in which to fish.It also 
marked the beginning of troubled Soviet-Indonesian relations, 






This chapter examines Soviet-Indonesian relations 
from August 1962 to October 1964.During this period, the 
Soviet Union continued to show great interest in the Third 
World but at the same time continued to reassess develop­
ments there.Following the espousal of the 'national democratic 
state' in 1960, Soviet ideologues noted that except for 
Indonesia, none of the countries which they claimed were 
approaching the goal of 'national democracy' willing
to permit the unrestricted development of local communist 
parties, in accordance with one of the requirements of 
the state of national democracy.At the same time, the 
'national democracy’ doctrine stated that only the working 
class and its vanguard were considered capable of initiating 
the social revolution which was required for the develop­
ment of truly independent states.However, some of the very 
regimes which banned the activities of local communist 
parties also initiatied radical measures of nationalization 
of both domestic and foreign capital and were willing to 
rely on the support of the Soviet bloc in any ensuing conflict 
with the Western powers.In these circumstances,the question 
which the Soviet leadership must have asked itself was: 
why wait for the development of strong local communist 
parties, if non-communist nationalist governments were 
willing to carry out much of the programme advocated by 
the Soviet Union? This directly led to a shift in policy 
towards the Third World, where the local communist parties 
were urged to play the role of 'friends and assistants' 
of the nationalist leaders. Thi,s was later to crystallise
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into the ’revolutionary democracy’ doctrine.
At the same time, it was not clear whether 
Khrushchev’s Third World policy at this time developed essentially 
out of antecedent theoretical formulations such as those 
concerning the revolutionary potential of the national 
liberation movements and the transitional functions of 
’national democracy’ or whether the theories were largely 
developed to fit a policy line that Khrushchev improvised 
as he advanced, with the goal of exploiting opportunities 
to outflank and replace the Western network of alliances 
and to implant a lasting Soviet presence in the Third World. 
Nevertheless, in spite of Khrushchev's high expectations 
concerning the prospects of revolutionary advance in the 
Third World,Soviet policy in conflict situations clearly 
was restrained, even constrained, by the danger of escalation, 
especially after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
debacle.Even though Khrushchev took a strong line of support 
for national liberation struggles, when situations arose 
that might involve the Soviet Union in direct confrontation 
with the United States or its allies, he was rather cautious 
about tendering Soviet assistance in any form that might 
entail the danger of widening conflict or war..
Between 1960 and 1962, Indonesia was seen as 
a proto-type of the ’national democratic state’.By 1963/
1964,however, Soviet ideologues ignored the ’revolutionary 
potential’ of Indonesia.This change in the ’revolutionary 
status' was the result of developments in Indonesia's 
domestic and foreign policies which Soviet leaders and 
ideologues found unacceptable from their angle of doctrine
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or interests in the Third World.What these were and how 
the Soviet Union related with Indonesia during this period 
are examined in this chapter.
Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Decline of Soviet-Indonesian 
Relations
Following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, 
Sukarno announced on 17 August 1962 that his Government 
would henceforth concentrate on economic development to 
uplift the living standards of the populace and assured 
his people that he felt "able...to overcome the bottlenecks 
and the difficulties of economic problems in a short time”? 
However, before any concrete economic policies could be 
implemented, the Republic was plunged into another interna­
tional crisis,involving the formation of Malaysia.A former 
minister in the ’Gotong-Royong’ cabinet informed the writer 
that following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, 
the Indonesian Army leadership became worried at the size 
of the armed forces and expected severe problems to result 
from demobilization, especially in view of the depressed 
economy and hyper-inflation.In order to avoid this and 
possibly a 'second Madiun'. General Yani, the Chief of 
Armed Forces, worked out a plan to invade East Timor.This, 
maintained Yani, would absorb the oversized Army and avoid 
demobilisation problems.On 16 August 1962, a day after 
the agreement on West Irian,the Yani plan was presented 
to cabinet but Sukarno rejected it arguing that "he had 
no intentions of having a headache similar to the one caused
1.Cited in D.Hindley,"Foreign Aid to Indonesia and its Political Implications", 
Pacific A ffa irs,Vol.36,No.2,Summer l%3,p.117.
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by West Irian". In fact, the Republic was soon to be involved 
in ’konfrontasi' against Malaysia, and this may have been 
Sukarno’s real reason for not wanting an East Timor 'headache' 
at that time.
The Malaysian Dispute
On 27 May 1961, in Singapore,Tunku Abdul 
Rahman,the Malayan Prime Minister,first advanced the idea 
of a federation consisting of Malaya,Singapore,Brunei,
3Sabah and Sarawak. One principal consideration behind the 
proposal was to prevent what he saw as the growing influence 
of Communism in Singapore - his aim was to preempt a 'Cuba'
4in the region. When the idea was first mooted, Indonesia 
did not indicate any misgivings^, and Subandrio even stated 
in the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 that "when 
Malaya told us of its intention to merge with the three 
British crown colonies of Sarawak,Brunei and British North 
Borneo,as one federation,we told them that we had no 
objections and we wished them success with this merger 
so that everyone might live in peace and freedom".
Subandrio's declaration was, however, a tactical 
one because the West Irian issue was still being fought 
over, and the Government had no intention of alarming 
the United States,which was helping to settle it.Subandrio
2.Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 1984,Jakarta.This was confirmed 
by the writer in his interview with Gen.Nasution on 14 April 1984,Jakarta.
3.UJ.Hanna,"The Proposal", W F S  Reports:Southeast Asia Series,Vol.10,No.
1,1963,p.1.
4.Tunku's fear was clearly manifested when he stated:"There is a section 
of the Chinese in Singapore who do not want a good government which 
works for the good of the people...UJhat they want is a Communist govern­
ment or a Communist-oriented government".Cited in A.Brackman,Southeast 
Asia's Second Front,(New YorkiPraeger Pub.,1966),p.34
5.Cited in J.A.C.Mackie.KonfrontasiiThe Indonesian-Malaysian Dispute,1963-
1965,(London:Oxford University Press.i974).p.1Q5;Aqung,Op c it ,p.457.
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also indicated that his country had no territorial claims 
or designs in the region other than those which were rightly 
hers, namely, those territories which had belonged to the 
former Dutch East Indies.A change in the Indonesian Govern­
ment position on the proposed federation could,however, 
be discerned after the West Irian settlement.During 
a press conference in Singapore on 27 September, Subandrio 
stated that "it was impossible for Indonesia to remain 
indifferent to Malaysia's formation because both Malaysia 
and Indonesia shared a common frontier".He also warned 
that "if Malaysia were to establish a military base in 
North Borneo, Indonesia would take a counteraction... If 
it is American,we shall then arrange for a Soviet base 
in our part of Borneo.I don't say that this thing will 
happen or even that it is being contemplated but I merely 
want to make it clear why Indonesia cannot remain indifferent 
toward the formation of Malaysia " 6
The PKI was the first to exploit the Malaysian
7issue. On 6 March 1962, Aidit declared that "if we practice 
a policy that is counter to the concept of Malaysia,this 
is no different from promoting our ideas of opposing imperialism 
in general,since we believe the concept of Malaysia to 
be a concept of imperial ism,which not only endangers the 
struggle of the Malayan, Singaporean, Brunei and North 
Borneo peoples, but also endangers the struggle of other
6.Cited in Ibid,p.458.
7.On 31 August 1961, in an article entitled "LJhat is "Greater Malaysia*.Harian 
Rakyat argued that "the disturbances in North Kalimantan posed a threat 
to English colonial interests.To protect military bases and economic 
investments/the British put forward the concept of 'Malaysia' as a trap 
to inveigle the peoples of Malaya,Singapore and North Kalimantan".
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peoples in Asia, especially the Indonesian people". It 
was only after the suppression of the Brunei revolt in 
December 1962 that Indonesia opposed Malaysia as a matter 
of state policy.As in the West Irian issue, Sukarno, the
9Army and the PKI opposed Malaysia, but for different reasons.
On 16 September 1963, Malaysia was officially
inaugurated.Jakarta as did Manila,because of the Sabah , . 10ciaim, refused to recognise it, which caused Kuala Lumpur
to sever diplomatic relations with both countries on the
following day.On 16 September Sukarno declared his policy
of Ganjang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia) ^  and on 25 September
he decreed a ban on all trade relations with Malaysia and
12confiscation of all Malaysian property. Despite the declaration
of ’ Ganjang Malaysia1, Indonesia’s initial policy represented
nothing more than a ’verbal b a r r a g e T h i s  changed with
the establishment of the Dwikora or Dual People’s Command/
on 3 May 1964, and on 17 August and 2 September ’volunteers’
13parachuted into Johore,in south-west Malaysia.' On 3 September 
Malaysia protested to the Security Council about Indonesian
' aggression’,which the Indonesian representative did not
14deny. On 17 September the Security Council voted 9-2 to
condemn the Indonesian actions, but the Soviet Union vetoed 
15the resolution.
8.Ibid,6 March 1962.
9.See Franklin Weinstein,Indonesia Abandons Confrontation,(Interim Report 
SeriesiModern Indonesia Project.Southeast Asia Program,Cornell University 
Press,Ithaca,New York,1969).
10.For details,see Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl,Southeast Asia and Theories of 
Regional Integration,(PhD Thesis,Dept, of International Relations,Australian 
National University,Canberra,l975),pp.85-120.
11 .Agung.Dp c it ,p.474.
12.Jones,Op c it ,p.264. *
13.Kosut,Op c it ,pp.995;Mackie,Dp c it ,pp.210-217.4
1 A.Ibid,p.265.
15.See D.Volsky,"Malaysia - Imperialist Bastion",New Times,No.39,Sept. 1964, 
pp.14-15.
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The Soviet action should not be interpreted as 
a declaration of immediate or unqualified support for 
Indonesia's policy of confrontation.On the contrary, 
Indonesia’s decision to launch ’konfrontasi’ marked a turning 
point in Soviet-Indonesian relations because, unlike its 
earlier support over West Irian, the Soviet Union initially 
showed itself indifferent towards Jakarta’s claim and only 
later altered its stance to one of qualified support? 6 
While West Irian was seen as a colonial struggle, a national 
liberation movement against a colonial power, Indonesia’s 
confrontation against Malaysia was viewed as a clash between 
two newly independent states * 7 This principally explained 
the Soviet Union’s different attitude to the two conflicts.
To be sure, Indonesia’s confrontation against
Malaysia placed the Soviet Union in a difficult position.
To support Jakarta's policy with the same vigour as its
brinkmanship over West Irian would have incurred the following
costs:it would have disturbed the detente with the United
States; foreclosed the possibility of useful relations
with Malaysia (and later Singapore);forced the Soviet Union
to choose sides not between a colonial power and a new
state but between two new states and thus incur the wrath
of states such as Egypt and India that had recognised
Malaysia; and finally, an open approval of Indonesia’s
dispatch of guerillas into Malaysia would have the result
of sanctioning the ’export of revolution’, a policy the
Soviets had publicly disclaimed.On the other hand, the
open opposition to Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia
16.See D.Volsky/'The Malaysian Knot",Ibid,No.21,27 May I964,pp.10-11.
17.N.Derkach,The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and 
the Malaysian Disputes,(Santa Monica:The Rand Corporation,l965,p.3081- 
D.P.4.
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would have proved the Chinese contention that the Soviet
Union had lost interest in national liberation movements,
and hence guaranteed to the Chinese a dominant influence 
18in Indonesia. That the Soviet Government did not issue
an offical public statement comparable to the one on West
Irian,that less attention was devoted by the Soviet media
on the dispute and that there were no arms transfer, not even
small scale ones,were clear indications of Moscow's lack of support,
even disapproval of Indonesia's 'konfrontasi' against
Malays ia.
Soviet-Indonesian differences also arose over 
the latter's inability to repay its debt, and its decision 
to adopt a radical foreign policy posture instead of 
remedying its economic woes.
Debt, Economic Problems and the Soviet Union
Even before the West Irian dispute was settled,
Soviet leaders and publicists had, on a number of occasions^
hinted that not enough was being done towards putting
19Indonesia's economic house in order. Even though Soviet 
writings openly critical of the economic shortcomings 
started in earnest only in 1963, Indonesia’s economic 
difficulties had been analysed much earlier.V.I.Antipov 
noted that the execution of Indonesia's first Five Year 
Plan, covering 1956-1960,was achieved under serious
18.Ibid,p.11.
19.See S.Menshikov,"Premier Khruschov in Indonesia",New Times,IMo.9,Feb.
I960,p.5;M.A.Andreyev,"The Eight Year Plan and Some of the Economic 
Problems Facing Indonesia",Narody Azii i A frik i,No.3,1962,pp.32-40.
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difficulties, caused principally by the ’armed struggle
with forces of internal reaction’ and 'foreign capital’.
Even though the Eight Year Plan, covering 1961 to 1968, 
was welcomed, Soviet writers pointed out that one pressing 
problem pertained to agriculture and one observed that 
Indonesia's inability to alleviate the food problem was 
caused by its weak industrial sector and its one-sided 
development in agriculture,which resulted in it being totally 
dependent on the world capitalist m a r k e t ^  The Government 
had also been criticised for its failure to change the
system of land tenure, which was seen as the principal
22cause of the peasantry's woes.
Following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, 
Soviet writings repeatedly stressed that, of the three 
aims of the 1959 Guided Democracy programme, namely,the 
liberation of West Irian,the establishment of internal 
security and the provision of adequate food and clothing 
for the people,only the first two had been attained.
Zharov blamed this on the Dutch, emphasising that in the 
course of "many decades, the colonialists merciLessly 
stripped the Indonesian economy and turned it by force 
to their own needs and interests.The dependence on the
colonialists was so great that Indonesia could not develop
23without the help of Western countries". An economic survey 
in 1963, however, blamed Indonesia’s economic hardship 
on the West Irian campaign,which accounted for 75 to 80
20.V.I.Antipov,lndonesia:Geographical and Economic Characteristics,(Moscow: 
Oriental Pub.,House,1961),p.24.
21.V.Arkhipov,"Indonesia Builds Up Her Economy” ,Mirovaya Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya,No.0,1960,pp.63-72.
22.R.A.Ulyanovsky,Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations,(Moscow:
Progress Pub.,1974),pp.381 -383.




percent of the state expenditure and strongly advised
that "at the present time the vital problem of the utmost
importance is the stabilization of the economy and restoring
24the finances to health". This was endorsed by another
25survey later that year.
While Soviet writers in general approved of the 
growth of the state sector of the economy, its results 
had, however, been criticised.Andreyev noted that "in the 
most important branches of the national industry, excepting 
peasant cultivation,the state sector now controls more
than half of productive capacity and is now the leading
26sector in the economy". He, however, blamed ’reaction’
for the poor results, arguing that "in recent years it
had fiercely attacked the state sector of the economy,
trying to take revenge here for its political defeat.Reaction
in the form of the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie is
trying to protect its capital by means of manipulations
in government enterprises, to drain them dry, and then,
using the excuse of their non-profitabi 1 ity,to start a
27campaign for their liquidation".
Against this backdrop of Soviet reservations
about the Indonesian economy,following the settlement of
the West Irian dispute,Moscow's message to Indonesia was
28clear:put your economic house in order. if successful,
24."The Economic Situation of Some Underdeveloped Asian and African Countries 
in I962",Narody Azii i Afriki,No.4,1963,p p . 63-65.
25.”The Economic Situation of Capitalist Countries:A Survey for 1962 and
the Beginning of 1963",Supplement to Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye 
□tnosheniya, No. 8,1963, p. 75.
26.M.A.Andreyev,"Difficulties Before the Development of the State Sector 
in Indonesia",Narody Azii i A friki,No.5,1963,pp.34-41.
27.Ibid,p.39.
28.On the anniversary of the Indonesian independence in 1963, Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev sent their good wishes for "further successes in the develop­
ment of the national economy,social progress and an improvement in the 
living conditions of the people".Komsomorskaya Pravda,17 August 1963.
this would not only reduce Indonesian demands on the Soviets, 
but more important, it would make available foreign exchange 
to repay the Soviet debt.It was in this context that the 
Malaysian confrontation became another source of Soviet- 
Indonesian friction, for, because it was economically 
disastrous, it also meant further delay in repayment of 
Soviet debt.The situation was aggravated by the Soviet 
refusal of diplomatic and material support for the confronta­
tion.The PRC, on the other hand,fully supported the 
Indonesian cause, and this brought Soviet-Indonesian 
relations almost to a breaking point as the PKI and the 
Government supported Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Jakarta, the PKI and the Sino-Soviet Conflict
Chen Y i ’s (the Chinese Foreign Minister) visit 
to Jakarta in April 1961 marked the beginning of a rapproche­
ment between Jakarta and Peking,following the deterioration 
of relations caused by the Overseas Chinese issue.The PRC’s 
conflict with Moscow over a whole range of issues,including 
the leadership of the Third World, caused her to organise
29an international anti-Soviet as well as anti-American front. 
It was in this context that there developed a growing 
convergence of Sino-Indonesian foreign policy objectives, 
that were clearly epitomised by the Malaysian confrontation. 
To the PRC, Malaysia represented another effort by the 
’imperialists^ in addition to SEATO, to establish a chain
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29.See Mozingo.Dp cit,Chapter 7.
of anti-communist states in the region as part of the 
containment policy.In order to win over Indonesia to its 
side, the PRC not only supported confrontation but more 
important, played down the underlying conflicts such as 
the issue of Overseas Chinese?^ Peking's conviction in 
its support for Jakarta was further enhanced by the PKI's 
tilt towards the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
The PKI's difference with the CPSU began in
the early 1960s,the major turning point being the Twenty-
second Party Congress of the CPSU in December 1961.At
that Congress, the CPSU publicly condemned Albania, but
like the Chinese Communist Party(CCP), the PKI refused
to follow suit.However, the PKI did not follow the C C P 's
example of defending the Albanian Workers’ Party (AWP).
On 15 December, Aidit declared that the PKI did not criticise
the AWP because "it did not know in advance that the party
would be criticised,that the PKI believed that party
differences cannot be settled by open criticisms and that
the 1957/1960 Documents [referring to the resolutions passed
at the Meetings of the Communist Parties] clearly indicated
that problems between parties should be settled by negotiations"
The PKI also disagreed with the CPSU's handling of Stalin.
For instance, Aidit declared:
...it is the right of the Soviet communists to do whatever they 
like about their former leader,Stalin.Viewed from this angle,all 
the CPSU's actions towards Stalin can be considered an internal 
a ffa ir in which other Communist Parties do not have the right 
to and cannot interfere.lt is impossible for other Communist 
Parties to be familiar with the details of the internal life  of
30.Ibid,p.192.
31.Harian Rakyat,15 December 1961.
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the CPSU,just as it is impossible for the CPSU to be Familiar 
with the details of the internal life of other Communist Parties.
...Dn the other hand,Stalin was an international figure who led 
the continuation of Lenin's efforts to build Socialism in the 
Soviet Union and he played an important role in the defeat of 
fascism.Being Communists and democrats,we can speak of Stalin 
as an international figure.
In its criticism of Stalin for the cult of the individual,the CPSU 
has the support of the Communists of Indonesia.At the same time, 
the Communists in Indonesia continue to respect Stalin,many of whose 
speeches and writings are still useful,for example those dealing with 
revolution in Eastern countries,including the Indonesian revolution.32
The PKI's stance on Albania and Stalin was indicative of 
the emerging differences between the PKI and the CPSU.
The Chinese opposed Soviet criticisms of Albania and Stalin, 
and, though the PKI did not support the Chinese stance, 
its assessment of the situation did not entail any 
convergence with the Soviets either.
The PKI's differences with the CPSU escalated
as a result of six other developments: Khrushchev's
handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet
decision to back India in the war against China in 1962,
to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, to deal with
Tito despite the condemnation of him at the 1960 International
Meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow,the Soviet conclusion
of an arms deal with the Indonesian Army without consulting
with the PKI and, finally,the lukewarm attitude towards
33Indonesian policy over Malaysia.
However, it was only in October 1963 that the 
PKI openly backed the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
Following an international tour of the PRC,the USSR and 
Eastern Europe between July and September, Aidit declared
32.Ibid.
33.See Agung.Dp c it ,p.422.
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on his return the party's new line.This may be summed up
in these terms:
The Party would adopt those aspects of Chinese international 
strategies which advanced the radical nationalist course that 
was being followed by the Sukarno-PKI alliance and that found 
its most militant expression in the confrontation against 
Malaysia.In this area,the Indonesian Communists would 
cooperate closely with their Chinese comrades in the interest 
of mutual advantage,but would present the common strategy 
of the two parties in their own idiom and without overt 
recognition of Chinese authorship.In the domestic sphere, 
the PKI would pursue its own strategy of peaceful penetration 
and pressure without regard for Chinese denunciations of the 
peaceful road to power.In the conflict between the CPSU and the 
CPC,the PKI would henceforth align itself fully with the latter 
against the Soviet's 'collaborationist' relationship with the United 
States and its attempts to intimidate parties that declined to 
follow its ideological lead.At the same time, the PKI would make 
no formal break with the CPSU.Unlike the CPC,the Indonesian 
Party was not aspiring to hegemony over the world communist 
movement,and hence it had no interest in enlarging the fissures 
in it;although the split had not affected the PKI adversely to 
any appreciable extent,the party still had reason to fear that 
further exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict might rebound 
to the advantage of those in the Indonesian governmental 
elite who were opposed to the current trend in the country's 
foreign policy and sought a return to a more independent 
stance or a pro-western alignment.34
The PKI's denunciation of the CPSU was made more explicit
when Aidit catalogued his party's grievances:
1.The Soviet Communist Party has shown egoism and commandership in its 
relationship with the other Communist Parties and has sought to prevent 
them from being sovereign.The most obvious case in recent years is that 
of Soviet Communist Party's relations with the Albanian Workers Party;
2.Following from this,the Soviet Communist Party has attempted to foist 
policy on other parties which are in fact harmful to those parties.lt has 
attempted to force other parties to accept the peaceful or parliamentary 
roads to Socialism or the error of modern economism and has sought to 
stifle wars of national liberation.In other words,the Soviet Communist 
Party has led other parties to accept policies which lead into a cul-de- 
sac or destruction,not to Socialism.Previous comments of the Indonesian 
Communist Party have suggested that its leaders consider at least their 
Iraqi,Egyptian and Indian comrades to have been brought to such a situation;
3.The Soviet Communist Party has blunted the struggle to resolve the basic 
contradictions by treating the imperialists as seekers of peace by 
promoting the concept of peaceful economic competition and by putting
34.See Rex Mortimer,Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno:Ideology and 
Politics,1959-1965,(Ithaca,New Vork:Cornell University Press, 1976),pp.356-
357.
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a brake on the struggle of the oppressed nations to shatter the bonds 
of imperialism;
4.The Soviet Communist Party,in its subjectivist quest to build Communism 
before the demise of imperialism,has placed its own affluence and security 
before the needs of the international Communist movement.lt has given 
only limited aid to the other Socialist countries and has held in check
the national liberation movements;
5.The Soviet Communist Party has taken decisions affecting other Communist 
Parties without prior consultations as equals.The Indonesian Communist 
Party has cited as examples:the de-Stalinization process, the rapprochement 
with the Yugoslav League of Communists,the attacks on the ALJP.the 
polemics against the CCP,the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,the withdrawal of 
missiles from Cuba, and the ambivalence in the Sino-Indian border war.35
The PKI, in support of the CCP, refused to attend
the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow
scheduled for December 1964.Instead, Aidit declared that
"the PKI and the CCP are as close as flesh and blood in
the struggle against the twin brothers - imperialism and
revisionism.We hold that the CCP is a real beacon light
in upholding Marxism-Leninism and combating modern 
36
revisionism". It was thus clear that after the settlement 
of the West Irian dispute, the PKI,which was the most 
powerful political party in Indonesia and one which cooperated 
closely with Sukarno, strongly opposed the CPSU and with 
it,Soviet policies.This was to play an important role in
Soviet assessment of Indonesia as a whole,especially 
following Sukarno's growing criticism of Moscow's policies.
The Soviet Union,Indonesia and the Afro-Asian Conference 
Another source of Soviet-Indonesian friction 
was Jakarta's refusal, in league with Peking,to support
35.Cited in Agung.Dp cit,pp.423-424.
36.Cited in S.Simon.The Broken Triangle,(Baltimore:John Hopkins University 
Press,1969),p.90.
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Soviet participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference 
scheduled for June 1965.^7 When the first Afro-Asian 
conference was held in Bandung in 1955,the Soviet Union 
was not invited.Even though it showed its displeasure 
privately, Moscow gave full public support to the conference.
In the subsequent meetings involving the Afro-Asian conferences, 
the Soviet Union began pressing hard its right to participate 
as an Asian or Eurasian country ? 8 This was motivated by 
its desire to identify more closely with the Afro-Asian 
bloc that was emerging as an important force in international 
politics, as well as to dwarf the Chinese role in the Afro- 
Asian movement, an objective which became more pressing 
following the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
The Soviet Union made a concerted effort to 
participate in the Second Afro-Asian Conference, and at 
the April 1964 Ministerial Meeting for the Preparation 
of the Conference, held in Jakarta, India, which had opposed
Soviet participation at the Bandung Conference, this time
39proposed it. This was, however, objected to by Chen Yi, 
the leader of the Chinese delegation, arguing that the
proposal was improper "because as everyone knows , the Soviet
40
Union is not an African or an Asian country” . Principally
41due to the Chinese objection,which was endorsed by Indonesia,
37.For details of the conference,see G.H.Jansen,"Postponement of the 
'Second Bandung',The UJorld Today,Vol.21 ,No.9,Sept.1965;G.H.Jansen,Non- 
Alignment and the Afro-Asian States,(New York:Praeger Pub.,1966).
38.See A.Kashin, The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Second Afro-Asian 
Conference",Bulletin:Institute for the Study of the USSR,Vol.12,No.9,
Sept. 1965, pp. 34-40.
39.Meeting of Ministers in Preparation for the Second Afro-Asian Conference, 
Djakarta,10-15 April 1964,(Djakarta:Conference Secretariat,1964),p. 108.
40.See the statement of the Chinese Government in Peking Review,No.23,5 
June 1964.
41 .See Agung.Op cit,pp.507-541.
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no invitation was extended to the Soviet Union.On the issue 
of Soviet participation, the final communique of the 
Ministerial Meeting stated:
It was proposed that an invitation be extended to the USSR.
Some delegates supported and others opposed the proposal 
to extend an invitation to the USSR.A number of delegations 
stated that they needed consultations with their governments.
After discussions, no consensus could be reached.Some 
delegations were of the view that the matter may be placed 
before the Heads of State and Governments 6f the Second 
Afro-Asian Conference,for their consideration.Some other 
delegations were against submitting the matter to the Heads 
of State/Governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference 
for their consideration.Therefore.no agreement was reached.42
However, the coup by Colonel Boumedienne against 
President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeirs on 19 June 1965 put 
an end to the scheduled conference, and in that regard 
the enterprise remained abortive.What was important was 
Indonesia's decision to lend its weight to the PRC in 
blocking Soviet participation in the conference.Indonesia 
had no direct interest in excluding the USSR, so its only 
reason to back the PRC was a quid pro quo for Peking's 
backing of 'konfrontasi' against Malaysia.
The refusal of Jakarta to back Soviet participation
further soured Soviet-Indonesian relations:Guber argued
that "the consistently increasing pro-Peking course of
Indonesia was manifested in the exclusion of the Soviet
Union from the Afro-Asian Conference of journalists in
1963 in Jakarta on the grounds that it was a non-Asian
country and in the attempt of Indonesia and several other
countries to exclude the Soviet Union from the proposed
43
Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers".
42.Meeting of Ministers in Preparation for the Second Afro-Asian Conference,p.18Q.
43.Guber, Indoneziia ,B.S.E.,p.243.
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OLDFO,NEFO,GANEFO,CQNEFO and the Soviet Union
Over and above ’Konfrontasi* and Jakarta's refusal 
to support Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian Conference, 
relations between the two countries were further strained 
by Sukarno's attempt to realise his concept of the New 
Emerging Forces(NEFO) as distinguished from the Old Established 
Forces(OLDFO),which was a manifestation of the growing 
radicalization of Indonesian foreign policy.
In September 1961, at the Belgrade Conference 
of the Non-aligned Nations, Sukarno introduced his NEFO 
concept, a term referring to the Afro-Asian countries as
well as the various national liberation movements that
45were still fighting for independence. However, the concept 
only became a key guide to Indonesia's foreign policy after 
the West Irian issue had been settled, and was clearly 
manifested during 'konfrontasi'5
The Fourth Asian Games were held in Jakarta in 
1962, but were declared illegal by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) because Taiwan and Israel were barred from 
participation for political reasons.The IOC admonished 
that politics and sports should not be mixed, but Sukarno 
emphasised the political nature of all international sports, 
and the IOC thereupon banned Indonesia from membership.
In retaliation,Sukarno launched a new project,GANEFO,the
Games of the New Emerging Forces,both as a rival to the
44.See J.R.Angel,The New Emerging Forces in Indonesian Foreign Policy,Vol.
1/2,(PhD Thesis,Dept, of International Relations,Australian National 
University,1970).
45.Address by H.E.Soekarno before the Conference of Heads of State or 
Government of Non-aligned Countries,Belgrade,Sept. 1 1961,(New York:
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations).
46.G.A.Modelski,(edn.),The New Emerging Forces:Documents on the Ideology 
of Indonesian Foreign Policy,(Canberra:Dept. of International Relations,
Australian National University,1963),pp.73-74.
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Asian and Olympic Games and as a means of realising in 
part , his doctrine of NEFO.He asserted:
...that sports cannot be separated from politics.Therefore, 
let us now work for a sports association on the basis of the 
new emerging forces.The IOC have proved to be openly an 
imperialistic tool...Indonesia proposes to mix sports with 
politics and let us now establish the Games of the New 
Emerging Forces...against the Old Established Order [as 
represented by the IOC].47
This culminated in the staging of the first
GANEFO Games in November 1963,with 3000 athletes from 51 
. . 48countries. The PRC,itself not an IOC member,fully supported 
the scheme, and financially bore the main brunt of the
games? The Soviet Union was embarras&d by the entire
enterprise,even though it was made the European Vice-Chairman
of the Games, as it feared its participation would jeopardise
its Olympic status.However, to avoid offering the PRC a
new forum to launch polemics against the Soviet Union and
at the same time to win Afro-Asian support, a delegation
from the Soviet Communist Youth Organization, Komsomol,
50was sent to the Games.
At the Preparatory Conference of GANEFO,the
Chief Soviet delegate, Evgen«y Valuev, expressed his disapproval
of the IOC's banning of Indonesia:
The Soviet Sports Organization consider such recommendations 
as an attempt to exclude one of the largest countries of Asia 
from the Olympic Movement as an international[sic] pre-arranged 
tactic of imperialist circles to weaken the joint front of 
progressive forces of the whole world in the struggle against 
Imperialism,Colonialism,for peace and social progress.
47.Cited in E.Pauker,"GANEFO 1:Sports and Politics in Djakarta”,Asian Survey, 
Vol.5,No.4,April 1965,p.174.
48. Pravda,11 November 1963.
49.Justus M.Van der Kroef,”The Sino-Indonesian Partnership”,Orbis,Vol.8,
No.2,Summer 1964,p.351.
50.Komsomol>skaya Pravda,13 October 1963.
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...the Sports Organizations of the Soviet Union express their 
positive attitude to the organization of these Games and 
consider them an important contribution to the further 
development of sports in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
and in Socialist countries as a means of consolidation of 
progressive forces in the struggle against imperialism and 
and colonialism,for peace and friendship among the nations.51
This statement is revealing as it showed the
Soviet dilemma:on the one hand, nothing was said about
Soviet support for GANEFO, so as to preempt any adverse
reaction which might jeopardise Soviet Olympic status;
on the other hand, the Soviet Sports Organizations endorsed
GANEFO and criticised the I O C ’s decision on Indonesia,
thus demonstrating support for the Indonesian cause and
at the same time neutralising any attempts by the PRC to
make undue capital out of the Games.The Soviet participation
was presented as ’people to people diplomacy’, to prevent
any embarrassing encounters between the IOC and the Soviet
Government.The Soviet dilemma was well reflected by a
TASS statement on the Games:
The nature of the activities of Soviet representatives in the 
International Olympic Movement is determined by the spirit of 
internationalism,the sense of great responsibility to the 
progressive forces of the world, to the young states of Asia,
Africa and Latin America.Realising the necessity of strengthening 
the unity of the world sports movement,the Soviet Youth support 
the idea of the GANEFO,which as conceived,does not stand in 
opposition to the Olympic Games.52
While Sukarno's objective was to rival the OLDFO, 
in this case the Olympic Movement,the Soviets, in order 
to prevent any clashes with the IOC,depicted the Games
51.See Documents on the Preparatory Conference for the GAANEFD held 
in Jakarta,27-29 April 1963,(n.p.,n.d.),p.9.
52.Cited in Sheldon Simon,The Broken Triangle,p.59.
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as being in accord with the Olympic spirit.This was also
stressed by Yuri Torsuyev, a member of the Soviet Youth
delegation to the Games,who stated that the "Games do not
compete with the Olympic Games but somehow widen the arena
of sports meetings and serve as a means of strenghtening
m 53the solidarity of progressive forces .
Following the success of GANEFO, Sukarno next
concentrated his efforts on CONEFO,the Conference of the
New Emerging Forces,which the Chinese supported and agreed
to finance, as well as assisting in the construction of
the CONEFO Building in Jakarta?^ However, throughout the
Khrushchev period in office, the Soviet Union did not
declare its support for the project, indicating its
disapproval of what was perceived as Sukarno's growing 'leftism'
in league with the 'Maoist regime'.
Soviet-Indonesian Relations into the Abyss
An Izvestia editorial on 14 April 1964 admitted 
that relations between the two countries were not ’normal':
It is well known that both inside the Republic and beyond its 
border there are certain quarters which oppose Indonesia's 
friendship with the USSR.But their efforts aimed at hindering 
the great process of the international rapprochement of the 
two people are doomed to failure.Soviet-Indonesian relations 
have withstood the tests of joint anti-imperialist struggle. 
The Soviet Union has repeatedly rendered moral,political, 
diplomatic and military aid to Indonesia.This happened during 
Indonesia's armed clashes with the colonialists in the period 
1945-1949,in the period of rebuffing foreign intervention in
1958,during the suppression of the anti-Government rebellion 
in Sumatra and Sulawesi and during the liberation of West 
Irian.The Soviet peoples for their part highly appreciate the
53.Pravda,26 November 1963. 
54.See Harsono.Op c it ,p.Z87.
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support the Indonesian people gave to the Soviet Union's 
anti-imperialist and peaceable policy.55
It is important to note the timing of the editorial,which 
was on the second last day of the Ministerial Meeting 
preparing for the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Jakarta, 
and it can be argued that it was part of the Soviet Govern­
ment's 'signal' to Jakarta to view its case favourably. 
Secondly, the editorial’s omission of any reference to 
Malaysia was a revealing indication of Soviet reservations, 
at a time when Indonesia was conducting its 'crush Malaysia' 
campaign.
In June 1964, Mikoyan visited Jakarta^and, in 
contrast to previous Soviet reticence, he repeatedly declared 
that Malaysia was a 'neo-colonialist p l o t ’ and that the 
Soviet Union fully supported Indonesia's policy of
confrontation? For instance,in a speech at a mass rally 
in Jakarta on 25 June 1964,Mikoyan declared:
Malaysia offers an example of neo-colonialism camouflaged by 
independence.This artificial state was created by British capital 
in an attempt to maintain its control over the area.The Soviet 
people are heart and soul with the fighters against neo­
colonialism.They are with the working people of Indonesia in 
their struggle to eliminate such survivals of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism as Malaysia.57
Mikoyan also pledged military assistance to Indonesia,
but this failed to materialise,thus further aggravating
58relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, Mikoyan's
visit can be seen as an attempt to dissipate Soviet-Indonesian 
55.Izvestia,14 April 1964.
56.See W.Hanna,"The Indonesian Crisis-mid-1964 Phase",AUFS Reports:Southeast 
Asia Series,Vol.12,No.7,August I964,pp.102-103.
57.See New Times,No.29,22 July 1964,p.42.
58.Interviews with Gen.Nasution on 14 April and Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 
April 1984,Jakarta.
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misunderstanding and to counteract Chinese political and 
diplomatic successes in Indonesia.Regardless of these 
motivations,the net result appears to have been worsened 
relations, especially in view of the Soviet rescinding of 
their pledge to deliver arms to Indonesia.
That relations between the two countries had 
deteriorated rapidly since August 1962, was not in question. 
This was most vividly apparent in Indonesia's exclusion 
from the list of states which Soviet ideologues described 
as, 'revolutionary democracies'.At a time when the Soviet 
leadership was pinning its hopes on 'revolutionary democrats' 
rather than the communist parties,Indonesia’s ideological 
downgrading was clearly evident in spite of the fact that 
Sukarno was avowedly anti-colonial and anti - imperialist 
and the presence of a powerful communist party.This state 
of affairs can be explained by the increasing radicalization 
of Indonesia's foreign policy, its support for the PRC in 
the Sino-Soviet conflict,the cool PKI-CPSU relations, 
Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia,Jakarta's refusal 
to support Soviet participation in the proposed second 
Afro-Asian Conference and the inability of Indonesia to 
repay its massive debts to the Soviet U n ion.Thus,it was 
obvious that Soviet policies in the Third World, as far as 
Indonesia was concerned,were already in trouble even before 
Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964.His removal and the 
inauguration of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership provided 
the opportunities for the revamping of Khrushchev's Third 
World policies and this had far-reaching consequences for 
Soviet-Indonesian relations.
CHAPTER FIVE
SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER BREZHNEV- 
KOSYGIN,OCTOBER 1964 - OCTOBER 1968
This chapter examines Soviet-Indonesian relations 
under the leadership of Brezhnev-Kosygin from October 1964 
to October 1968.This period would be discussed in the light 
of two broad phases.The first, covering the period from 
October 1964 to October 1965, details Moscow's relations 
with Sukarno's Indonesia.The second phase,from October
1965 to October 1968, covers relations between the two 
countries after the attempted ’coup' of October 1965.How 
the 'coup' transformed Indonesia and how this in turn had 
consequences for Soviet-Indonesian relations will be analysed 
under this section.
Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union greatly expanded 
its relations with the Third World and this was facilitated 
by its willingness to provide considerable economic and 
military aid on concessionary terms.On 14 October 1964, 
Khrushchev was ousted/ and his dual role as leader of the 
Party and Government divided between Brezhnev as the First 
Secretary of the CPSU and Kosygin as Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers.The new Soviet leadership called for greater 
realism and sophistication in its relations with the Third 
World? This was largely the result of its growing awareness 
of the domestic problems of the new states, the buildup 
of extended and unfulfilled aid commit ments and the extensive 
Soviet courtship with Third World states which had yielded only 
minimal political dividends.
I.See Carol R.Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby,Soviet-Third World Relations,(Boulder, 
Colorado:Westview Press,1985),pp.44-60;R.A.Yellon,"Shifts in Soviet Policies 
Towards Developing Areas,1964-1968",in UJ.Raymond Duncan,(edn.),Soviet 
Policy in Developing Countries,(UJaltham,Mass.:Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970),pp.225- 
286;Stephen T.Hosmer and Thomas LU Wolfe,Soviet Policy and Practice Toward 
Third World Countries,(Lexington,Mass.:Lexington Books,1983),pp.27-28.
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Following Khrushchev's overthrow, Soviet policy
in the Third World was gradually rationalised, with the
optimism of the late 1950s and early 1960s being questioned
and indeed, replaced by a growing realism concerning
prospects for political and economic development.The new
leadership recognised that prospects for the introduction
of socialism in the majority of Third World states were
2bleak and that the instability of many of these societies 
meant that leaders favourably disposed towards the Soviet 
Union might well be overthrown by 'reactionary elements'.
In the»- circumstances, the Brezhnev-Kosygin collective 
leadership did not expect much from the Third World nationalist 
leaders, was more reluctant to back up Third World states 
in their territorial disputes or their confrontation with 
the West and at the same time began to look pragmatically 
upon right-wing states.This also led to a new approach 
to the Third World.The Kremlin maintained that while the 
Third World was an important element in its foreign relations, 
nevertheless, its short run priorities there were reduced 
until the economic situation in the Soviet Union allowed 
it to focus greater attention or improved prospects of
substantial revolutionary gains merited renewed Soviet
3initiatives, it also called for the broadening of the base 
of Soviet relations with Third World states along the'lines
2.In fact, G.Kim and A.Kaufman suggested that in the light of the relatively 
backward political and economic conditions prevailing in most Third 
World states,the skipping of stages and premature radical steps in the 
transition to scientific socialism were inadvisable, and that the revolu­
tionary process in the Third World would therefore turn out to be much 
slower than once thought,perhaps spanning 'an entire historical epoch'.
See G.Kim and A.Kaufman,"On Sources of Socialist Conceptions in Developing 
Countries",World Marxist Review,December 1971,p. 128.
3.See Pravda,27 October 1965.
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oriented towards achieving possible revolutionary gains 
in the long run. A major Third Ivor Id plank at this juncture 
was to reduce the backlog of unfulfilled aid commit ments 
by holding new pledges to the minimum while fulfilling 
previously granted credits.The new leadership also adopted
a more detached attitude towards the Third World with a view 
* 0 impressing upon these states that Soviet economic and 
political support should not be taken for granted but 
rather demanded as a quid pro quo than had hitherto 
been the case.Finally,the policy was to recover ideological 
initiatives concerning the evolution of the national liberation 
movements,especially in the face of the Chinese challenge, 
by developing a clear ideological stance founded on a more 
realistic analysis of Third World developments and conditions.
The new Soviet leadership continued its past policy 
of aid and trade but concentrated in a few areas, which 
were chosen according to the consideration of political- 
strategic importance rather than the criteria of ’progressive­
ness ' alone.^ in fact, even in cases where previously pro- 
Soviet regimes had been replaced by moderate and less 
friendly governments, the Kremlin attempted to maintain 
business-like relationship* in order to protect its past 
investments.Over and above economic factors such as debt 
repayment, the acquisition of new markets and raw materials, 
in choosing its targets in the Third World,the Soviet Union 
considered strategic factors such as the degree of Chinese 
and Western interest in a country,its importance to Soviet
/♦.Joseph L.Nogee and Robert H.Donaldson,Soviet Foreign Policy Since World 
War II,(New York:Pergamon Press,1981),pp. 147-148.
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security and its ability to provide support facilities, 
including airports, harbours or sites for communication 
stations for Soviet military activities.The strategic factor 
was a new element in Soviet-Third World relations during
5the Brezhnev period.
By the time Khrushchev was ousted, Soviet- 
Indonesian relations had deteriorated and this trend continued 
under the new leadership.The continued deterioration of 
this relationship should be understood in the broader context 
of Soviet foreign policy objectives and the factors which 
impinged upon Moscow's interests world-wide.Soviet-Indonesian 
relations during the Brezhnev-Kosygin period were shaped 
by developments in the Soviet Union and Indonesia,by the 
increasing momentum towards detente between the Soviet 
Union and the United States,especially after the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis,by the intensification of the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry and the increased militarization of American 
policies in Southeast Asia,as evidenced by the escalation 
of the war in Vietnam.
Phase 1: October 1964 to October 1965
During this period,Soviet-Indonesian relations 
were plagued by five inter-related issues:Indonesia's 
confrontation against Malaysia,Sukarno's attempts to hold 
a conference of new emerging forces,Jakarta's withdrawal 
from the United Nations,Sukarno's endorsement of Peking's 
foreign policy and the PKI's support for the Chinese in
5.Alexander R.Alexiev.The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World,
(Santa Monica:Rand Publication Ser ies,June 1983,N-1995-AF),pp.9-10.
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the Sino-Soviet conflict.In all these issues, the Chinese 
supported the Indonesians while the Soviets were either 
openly against or disapprovingly reticent.
A major indication of the growing closeness between 
Jakarta and Peking on the one hand and growing distance 
between Moscow and Jakarta on the other, was Indonesia’s 
decision to leave the United Nations.S u k a r n o ’s grievances 
against the United Nations were not of recent vintage and 
as far back as September 1961,he had stated,in an address 
to the General Assembly,that the organization was riddled 
with shortcomings and should be radically transformed?
His grievances escalated following the setbacks suffered 
by Indonesia at the United Nations,when Malaysia successfully 
mustered support for its case against Indonesia’s ’aggr e s s i o n ’. 
Though saved from total embarrassment by the Soviet veto, 
Indonesia’s complaints were only reinforced when a number 
of Afro-Asian states sided with Malaysia, and the grievances 
came to head when Malaysia was elected a temporary member 
of the Security Council.On 7 January 1965, Sukarno therefore
7decreed^ against the advice of his Foreign Minister, that 
Indonesia should become the only country to abandon United 
N ati o n s ’ membership.On the following day,he denied that 
the decision was taken in league with the PRC, stating 
that "our secession from the United Nations has no connection 
at all with Communist China...Many quarters view that we 
quit the UN in an attempt to stir up the Indonesian p e o p l e s ’ 
sentiments,just as we did in the liberation of West Irian
6.Adams,0p c it ,pp.305-306;Harsono,Dp c it ,p.221.
7.See Dewan Pertimbangan Agung:Deklarasi Indonesia Keluar Dari PBB,(Jakarta: 
Dept.Penerangan Indonesia,1965),p.4;Harsono,Op c it ,p.27Q.
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and the holding of GANEFO,but such a view is entirely wrong". 
The Chinese Government was pleased with the Indonesian 
decision and Chou En-lai declared that "a revolutionary 
UN may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged 
in competition with the body which calls itself the UN 
but which being under the manipulation of US imperialism 
is capable only of making mischief and can do nothing 
good"?
The Soviet Union did not approve of the Indonesian 
action and along with a number of Eastern bloc countries,
attempted to dissuade Jakarta?^ On 21 January 1965, Pravda 
argued that "regardless of how one assesses Indonesia's 
withdrawal from the United Nations, this fact in itself 
is evident of an abnormal situation in the United Nations"
Not surprisingly, Sukarno was later to claim that the Soviet 
Union did not support his g o v e rnment’s decision to quit
the United Nations, maintaining that the only support he
12received was "in the Russian press". A later Soviet 
assessment strongly reaffirmed M o s c o w ’s disapproval of 
Sukarno's decision to quit the United Nations:
Despite the 'Left-wing' phraseology the decision was couched 
in.it was clearly a rash,hasty move that came as a shock to 
world public opinion and was unprecedented in the history of 
the UN.evidence of the impasse that was becoming increasingly 
patent in the foreign policy of the Sukarno Government.and 
considerably lessening the chances of its getting out of this 
impasse.At the same time,unexpected though it was.this move 
was clearly prepared for by the whole nature of Sino-Indonesian ‘
8. Sukarno's interview with Monoru Omori,Foreign News Editor,Mainchi Shimbun, 
on 8 Jan .1965.Reprinted in Indonesian Newsletter,No.55/3,20 Jan. 1965,p.U.
9.A.G.Mezerik,(edn.),MaIaysian-Indonesian Conflict,(New York:International 
Review Service,1965),p.94.
10.See Komsomol'skaya Pravda,19 March 1967.
11.Pravda,21 January 1965.
12.Indonesian Newsletter,5 July 1965,p.8.
234
cooperation as it had developed over the preceding years, 
and their joint actions in the international sphere.
Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN,...caused incalculable 
damage to the diplomatic prestige of Sukarno's Government 
and increased Indonesia's international isolation. 13
Similarly, Moscow's position on CONEFO highlighted 
its skepticism of Sukarno's foreign policy.Ever since 
Sukarno announced his intentions to hold a CONEFO in Jakarta 
after the GANEFO Games in November 1963, the Soviet Union 
remained silent on the question.Only in m i d - 1965,when details 
were being worked out for the convocation of the conference, 
did the Soviet Union indicate its intention to participate. 
Prior to 1965,it was assumed that CONEFO was merely an 
idea, but after the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United 
Nations,the Soviet Union realised that Indonesia was serious. 
When in May 1965 the conference was tentatively scheduled 
for August 1966, Deputy Foreign Minister K.T.Mazurov 
expressed Soviet endorsement on 18 May 1965 and further 
stated that "if Indonesia wanted the Soviet Union to 
participate in the preparation of the conference, it could 
make a constructive contribution", while stressing that 
the CONEFO suggestion was in line with Soviet policy which 
aimed "to strengthen the progressive forces in the world 
to destroy imperialism"?^ That this was wholly a diplomatic 
declaration was clear to Jakarta,, since both countries had 
very divergent views on what constituted 'Imperialism' 
and 'progressive forces'.Nevertheless,the motivation behind 
the Soviet expression of support for CONEFO included the 
desire to check Chinese exploitation of the proposed conference 
for anti-Soviet purposes and to prevent Indonesia from
13.See Astafyev and Dubinsky.Op c it ,p.70.
14.Quoted in Harsono.Op c it ,p.287.
falling completely into the Chinese orbit.It also represented 
an important ’signal’ from the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership 
that it intended to mend its fences with Indonesia.
Notwithstanding, the Soviet U n i o n ’s continued 
ambivalence to Sukarno's confrontation against Malaysia, 
its failure to convince the PKI to support its position 
or at least to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict 
and to convince Sukarno not to openly support Chinese 
foreign policy posture,gravely disturbed Soviet-Indonesian 
relations at a time when Moscow was reassessing its posture 
in the Third World as a whole.And as to where S u k a r n o ’s 
Indonesia stood in the Sino-Soviet conflict , was made clearly 
explicit on 17 August 1965 when Sukarno announced the
’’existence of a mighty, powerful and unbreakable Jakarta-Hanoi-
Phnom Penh-Peking-Pyongyang axis - uniting five countries
in one purpose:to struggle against the old established
order, colonialism, imperialism and to destroy Western stern
15imperialist influence in A s i a ”. The 'axis’ was condemned 
by a Soviet writer as a 'dangerous slogan' that would 
not only 'deprive Indonesia of her independence’ but also 
isolate her internationally and result in 'a certain retreat
4 - .  1 6from non-alignment . Through the 'axis’, maintained another
Soviet political analyst, Indonesia became a ’client of
17 
C h i n a ’.
The above developments would indicate that the 
post-Khrushchev leadership failed to improve its relation­
ship with Indonesia, if anything,it became worse.It was 
in the light of this context of strained relationship that
15.Cited in Agung.Gp c it ,p.441.
16.See New Times,IMo.52,28 December 1966,pp. 15-17.
17.Astafyev and Dubinsky.Op c it ,p.79.
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on 1 October 1965 a 'coup' was launched and this had widespread 
ramifications for relations between the two countries.
Phase 2: October 1965 - October 1968
The attempted 'coup' against the Army High Command
on 1 October 1965 marked a turning point in the history
18 .  ,of independent Indonesia. This coup occurred against 
the backdrop of intense polarization between the left 
and right-wing forces, severe economic difficulties and 
the increasing isolation of Indonesia i n t e r n a t ionally.^
On the morning of 1 October 1965, the Gerakan September 
Tigapuluh(GESTAPU),the Thirtieth September Movement,headed 
by L t .C o l .Untung, a commander of the Tjakrabirawa Battalion, 
which provided the palace guards, kidnapped six senior 
Army generals:three were shot dead in their homes while 
the three other captives,including General Nasution's 
adjutant,were murdered at Lubang Buaya at the Halim Air
Force Base,which was also the operational headquarters 
20of the GESTAPU. Later, the GESTAPU headquarters announced
that the 'Council of Generals' had been purged as it had
planned a coup for 5 October;that a Revolutionary Council
would be established in place of the Dwikora Cabinet;and
o 1that the putsch was an internal affair of the Army. A
18.It is important to briefly detail the ’coup' as it marked a watershed 
in Indonesia's relations with Communist countries and the West, and this 
was due not only to the consequences of the coup, but more important, 
to the perceptions at different times from October 1965 to October 1968 
of the ones responsible for it.
19.For details of the event,see B.Anderson and R.McVey,A Preliminary Analysis 
of the October 1 1965 Coup in Indonesia^Modern Indonesia Project,Cornell 
University,Ithaca,I971);A.Brackmann,The Communist Collapse in Indonesia,
(New Vork:Norton,1969);Indonesia - 1965:The Coup that Backfired,(CIA,
Directorate of Intelligence,1968).
20.See Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia,(G.30.S./PK1),(Jakarta: 
Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Keterbitan,1978),pp.126-136.
21. Ibid, p. U .
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45 member Revolutionary Council was subsequently announced.
On the same day, Sukarno appointed M a j .G e n .Pranoto Reksosa- 
mudara as the Acting Chief of the Army and confirmed this 
in a letter to Suharto, delivered to the KOSTRAD (the 
Strategic Reserve Command of the Armed Forces) h e a d q u a r t e r s ? ^  
In his reply,Suharto stated that retaliatory measures were 
being taken against the 'p lotters',that the fate of the
kidnapped generals was still unknown and that, as the general
23next senior to Yani,he was temporarily assuming command.
Forces loyal to Suharto and Nasution easily captured 
the installations under the occupation of the GESTAPU forces, 
and in the early hours of 2 October Halim Air Base was 
retaken and the putsch,to all intents and purposes, smashed?^ 
On 2 October,Sukarno announced that the putsch and counter­
putsch were political affairs which had to be settled
immediately in the political field, a direct contradiction
25of U n t u n g 's claim that it was a military affair. On the
same day, the PKI daily, Marian Rakyat,published an editorial
which had gone to press on 1 October,supporting GESTAPU.
On 4 October, Sukarno attempted to downplay the role of
27the Indonesian Air Force in the affair/ and on the same 
day the bodies of the six generals were discovered in 
an unused well at Halim Air B a s e .Following this,rumours
22.Y.Muhaiman,Perkembangan Militer Dalam Politik Di Indonesia,1945-1965, 
(Jogjakarta:Gaja Mada University Press,1982),p.166.
23.Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia,(G.30.S./PKI),p.144.
24.0.G.Roeder,The Similing General:President Suharto of Indonesia,(Jakarta:
Gunung Agung,l969),pp.21-23.
25.This was referred to by Suharto in his first public account of the affa ir 
on 15 October 1965.See "A Speech by Maj.Gen.Suharto:October Dawns in 
Djakarta",France Asia:Asia,No. 186,1966,p.507.
26.Harian Rakyat,2 October 1965.
27.See J.Hughes,The End of Sukarno:A Coup that Misfired,A Purge that 
RanJiJild,(London:Angus and Robertson,1968),p.122.
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began proliferating throughout Jakarta that the generals
had been brutally tortured by the PKI Youth(Pemuda Rakyat)
and Women(Gerwani) wings.To feed the rumours further, the
Army started a mass propaganda campaign showing photographs
of the dead generals repeatedly over the television and
28in the newspapers. Whether the rumours were true or false,
they were believed by the Army rank and file and the masses,
and this was an important factor in explaining the subsequent
revulsion against the PKI.
On 6 October, the PKI Central Committee issued
a statement to the effect that the 'coup' was an internal
affair of the Army, that the PKI was not involved, and
that the communists listed in the Revolutionary Council
29had been named without approval. To the Army and Muslim
groups,however, the affair was an opportunity to settle
old scores,and a nation-wide pogrom was launched against
the PKI, beginning with the burning down of its headquarters
and other associations linked with it in Jakarta.S u k a r n o 's
attempts to protect the PKI leaders and a number of senior
Air Force officers anqered the Army, and the general public
was made to believe by the Army that the PKI was the
30' dalang *,the manipulator of the ’c o u p ’. This also marked 
the beginning of the end of Sukarno's political power. 
Sukarno's main reason for protecting the PKI leaders and
28.T.Vittachi,The Fall of Sukarno,(New YorkiFrederick Praeger,l967),p.14;
General Suharto stated after the recovery of the bodies on U October:
"You can imagine the fury of a soldier once he learned what had happened. 
Perhaps, an o fficer can be controlled but an ordinary soldier can be
very hard to restrain”.Cited in Hughes,Op c it ,p.23.
29.None of the Jakarta papers published the statement.The Soviet media, 
however, reported it.
3Q.Rangkaian Peristiwa Pemberontakan Komunis Pi Indonesia,(Jakarta:Lembaja 
Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Kemasyarakatan,1983),pp.105-116.
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PKI was his desire to preserve NASAKOM,and therefore he
31opposed the persecution of the party.
On 14 October^ Suharto was officially appointed 
as Chief of the Armed Forces,rep lacing the de jure chief,
General Pranoto,indicating that the counter-putsch group
32had won its first battle against Sukarno. The appointment 
also marked the official ascendancy of Suharto in Indonesian
politics.On 18 October, the Army banned all PKI activities
33in Jakarta, but not the party itself. Meanwhile relations 
between the Army and Sukarno continued to deteriorate,the 
Army being angered by his refusal to attend the gener a l s ’ 
funeral,protective statements on behalf of the PKI and 
sheltering of senior Air Force officers.Following the crushing 
of the putsch and the PKI, Sukarno's political power was 
methodically reduced.This in many ways can be regarded 
as the real coup d'etat in Indonesia,Untung's putsch having 
been more aimed at purging the Army's High Command.S u h a r t o 's 
counter-putsch not only crushed the Untung putsch group 
but obliterated the PKI,finally deposed the President and 
elevated the leader of the counter-putsch group to his 
place,though this was undertaken gradually in 'Javanese 
style'.On 11 March 1966,Suharto executed a coup d'etat 
'Javanese s t y l e ’,where Sukarno was forced to transfer his 
executive powers to the Indonesian Army. ^ Having assumed
31.Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 1984,Jakarta.
32.For details on Suharto's rise to power,see H.McDonald,Suharto's Indonesia, 
(Blackburn,Victoria:Fontana Books,1981),pp.49-67.
33.See Daily Report:The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,No.203,20 October
1965,p.BB5.
34.See SUPERSEMAR:Surat Perintah 11 Maret,(Jakarta:Badan Penerbit
Alamanak Republik Indonesia,1977),pp.12-13;"Setelah Tiga Jenderal Kembali 
Dari Bogor",Tempoh,Vol.16,No.3,15 March 1986,pp.12-20.
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executive powers, Suharto on the following day formally
35dissolved the FKI throughout Indonesia. At the 5 July
1966 M P R S (Provisiona1 People's Consultative Congress)Session,
S u k a r n o ’s constitutional powers were further curtailed.
In foreign policy,the Congress endorsed the decisions to
rejoin the United Nations, to resolve the Malaysian dispute
peacefully, to pursue a free and independent foreign policy,
seek assurances of economic aid from the West and obtain
36a rescheduling of the extensive debt. The transfer of 
executive power to Suharto,which was sanctioned by the 
June MPRS Session,signalled the political death of Sukarno 
and marked the launching of the New Order.With the Army's 
backing,Suharto consolidated his p o w e ^  and on 27 March 
1968 was sworn in as President,while Sukarno languished 
under house arrest until his death on 23 June 1970.
The putsch and the subsequent actions by the Army 
were a watershed in Indonesian history and politics, bringing 
about the downfall of President Sukarno,the destruction 
of the PKI,the rise of the military and Suharto to the 
pinnacle of power in Indonesia, an end to the Jakarta- 
Peking axis and a turnabout in Indonesia’s foreign policy 
towards the West.In Southeast Asia, 'konfrontasi’ was 
terminated, Malaysia and Singapore recognised, and Indonesia 
began to play an active role in promoting regional 
cooperation and stability.
35.Roeder,Dp cit,p.43.
36. Ibid, p. 51; K osu t , 0£_cit, p. 122.
241
Soviet-Indonesian Relations In the Light of the 'Coup' 
and its Consequences
Before the putsch, Soviet-Indonesian relations 
had been at their lowest ebb since diplomatic representatives 
were exchanged in 1954, mainly because of Sukarno's pro- 
Peking foreign policy.In view of the cool Soviet-Indonesian 
relations on the one hand and the increasing military 
escalation of the United States in Vietnam and the growing 
radical posture of the PRC,manifested by the Cultural 
Revolution,on the other,it would be useful to sketch the 
Soviet response to the 'coup' and developments thereafter, 
as a barometer of Mo s c o w ’s relations with Indonesia during 
this period.The Soviet-Indonesian relationship during this 
period can be examined in two broad phases:Phase A:October 
1965 to December 1966; and Phase B: January 1967 to October 
1968.
Phase A : October 1965 - December 1966
The initial Soviet response to the 'coup' was
37one of surprise and confusion. The Soviet media had to 
rely largely on Western sources for their reporting of 
the developments in Indonesia.On 1 October, Radio Moscow 
announced that "Indonesian Army units have put down an 
attempted coup against the present Indonesian Government.
They arrested members of the so-called G e n e r a l s ’ Council 
created in Indonesia with the help of the United States
37.This was cleariy evident in the early reportage in the Soviet media.Accord­
ing to Manai Sophian,the then Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow, "the 
Russians simply did not know what was going on in Jakarta".Interview 
with Manai Sophian on 13 April 1984,Jakarta.
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Central Intelligence Agency,which prepared the coup.The
coup was scheduled for 5 October,Indonesian Armed Forces
38Day". This was no more than a factual report of Untung's
39first broadcast at 7.20 am on 1 October. In the next few
days, the Soviet media continued to present a factual account
of the developments in Indonesia without commitment to
any side.On 8 October, the Soviet media widely reported
the PKI's denial of involvement in the putsch.For instance.
Radio Moscow stated:
concerning the 30 September Movement,the Central Committee of 
the PKI was of the opinion that the movement constitutes an 
internal issue of the army and the PKI was not at all involved in 
it.As a result of the answers to the questions about PKI members 
whose names were listed in the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, 
obviously they were not consulted and they have not given their 
consent to the inclusion of their names in the namelist.40
The Soviet media did not report the murder or
funerals of the six generals.Instead, they emphasised the
41growing anti-PKI atmosphere and movement in the country.
On 11 October, Brezhnev and Kosygin sent a message to 
Sukarno,wishing him good health and expressing the hope 
that "all anti - imperialist forces would work together', 
as well as warning that "the reactionary forces are trying
42to strike a blow at the most active anti-imperialist forces". 
This was the first Soviet 'signal' to Sukarno that it was 
willing to forget the past differences;it was motivated
38.Daily Report:USSR and Eastern Europe,IMo.191,1 October 1965,p.bb24..
39.Muhaiman,Dp c it,pp.185-186.




by the growing ascendancy of the Army in Indonesian politics, 
the growing anti-PKI movement and the increasing isolation 
of the President.
On 17 October, Izvestia made the first detailed
analysis of the 'coup’.The Soviet Government newspaper
noted that "reactionary elements have launched a massive
campaign under the slogans of anti-communism";that "demands
have been made to ban the Communist Party and other progressive
organizations’’; that "the President had appealed to the
country to preserve order and not to give vent to vengeance";
and that "Sukarno had urged that the NASAKOM system be
preserved " ? 3 Izvestia also noted that "making use of the
fact that several communists were included in the Revolutionary
Council and that the Communist Party organ Harian Rakyat,
not having looked into the confused situation of the events
of the first few days, wrote that the revolt was supported
by the people,the reactionary elements unleashed a mass
campaign under anti-communist slogans".The article concluded
that the situation in Indonesia "continues to remain tense.
Imperialists and other forces who would like to use the
internal affairs of the country for their own external
political machinations against the national interests of
„44the Indonesian people are interested in its aggravation .
The Soviet Union supported Sukarno's call for 
the preservation of the NASAKOM system as this would mean 
the return of Sukarno to his preeminent position, the 
cessation of persecution against the PKI, the moderation 
of the A r m y ’s anti-Communism and the Republic's ability
43.Izvestia, 17 October 1965.
44. Ibid.
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to act as a barrier against the economic and political
penetration of the West.The article also revealed the
first Soviet admission that the PKI might have been involved
in some ways in the putsch.However, with growing momentum
in the mass killing of the PKI members, the Soviet media
shifted their emphasis:their line stressed that reactionary
forces,both within and without,were using the incident
45to further their own cause.
Following the funerals of the six generals, a 
mass movement,orchestrated by the Army leadership and the 
Muslim parties, pressed for the banning of the PKI.On 20 
October, Pravda argued that ’’the Right-wing forces in 
Indonesia are using the extreme situation which has arisen 
to settle accounts with their political enemies, 
disregarding the interests of national unity and the anti­
imperialist struggle of the Indonesian p e o p l e ” Q n  25 
October, Pravda, in its first editorial, entitled "In Defense 
of the Unity of the National-Democratic Forces in Indonesia", stated 
that:
...the only established fact is that the active force attempting 
to carry out the putsch was a group of conspirators made up of 
Indonesian officers headed by Lt.Col.Untung.
The anti-communist campaign is being fanned under the 
proposition that the PKI allegedly participated in the 30 September 
Movement.At the same time,the fact that the PKI as far back as on
5 October published an official statement in which it disassociated 
itself from the organisers of the unsuccessful overthrow and 
characterised it as an 'internal a ffa ir of the army' has been 
completely ignored.Even if one were to assume that individual 
members of the le ftis t organizations,lending themselves to 
provocation,has some some sort of connection with the event of 30
45.Daily Report:USSR and Eastern Europe,No.225,22 November I965,p.bb12.
46.Pravda.20 October 1965.
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SepLember.it still does not in any way justify the repression 
against the three million strong PKI that achieved the 
deserved glory of a truly patriotic and revolutionary party.
The wave of anti-communist outbreak in Indonesia causes serious 
damage to the unity of the national-democratic forces in Lhe 
struggle against imperialism.colonialism and neo-colonialism.One 
cannot help but see that those who attack the Communist Party 
and other democratic organs cause direct harm to the national 
interests of their country.
Attempts by international reaction to accuse the Communists 
with a desire to split the national-liberation movement will be 
resolutely rejected by the world progressive public.Progressive 
people throughout the world know well the ideology and the 
strategic ana tactical principles ot the Marxist-Leninist parties.
Political adventurism,putschism and sectarianism are foreign
to Marxism-Leninism.Marxists-Leninists see in the national-democratic 
forces of the developing world their natural allies and consider their 
duty comprehensively to support them in their common struggle 
against imperialism and for national rebirth and social progress. 
Communists have always supported and continue to support a 
broad alliance of all patriotic and anti-imperialist forces in the 
national-liberation movement and are ready to conscientiously 
cooperate with all progressive revolutionary organizations and 
figures.
The editorial concluded with the note that:
...the Soviet people sincerely strive for further cooperation 
between the USSR and Indonesia in political,economic,cultural 
and other areas.The Soviet people express their confidence 
that domestic and international reaction will suffer a defeat 
in its attempts to fan anti-communist hysteria in the country, 
to upset the unity of the national-patriotic forces and to turn 
Indonesia away from the path of independent democratic 
development. 47
The editorial represented the first extension of 
ideological solidarity from the CPSU to the PKI.It was 
also a defense of the PKI in the face of repression by 
the Army.As in the 17 October Izvestia article,the Pravda 
editorial indirectly admitted the PKI's involvement in 
the putsch but attempted to distinguish between involvement 
of the PKI as an organization and the involvement of some 
of its members.The editorial also expressed the opinion
47.Ibid,26 October 1965.
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that PKI members might have been provoked by 'reactionary 
forces'.It is also worth noting the Soviet Union's 
ideological preoccupation on the matter,where "political 
adventurism, putschism and sectarianism" were regarded 
as being "foreign to Marxism-Leninism".Initially,when the 
PRC was blamed for the putsch,the Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister, 
Nikolai Firyubin 'scolded' Manai Sophian as this was "not 
in line with communist tenets".Even though the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry was at its peak, the Soviets still 'defended' the 
Chinese on grounds that as communists they could not be 
involved in the putsch, and to accuse the Chinese communists
would be tantamount to a negative reflection on the Soviet
. . 48 communists.
The 'predominant line' during this period was 
that the 'coup' was an internal affair of the Army and 
that the PKI was not involved;this was clearly manifested 
by Radio Moscow on 27 October:
Reactionary elements have taken advantage of the conspiracy 
to pursue an anti-communist campaign.They allege that the PKI 
was involved in the 30 September Movement.Yet it is absolutely 
clear that this movement was nothing but a conspiracy by a 
completely isolated group of officers.The fact that the three 
million strong PKI had nothing to do with the coup is evident to 
anyone who respects facts and not inventions.49
In addition to the fate of the PKI and its members,the 
major Soviet concern related to the course of Indonesian 
foreign policy.This was clearly highlighted in V.Shurygin's 
article in Pravda on 6 November,in which he stated,"many 
Indonesian leaders say that present events in the country 
will not influence the anti-imperialist course of the
48.Interview with Manai Sophian on 13 April 1984,Jakarta.
49.Daily Report:USSR and Eastern Europe,No.209,28 October I965,p.bb15.
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s t a t e ’s foreign policy".He e o n c 1 uded,however, that "one
cannot help noticing that the spreading campaign against
the communists and democratic organizations in Indonesia
is meeting with the warm support of the very forces who
are trying to achieve changes in this anti-imperialist 
50
course".
Another prominent feature of the Soviet response 
during the early phase of the putsch and counter-putsch 
was the repeated attempts made to extend the hand of friend­
ship to the Indonesian leaders.This was despite the continued 
persecution of the PKI,indicating that friendly state- 
to-state relations were not seen as necessarily incompatible 
with the continued persecution of the left-wing forces 
in the country.Thus,on 6 November 1965,in a speech on Soviet- 
Indonesian relations in the Kremlin, Dmitri Polyansky,the 
First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a 
Politburo member, declared:
our people has always praised highly the anti-imperialist direction 
of its [Indonesia] policy.We believe that every people must choose 
the path and form of its social and national development.At the 
same time,the Soviet people cannot help being troubled by the fact 
that in certain countries which have good relations with us, an anti­
communist campaign is being waged and progressive people are being 
arrested and thrown into prison.51
It was clear that the last remark was directed at Indonesia
though it was not specifically named, and this can be
regarded as an attempt to extend a conciliatory hand to
Jakarta and especially to the new leaders.
5Q.Pravda,6 November 1965. 
51.Ibid,7 November 1965.
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On 26 December 1965, Pravda brought out its second 
editorial on Indonesia entitled, "Against Rampant Reaction 
in Indonesia" . 1 1  noted that:
...this entire campaign is of clearly anti-communist nature.
The brunt of the oppression is borne by the PKI and the 
public organizations affliated with it.In effect,the Communist 
Party has already been declared illegal.All of its representatives 
have been expelled from the central and local organs of power 
and the majority of them have been arrested.Savage reprisals 
against many Indonesian Communists were carried out without 
a trial or an investigation.In recent days,the foreign agencies 
have reported the murder of the leaders of the PKI.
...the imperialist reactionary circles do not hide their 
rejoicing over this anti-communist offensive.They see in it 
the disassociation of the anti-imperialist forces and the under­
mining of the anti-imperialist front in Indonesia.They attempt
to utlise the situation that has come about in Indonesia to 
change its foreign policy towards a rapprochement with the 
imperialist camp and to turn it toward reaction in internal 
politics.52
While it was incorrect to state that the PKI had been 
declared illegal - it was only suspended - the tone of 
the editorial demonstrated a growing harshness and concern 
for the fate of the PKI,especially after the reported 
shooting of Aidit.By the end of December 1965, it was clear 
to the Soviet Union that the Army was bent on wiping out 
the PKI, and even though the party had been pro-China 
since 1963,as a self-proclaimed leader of the communist 
bloc, Moscow could not remain silent as it witnessed its 
wholesale annihilation.
On 19 January 1966,Izvestia reported Brezhnev’s 
"anxiety over the attempts of the reactionary forces and
imperialism to divert Indonesia from a position of struggle




On 21 February 1966, Njono,one of the main PKI leaders,
was sentenced to death by a Military Tribunal.On 24 February,
Pravda published a statement issued by the Central Committee
of the CPSU, "angrily condemning the sentence of death
on Njono".It also stated that "the whole trial,which took
place in an atmosphere of mass terror against the Communist
Party and left-wing forces,revealed the intention of the
54reactionaries to deal with their political enemies". on
6 March,Brezhnev and Podgorny appealed to Sukarno to repeal
55the death sentence. Writing in Trud on 2 March 1966, A.
Lavin condemned the 'death sentence passed by the Military
Tribunal on Njono'.At the same time,however,he argued that:
The Soviet people do not interfere in the internal affa irs of 
other countries but they have a right to state their attitude 
on certain events,particularly when they concern such a 
friendly people as the Indonesians,whose historic struggle 
against imperialism and for national independence was so 
highly appreciated in our country, and received moral,political 
and economic support in this struggle.56
Significantly,on 9 March 1966, I.Antonov claimed that since
1959, the PKI had adopted the ’correct a p p r o a c h ’:
The PKI and its members have followed the party programme adopted 
at the Sixth Congress (September 1959) and reaffirmed at the Seventh 
Congress in 1962.The Party's ultimate aim,as formulated in the 
programme is popular government.Can this be achieved by peaceful 
parliamentary means?The programme says, 'This is fully possible, 
and we must exert every effo rt to translate this possibility into 
reality'.As far as the Communists are concerned,the peaceful, 
parliamentary way is the best,ideal form of transformation to 
'People's Democracy' as a preparatory stage to Socialism.And if 
it depends upon the Communists,this is the way that will be 
chosen.The Party programme has nothing in common with the tactics 





57.1.Antonov,"Black Days For Indonesia",New Times,No.10,9 March I966,pp. 
7-8.
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This declaration is important in the light of later revelations
by the PKI remnants and the subsequent change in the
Soviet assessment both of the PKI and of its role in the
’coup'.On 15 March 1966,Izvestia alluded to the fact that
the 1965 'coup' might have been provoked along the lines
of Madiun in 1948.It stated that "it could be compared
to the events of 1948 when bourgeoisie and landowning
circles provoked a clash between various military units 
„58in Madiun". However, in the light of developments in 
Indonesia and the emergence of a pro-Soviet PKI wing,this 
line was discontinued.
At the Twenty-third Party Congress of the CPSU
held in Moscow from 29 March to 8 April 1966, Brezhnev
condemned the continued repression of the PKI.Other than
the need to oppose the persecution of a communist party
in front of the world communist audience, Brezhnev was
influenced by a number of considerations:the rise to
prominence of the anti-communist Army which since March
had held the reins of political power;the complete ban
on the PKi;and the arrest of pro-Sukarno,leftist ministers,
which signalled that the new leaders were attempting to
swing the political pendulum of the country towards the
right.Brezhnev declared on 29 March:
The whole of our Party and all our nation condemn the anti­
communist terror in Indonesia.The reactionary forces in that 
country have,without trial,brutally exterminated tbns of 
thousands of people whose only 'guilt' was their being members 
of the Communist Party.The persecution and banning of the
58.Izvestia ,15 March 1966.
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Communist Party prejudices the unity of the revolutionary 
forces of Indonesia,underminE'S the anti-imperialist front 
and greatly damages the interests of the friendly 
Indonesian people.UJe demand that the criminal butchery 
of Communists,those heroic fighters for Indonesia's 
national independence and the in terests of the working 
people.be stopped a t once.59
By March 1966, the Indonesian Army exercised 
de facto as well as semi-de jure control [nb:General Suharto 
was only sworn in as Acting President in March 1967].In 
view of this,it was not surprising that on 16 April 1966,
Literaturnaya Gazeta blamed the Indonesian Army for the 
'reign of terror' in the country.However,the writer also 
argued that "armies can play a progressive role in the 
developing countries.This was because the part played by 
the army in most young countries of Asia and Africa is 
considerable.lt is often the most real and organised force 
capable of playing a serious role in deciding the paths 
of further d e v e l o p m e n t " ^
To be sure,the Soviet Union was in a dilemma 
and did not really know how to handle military regimes, 
and this problem was compounded by the series of coups 
that occurred between late 1965 and later 1968,viz.Indonesia 
(October 1965),Congo (November 1965),Dahomey (December 
1965),Nigeria,Upper Volta and Central African Republic 
(January 1966),Ghana (February i966),Togo (January 1967), 
Sierra Leone (March 1967) and Mali (November 1968).
In May 1965,that is, four months before the events in 
Indonesia, K.Ivanov, a Soviet specialist on the Third World, 
examined the 'new role' of the military in revolutions
59.23rd Congress of the CPSU,1966,(Moscow:Novosti Press Agency Pub. House, 
1966),p.29.
6Q.Literaturnaya Gazeta,16 April 1966.
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in the developing countries and concluded that:
Armies are not walled off from revolutionary process under 
way among the people.The noble heart of a patriot may beat 
beneath an army uniform...In Egypt,Burma,Algeria and some 
other countries army officers formed the backbone of the 
revolutionary democratic forces;the army was not only the 
centre of patriotic resistance,but also began to play,...an 
outstanding part in. laying the basis of a new life...Nowa­
days, the various detachments of anti-imperialist fighters 
are marching towards each ot.her;to ignore some of them 
merely because they wear uniform would be the height of 
folly.61
However, not all Soviet writers accepced Ivanov's analysis,
indicating that the Soviet leadership had not decided on
the matter. This was clearly indicated in A . S .K a u f m a n ’s
evaluation of the problem:
The view is sometimes expressed that,owing to the ideological 
and organizational weakness of the working class,the liberated 
countries' transition to socialism can be accomplished under the 
leadership of other revolutionary forces.In this context,one is 
increasingly often given the names of outstanding national 
democrats, and of generals and officers of a patriotic disposi­
tion,as representing those political and revolutionary forces 
which are capable of consummating the cause of the national 
liberation revolutions in the developing countries.Such a view 
of the question overlooks class relations within society;it is 
contrary to Marxism, and in our opinion inevitably leads to 
overestimation of 'strong personalities'.It also results in an 
exaggeration of the importance of the army.The army has its 
own specific forms and methods of leadership,which do not 
always accord with the development of democratic forms of 
government.62
63In spite of the differences in view, the 16 April L.itera-
turnaya Gazeta article indicated that the Soviet Union 
was not averse to the rise of a military regime in Indonesia 
as long as it was 'progressive'.But what caused serious 
doubts in Moscow was the steady slide towards the Western
61.K.Ivanov,"National Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Develop­
ment^ ", In te rn a tio n a^  ,(M osc ow), N o. 5,1965,p.63.
62.A.S.Kaufman,"Socialist Doctrines in the Developing Countries",Narody 
Azii i A frik i,No.4,1968,pp.54-55. ‘
63.By 1968,it appears that the Soviet leadership had worked out a policy 
toward Third World 'military regimes'.See G.Mirskii,"Political Role of the 
Army in Asia and Africa",Ibid,No.6.1968,pp.3-14.
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camp.Hence,on 19 June 1966,Pravda reported that Japan 
planned to form a consortium of Indonesian creditors.lt 
warned that this would "lead to economic and political 
control over the country".It also noted that the Soviet 
Union,the largest creditor of Indonesia, was not invited 
to take part in the consortium?4Added to this,when the 
idea of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
was first raised in August 1966 and Indonesia was considering 
joining, Izvestia warned that "such a step would be against
the interests of Indonesia itself and against the people
„65of Asian countries . This was because the proposed Association 
was seen to have been prompted by the Americans, partly 
as a replacement for the ineffectual SEATO.lt was also 
seen to be against Jakarta's proclaimed policy of 'neutralism'.
On the twenty-first anniversary of Indonesian
independence, Pravda failed to report on the ongoing
persecution of the P K I .Instead,the CPSU paper stated that
"the Soviet Union and other Socialist states have always
supported Indonesia in its efforts to build a new life.
The desire of the Indonesian people to strengthen sovereignty
and the independence of its young state, 1 iquidate economic
d i fficulties,achieve a rise in the interests of peace,
national ¡independence and security of peoples has met and
meets unfailingly the understanding and support of the
66Soviet people".
64.Pravda,19 June 1966.
65.Izvestia, 16 August 1966.
66.Pravda,17 August 1966.
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Following the MPRS sessions from 20 June to 6
July 1966, Sukarno's political powers were severely eclipsed,
indicating clearly that his fortunes were on the decline.
This was one reason why,uni ike Pravda, Izvestia chose the
twenty-first anniversary of Indonesian independence to
criticise S u k a r n o ’s policies.While in the past the Soviet
67
Union had supported NASAKOM^ now Izvestia maintained that:
... it did not justify itself because it remained on paper.
Moreover,in recent years,not all actions undertaken 
by Indonesia have made a contribution to the development 
of world progress.Attention is drawn,for example,to 
Indonesia's hurried exit from the United Nations and 
other international organizations.Not everyone under­
stood the change in Indonesia's relations to the policy 
of peaceful coexistence of states with the different 
social structures and the change in attitude towards 
atomic warfare.68
On 5 September 1966,Harian R a k y a t ’s Moscow correspondent,
Anwar Dharma,was expelled on grounds of ’’engaging in anti-
Soviet activities and maintaining an active contact with
a certain foreign mission which is hostile to the Soviet 
,, • ,,69Union . This was followed by the expulsion of Suar Surosa,the
70PKI representative in Moscow. Both were later granted 
political asylum in Peking,and the expulsions can be seen 
as another indication of Soviet attempt to establish a 
’corr e c t ’ relationship with the Suharto regime.
67.See Observer,"Indonesia's D ifficult Days",New Times,No.44,2 Nov.1965,p.?r 
Later, R.A.Ulyanovsky was to argue that "Sukarno's concept of NASAKOM 
could theoretically have become a progressive basis for a united patriotic 
front,capable of leading the nation's efforts towards the completion 
of the tasks of the national democratic stage of revolution and the 
transfer of Indonesia on to the path of socialist orientation...But his 
subjectivist approach to the problem of classes and the class struggle, 
and his conviction of the possibility of avoiding the capitalist degeneration 
of Indonesian society without the fundamental revolutionary break-up 
of the entire social system limited substantially his chances of cooperating 
with the Communist Party". See R.A.Ulyanovsky,Fighters For National 
Liberation:Political Profiles,(Moscow:Progress Pub. 1983),p.68.
68.Izvestia,17 August 1966.
69.Cited in New China News Agency,6 October 1966.
70.See Sumartono and et.al.Indonesia Under Fascism,(n.p.,n.d.).p.73.
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new leaders in Jakarta caused concern in Moscow.In September
1966, the ’Tokyo C l u b ’, a grouping of Indonesia’s Western
creditors,was formed, and on 29 September the Club agreed
to reschedule Jakarta's repayments.In November, Jakarta
lifted the controls over American and British enterprises
and plantations instituted in 1964/1965, and in December
the Indonesian Parliament passed a law opening the country
71to direct foreign investments. These developments were 
viewed as evidence of the new leadership’s drift into the 
'Western imperialist' camp.
The developments in Indonesia placed the Soviet 
Union in a dilemmaron the one hand,it was pleased to see 
the end of the pro-Peking PKI and of Sukarno's pro-PRC 
foreign policy, but on the other,the mass annihilation 
of the PKI and the increasing contacts between the new 
regime and the West, caused fear that the new leaders might 
join the 'imperialist camp'.In this context, the USSR found 
it difficult not to condemn the violent excesses against 
the PKI, but at the same time,Moscow was interested in 
courting the new leaders,if not for anything else,at least 
to safeguard its past investments in the country.The Soviet
dilemma was well expressed by Pravda on 24 November:
...the terror waged against the Communists and other forces 
had seriously weakened the national forces in Indonesia.The 
recent Soviet-Indonesia talks [Adam Malik,the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister,was in Moscow to discuss the rescheduling of 
Indonesian debts and an agreement was reached on 2U November 
19661 in Moscow has dealt only with inter-state relations
At the same time, the evolving policies of the
71.Mozingo,Ü£_cit,p.251;V.Ivanov,"lndonesia:Hour of Trial",Internatiotial 
Affairs. (Moscow), No. 2, February 1967,pp.92-93.
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[meaning not people-to-people or party-to-party}.The fact that 
the Soviet Union supports proper state contacts with Indonesia 
in no way signifies that the Soviet Socialist State can remain 
indifferent to acts of terror against the Communists,to the 
persecution of Marxist-Leninist ideology.72
During phase A,the Soviet Union maintained that the putsch 
was an internal affair of the Army;that the PKI was not 
involved;that reactionaries from within and without were 
involved;condemned the persecution of the PKI and other 
progressive organizations;and at the same time,attempted 
to establish friendly relations with the new leaders in 
Jakarta.Even though a number of reports hinted that some 
PKI members may have been involved in the putsch,these 
were brushed aside as in no way implicating the party as 
a whole.
The initial Soviet response indicated that the 
putsch came as a surprise to Moscow,and the need to rely 
on Western sources prevented an early Soviet appraisal 
of the putsch and counter-putsch.Right up to the end of 
1965,the Soviet Union hoped that the putsch was only an 
attempt by junior officers to get rid of the senior generals, 
and that Sukarno's power and position would not be trampled 
upon.However, with the steady increase of Suharto's power 
at the expense of Sukarno, and the implication of the 
President in the affair,it dawned on the Soviet leaders 
that the President was losing his fight to remain in power; 
this largely explained the various Soviet attempts to win 
the friendship of the new leaders and of the Army as a
72.Pravda,24 November 1966.
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whole.By the end of 1966, S u h a r t o ’s political power was 
consolidated and the PKI obliterated as an effective political 
force;this principally motivated the Soviet reassessment 
of the P a r t y ’s role in the putsch,which marked the beginning 
of the second phase of Soviet response to the ’coup'.
Phase B : January 1967 - October 1960
On 17 August 1966,the pro-Peking Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee of the PKI issued a document 
entitled ’’Take the Road of Revolution to Realise the Tasks 
which Should Have Been Accomplished by the 1945 August 
Revolution” (hereafter this document will be referred to 
as 'The Road to Revolution).In September,the pro-Peking 
faction of the PKI adopted a self-criticism which was 
subsequently published in the Indonesian Tribune in January
1967. The self-criticism was entitled ’’Build the PKI Along 
the Marxist-Leninist Line To Lead the P e o p l e ’s Democratic 
Revolution in Indonesia” (hereafter this document will 
be referred to as the 'Self-Criticism').The ’Road to
Revolution’ maintained that:
The crucial struggle of the people against the armed counter­
revolution is unavoidable and constitutes the chief form of 
struggle of the coming revolution.Only by taking the road of 
armed struggle,the Indonesian people will succeed in over­
throwing the power of the armed counter-revolutionaries,as 
a precondition to realise their aspirations for which they 
have fought for scores of years - independence and freedom.73
73.Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian 
Communist Party in People of Indonesia.Unite and Fight To Overthrow 
the Fascist Regimet(Peking:Foreign I anguage Press, 1968),p.20.
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This clearly followed the Chinese line of armed struggle
as distinct from the Soviet line of a peaceful, parliamentary 
74path to power. In contrast, the ’Self-Criticism' focussed
mainly on the ’c o u p ’ and maintained that:
The PKl's leadership had been engaged in adventurism.
Violating organizational rules they easily involved themselves 
in the September 30 Movement that was not based on the 
high consciousness and conviction of the masses.And therefore 
they had caused the isolation of the Party from the masses of 
the people.On the contrary,after the defeat of the September
30 Movement,the Party leadership carried out a Right opportunist 
line,by entrusting President Sukarno with the fate of the Party 
and the revolutionary movement.These were the climax of serious 
shortcomings and weaknesses of the PKI in the ideological , 
political and organizational fields.
Moreover,'modern revisionism' began to penetrate into our 
Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee 
of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved a report which 
supported the lines of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU 
and adopted the lines of 'achieving Socialism peacefully 
through parliamentary means' as the line of the PKI.This 
peaceable road,one of the characteristics of modern 
revisionism was further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress 
of the PKI...This revisionist line was further emphasised in the 
Seventh(Extraordinary)National Congress of the PKI and was 
never corrected,not even when our Party was already aware that 
nocM i  5 Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.the leadership of the 
LHbU had been following the road of modern revisionism.75
This document clearly admitted the PKI leadership’s 
involvement in the putsch.Thus,it not only strengthened 
the New O r d e r ’s case against the PKI, but more important, 
forced a change in the Soviet assessment of the putsch.In 
the main,the pro-Peking remnants of the PKI admitted that 
the Party made three mistakes: 1. it was engaged in 
adventurism; 2. it relied too much on Sukarno and his 
popularity; and 3 . it succumed to ’revisionist influences
74.For a comparison of the two 'lines',see Justus M van tier Kroef, Soviet- 
Indonesian Relations and the PKI".Pacific CommunitytNo.4,Autumn 1970,pp. 
311-325.
75.Cited in Yearbook On International Communist Af fairs,1968PP.896-898.
76.Ibid.pp.898-907.
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The first indication that the Soviet Union had 
changed its line on the putsch was revealed by Pravda on
20 January 1967, when it blamed ’’Chinese leaders for causing 
many difficulties for the Communist movements in Asia.
This had particularly influenced the tragic events in
Indonesia” . ^ O n  25 January 1967, Sergei Sevchenkov and 
Boris Smirnov, correspondents for New Times declared:
Repeatedly.we heard it said [in Indonesia! that Col.Untung's revolt, 
supported(if not inspired) by some leading figures in the Communist 
Party,was provoked from two sides:by Western intelligence services 
and by Peking.Everyone knows.people told us.that Peking had a 
great influence on the Communist Party's leadership and tried to 
impose its adventurist line on the Indonesian Communists and the 
left forces supporting them.This was one of the reasons why the 
Communist Party's leadership succumbed to the imperialist 
provocation.
Others did not speak of provocation but they too linked the tragic 
events in Indonesia with the Chinese leaders'interference in her 
affairs.lt seems clear in any case that the subversive Western 
intelligence activities designed to get the left forces smashed 
and the pressure exerted by the disrupters of the international 
communist movements,helped to produce an atmosphere of general 
distrust and suspicion,to increase political tension,divide the 
nation's patriotic forces and divert them from the principles of 
joint struggle for a free and flourishing Indonesia.78
This indicated an important reassessment of the Soviet 
position as the claim that the ’c o u p ’ was an internal affair 
of the Army was no longer credible in view of the 'Self- 
Criticism' .
Even though Izvestia and Pravda reported on the 
developments in Indonesia,the former,being the Government’s 
paper,emphasised the changes in the course of the c o u n t r y ’s 
foreign policy,while the latter,being the Party's paper, 
paid more attention to the persecution of the PKI members 
and examined the causes of the 'c o u p '.On 1 February 1967,
77.Pravda,20 January 1967.
78.S.Sevchenkov and B.Smirnov,"In Indonesia Today",New Times,No.U,25 
January 1967,p.7.
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Izvestia argued that the United States was attempting to 
"shift Indonesia from its neutralist position and bring 
her into United States' inspired bloc in Southeast Asia".
In addition,"there were certain influential people in the 
country who would be prepared to fall in line with the 
American plans".The article,however,concluded on an optimistic 
note, stating that "leaving aside an appraisal of the 
events which have happened in Indonesia,one must say that 
the positions of neutralism and non-alignment are a victory 
for the Indonesian state and people which allowed it to
maintain its national independence and which cannot be
79wiped out by the events of September 1965".
In March 1967, Suharto was sworn in as Acting 
President,signifying the complete political demise of 
Sukarno,and it was partly because of this that on 19 March 
V.Verbenko,a political analyst,catalogued the 'errors'
of the former President:
Sukarno began to oppose the ideas of peaceful coexistence... 
departed from the spirit of the Bandung Conference and slid 
towards dangerous adventures.He withdrew Indonesia from the 
United Nations,despite the fact that many countries including 
the USSR.believed that with all its failings,the United Nations 
is a real international institution for the struggle against 
imperialism and colonialism in all its manifestations.These actions 
also proved detrimental to Indonesia's interests.Sukarno declared 
the so-called 'confrontation' of Malaysia,which ate up 80 percent 
of the annual budget, to be the central task of the country.The 
Peking leaders set these two states against each other,and 
confrontation fully suited them.The Indonesian economy declined.
Specialists began to speak of catastrophe.Propagandists were
reassuring.The country was on the verge of disaster,but
the President spoke of prosperity...Sukarno spoke of prosperity
and proposed grandeur projects,having no idea of the enormity
79.Izvestia,1 February 1967.
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of the catastrophe.Historians have still to tell us how 
great is the personal responsibility of Dr Sukarno for 
what Indonesian had to endure.80
Soviet writers also began criticising 'Guided Democracy',
a concept which had formerly been vehemently endorsed.
For instance, Guber pointed out that "Sukarno viewed guided
democracy as a way to curb the right-wing parties,to enhance
his personal authority and to implement the ideas of petit
bourgeois Socialism . yuri Drugov,on the other hand, noted
that Guided Democracy had many weaknesses:
The new system embodied all the elements of a regime of 
personal power,although by virtue of the particular 
conditions obtaining in Indonesia,this power was not 
absolute.lt was restricted,on the one hand,by the 
presence of the influential and steadily strengthening 
Communist Party,with its mass organizations,and on 
the other,by the mounting role of the army,which 
undoubtedly played an important part in winning and 
defending independence,and had acquired by that time the 
status of an influential caste with its own attitude on 
the country's future development.82
During the June/July 1966 Session, the MPRS decreed 
that the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology be 
prohibited.In line with this, on 18 March 1967 the Indonesian 
Government banned a number of Soviet publications,and this 
evoked strong criticisms from the Soviet Union.On 20 March, 
Radio Peace and Progress stated:
SQ.Komsomol'skaya Pravda,19 March 1967;Similarly,in 1980, M.Kapitsa and N. 
Maletin,writing a political biography of Sukarno,in what has been described 
as the first attempt in Soviet literature to make an allround analysis 
of Sukarno,argued that "having become a closed political group linked 
by personal relationships,the ruling elite headed by Sukarno objectively 
impeded the development of the country and doomed it to stagnation".





This unfriendly act caused a feeling of misapprehension and 
sorrow and was a sign of the reactionaries' aspirations to 
impose an illiteracy which would help to purge peoples' mind 
of freedom-loving spirit and suppress democratic institutions.
By burning Soviet books and magazines,an act reminiscent 
of Hitler,Indonesian reactionaries wanted to force the 
Indonesian people to forget their ancient links of friendship 
with the USSR and their joint struggle against the imperialists 
and neo-colonialists.In burning such literature,the Indonesian 
reactionaries wanted to earn the approval of the imperialists.
These plans had not been worked out in Jakarta:they had been 
sent to the Indonesian capital for execution.83
In the same vein, Pravda warned that "the whole policy
of our State is founded on the principles of Marxism-
Leninism, which has the greatest regard for the defence
of the vital interests of the working masses.All states
which are interested in developing friendly or simply normal
relations with the Soviet Union must take this fact into
account"?^
Throughout 1967,the Soviet media repeatedly 
declared that Indonesia was being dragged into the anti­
communist camp by the * i m p e r i a l i s t s F o r  instance, Yuri 
Sholnov,a feature article writer, argued that Indonesia’s 
independence was threatened by ’imperialist pressures', 
that 'the increased power of the right-wing in Indonesia 
had made it difficult to pursue a non-aligned policy' and 
referred to 'Indonesia's plan to participate in a military 
and political bloc of Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s T h e  
writer,however, concluded that "these bellicose appeals 
by the right-wing did not meet with the approval of 
representatives of the present rulers of the country,who
83.SUB:The USSR:Part 1,22 March 1967.SU/2422/A3/A.
84.Pravda,25 March 1967.
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it a p p e a r s  e v a l u a t e  I n d o n e s i a ' s  role in the m o d e r n  w o r l d  
more soberly and with g r e a t e r  r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y ... Recently, 
Indonesian leaders have o f t e n  t alked of r e g i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  
and cultural c o o p e r a t i o n  a m o n g  -the s t a t e s  of S o u t h e a s t  Asia.
Such c o o p e r a t i o n  could, u n d e r  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  pl a y
... , „85
a p o s i t i v e  role .
On the f o r t y - s e v e n t h  a n n i v e r s a r y  of the PKI in
May 1967,P ravda c r i t i c i s e d  the p a r t y  for its 'errors':
It is still up to the Indonesian Communists and the entire 
international Communist movement to provide answers to 
many questions relating to the recent tragic events in 
Indonesia.Uhy and how did the 3,000,000 strong party suffer 
a severe defeat ?;ldhy and how were hundreds of thousands of 
its best sons exterminated and the overwhelming majority of the 
Party’s leaders - members of the Politburo and members of the 
PKI Central Committee - put to death without trial and 
investigations or thrown into prison?
The answers to all these questions must be given first of all
by the Indonesian Communist themselves so that lessons
necessary for the future can be drawn.It follows from
documents{Self-Criticism} circulated recently by various groups 
in Indonesia that the Party leadership violated provisions of
the Party programme and in the years preceding the events of 
September 30 had committed serious mistakes,which weakened 
the unity of the Party and led to its defeat.86
This c r i t i c i s m  was i n e v i t a b l e  in the light of the 'self- 
criticism' of the PKI r e m n a n t s . l t  w a s  al s o  u s e f u l , f r o m  
the K r e m l i n’s v i e w p o i n t , t o  e x p l a i n  its s h i f t  in a s s e s s m e n t  
on the ' c o u p’ and d e v e l o p m e n t s  thereafter.
F o l l o w i n g  the p a s s i n g  of the d e a t h  s e n t e n c e  on 
S u d i s m a n , o n e  of the five p r i n c i p a l  le a d e r s  of the PKI from 
1951 to 1965,w h o  was a r r e s t e d  in D e c e m b e r  1 9 6 6 , P r a v d a  
d e c l a r e d  that "it r e p r e s e n t e d  a normal a c t i o n  of the a n t i ­
c o m m u n i s t  forces in I n d o n e s i a  w h o  ha v e  e m b a r k e d  on the
85.Literaturnaya Gazeta,12 April 1967.
86.Pravda,28 May 1967.
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physical d e s t r u c t i o n  of their p o l i t i c a l  o p p o n e n t s " .The
paper a l s o  c l a i m e d  that "the e v i d e n c e  of the a c c u s e d  and
w i t n e s s e s  s howed only a v e r y  small g r o u p  of p e o p l e  in the
PKI l e a d e r s h i p  knew of the 30 S e p t e m b e r  M o v e m e n t . T h e  v e r y
co u r s e  of e v e n t s  after 30 S e p t e m b e r  c l e a r l y  bears w i t n e s s
to the fact that the b road m a s s  of C o m m u n i s t s , i n c l u d i n g
even m e m b e r s  of the Central C o m m i t t e e y w e r e  c a u g h t  u n a w a r e
and k n e w  n o t h i n g  of what h a p p e n e d  in J a k a r t a  d u r i n g  the
n i g h t  of first O c t o b e r  1 9 65"?^
In N o v e m b e r  1 9 6 7 , the C h i n e s e  p a p e r  Honggi (Red
F l a g ) ,p u b l i s h e d  an editorial, e n t i t l e d  " P e o p l e  of Indonesia,
Un i t e  and F i g h t  to O v e r t h r o w  the F a s c i s t  R e g i m e " ,d e c l a r i n g :
The Political Bureau of the pro-Peking PKI criticises the 
revisionist line of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and points 
out that this counter-revolutionary line has caused serious 
damage to the Indonesian Communist Party and brought tremendous 
losses to the Indonesian peoples' revolutionary movement.
Modern revisionism,with the leadership of the CPSU as its centre, 
is the greatest danger to the international communist movement 
and to the Indonesian Communist Party as well.The bloody lesson 
of the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in Indonesia shows 
once again that the revisionist road to peaceful transition 
advocated by the leadership of the CPSU is the road of burying 
the revolution,the road to exterminating the Party and 
the people.88
This c r i t i c i s m  was largely in r e s p o n s e  to the i n c r e a s i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  of the p r o - S o v i e t  r e m n a n t s  of the PKI ba s e d  
in the S o v i e t  Un i o n  and E a s t e r n  E u r o p e , a n d  w h e r e  there
w e r e  s u g g e s t i o n s  that a n e w  p r o - S o v i e t  PKI w a s  a b o u t  to
89
be e s t a b l i s h e d .  On 7 N o v e m b e r  1 9 6 7 , t hese r e m n a n t s  p u b l i s h e d  
87.Ibid,5 August 1967.
88.CIEed in People of Indonesia,United and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist 
Regime,pp.3-4.
89.See SUJB:The USSR,Part 1:10 November 1967,SU /2617/A3/1;Abdullah Saleh, 
"Sikap-Sikap di Uni Sovyet Terhadap Indonesia",Persepsi,Vol. 1 ,No,1 .April,
May, June,1979,pp. 53-57.
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a d o c u m e n t  in Prague entitled, "Appeal of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t
Group of the C o m m u n i s t  Party of I n d o n e s i a :For a S o u n d
Vo
R e v o l u t i o n "  ( hereafter to be r e f e r r e d  as ’The  Appeal').
A
It no t e d  that, prior the o u t b u r s t  of the S e p t e m b e r  30 
M o v e m e n t , t w o  n e g a t i v e  t e n d e n c i e s  a f f l i c t e d  the Party:
1. "increasing penetration of bourgeois ideology into the Party's
organism and the shifting of the Party's policy on to an 
adventuristic footing";
2."increasing symptoms of the Party's leadership turning bourgeois, 
which made them lose the Party identity,caused them to sink down 
even deeper into the bog of self-conceit and bureaucracy and become 
drunk with their achievements".90
The d o c u m e n t  a l s o  p o inted out that even t h o u g h  the P a r t y
made q u i t e  a few gains from c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  S u k a r n o , t h e
c o o p e r a t i o n  was fraught w i t h  some n e g a t i v e  symptoms:
Not infrequently when analysing our political successes,it was 
hard to see which of them were the result of our struggle 
and which were achieved by borrowing from the President's 
prestige.Moreover,the Party was being increasingly misled by 
illusions with regard to Bung Karno which resulted in the loss 
of its political independence,the inexorable gravitation towards 
ideological prostitution and the alignment of its theory and 
practices with those of Bung Karno.This in turn,led to utter 
confusion in interpreting Marxism-Leninism and to complete 
departure from it.
The Party's cardinal mistake in the field of theory was the 
thesis of 'subordinating class interests to national interests'.
Compliance with the thesis make it appear that,allegedly,class 
interest contradict national interests.In actual fact,this was 
a deviation from Marxism-Leninism which teaches us that the
interests of our class encompass the best interests of the 
entire nation.
It is thus clear that the thesis of the priority of national 
interest over class interest,the attempts to subordinate the 
Party programme to the Political Manifesto,the United Action 
to the NASAKOM Alliance,the attempt to make Marxism the 
property of the nation - all this is but a reflection of how 
deeply petty-bourgeois ideology became rooted in the body 
of our Party.
The d o c u m e n t  fu r t h e r  p o i n t e d  o u t  that:
90.See "Appeal of Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia", 
Information Bullet in,No. 106(18), 6 Nov.1967,pp.44-69.
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... the Chinese comrades were not averse to capitalising on the 
positive and negative characteristics of President Sukarno;while 
in doing so they aligned themselves with our Party's leadership 
to ensure the victory of their petty-bourgeois concepts of 
political hegemony in Asia and Africa and to replace the policy 
of international anti-colonial front and struggle for peace with 
the 'Jakarta-Peking Axis1.
On S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  relations, the d o c u m e n t  noted:
Although,officially,our relations remained good and friendly, 
in actual fact,we followed the wrong path by treating as our 
enemies those whom we believed to be 'revisionists' matching
in their viciousness and evil the pillars of world imperialism.
Each critical thought or argument which failed a priori either 
to justify or accuse the sides was increasingly strongly condemned 
as an inconsistent class position reeking of revisionism,to be 
naturally exorcised from the Party.Not only did we fail to stand 
on our own and strenghten our identity,but rather we became even 
more ideologically,politically and economically dependent on a 
certain party [the CCPl.UJhat is more,that Party was responsible 
for turning the Indonesian Revolution into a gaming table for 
its political gambles.91
The d o c u m e n t  p r o c e e d e d  to a r g u e  that ’the w e a k e n i n g  and
d i s a p p e a r a n c e  of f r i e n d s h i p  b e t w e e n  the two m a j o r  p a r t i e s
[CPSU and PKI] w h i l e  the a d v a n t a g e s  of this f r i e n d s h i p
had be e n  tested over the d e c a d e s , c a u s e d  s e r i o u s  d a m a g e
to our m o v e m e n t  due to the fact that we w e r e  forced to
s u b s c r i b e  to a lopsided p o i n t  of v i e w . T h i s  is w h a t  led
». 92
to the 1965 tragedy*. Mo r e  i m p o r t a n t  w a s  the d o c u m e n t’s 
a n a l y s i s  of the ’c o u p’;
...the September 30 Movement was spearheaded against the 
coup,a movement that overthrew the Council of Generals and was 
at the sametime- a revolutionary movement aimed at the establishment 
of State power that will be a harbinger of a People’s Democracy.In 
reality,this movement developed into a military adventure and was 
foiled.
The primary cause of the defeat of the September 30 Movement 
was not that the enemy confronting us was too strong, or that 
we lacked courage or that our fighthers lacked courage.The 
subjective causes lie in recklessness on the part of some 
leading Party quarters,in the ideological,political and organizational 




p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s  ideology of revolutionism,in excessive revolutionary 
zeal,a desire to achieve a quick victory,in forcing the development 
of the revolution which miscarried in gambling on the balance of 
forces.in indulgence in adventurist fantasies,etc.
The d o c u m e n t  listed two p o l i t i c a l  m i s t a k e s  that were
p e r p e t r a t e d  by the P a r t y ’s l e a d e r s h i p  d u r i n g  the ’c o u p ’
itself:
1.The organisers of and immediate participants in Untung's actions failed 
to take into consideration the need to draw the masses to their side
in order to secure the support of progressive forces within the country.
After the successful seizure of Radio Republic Indonesia.they did not offer 
their people a positive socio-economic platform,nor did they call upon 
peasants and workers to watch for the dangers of the conspiracy of the 
Council of Generals.lnstead of issuing a decree for the creation of people's 
armed forces,a decision was made to give fresh boost to the military.
Following all this.it was hard to count on the support of the masses for 
the September 30 Movement;
2.When all the political leaders denied their participation in the Revolutionary 
Council,the leadership of the Party made a belated statement to the effect 
that it was wrong to believe that the Party had taken part in the September 
30 Movement.However,the Party leadership did not refute that it had supported 
the purge carried out by Untung and his followers.93
The ' A p p e a l’, as in the 'Self-Criticism', a d m i t t e d  
the i n v o l v e m e n t  of the P a r t y ' s  l e a d e r s h i p  in G E S T A P U . B o t h  
the d o c u m e n t s  b l a m e d  the P a r t y ' s  d e v i a t i o n  from M a r x i s m -  
L e n i n i s m  as the c a u s e  of its d e b a c l e . B o t h  the p r o - S o v i e t  
and p r o - C h i n e s e  PKI r e m n a n t s  b l a m e d  t heir c l o s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  
and s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of t heir i n t e r e s t s  to S u k a r n o  and his 
i d e a s . T h e  'Appeal*, however, m a n i f e s t e d  two m a j o r  d i f f e r e n c e s :  
in a d d i t i o n  to the a b o v e , i t  b l a m e d  b o u r g e o i s  an d  M a o i s t  
i d e o l o g i e s  for the P a r t y ' s  d e v i a t i o n  from its p r o g r a m m e . I n  
p r a c t i c a l  t e r m s , t h i s  r e f e r r e d  to the d i v e r g e n t  S o v i e t  v i e w  
of the P a r t y ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the n a t i o n a l i s t  r e g i m e  and 
the w a y  of c a r r y i n g  o u t  r e v o l u t i o n , f r o m  the on e  put for w a r d  
by the C h i n e s e . T h e  ’Appeal' a t t r i b u t e d  the P a r t y ’s d e f e a t  
to its i n a b i l i t y  to i m p r o v e  the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and i d e o l o g i c a l
93.Ib id ,p .64.
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level as well as its e x c e s s i v e  r e l i a n c e  on p e a s a n t - b a s e d  
r e v o l u t i o n . I n  c o n t r a s t , t h e  ’S e l f - C r i t i c i s m’ a t t r i b u t e d  
the d e b a c l e  to the lack of s t r e s s  on the e d u c a t i o n  and 
t raining of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  c a d r e s  to p r e p a r e  them for 
the r e volution, for w o r k  a m o n g  the p e a s a n t s  in o r d e r  to 
e s t a b l i s h  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  b a s e s .Th e  'Appeal' c o n d e m n e d  the 
n otion that r e v o l u t i o n  can o n l y  be b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by 'force 
of a r m s ’ and instead s t r e s s e d  the ’peace f u l  r o a d '.The 
’S e l f - C r i t i c i s m’ rej e c t e d  the ’peaceful p a t h ’ and e x h o r t e d  
that the P a r t y  sho u l d  ’'firmly ho l d  to the g e n e r a l  law of 
r e v o l u t i o n  in co l o n i a l  and s e m i - c o l o n i a l  c o u n t r i e s .Th e  
d i f f e r e n t  d i a g n o s i s  and t h erapy can be e x p l a i n e d  and 
a p p r e c i a t e d  in the c o n t e x t  of the o n g o i n g  S i n o - S o v i e t  
c o n t r o v e r s y  o v e r  the r o l e  of the P a r t y  and S t a t e  in 
M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m .
In J a n u a r y  1968 A . B .Reznikov, in an a r t i c l e  entitled,
’Two D o c u ments: Two C o u r s e s  of C o m m u n i s t  M o v e m e n t s  in
I n d o n e s i a”, in Na r o d y  Azii i A f r i k i , a n a l y s e d  the ’A p p e a l’
and the ’S e 1f - C r i t i c i s m’.He a r g u e d  that the ’Ma r x i s t  Se l f -
C r i t i c i s m  had d e v i a t e d  from the line of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
C o m m u n i s t  Movement", and that it was "widely k n o w n  that
the l e a d e r s  of the P K I , a f t e r  the ret u r n  of a P a r t y  d e l e g a t i o n
from the PRC in the a u t u m n  of 19 6 3 , ca m e  ou t  a g a i n s t  the
line of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i s t  Movement, w h i c h  had b e e n
fixed a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  forums of C o m m u n i s t  P a r t i e s  w i t h
the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of m e m b e r s  of the P K I . I n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h
this, the PKI leaders r e v i e w e d  m a n y  Pa r t y  d e c i s i o n s .A f t e r
the S e c o n d  P l e n a r y  S e s s i o n  of the C e ntral C o m m i t t e e  of 
the P K I ( D e c e m b e r  1 9 6 4 ) , the le a d e r s  of the P a r t y  a d o p t e d
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the p o sition of the Mao Tse--tung group, whi le m a i n t a i n i n g
formal c o n t a c t s  with the fraternal p a r t i e s  w h i c h  s u p p o r t e d
the p o s i t i o n s  of the wo r l d  C o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t , f o u g h t  a g a i n s t
them.In 1 9 6 5 , the Party l e a d e r s h i p  had g o n e  so far that
it c eased to conceal its s u b o r d i n a t e  p o s i t i o n  in r e s p e c t
of the Mao T s e - t u n g  g r o u p . O n  25 May, it p u b l i c l y  announced:
'The PKI and the CCP have joined t o g e t h e r  in the s t r u g g l e
aga i n s t  the twins of i m p e r i a l i s m  and m o d e r n  r e v i s i o n i s m
like finger nail to f i n g e r . . . W e  b e l i e v e  that the CCP is
an e x a m p l e  for us in d e f e n d i n g  M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  and in
94
s t r u g g l i n g  a g a i n s t  m o d e r n  r e v i s i o n i s m’. C o n c l u d i n g  his 
c o m p a r a t i v e  analysis, R e z n i k o v  a r g u e d  that:
One thing at least is clear:the 'Politburo',that is,the pro-PRC 
group recommends to the Party the same programme and strategy 
by which the PKI leaders between 1963 and 1965 led the Party to 
inevitable collapse...the Marxist-Leninist Group of the PKI 
advocates the line which for a long time gained the Party 
growing political influence in the country but which was later 
rejected by its leadership...one cannot help drawing the conclusion 
that the course on which the 'Politburo' is pushing the Indonesian 
Communist does not accord with the tasks of reviving the Party.
The group which published the 'Self-Criticism' is,under the flag 
of 'self-criticism',striving to assert and carry out,even more 
persistently than before 30 September 1965 the same political line 
which brought the Party to a heavy defeat...As for the document 
For the Correct Path of the Indonesian Revolution",then this in
our view gives the Communists a basically correct orientation.
This document can be useful for working out a programme of 
action with which to try and raise the Communist Party of 
Indonesia from the ruins.95
R e z n i k o v ' s  a n a l y s i s  of the s h i f t  in 'line' t o w a r d s  the
PRC by the PKI from 1963 to 1965 , is c o r r e c t . l t  should, however,
be no t e d  that that his a r g u m e n t  c o n t r a d i c t e d  A n t o n o v ' s
claim of M a r c h  1966,w h i c h  i n s i s t e d  that the Party m a d e
no d e v i a t i o n  and that it f o l l o w e d  the P a r t y ' s  p r o g r a m m e
a d o p t e d  at the S ixth and S e v e n t h  C o n g r e s s e s , w h i c h  r e c o m m e n d e d
94.A.B.Reznikov,"Dva dokumenta - dva kursa v kommunisticeskom dvizenii 
Indonezii".Narody Azii i AfrikitNo.1,l968,p.47.
95.Ibid,pp.48-50.
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a p e a c e f u l ,par Iiamentary road to p o w e r .R e z n i k o v’s a r t i c l e  
s h o u l d , h o w e v e r , b e  a n a l y s e d  in the c o n t e x t  of h e i g h t e n e d  
S i n o - S o v i e t  rivalry, and it w a s  c l e a r  that o n e  of its 
o b j e c t i v e s  was to d e m o n s t r a t e  that the S o v i e t  'path' was 
not only rational and s u p e r i o r  but a l s o  m o r e  r e l e v a n t  for 
the PKI in c o n t r a s t  to the M a o i s t  'r o a d '.A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
R e z n i k o v ' s  a r t i c l e  should be v i e w e d  in the c o n t e x t  of 
the c h a n g e d  S o v i e t  p o s i t i o n  on the ’c o u p 1, which no lo n g e r  
saw it m e r e l y  as an 'internal a f f a i r  of the Army'.
T h r o u g h o u t  P h a s e  B, the S o v i e t  U n i o n  b l a m e d
the PRC for the 'coup'.This wa s  r e a f f i r m e d  on 8 M a r c h  1968
when R a d i o  M o s c o w  stated:
...progressive public opinion and the Indonesian Communists 
waging an underground struggle,agree that,except for the 
handful of PKI leaders,who were influenced by Mao Tse-tung,
Mao Tse-tung himself and his group should bear a major share 
of the responsibility for the destruction of the PKI and the 
martyrdom of tens of thousands of its members.96
Wh i l e  the p r o - P e k i n g  fac t i o n  of the P K I ( a n d  h e n c e  the PRC)
blamed the P a r t y’s l e a d e r s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y  A i d i t  * for the
di s a s t e r  of 1965, So v i e t  c o m m e n t a t o r s  h a v e  e v a l u a t e d  A i d i t ' s
role in a mo r e  ba l a n c e d  m a n n e r . O n  30 J u n e  1 9 6 8 , the forty-
fifth a n n i v e r s a r y  of A i d i t ’s b i r t h , a n  a r t i c l e  by P . A f a n a s y e v
e n t i t l e d  ’Va l i a n t  Son of the I n d o n e s i a n  P e o p l e’ in P r a v d a
a r g u e d :
...the Party under Aidit's leadership made serious mistakes in 
the early 1960s and the Party had to pay a heavy price for the 
deviations.However,in criticising the Party leadership and Aidit 
personally for these errors,Indonesia's Marxist-Leninists at the 
same time reject with indignation the attempts of the Mao Tse- 
tung group and its supporters in Indonesia to lay the blame 
for these events entirely on Aidit,the distinguished leader of 
the Indonesian Communist Movement...He was courageous to the
96.Radio Moscow on 8 March 1968.Cited in Mizan Supplement B,IMo.2,March- 
April 1968,p.2.
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end.Indonesian reaction is still trying to smear the name of this 
valiant man.But its attempts are vain.The name of Comrade Aidit- 
distinguished revolutionary - is linked forever with the history 
of the national-liberation movement,with the struggle of the 
Communist Party.97
Between July and A u g u s t  1968, the I n d o n e s i a n
Army c a r r i e d  out ’search and destroy' o p e r a t i o n s  in E a s t
Java and s u c c e s s f u l l y  ro u t e d  the PKI r e m n a n t s . T h e  S o v i e t
Union blamed the PRC for t h i s , b e c a u s e  C h i n a  had e n c o u r a g e d
the c o m m u n i s t s  to ad o p t  a s t r a t e g y  of ’p e o p l e’s w a r ’ and
98
’the tactics of s u r r o u n d i n g  the c i t i e s  w i t h  v i l l a g e s’.
On 14 S e p t e m b e r  1968,P r a v d a  s t a t e d  that "these new and
tragic r e s u l t s  once again c l e a r l y  b e a r  w i t n e s s  to the g r e a t
harm that d i s r e g a r d  for the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  t e a c h i n g  of M a r x
and Lenin and its s u b s t i t u t i o n  by the ideas of M a o  Tse-
99
tung g r o u p  will bring to the C o m m u n i s t  M o v e m e n t’.
In O c t o b e r  1 9 6 8 , A . B e l i n k i y  and B . I l i c h e v  p u b l i s h e d  
an a r t i c l e  in K o m m u n i s t , e n t i t l e d  , ’Some  L e s s o n s  of the E v e n t s  
In I n d o n e s i a " .Both w r i t e r s  s t r e s s e d  that two e r r o r s  we r e  
r e s p o n s i b l e  for the d e s t r u c t i o n  of the P K I : i t s  total s u p p o r t  
for S u k a r n o  and its p r o - P e k i n g  o r i entation:
The unconditional support for Sukarno and his exaltation by the 
leadership of the Communist Party, and the training in this spirit 
of the whole three million strong Party,chiefly peasant in 
composition.gradually led to the ideological disarmament of the 
PKI and relinquishing of class positions, and the replacement of 
proletarian slogans by petty bourgeois nationalist ones...they 
opposed the line of peaceful coexistence of countries with 
different social systems,promoted the thesis of the impossibility' 
and undesirability of building Communism in the USSR before the 
worldwide and complete victory over imperialism,supported the 
Maoist slanders about the 'restoration of capitalism' in the USSR 
and rejected the thesis of the decisive role of the Socialist system.
97.Pravda,30 June 1968.
98.SUJB:The USSR,Part 1,1 October 1968.SU/2887/A3/1.
99.Pravda,14 September 1968.
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They tried to educate the Indonesian communists in an anti- 
Soviet spirit,filling the columns of the Party press with reprint 
of the malicious,slanderous articles from the Chinese and Albanian 
newspapers.Such activity resulted in a sharp deterioration in the 
links between the Indonesian Communist Party and the inter­
national Communist movement.On the eve of the events of 30 
September 1965,the Party was in a state of complete isolation from 
the other fraternal parties.100
The w r i t e r s  concluded:
The PKl's cooperation with Sukarno,who had achieved authority 
among the people by his long struggle for Indonesian independence 
was completely natural.However,the course of the PKI leadership 
of total and unconditional support for Sukarno,which resulted 
in the disappearance of the revolutionary struggle for the 
everyday and basic interests of the proletariat and all 
workers at a time when their conditions were deteriorating all 
the time, was incorrect.101
D u r i n g  Phase B , t h e  S o v i e t  r e s p o n s e  t o t a l l y  i g n o r e d  
the e a r l i e r  the s i s  that the ’coup' was an in t e r n a l  a f f a i r  
of the a r m e d  f o r c e s .F o l l o w i n g  the p u b l i c a t i o n  of the ’Self- 
C r i t i c i s m’ and the ’A p p e a l’, w h e r e  b o t h  the p r o - P e k i n g  and 
p r o - M o s c o w  f a c t i o n s  a d m i t t e d  a d e g r e e  of i n v o l v e m e n t  of 
the Pa r t y  l e a d e r s h i p  in the p u t s c h , t h e  S o v i e t  Un i o n  was 
c o m p e l l e d  to al t e r  its ’1 i n e’.H o w e v e r , M o s c o w  a d d e d  a n e w  twist 
to the a r g u m e n t  by b l a m i n g  the ’M a o i s t s’ for i n f l u e n c i n g  
the P KI's l e a d e r s h i p  and thus for b e i n g  p r i n c i p a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  
for the d i s a s t e r . A t  the same t i m e , P K I ' s  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
with S u k a r n o  w a s  r e a s s e s s e d  a n d  p a r t i a l l y  b l a m e d  for the 
t ragedy that befell the Party.
On 4 July 1968, A d a m  M a l i k , t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  F o r e i g n
Minister, d e c l a r e d  in J a k a r t a  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the
102
S o v i e t  U n i o n  and Indonesia ha d  e n t e r e d  a n e w  s tage .
100.A.Belenkiy and B.Ilichev/’Nekotorie uroki sobitii v Indonezii>,,Kommunist, 
No.15,October 1968, p. 112.
101.Ibid,p.122.
103.Jakarta Radio,U July 1968.Cited in Mizan Supplement B,No.A,July/August 
1968,p.2.
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This fol l o w e d  the a g r e e m e n t  s i g n e d  w i t h  the S o v i e t  A m b a s s a d o r  
in J a k a r t a  to r e s c h e d u l e  the r e p a y m e n t  of S o v i e t  c r e d i t s . B y  
O cto b e r , h o w e v e r ,  S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  ha d  r e a c h e d  
a cr i s i s  point, and an a n t i - I n d o n e s i a n  c a m p a i g n  was l a u n c h e d  
by the So v i e t  m e d i a i ^  The i m m e d i a t e  c a u s e  of this r e v e r s a l  
was the r e j e c t i o n  by J a k a r t a  of the S o v i e t  G o v e r n m e n t’s 
plea for c l e m e n c y  for N j o n o  a n d  S u d i s m a n . O n  11 October,
P r avda p u b l i s h e d  a s t a t e m e n t  f r o m  the CPSU:
The continuing reprisals against the Communists and other 
democrats in Indonesia show that the Indonesian authorities 
have no intention of heeding the wrathful protests of world 
opinion or the promptings of their own people's conscience 
and honour.
For three years now, the reactionaries in Indonesia,who 
have chosen anti-communism as an instrument of their policy, 
have been following a line aimed at the physical extermination of 
those who think differently.The history of man has not previously 
witnessed such mass extermination of people in time of peace for 
ideological reasons.
The. Communists of the-Soviet. Union, together with the entire 
Soviet people pay tribute to the memory of our class brothers 
who have perished and brand with shame these monstrous crimes 
The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet public have 
repeatedly and resolutely demanded an end to the bloody reprisals 
against the Communists and other patriots of Indonesia.The CC CPSU 
declares that the unwillingness of the Indonesian authorities to heed 
these justified protests and demands and to heed to the voice of 
world public opinion shows that the upper hand in Indonesia is being 
taken by forces which seek to complicate relations with the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries,to renounce the traditional 
friendship between the Indonesian and Soviet peoples in order to
curry favour with the imperialist powers and to win the approval 
of the darkest reaction.105
On 12 O c t o b e r , t h e  P r e s i d e n t  of the P r e s i d i u m  of the USSR
S u p r e m e  Soviet, P o d g o r n y ,  a p p e a l e d  d i r e c t l y  to Suharto:
Soviet people were profoundly shocked by the intention to carry 
out the death sentence.lt is difficult to avoid the impression that 
this decision was made under the pressure of those forces,including 
forces outside Indonesia.who are not sated with the blood of 
hundred of thousands of Indonesians who perished after 30 September 
1965 and want more and more victims,caring little about the serious
104.Refer to the 36 articles published in In Defence of Fighters Against 
Reaction and Imperial ism: On the Events in Indonesia,Second Edition,
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Pub.House,1969),p p .5-88.
105.Pravda,11 October 1968.
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damage that these executions will do to the national interests 
of Indonesia,its international prestige and its cooperation with 
Socialist countries. 106
Jak a r t a  not o n l y  ignored the S o v i e t  pl e a s  but v i e w e d  them
107
as 'i n t i m i d a t i o n s '. Njono an d  S u d i s m a n  w e r e  e x e c u t e d  
on 29 O c t o b e r  and on 1 N o v e m b e r  P r a v d a  declared:
They were killed because the reactionaries, the imperialist 
agents in Indonesia, bourgeoisie,the landlord usurers and
§7¡?£zzlívSJ 'ried tP take vengeance on the leaders of the 
Party which was always a great threat to them. They could 
not forgive the Communist Party for the fear which all the 
black forces experienced and still experience at the very 
word Communist’.108
The a n t i - I n d o n e s i a n  c a m p a i g n  c o n t i n u e d  until e a r l y  1970, 
and this was n o t  si m p l y  b e c a u s e  J a k a r t a  r e j e c t e d  M o s c o w ' s  
c l e m e n c y  plea.Rather, it o p e n e d  the f l o o d g a t e s  for c r i t i c i s m s  
of the I n d o n e s i a n  l e a d e r s h i p  o v e r  a w h o l e  r a n g e  of issues: 
its a n t i - c o m m u n i s m , i t s  p r o - W e s t e r n  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  its 
p e r s e c u t i o n  of the P K I , i t s  c r i t i c i s m  of the S o v i e t  i n v a s i o n  
of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a  in A u g u s t  1968, its m e m b e r s h i p  in A S E A N , i t s  
steady i n t e g r a t i o n  of its e c o n o m y  into the W e s t e r n  c a p i t a l i s t  
system and d e c i s i o n  to op e n  the c o u n t r y  to p r i v a t e  enterprise. 
Two r e lated fac t o r s  a g g r a v a t e d  S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  relations, 
n a m e l y , t h e  S o v i e t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  a f t e r  
the 'Prague Spring' and the S i n o - S o v i e t  c o n f l i c t . T h e  S o v i e t  
Union ad o p t e d  a 'hard l i n e’ to w a r d s  its a l l i e s  in E a s t e r n  
E urope and this was m a n i f e s t e d  in its g r o w i n g  i d e o l o g i c a l  
r i g i d i t y .O v e r  and ab o v e  S o v i e t  p r o b l e m s  in E a s t e r n  E u r o p e , t h e  
C h i n e s e  ac c u s e d  the S o v i e t s  of h a v i n g  p r o v i d e d  arms g r a n t e d
A
d e f e r m e n t  of d e b t  repayments, all of w h i c h  f a c i l i t a t e d
109
the S u h a r t o  r e g i m e ' s  s u p p r e s s i o n  of the P K I .
106.Ibid,12 October 1968.
1Q7.ffrTEara,16 October 1968.Cited in Mizan Supplement B,No.5,Sept./Oct.1968.p.2.
108.Pravda,1 November 1968.
109.See Peking Review,No.11,15 March 1968,p.31.
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In s h o r t , f o l l o w i n g  the p u t s c h , t h e  n e w  leaders 
b r ought the c o u n t r y  into the W e s t e r n  c a m p  in s p i t e  of th e i r  
p r o c l a m a t i o n s  of p u r s u i n g  a 'free and i n d e p e n d e n t  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y ' , a n d  in this r e g a r d  r e p r e s e n t e d  a 'l o s s’, e s p e c i a l l y  
a n n o y i n g  to M o s c o w , i n  v i e w  of the v a s t  S o v i e t  e c o n o m i c  
and m i l i t a r y  i n v e s t m e n t s  in I n d o n e s i a .M o r e o v e r , e v e n  t h o u g h  
the S o v i e t  U n i o n  was I n d o n e s i a’s la r g e s t  c r e d i t o r , i t  c o u l d  
do little to i n f l u e n c e  its b e h a v i o u r , b e c a u s e  of  the a v a i l i b i l i t y  
of W e s t e r n  c r e d i t s . T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  of these f a c t o r s  e x p l a i n e d  
the S o v i e t  h o s t i l i t y  t o w a r d s  I n d o n e s i a  in O c t o b e r  1968.
In F e b r u a r y  1969, the p r o - S o v i e t  PKI f a c t i o n
p u b l i s h e d  a d o c u m e n t  in M o s c o w  e n t i t l e d  "The p r e s s i n g  T a s k s
110
of the C o m m u n i s t  M o v e m e n t  in I n d o n e s i a”. N o t h i n g  n e w  w a s  
put f o r w a r d : t h e  points r a i s e d  in the ’Appeal' w e r e  m e r e l y  
r e i t e r a t e d . I t , h o w e v e r , c r i t i c i s e d  the ’S e l f - C r i t i c i s m’ for 
a t t e m p t i n g  to impose the ’C h i n e s e  p a t h ’ on the I n d o n e s i a n  
C o m m u n i s t s  a n d  for c o n d e m n i n g  A i d i t  for the P a r t y ' s  p a s t  
m i s t a k e s .
S u k a r n o  died on 23 J u n e  19 7 0 . On the f o l l o w i n g  day,
Pravda d e s c r i b e d  him as 'an o u t s t a n d i n g  p e r s o n a l i t y  of 
the I n d o n e s i a n  l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t’ and e m p h a s i s e d  that 
'he f a v o u r e d  a f o reign p o l i c y  of a n t i - i m p e r i a l  ism an d  a n t i ­
col o n i a l  i s m’ ^ Radio M o s c o w , h o w e v e r , u s e d  the o c c a s i o n  
to d e s c r i b e  hi s  mistakes:
Sukarno's greatest mistakes included the confrontation against 
Malaysia and the isolation of Indonesia from the world revolution­




could not escape from his illusion that contradictions could 
be solved artificially by unifying all political elements,both 
Rightists and Leftists within his NASAKÜM concept.When in 
the autumn of 1965 there was a Right-wing plot which wiped out 
out his illusory concept of a ’reconciliation of classes' in 
Indonesia,the late Sukarno,being a leader of the petty 
bourgeoisie,did not have the courage to take a resolute 
stand...In the end,he fell victim to his vacillation at a time 
of violent class struggle in Indonesia.112
D e s p it e  th e  g r o w in g  h o s t i l i t y  to w a rd s  I n d o n e s i a ,  th e  S o v i e t  
U nio n  d i d  n o t  in t r o d u c e  any  new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  'c o u p '  
in the  p e r i o d  c o v e r e d  by t h e  s t u d y , a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  i t  w as 
s t a g e d  by  'p r o g r e s s i v e  j u n i o r  o f f i c e r s '  w it h  the  b a c k i n g
o f  some PK1 l e a d e r s  an d  t h a t  t h e  P K I was i n v e i g l e d  by
D L» * 113 P e k in g .
112.Moscow Radio in Indonesian on 23 June 1970.Cited in Mizan Supplement B,
No.A,July/August 1970,p.9.
113.See Y.Alyoshin,"Half Century of Struggle",New Times,,No.21,
26 May 1970,p.25;It is important to point out that in 1984,R.A.
Ulyanovsky,added a new twist to the Soviet interpretation of the 1965 
events,where for the first time in Soviet literature,Sukarno's involvement 
in the affair was alluded to:"ln 1965,the President and supreme commander 
of the armed forces learned of the existence among the top generals 
of a right-wing conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the head of state or 
severely limiting his powers,a basic revision of the entire political course, 
the elimination of left-wing forces,above all,the communists and left- 
wing nationalist movements,and at a rapprochement with the imperialist 
iiiest.Sukarno remained true to himselfrhe took the decision to make do 
with measures at the top,having limited as far as possible,the scale of 
the conflict.He did not relate the fact of the conspiracy to general 
class processes in society and hoped to avoid bloodshed by depriving 
the conspiracy of its leaders with the help of loyal officers of the palace 
guard,the army,air force and navy.The President and his supporters 
tried to enlist the support of the leadership of left-wing forces.But 
here,once again,his petty-bourgeois Pear of involving the masses in 
political struggle played its fatal part.Sukarno and the officers on 
whom he relied did everything to ensure that the participation of the 
members of left-wing parties,above all the Communist Party,was reduced to 
auxilliary activities,guaranteeing the operation of the military units, 
and the whole conflict under no circumstances got out of control. 
Unfortunately,...the small group of Party leaders who were initiated 
into Sukarno's plans went along with the President's cause and did not 
show the necessary political independence,but accepted the secondary, 
dependent role which it was alloted under these plans and did not appeal 
to the people to save the republic, from the threat from the right”.See 
R.A.Ulyanovsky,Fighters For National Liberation:Political Profiles, 
(MoscowiProgress Pub.,1984),p.71.
CONCLUSION
In this final section, a s u m m a r y  of the main 
d e v e l o p m e n t s  in S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  from 1945 to 
1968 is p r o v i d e d . T h i s  is f o l l o w e d  by an a s s e s s m e n t  
of S oviet gains and losses in Indonesia, the u n i q u e n e s s e s  
of its i n v o l v e m e n t  there and f i n a l l y , t h e  m a j o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
this st u d y  has made to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of the subject.
S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  R e l a t i o n s , 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 8 : A S u m m a r y
This study has e x a m i n e d  the d e v e l o p m e n t ,  rise 
and st e a d y  d e c l i n e  of S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  from 
1945 to 1 9 6 8 . The S o v i e t  U n i o n’s a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  I n d o n e s i a  
under S t a l i n  can be s t u d i e d  t h r o u g h  a n u m b e r  of c l e a r l y  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  s t a g e s . I t  m a n i f e s t e d  i n d i f f e r e n c e  tow a r d s  
the A u g u s t  R e v o l u t i o n  due l a r g e l y  to the lack of information, 
its p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  its w a r t i m e  g a i n s  in E a s t e r n  
Europe and its own p o s t - w a r  r e h a b i 1 i t a t i o n .Th e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
showed int e r e s t  in I n d o n e s i a  o n l y  a f t e r  the l a nding of 
British and, l a t e r , D u t c h  t roops in Ja v a  - this was mo r e  
to e x p l o i t  the o p p o r t u n i t y  to c o n d e m n  the B r i t i s h  as the 
a d vance g uard of the Dutch, a i m e d  at r e s t o r i n g  Du t c h  c o l o n i a l  
rule, even th o u g h  it had be e n  a g r e e d  at the T e h e r a n  and 
P o t s d a m  C o n f e r e n c e s  that the B r i t i s h  w e r e  to a d m i n i s t e r  
the s u r r e n d e r  of the J a p a n e s e  t roops in S o u t h e a s t  Asia. 
M o r e o v e r , w i t h  the g r o w i n g  t e n s i o n  in the w a r t i m e  a l l i a n c e  
b e t w e e n  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  and th e  W e s t e r n  powers, the c l a s h e s  
be t w e e n  the I n d o n e s i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and the A l l i e d  forces 
pr o v i d e d  the S o v i e t  Un i o n  w i t h  a case of a ’just w a r ’ of 
’national 1 i b e r a t i o n’.S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  and e n d o r s e m e n t  of
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the I n d o n e s i a n  R e p u b l i c  at the U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be 
u n d e r s t o o d  in this light.It w a s  a l s o  a c o n v e n i e n t  issue 
with w h i c h  to e m b a r r a s s  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s , t h e n  a ’cold 
war' a d v e r s a r y ,w hich had h i t h e r t o  p r e s e n t e d  itself as an 
a n t i - c o l o n i a l  p o w e r . I n  m a n y  w a y s , t h e  p e r i o d  from the l a n d i n g  
of the A l l i e d  troops in I n d o n e s i a  in late O c t o b e r  1945 
up to the first Dutch 'police action' in J u l y  1947 c a n  
be r e g a r d e d  as one of S o v i e t  s u p p o r t , w h o  1ly t h r o u g h  
diplomacy, for the Republic.
F o l l o w i n g  the s e t t i n g  up of the C o m m i s s i o n  of 
Good O f f i c e s  [CGOJ, a f u n d a m e n t a l  c h a n g e  o c c u r r e d  in the
S o v i e t  a t t i t u d e  towards I n d o n e s i a . T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
c o n t i n u e d  to s u p p o r t  the G o v e r n m e n t  of A m i r  S y a r i f f u d i n ,  
w h i c h  c a m e  to p o w e r  in June 1 9 4 7 . H o w e v e r , M o s c o w  s howed 
its r e s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  the C G O , l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  it was
e x c l u d e d  from ity and thus d e n i e d  the o p p o r t u n i t y  to
i n f luence the c o u r s e  of e v e n t s  in I n d o n e s i a .M o r e o v e r , i t
was also a jun c t u r e  for the a d o p t i o n  of a h a r d l i n e  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y , f o l l o w i n g  the a n n o u n c e m e n t  of Z h d a n o v ' s  'two camps' 
d o c t r i n e .
F o l l o w i n g  the dow n f a l l  of the A m i r  G o v e r n m e n t  and 
the rise of H a t t a ' s  in J a n u a r y  1948, M o s c o w  a d o p t e d  a dual 
po s t u r e  to w a r d s  the I n d o n e s i a n  R e p u b l i c .W h i l e  s u p p o r t i n g  
the 'Republic' in principle, M o s c o w  c o n d e m n e d  the H a t t a  
G o v e r n m e n t  as a 'right-wing a g e n t  of W a s h i n g t o n T h i s ' w a s  
largely e n g e n d e r e d  by H a t t a ' s  p r o - W e s t e r n  s t a n c e , m a n i f e s t e d  
in his d e c i s i o n s  to om i t  the F D R  from his c a b i n e t , r e j e c t  
c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the S o v i e t  Union, b r u t a l l y  s u p p r e s s  
the M a d i u n  revolt, and f i n a l l y  c o n c l u d e  the R o u n d  T a b l e  
A g r e e m e n t s  in s p i t e  of S o v i e t  o p p o s i t i o n .E v e n  th o u g h  the
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S o v i e t  U n i o n  did not ve t o  the s e t t i n g  up of the C G O  and 
m o s t  of its a c t i v i t i e s  for fear of b e i n g  a c c u s e d  of i m p e d i n g  
the s o l u t i o n  of the I n d o n e s i a n  P r o b l e m , i t  c l e a r l y  s h o w e d  
its o p p o s i t i o n  to the c o m m i t t e e ' s  a c h i e v e m e n t s ,  w h e t h e r  
it was the R e n v i l l e  A g r e e m e n t  or the R o u n d  T a b l e  A g r e e m e n t s .  
The o n l y  o c c a s i o n  wh e n  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  e x e r c i s e d  its v e t o  
on the I n d o n e s i a n  Q u e s t i o n  w a s  w h e n  the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
was e v a l u a t i n g  the a c h i e v e m e n t s  of the C G O  in D e c e m b e r  
1 9 4 9 , f o l l o w i n g  the c o n c l u s i o n  of the a g r e e m e n t s  in The 
H a g u e . B y  then, the c o m m i t t e e s  a c t i v i t i e s  w e r e  over, an d  
the S o v i e t  v e t o  had only s y m b o l i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
F o l l o w i n g  I n d o n e s i a ' s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  in late D e c e m b e r  
1949, cool s t a t e - t o - s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  
c o n t i n u e d , e s p e c i a l l y  u n d e r  the c a b i n e t s  of Hatta, N a t s i r  
and S u k i m a n . T h i s  largely r e p r e s e n t e d  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  of 
the c h i l l e d  r e l a t i o n s  s i n c e  J a n u a r y  1948 w h i c h  w e r e  c a u s e d  
by the v a r i o u s  I n d o n e s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t s '  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  
p o l i c i e s  and th e i r  p r o - W e s t  o r i e n t a t i o n s .Th e  s i t u a t i o n  
was e x a c e r b a t e d  by M o s c o w ' s  c o n d e m n a t i o n  of the three 
g o v e r n m e n t s / as well as the S t a l i n i s t  b e l i e f  that the n e w  
states w e r e  'neo-colonies' of the W e s t .R e l a t i o n s  on l y  
im p r o v e d  d u r i n g  the W i l o p o  c a b i n e t  w h e n  c o n c e r t e d  e f f o r t s  
were m a d e  to e x c h a n g e  d i p l o m a t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  as well 
as to i m p r o v e  t r a d i n g  relations.
In e v a l u a t i n g  S o v i e t  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  I n d o n e s i a  
du r i n g  the S t a l i n i s t  period, it is i m p o r t a n t  to b e a r  in 
mind that I n d o n e s i a ' s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to M o s c o w  w a s  o n l y
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o p p o r t u n i s t i c  in n a t u r e .M o s c o w  had no i n t r i n s i c  in t e r e s t s  
in the Indone s i a n  a r c h i p e l a g o  o t h e r  than to e m b a r r a s s  
the W e s t e r n  p owers and impede t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  t h e r e . T h a t  
was the principal r e a s o n  why the W e s t e r n  p o w e r s  c r e a t e d  
the CGO, a d e v i c e  to r e d u c e  S o v i e t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in Indonesia. 
F o l l o w i n g  the ’in t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n '  of the I n d o n e s i a n  
Q u e s t i o n  by the S o v i e t  Un i o n  in F e b r u a r y  1 9 4 6 , the I n d o n e s i a n  
leaders [other than the F D R , w h i c h  di d  not p l a y  a c r ucial 
role in the I n d o n e s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n ]  looked t o w a r d s  the U n i t e d  
Sta t e s  to a s s i s t  the R e p u b l i c  in a c h i e v i n g  its i n d e p e n d e n c e  
b e c a u s e  the l e a d e r s h i p  was a w a r e  that o n l y  W a s h i n g t o n  ha d  
the clout, i n f l u e n c e  and i n t e r e s t  to force the Du t c h  to 
r e l i n q u i s h  t h e i r  c o l o n y . I n  this c o n t e x t , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
was v i e w e d  as a s e c o n d a r y  a c t o ^  an d  r i g h t  up to S t a l i n ' s  
death its role r e m a i n e d  secondary.
With the i n a u g u r a t i o n  of the W i l o p o  c a b i n e t , t h e  
gradual i m p r o v e m e n t  of s t a t e - t o - s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s  was 
d i s c e r n i b l e . l t  was,however, d u r i n g  the p r i m e - m i n i s t e r s h i p  
of Ali S a s t r o a m i d j o j o  that S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  
improved d r a m a t i c a l l y .F o l l o w i n g  the d e a t h  of Stalin, M o s c o w  
r e a s s e s s e d  its p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d  the T h i r d  W o r l d , v i e w i n g  
it as a ’zone of p e a c e’.At the sa m e  t i m e , t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
began to e s t a b l i s h  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e s  in W e s t  and S o u t h e a s t  
Asia, as part of its c o n t a i n m e n t  strategy, a n d  in o r d e r  
to foil t h i s , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  u n d e r  K h r u s h c h e v  m a d e  g r e a t  
e f f o r t s  to c o u r t  c o u n t r i e s  s u c h  as Indonesia, Egypt, B u r m a  
and Ind i a , w h i c h  o p p o s e d  the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of the 'Cold 
W a r ’.In addition, the p o l i c i e s  of the Ali G o v e r n m e n t  of
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r e j e c t i n g  SEATO, c u r t a i l i n g  W e s t e r n  e c o n o m i c  a n d  pol i t i c a l  
i n f l u e n c e  and v y i n g  for l e a d e r s h i p  of the A f r o - A s i a n  w o r l d , a s  
sh o w n  by the c o n v o c a t i o n  of the B a n d u n g  C o n f e r e n c e ,  we r e  
i n d i c a t i o n s  to M o s c o w  that I n d o n e s i a  w a s  an i m p o r t a n t  T h i r d  
W o r l d  s t a t e  w h i c h  was ’a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t ' a n d  ' a n t i ­
imperial i s t '.M o r e  s p e cifically, the W e s t  Ir i a n  dispute, 
in w h i c h  the W e s t e r n  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  s e e n  as b e i n g  in le a g u e  
w i t h  the Dutch, p r o v i d e d  M o s c o w  w i t h  an o p p o r t u n i t y  to p r e s e n t  
itself as a s u p p o r t e r  of o p p r e s s e d  a n d  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  T h i r d  
W o r l d  s t a t e s  s u c h  as I n d o n e s i a  a g a i n s t  the a v a r i c i o u s  
W e s t e r n  c a p i t a l i s t s . T h e  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  for the I n d o n e s i a n  
G o v e r n m e n t  a g a i n s t  the s e p a r a t i s t  m o v e m e n t s  c a n  a l s o  be 
v i e w e d  in the s a m e  light.
In the c o n t e x t  of this g r o w i n g  momentum, the 
h i g h e s t  p o i n t  of c o r d i a l i t y  in S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  
wa s  r e a c h e d  u n d e r  K h r u s h c h e v , f r o m  m i d - 1 9 5 7  to mid-1962, 
a w a r m n e s s  that has not been w i t n e s s e d  b e f o r e  or since.
This p e r i o d  s a w  the v i s i t s  of the S o v i e t  P r e s i d e n t  and 
the CP S U  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  to Indonesia, and the c o m m i t  m e n t  
of S o v i e t  e c o n o m i c  and m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  to an e x t e n t  
not found e l s e w h e r e  in the T h i r d  W o r l d , e x c e p t  Egypt. 
Di p l o m a t i c a l l y ,  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  was the p r i n c i p a l  s u p p o r t e r  
of the R e p u b l i c , a n d  on issues such as the fo r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
in the s e p a r a t i s t  m o v e m e n t s  and W e s t  Irian, no country, 
b a c k e d  I n d o n e s i a  as did the S o v i e t  U n i o n . I n  fact, a n u m b e r  
of W e s t e r n  s c h o l a r s  r e g a r d e d  I n d o n e s i a  as b e i n g  p a r t  of 
the S o v i e t  c a m p ; and in W a s h i n g t o n  S u k a r n o  was v i e w e d  as 
a c o m m u n i s t  or at least a c r y p t o - c o m m u n i s t .
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It was also u n d e r  K h r u s h c h e v  that r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
the S o v i e t  U nion and I n d o n e s i a  d e t e r i o r a t e d .The t u rning 
point o c c u r r e d  i m m e d iately a f t e r  the s e t t l e m e n t  of the 
West Irian dispute, a s e t t l e m e n t  in w h i c h  the S o v i e t  Un i o n  
pla y e d  no r o l e , i n  c o n t r a s t  to its pri n c i p a l  a d v e r s a r y , t h e  
U nited S t a t e s .F o l l o w i n g  the C u b a n  M i s s i l e  C r i s i s  in O c t o b e r
1962, M o s c o w  b e c a m e  int e r e s t e d  in e s t a b l i s h i n g  a more 
p r e d i c t a b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  Washington, m a r k i n g  the 
early ph a s e  of d e t e n t e  b e t w e e n  the two s u p e r powers.lt, 
therefore, b e g a n  to e n c o u r a g e  Ind o n e s i a  to e m p h a s i s e  
e c o n o m i c  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  and r e c o n struction, and to d e s i s t  
from a d v e n t u r i s m . H o w e v e r ,  S u k a r n o  e m b a r k e d  on ’k o n f r o n t a s i’, 
w r e a k i n g  havoc on the c o u n t r y’s e c o n o m y .E s t r a n g e m e n t  w i t h  
M o s c o w  wa s  wo r s e n e d  by the S i n o - S o v i e t  c o n f l i c t , s i n c e  
c o n t r a r y  to the Soviets, the C h i n e s e  e n c o u r a g e d  and s u p p o r t e d  
S u k a r n o’s radical foreign policy. Issues s u c h  as debt 
repayment, I n d o n e s i a’s refusal to b a c k  S o v i e t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in the S e c o n d  A s i a n - A f r i c a n  C o n f e r e n c e  and the P K I ’s tilt 
towards the Chinese, f u rther d a m a g e d  r e l a t i o n s  be t w e e n  
the two countries.
This was the s tate of S o v i e t - l n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  
which the B r e z h n e v - K o s y g i n  l e a d e r s h i p  i n h e r i t e d  in O c t o b e r  
1964 a n d  no h e a d w a y  wa s  m a d e  in i m p r oving r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
Ja k a r t a . I f  anything, r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  w o r s e n e d  by the d r a m a t i c  
ev e n t s  of 1965 in I n d o n esia.Generally, the S o v i e t  Union 
a d o p t e d  a r e a c t i v e  stance, e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  G E S T A P U . T h e  
’c o u p’ was a w a t e r s h e d  in the h i s t o r y  of i n d e p e n d e n t  
Indonesia, an d  it o c c u r r e d  at a time w h e n  the S o v i e t  Un i o n
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was r e a s s e s s i n g  its r o l e  in the T h i r d  W o r l d . I n  some respects, 
the S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p  w e l c o m e d  the p o s t - G E S T A P U  developments, 
which inc l u d e d  the a b a n d o n m e n t  of the p r o - C h i n e s e  foreign 
policy, the e l i m i n a t i o n  of the p r o - P e k i n g  PKI and the 
easing of ’k o n f r o n t a s i’, w h i c h  a l l o w e d  the S o v i e t  Union 
to d e v e l o p  its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S i n g a p o r e  and M a l a y s i a  w i t h o u t  
i n h i b i t i o n s . T h e  n e w  r e g i m e  w a s  less c o n c e r n e d  with 
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  ide o l o g y  th a n  S u k a r n o’s,and this c r e a t e d  
hopes that M o s c o w  w o u l d  be a b l e  to c o m e  to s o m e  form of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w i t h  J a k a r t a , e s p e c i a l l y  si n c e  the So v i e t  
Union was I n d o n e s i a’s largest creditor.
However, the S o v i e t  a t t e m p t s  to n o r m a l i s e  r e l a t i o n s  
with the n e w  l e a d e r s h i p  w e r e  h a m p e r e d  by a n u m b e r  of factors: 
Fi r s t , e v e n  t h o u g h  the C u l t u r a l  R e v o l u t i o n  in C h i n a  p r o v i d e d  
M o s c o w  wi t h  an o p p o r t u n i t y  to e r o d e  C h i n e s e  inf l u e n c e  in 
So u t h e a s t  A s i a , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  d i s c o v e r e d  that J a k a r t a’s 
ant i - P R C  p o l i c i e s  did n o t  m e a n  that it w o u l d  w e l c o m e  the 
Soviet U n i o n .Instead, the n e w  l e a d e r s h i p  s a w  C o m m u n i s m  
in general as to be c o n d e m n e d  and feared, an d  even though 
M o s c o w  p l a y e d  no r o l e  in GESTAPU, its p o s i t i o n  as the leader 
of the c o m m u n i s t  bloc e n s u r e d  J a k a r t a ' s  m a i n t e n a n c e  of 
a d i s t a n c e  from it.Second, in d i r e c t  r e v ersal of S u k a r n o’s 
policies, the n e w  l e a d e r s h i p  c o n c e n t r a t e d  on the r e h a b i l i t a ­
tion of the e c o n o m y . F o r  t h i s , f o r e i g n  ca p i t a l  and firms 
were w e l c o m e d , a l l  for e i g n  e n t e r p r i s e s  d e n a t i o n a l i z e d  and 
the n o n - c a p i t a l i s t  road of d e v e l o p m e n t  aband o n e d . T h i r d ,  
the new l e a d e r s h i p  p r o c l a i m e d  a n o n - a l i g n e d  foreign policy, 
but this was m o r e  a p p a r e n t  t h a n  r e a l , b e c a u s e  J a k a r t a  a t t e m p t e d  
to m a x i m i s e  its e c o n o m i c  o p t i o n s  and o v e r c o m e  its p o l i t i c a l
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isolation by increasing its c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  West.
This was c l e a r l y  m a n i f e s t e d  w h e n  I n d o n e s i a  j o i n e d  ASEAN, 
w h i c h  M o s c o w  initially saw as a m i l i t a r y  p a c t  set up  by 
the United S t a t e s  to c o n t a i n  the s p r e a d  of c o m m u n i s m  in 
S o u t h e a s t  A s i a . I n  short, the S o v i e t  U n i o n  s a w  the n e w  leaders 
in J a k a r t a  c h a n g i n g  their p r o - C h i n e s e  l e a n i n g  for a pro- 
We s t e r n  on e . I n  the period u n d e r  s u r v e y , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
un d e r  B r e z h n e v - K o s y g i n  failed to i m p r o v e  its r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  Indonesia after GESTAPU. If a n y t h i n g , r e l a t i o n s  
w o r s e n e d  and M o s c o w  d e m o n s t r a t e d  its h o s t i l i t y  t o w a r d s  
the new l e a d e r s h i p  by labelling it a 'fascist r e g i m e’, 
by taking an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  line on d e b t  r e s c h e d u l i n g  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  a n d  finally by l a u n c h i n g  a y e a r - l o n g  c a m p a i g n  
a g a i n s t  the J a k a r t a  g o v e r n m e n t  for p e r s e c u t i n g  the ’p r o g r e s s i v e  
forces' and b e i n g  a ’pup p e t  of W e s t e r n  i m p e r i a l i s m’.This  
was, h o w e v e r , m a i n l y  a r e s p o n s e  to J a k a r t a ' s  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t , p r o -  
W e s t e r n  d o m e s t i c  and foreign policy.
On the whole, the o v e r t h r o w  of S u k a r n o ' s  g o v e r nment, 
the large sc a l e  b l o o d - l e t t i n g  a g a i n s t  the PKI and its 
sympathisers, the new I n d o n e s i a n  l e a d e r s h i p ' s  u p g r a d i n g  
of e c o n o m i c  and political r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the West, the 
a d o p t i o n  of a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  p o s t u r e  bo t h  d o m e s t i c a l l y  and 
in foreign p o l i c y  and the s u p p o r t  of A m e r i c a n  p o l i c i e s  
in the r e g i o n , e s p e c i a l l y  in I n d o c h i n a , i n d i c a t e d  c l e a r l y  
that s ince O c t o b e r  1965, I n d o n e s i a  wa s  lost to the West.
S o m e  w r i t e r s  h a v e  argued that the d e v e l o p m e n t s  in I n d o n e s i a  
s i n c e  O c t o b e r  1965 r e p r e s e n t e d  a v i c t o r y  for the S o v i e t  
U n i o n  in that the P e k i n g - J a k a r t a  ’a x i s ’ was  r e v o k e d . *
I.See Rodolfo Severino,Jr./'Soviet Policy Towards the New Order in 
inHnnPRia”.Pacific Community,No.8,AUtumn 1971 ,p.75.
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If that can be r e g a r d e d  as a victory, then the net 
c o n s e q u e n c e  of the 'coup' m u s t  c e r t a i n l y  be ju d g e d  as a 
total loss, b e c a u s e  the ri s e  of r i g h t - w i n g  A r m y  o f f i c e r s  
to the p i n n a c l e  of po w e r  in J a k a r t a  led to a c o m p l e t e  sh i f t  
of I ndonesian d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  an d  w i t h  it, 
increasingly h o s t i l e  S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s . T h i s  
c e r t a i n l y  c a n n o t  be e v a l u a t e d  as a S o v i e t  v i c t o r y . E v e n  
though the e s t r a n g e m e n t  and b r e a k  b e t w e e n  J a k a r t a  a n d  P e k i n g  
must have been w e l c o m e d  in Moscow, I n d o n e s i a ' s  increasingly 
wa r m  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the W e s t  w e r e  o b v i o u s l y  u n w e l c o m e  for 
in pra c t i c a l  terms I n d o n e s i a  m e r e l y  c h a n g e d  its e x t e r n a l  
a l i g n m e n t  from one b i t t e r  a d v e r s a r y  of the S o v i e t  U n i o n  
to another, and in this s e n s e  the 1965 e v e n t s  and th e i r  
consequences, c e r t a i n l y  c a n n o t  r e p r e s e n t  a S o v i e t  v i c t o r y  
at all.
S oviet Gains an d  Losses in I n d o n e s i a
Most w r i t e r s  have a r g u e d  that S o v i e t  p o l i c y  in 
Indonesia was a dismal failure, b e c a u s e  M o s c o w ' s  economic, 
political, d i p l o m a t i c  and m i l i t a r y  i n v e s t m e n t s  failed to 
a c c o m p l i s h  the following:
1.To p r o m o t e  s o c i a l i s m  in Indonesia;
2.To d i v e r t  I n d o n e s i a  on to the n o n - c a p i t a l i s t  p a t h  of 
e c o n o m i c  d e velopment;
3. To p r o m o t e  the c o u n t r y ' s  e c o n o m i c  development,*
2.See Justus M.Van Der Kroef/'The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia",in 
R.E.Kanet,(edn.),The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations.pp.96-105:
K.S.Nathan,Detente and Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia,(Unpublished PhD 
Thesis,Claremont Graduate School,l975),pp.145-151.
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4 . To p r e v e n t  S u k a r n o  and the PKI from e s t a b l i s h i n g  c l o s e  
ties wi t h  Peking;
5 . To e n c o u r a g e  the Army to p r o m o t e  S o v i e t  i n t e r e s t s  in 
the country;
6 .To p r e v e n t  J a k a r t a  from l a u n c h i n g  its ’k o n f r o n t a s i ' 
a g ainst Malaysia;
7 . To p e r s u a d e  Indonesia to s u p p o r t  S o v i e t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in the a b o r t e d  A f r o - A s i a n  c o n f e r e n c e ;
8 .To induce I n d o n e s i a  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  to r e d u c e  or e v e n  cut 
off its e c o n o m i c  and p o l i t i c a l  ties w i t h  the West;
9.To p r e v e n t  I n d o n e s i a’s w i t h d r a w a l  from the U n i t e d  
Nations; and
10.To p r e v e n t  the new l e a d e r s h i p  in J a k a r t a  f r o m  e s t a b l i s h i n g
close ties w i t h  the West o r  to halt the d e c i m a t i o n  of 
of the PKI and ot h e r  'progressive' forces.
Th e s e  f a i l u r e s  are u s u a l l y  e x a m i n e d  in the w i d e r  c o n t e x t  
of S o v i e t  s e t b a c k s  in the T h i r d  World, f o l l o w i n g  the s p a t e  
of coups that o v e r t h r e w  p r o g r e s s i v e  lea d e r s  s u c h  as N k r u m a h  
and Ben B e l l a . T h i s  v i e w p o i n t  w a s  r e i n f o r c e d  by S o v i e t  
w r i t i n g s  w h i c h  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  in g e n e r a l  M o s c o w  had 
failed to p r o m o t e  s o c i a l i s m  or the n o n - c a p i t a l i s t  m o d e
3
of p r o d u c t i o n  and s u f f e r e d  s e t b a c k s  in the T h i r d  World.
T h e r e  have been n o  d i r e c t  r e f e r e n c e s  in S p v i e t
w r i t i n g s  to M o s c o w ' s  'failures' in I n d o n e s i a . T h e r e  have,
h o w e v e r , b e e n  a n u m b e r  of s t u d i e s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  the ’errors'
of S u k a r n o  and the PKI, and an e x a m i n a t i o n  of these w o u l d
3.See A.S.Kaufman/'O socialisticeskikh diktrinakh v razvivanikhsya stranakh", 
Narody Azii i Afriki,No.4,1968,pp.fr8-58:R.Ulyanovsky,nStrankh socialistices- 
kii orientascii .Kommunist.No.l 1,July 1979.pp.114-123.
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indirectly r e f l e c t  M o s c o w ' s  v i e w  of its f a i l u r e s  in Indonesia, 
e s p e c i a l l y  in the light of its p a s t  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
with the S u k a r n o  r e g i m e . T h e  f o l l o w i n g  m i s t a k e s  of S u k a r n o
have been p o i n t e d  out:
1.N A S A K 0 M  r e m a i n e d  a p a p e r  c o n c e p t :As a r e s u l t , i t  did not 
justify itself b e c a u s e ,  "for m a n y  y e a r s  the C o m m u nists, 
o r g a n i s e d  in a more than t h r e e  m i l l i o n - s t r o n g  party, 
were not a d m i t t e d  into the g o v e r n m e n t I n  addition, the 
" d e v e l o p m e n t  of the c o o p e r a t i o n  of the n a t i o n a l i s t ,  
r e l i g i o u s  and c o m m u n i s t  f o r c e s  was h i n d e r e d  i n t e n t i o n a l l y
4
by the r e a c t i o n a r y  c i r c l e s , a b o v e  all by m e m b e r s  of M a s j u m i " .
2.His d e c i s i o n  to w i t h d r a w  f r o m  the U n i t e d  N a t i o n s :This 
pr o v e d  d e t r i m e n t a l  to I n d o n e s i a ' s  i n t e r e s t  b e c a u s e  
"despite all its f a i l i n g s , t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  is a real 
interna t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  for the s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  
im p e r i a l i s m  and c o l o n i a l i s m  in all its m a n i f e s t a t i o n s " .
3.His d e p a r t u r e  from the B a n d u n g  's p i r i t ':T h i s  r e f e r r e d  
to his s u p p o r t  for the PRC in the S i n o - S o v i e t  c o n f l i c t  
and his c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  P e k i n g  in l i m i t i n g  S o v i e t  
i n v o l v e m e n t  in the A f r o - A s i a n  m o v e m e n t ?
4 . His 'd a n g e r o u s  a d v e n t u r e s ':T h i s  i n v o l v e d  h i s  " s o - c a l l e d
'confrontation' of M a l a y s i a , w h i c h  ate up e i g h t y  p e r c e n t
7
of the annual state budget".
5. E c o n o m i c  m i s m a n a g e m e n t :The f a i l u r e  to c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
e c o n o m i c  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  a n d  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y  
af t e r  the r e u n i f i c a t i o n  of W e s t  I r i a n , " b r o u g h t  the c o u n t r y
Q
to the v e r g e  of disaster".
4.Izvestia,17 August 1966.
5.Komsomolfskaya Pravda,19 March 1967.
6.Gub9r.,,Indoneziia<,,B.S.E.,\/ol.10,p.243.
7.Komsomol skaya Pravda,19 March 1967.
8.Ibid.
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The two f u ndamental m i s t a k e s  of the PKI were:
1 . Its p r o - C h i n e s e  o r i e n t a t i o n s :This led to the a d o p t i o n
of a ’le f t - o p p o r t u n i s t  strategy' w h i c h  in the final
9
a na l y s i s  b r o u g h t  d i s a s t e r  to the Party.
2 . Its total s u p p o r t  of S u k a r n o :This led to ’ide o l o g i c a l  
disarmament', the r e l i n q u i s h i n g  of c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  an d  
the r e p l a c e m e n t  of p r o l e t a r i a n  s l o g a n s  w i t h  b o u r g e o i s -  
n a t i o n a l i s t  o n e s ? ^
The i l l u m i n a t i o n  of these 'mistakes' w a s  a g o o d  e x a m p l e  
of b e i n g  wi s e  a f t e r  the e v e n t . I n  the fi r s t  place, the S o v i e t  
Union s u p p o r t e d  and, indeed, r e c o m m e n d e d  P K I ' s  c o o p e r a t i o n  
with Sukarno, in line w i t h  the S o v i e t  i d e o l o g i c a l  p o s i t i o n  
of e n c o u r a g i n g  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  a n d  
p r o g r e s s i v e  n a t i o n a l - b o u r g e o i s  l e aders in the T h i r d  World, 
wh i c h  formed the basis of the n a t i o n a l - d e m o c r a c y  concept.
More important, i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  GESTAPU, t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
itself looked t o wards S u k a r n o  as the s a v i o u r  of the PKI, 
and this was b e c a u s e  it saw him as the o n l y  one w h o  had 
the p o w e r  and i n t e r e s t  to do s o . A t  the s a m e  t i m e , M o s c o w  
saw the c o n t i n u e d  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of N A S A K O M  as b e i n g  in line 
with its d e s i r e d  goal of s e t t i n g  up an a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  
and a n t i - f e u d a l  n a t ional f r o n t .Also, t h r o u g h  NASAKOM, the 
S o v i e t  Union h o p e d  to s t r e n g t h e n  the u n i t y  o f  the ' p r o g r e s s i v e  
forces' and p o s s i b l y  lead the c o u n t r y  to a n o n - c a p i t a l i s t  
path of d e v e l o p m e n t . A n y w a y ,  w h a t  c h o i c e  d i d  the PKI h a v e  
ot h e r  than m o r t g a g i n g  its s e c u r i t y  a n d  s u r v i v a l  w i t h  
S u k a r n o ? T o  c o n t i n u e  o p p o s i n g  b o t h  S u k a r n o  a n d  the A r m y
9.A.B.Reznikov,’Dva dokumenta - dva kursa kommunistisceskom divzenii 
Indonezii”,Narody Azii i Afriki,No.1,1968,pp.35-50.
10.A.Belenkiy and B.Ilichev,"Nekotorie uroki sobitii v Indonezii”,Kommunist,
No.15,1968,p.112.
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w o u l d  have b e e n  suicidal, as the PKI had le a r n t  f r o m  its d e b a c l e  
in 1 9 4 8 . In fact, the o n l y  c o u r s e  o p e n  to th e  p a r t y  wa s  
to a l i g n  i t s e l f  w i t h  S u k a r n o  in the ho p e  that t h r o u g h  the 
latter's 'balance p o l i t i c s ' , o f  w h i c h  N A S A K O M  w a s  one 
element, it w o u l d  e n s u r e  its s u r v i v a l  a n d  p l a y  an 
imp o r t a n t  r o l e  in I n d o n e s i a n  politics, as it d i d  fr o m  1953 
to 1 9 6 5 . Bu t  o n c e  S u k a r n o’s 'consensus pol i t i c s '  f a i l e d  
the PKI s a n k  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  h i m  into oblivion.
W h i l e  it is tr u e  that the S o v i e t  U n i o n  s u f f e r e d  
s e r i o u s  s e t b a c k s  in I n d o n e s i a  a f t e r  the r e l a t i v e l y  c l o s e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the two c o u n t r i e s  fr o m  1957 to 1962, 
it would, however, be u n r e a l i s t i c  to d i s m i s s  S o v i e t  p o l i c i e s  
as t o t a l l y  u n p r o f i t a b l e  d u r i n g  the p e r i o d  u n d e r  study.
A n a l y s i n g  the s h o r t  and m e d i u m  term g o a l s , i t  can be a r g u e d  
that the S o v i e t  U n i o n  a c c o m p l i s h e d  the following:
1.S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  aid to I n d o n e s i a  a d d e d  to the g r o w i n g  
t e n s i o n s  in S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ; t h i s  c a u s e d  p r o b l e m s  for the 
Uni t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  o t h e r  W e s t e r n  powers, b e c a u s e  it p a v e d  
the w a y  for p o l i t i c a l  q u a r r e l s  w i t h  the W e s t  and its 
al l i e s  in the region.
2 .S o v i e t  pol i t i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c  a n d  m i l i t a r y  s u p p o r t  for
I n d o n e s i a’s c l a i m  to W e s t  Ir i a n  w a s  p r i n c i p a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  
for i n f l u e n c i n g  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  to i n t e r v e n e  in the 
conflict, a n d  in this r e s p e c t , M o s c o w  ca n  be  c r e d i t e d  
w i t h  h a v i n g  i n d i r e c t l y  a s s i s t e d  in r e s o l v i n g  the d i s p u t e  
in I n d o n e s i a’s f a v o u r . I t  a l s o  r a i s e d  S o v i e t  i n v o l v e m e n t  
in the region, its p r e s t i g e  as a s u p p o r t e r  of T h i r d  
W o r l d  s t a t e s  an d  its c r e d e n t i a l s  as a b a c k e r  of 'just 
c a u s e s’ an d  ’na t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t s’.
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3.One of the m o s t  important a c h i e v e m e n t s  of K h r u s h c h e v  
was to b e g i n  the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of the S o v i e t  U n i o n  into 
a global power, s h i f t i n g  from a c o n t i n e n t a l - b a s e d  s t r a t e g y  
to a global o n e . I n  this r e g a r d , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  c l o s e  
ties w i t h  Ind o n e s i a  d u r i n g  the 'honeymoon* p h a s e  from 
m i d - 1 9 5 8  to mid-1962, r e i n f o r c e d  the S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  g r o w i n g  
role as a gl o b a l  power.
4 . E v e n  th o u g h  I n d o n e s i a  w o u l d  not h a v e  joi n e d  SEATO,
M o s c o w ' s  s u p p o r t  for J a k a r t a’s 'free and a c t i v e  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y ' h e l p e d  to r e i n f o r c e  the l a t t e r ' s  r e j e c t i o n  of 
S E A T 0 / a n d  this had the e f f e c t  of w e a k e n i n g  the A m e r i c a n  
a l l i a n c e  s y s t e m  in the region.
5 . T h r o u g h  its m i l i t a r y  a i d , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  
a l b e i t  temporally, m a d e  i n roads into S o u t h e a s t  Asia,
A
an area w h i c h  had p r e v i o u s l y  b e e n  a W e s t e r n  preserve.
By the same token, its i n v o l v e m e n t  in I n d o n e s i a  m a d e  
it an i m p o r t a n t  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  a c t o r , i n  c o n t r a s t  to its 
past p o s i t i o n  as an outsider.
The S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  I n d o n e s i a n  E x p e r i e n c e : I s  it U n i q u e ?
The l a r g e - s c a l e  S o v i e t  i n v o l v e m e n t  in the T h i r d  
W o r l d  b e g a n  a f t e r  the T w e n t i e t h  P a r t y  C o n g r e s s  of the C P S U  
in F e b r u a r y  1 9 5 6 , at w h i c h  the n e w l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e s  
w e r e  v i e w e d  as im p o r t a n t  u n i t s  in the gl o b a l  ' c o r r e l a t i o n  
of f o r c e s '.M o s c o w 's r e a s s e s s m e n t  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  the p e r i o d  
of A m e r i c a n  a t t e m p t s  to set up a l l i a n c e  s y s t e m s  in Asia, 
and this gave g r e a t e r  i m petus to M o s c o w  to i n v o l v e  itself 
in the r e g i o n . I n  a n u m b e r  of key s t a t e s  su c h  as Egypt,
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India and I n d o n e s i a , c h a r i s m a t i c  leaders s u c h  as Nasser,
N e h r u  and S u k a r n o  o p p o s e d  the A m e r i c a n  s e t t i n g  up of m i l i t a r y  
p acts in th e i r  regions, and this p r o v i d e d  M o s c o w  w i t h  
r e a d y - m a d e  ' f r i e n d s’, as well as o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to e x p a n d  
s t a t e - t o - s t a t e  relations.
To a large extent, a c o m m o n  p a t t e r n  of S o v i e t  
i n v o l v e m e n t  in the Third W o r l d  can be d i s c e r n e d . T h e  
c h a r i s m a t i c  leaders saw t h e m s e l v e s  as c a t a l y s t s  of c h a n g e  
and p u r s u e d  a f o reign p o l i c y  of n o n - a l i g n m e n t ,  w h i c h  w a s  
o f t e n  for c e d  u p o n  them by the d o m e s t i c  b a l a n c e  of power.
In a d d i t i o n  to o p p o s i n g  A m e r i c a n  'p a c t o m a n i a’,they  a l s o  
r e j e c t e d  A m e r i c a n  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e .T h e s e  l e a d e r s  c a m e  
into c o n f l i c t  w i t h  the E u r o p e a n  powers, e s p e c i a l l y  th e i r  
former c o l o n i a l  m a s t e r s , w h o  w e r e  m o r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in 
m a i n t a i n i n g  the political, e c o n o m i c  and m i l i t a r y  s t a t u s  
q u o . I n  the e n s u i n g  d i f ferences, the S o v i e t  U n i o n  as a rule, 
alw a y s  s u p p o r t e d  the ne w  s t a t e s  and their l e a d e r s  a g a i n s t  
the c o l o n i a l  p o w e r s . M o r e  important, in r e g i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s  
such as the A r a b-Israeli Wars, the I n d o - P a k i s t a n i  Wa r s  
and the I n d o n e s i a n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  the D u t c h  o v e r  W e s t  Irian, 
M o s c o w  s u p p o r t e d  Egypt, India a n d  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  this 
i n f l u e n c e d  the three s t a t e s  to turn to the S o v i e t  U n i o n  
for aid and p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t . l t  was t h r o u g h  this p a t t e r n  
that the S o v i e t  Un i o n  m a d e  its in r o a d s  into the M i d d l e  
East, S o u t h  As i a  and S o u t h e a s t  Asia.
In the I n d o n e s i a n  case, however, t h r e e  f a c t o r s  
c o m p l i c a t e d  the S o v i e t  i n v o l v e m e n t .First, t h e r e  was the 
r i v a l r y  w i t h  the P RC.As long as S o v i e t  an d  I n d o n e s i a n
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interests w e r e  in harmony, J a k a r t a  m a i n t a i n e d  w a r m  r e l a t i o n s  
wi t h  M o s c o w , b u t  on c e  the I n d o n e s i a n  l e a d e r s h i p  r e a l i s e d  
that M o s c o w  wa s  no longer w i l l i n g  to s u p p o r t  I n d o n e s i a n  
p o l i c i e s  w h i c h  ris k e d  its d e t e n t e  w i t h  the U n i t e d  States, 
J a k a r t a  tur n e d  to w a r d s  P e k i n g , w h i c h  p r e s e n t e d  its e l f  as 
a revolut i o n a r y ,  a n t i - s t a t u s  q u o  p o w e r  in the r e g i o n . I n  
the case of E g y p t  and I n d i a , t h e  C h i n a  f a c t o r  d i d  no t  p l a y  
the same r o l e . I n  fa c t , i n  the c a s e  of India, it f u n c t i o n e d  
in r e v e r s e , N e w  Delhi p e r c e i v i n g  P e k i n g  as a m a j o r  t h r e a t  
to its s e c u r i t y  a n d  c l o s i n g  r a n k s  w i t h  M o s c o w  as a c o u n t e r  
to C h i n e s e  power.
Secondly, in b o t h  E g y p t  a n d  I n d i a , t h e  C o m m u n i s t  
P a r t i e s  w e r e  w e a k  and p ro-Soviet, and this p e r m i t t e d  the 
S o v i e t  U n i o n  to d e v e l o p  its r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  the n a t i o n a l  
b o u r g e o i s  l e a d e r s h i p  w i t h o u t  m a j o r  c o m p l i c a t i o n s . I n  
I n d o n e s i a , h o w e v e r ,  t here was a large an d  p o w e r f u l  C o m m u n i s t  
P a r t y ; a s  long as the PKI p u r s u e d  a p r o - S o v i e t  or  a n e u t r a l  
p o l i c y  in the S i n o - S o v i e t  c o n f l i c t , M o s c o w  c o u l d  d e v e l o p  
its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S u k a r n o  w i t h o u t  m a j o r  problems, but 
on c e  the PKI t u rned to w a r d s  China, a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r
1963, w h e n  S u k a r n o  did the s a m e , I n d o n e s i a  b e c a m e  a w a s t i n g  
a s s e t  to Moscow.
T h i r d l y , t h e  g e o - s t r a t e g i c  f a c t o r  a l s o  i n f l u e n c e d  
S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p . U n l i k e  India a n d  Egypt,-which 
w e r e  lo c a t e d  in a r e a s  c o n t i g u o u s  to vi t a l  S o v i e t  e c o n o m i c  
and m i l i t a r y  interests, I n d o n e s i a’s l o c a t i o n  a w a y  fr o m  
i m m e d i a t e  S o v i e t  c o n c e r n s  p l a y e d  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  in the
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S o v i e t  easy d e t a c h m e n t  from the R e p u b l i c . I n  this regard, 
the d e v e l o p m e n t  of c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the two c o u n t r i e s  
was c e r t a i n l y  seen as a b o n u s  , but o n c e  o b s t a c l e s  and c l a s h e s  
of na t i o n a l  i n t e rests p l a c e d  a b r a k e  o n  t h e i r  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n ­
ship, the lack of vital S o v i e t  i n t e r e s t s  in the r e g i o n  
and in In d o n e s i a  itselfi m a d e  it easy for the S o v i e t  U n i o n  
to 'withdraw* from the R e p u b l i c  and d e t a c h  1 i t s e l f  d i r e c t l y  
from d e v e l o p m e n t s  t h e r e . T h e  g r e a t  d i s t a n c e  of  I n d o n e s i a  
from the S o v i e t  heartland, an d  the a b s e n c e  of a S o v i e t  b l u e  
w a t e r  n a v y  to gi v e  ’t e e t h’ to its p o l i c i e s  a n d  in the p r o c e s s  
r a i s e  c o n f i d e n c e  of its p a r t n e r , i n  this c a s e  Indonesia, 
only r e i n f o r c e d  this attitude.
The S o v i e t  e x p e r i e n c e  in I n d o n e s i a  w a s  s o b e r i n g  
for the f o l l o w i n g  reasons:
l.It d e m o n s t r a t e d  the d a n g e r s  of r e l y i n g  on a n d  i n v e s t i n g  
in one p a r t i c u l a r  leader in the T h i r d  W o r l d . A s  a r u l e , t h e s e  
leaders w e r e  nationalistic, a n t i - W e s t  a n d  a n t i - c o l o n i a l  
and o f t e n  i n f l u e n c e d  by M a r x i s m  to a g r e a t e r  or le s s e r  
extent.This, however, d i d  n o t  m e a n  that th e y  w e r e  r e a d y ­
made tools of the S o v i e t  U n i o n . M o r e  of t e n  than n o t , t h e s e  
leaders u s e d  the S o v i e t  Un i o n  to a c h i e v e  th e i r  f o r e i g n  
pol i c y  and d o m e s t i c  o b j e c t i v e s  and w h e n e v e r  th e r e  wa s  
a c l a s h  b e t w e e n  S o v i e t  and n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s , t h e y  w o u l d  
s a c r i f i c e  the S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  w i t h o u t  h e s i t a t i o n . I n  this 
r e g a r d , t h e  T h i r d  W o r l d  leaders' n a t i o n a l i s m ,  anti- 
iimperi a l i s m  and a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m  w e r e  not a g u a r a n t e e  that 
they w o u l d  lead their c o u n t r i e s  to ’s c i e n t i f i c  s o c i a l i s m’ 
if left to th e i r  own d e v i c e s . A t  the sa m e  t i m e , w i t h  the
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a d v a n t a g e  of h i n d s i g h t , t h e  n a t u r e  of S o v i e t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
with Th i r d  W o r l d  st a t e s  a l s o  h i g h l i g h t e d  the lack of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  by a n u m b e r  of W e s t e r n  s c h o l a r s  and o f f i c i a l s  
in the U n i t e d  S t a t e s , w h o  b e l i e v e d  in the e a r l y  1960s, 
that S u k a r n o  wa s  a c o m m u n i s t  , that I n d o n e s i a  wa s  in the 
So v i e t  camp an d  that S u k a r n o  was s i m p l y  a s u r r o g a t e  or 
proxy for the K r e m l i n . R a t h e r , i f  there s o m e t i m e s  a p p e a r e d  
to be a ’p u p p e t  r e l a t i o n s h i p’, it was l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  
So v i e t  and I n d o n e s i a n  i n t e r e s t s  e s s e n t i a l l y  converged, 
as d u r i n g  the W e s t  Irian dispute.
2 . E v e n  if some leaders c o u l d  be w o n  o v e r  for the S o v i e t  
c a u s e , i n c l u d i n g  the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of n o n - c a p i t a l i s t  
p r o g r a m m e s , t h e y  w e r e  still v u l n e r a b l e  and th e i r  o v e r t h r o w  
w o u l d  bring an end to ye a r s  of S o v i e t  g o o d w i l l  and 
i n v e s t m e n t s .This is because, given the s o c i e t a l  p o w e r  
s t r u c t u r e s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by c o n s e r v a t i s m  a n d  d e e p l y  
e m b e d d e d  W e s t e r n  i n f l u e n c e , t h e s e  lea d e r s  w e r e  u n l i k e l y  
to r e m a i n  long eno u g h  in p o w e r  to e f f e c t  the t r a n s i t i o n  
to 'Soviet ty p e  of social i s m '.H e n c e , t h e  'peaceful t r a n s i t i o n  
to s ocialism' p r o v e d  i l l u s o r y . T h e  lengthy c o l o n i a l  h i s t o r i e s  
of these countries, the g r e a t e r  c o n c e r n  of their g o v e r n ­
me n t s  for internal d e v e l o p m e n t  than for f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  the s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e s , t h e  d i v o r c e  of i n c o m p e t e n t  
leaders from the m a s s e s , t h e  too g r e a t  d e p e n d e n c e  on the 
w o r l d  c a p i t a l i s t  e c o n o m y , t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of s e r i o u s  e c o n o m i c  
p r o b l e m s , t h e  d i s r u p t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  of local and f o r e i g n  
'r e a c t i o n a r i e s ',the i n s t a b i l i t y  of p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s  democr a c y ,  
the large s c a l e  c o r r u p t i o n , t h e  a b s e n c e  of a s t r o n g  v a n g u a r d  
p a r t y , t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  m i s t a k e s  by the l e a d e r s h i p , t h e
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s e tting of a m b i t i o u s  go a l s  w i t h o u t  r e g a r d  to e c o n o m i c  
and c a d r e  r e s o u r c e s  and the i n a b i l i t y  to a c h i e v e  c o o p e r a ­
tion b e t w e e n  all anti - i m p e r i a l i s t  e l e m e n t s  o n l y  c o m p o u n d e d  
the w e a k n e s s e s  of wh a t  may h a v e  a p p e a r e d  to be ’p r o g r e s s i v e  
regimes', such as was S u k a r n o ' s  Indonesia.
3 . It is i m p o r t a n t  to note th a t  in a l m o s t  all cases, and 
this wo u l d  c e r t a i n l y  be true of Indonesia, it was 
the S o v i e t  U n i o n  that was d r a w n  into the r e g i o n  by the 
c o m b i n a t i o n  of d o m e s t i c  and r e g i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s  w h i c h  
the K r e m l i n  s a w  as p r o p i t i o u s .W h i l e  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  
r e a s s e s s e d  its p o s i t i o n  and w a s  w i l l i n g  to i n v o l v e  iself 
in the Th i r d  World, in ea c h  c a s e  it was the local l e a d e r s h i p s  
w h i c h  p r e s e n t e d  the m s e l v e s  as w i l l i n g  a l l i e s  to M o s c o w  
in o r d e r  to fu r t h e r  their n a t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s ; o n c e  t h e s e  
were a c h i e v e d , t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  was d i s c a r d e d , e s p e c i a l l y  
w hen it ca m e  into c o n f l i c t  w i t h  n e w  go a l s  of the T h i r d  
Wo r l d  s t a t e , a s  h a p p e n e d  in the c a s e s  of E g y p t  and Indonesia. 
This e x p e r i e n c e  showed that the S o v i e t  U n i o n  did no t  
have a str o n g  c o n s t i t u e n c y  in the T h i r d  W o r l d  and v e r y  
o ften was h o s t a g e  to the g o odwi 11 of a p a r t i c u l a r  Th i r d  
Wo r l d  state.
4 . In the case of S o u t h e a s t  A s i a , t h e  C h i n a  f a c t o r  p l a y e d
a vital ro l e  in h i n d e r i n g  the e x p a n s i o n  of S o v i e t  influence. 
S i n o - S o v i e t  r i v a l r y  was to a large d e g r e e  r e s p o n s i b l e  
for the S o v i e t  U n i o n’s initial l a r g e s s e  to I n d o n e s i a  
and it al s o  p l a y e d  a p r i m a r y  ro l e  in f i n a l l y  c a u s i n g  
the e s t r a n g e m e n t  b e t w e e n  M o s c o w  and J a k a r t a . I n  this 
r e g a r d , S o v i e t  s u ccess or f a i l u r e  in S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  an d
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  in I n d o n e s i a , has b e e n  d e t e r m i n e d  as m u c h  
by internal c h a n g e s  w i t h i n  the c o u n t r i e s  of the r e g i o n  
as by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g  the r o l e  of China.
5.The S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the PKI m u s t  ha v e  a l s o  
aw*v*M«i the K r e m l i n  that the e m e r g e n c e  of a p o w e r f u l  
c o m m u n i s t - l e d  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  m o v e m e n t  c a p a b l e  of s e i z i n g  
power w i t h o u t  o u t s i d e  a s s i s t a n c e  was n o t  a r e a l i s t i c  
e x p e c t a t i o n  in the T h i r d  World.
6 .F i n a l l y , S o v i e t  e c o n o m i c  a s s i s t a n c e  di d  no t  s e c u r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  d i v i d e n d s , n o r  did d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
sh o w  any e n t h u s i a s m  for e m b r a c i n g  the S o v i e t  m o d e l  of 
e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s  wa s  b e c a u s e  the S o v i e t  U n i o n  
s i m p l y  c o u l d  not c o m p e t e  w i t h  the W e s t  in e c o n o m i c  aid
to the T h i r d  World.
The S t u d y ' s  C o n t r i b u t i o n s
The f o l l o w i n g  can be r e g a r d e d  as the c o n t r i b u t i o n s
of this study:
l.It d e t a i l e d  the d e v e l o p m e n t s  in S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s  
from 1945 to 1968.This w o u l d  fill a m a j o r  g a p  in the 
a c a d e m i c  l i t e r a t u r e  as no s u c h  s t u d y  e x i s t s  o v e r  the 
p e r i o d  s u r v e y e d  in a s i n g l e  v o l u m e  and o v e r  su c h  w i d e -  
r a n g i n g  issues as c o v e r e d  in the study.
2 . The s t u d y  h i g h l i g h t e d  the S o v i e t  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n c e p t s  
on the T h i r d  W o r l d  and e x a m i n e d  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  to 
I n d o n e s i a . l t  is e v i d e n t  t h a t  if one w e r e  to c h a r a c t e r i s e  
the p o l i c y  of the S o v i e t  U n i o n  in the T h i r d  W o r l d  d u r i n g
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the p e riod u n d e r  s u r v e y , o n e  w o u l d  have to c o n c l u d e  thatjthis 
p o l i c y  has been one of c o n s t a n t  r e a s s e s s m e n t  an d  r e v i s i o n . W h e n  
it be c a m e  c l e a r  that a p o l i c y  of i s o l a t i o n  was 
u n s u c c e s s f u l ,the S o v i e t s  d e v e l o p e d  e c o n o m i c  an d  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t a c t s  w i t h  the T h i r d  W o r l d ; w h e n  it b e c a m e  e v i d e n t  
that n e u t r a l i s m  was the b a s i s  of the f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  
of m a n y  of the new states, S o v i e t  l e aders c a m e  o u t  in 
favour of n o n - a l i g n m e n t ; w h e n  the w e a k n e s s  of the 
p r o l e t a r i a t  and local c o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  w a s  recognised, 
the S o v i e t s  i n t r o d u c e d  the d o c t r i n e s  o f  ’na t i o n a l  and 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  d e m o c r a c y '.U n d e r  the B r e z h n e v - K o s y g i n  
leadership, the goal of s c i e n t i f i c  s o c i a l i s m  and w o r kers' 
s tate was p u s h e d  into the f u t u r e ; an d  the f o r e m o s t  
i m m e d i a t e  task s t a t e d  as the p r e s e n t  i n c r e a s e  of S o v i e t  
i n f l u e n c e  in the Th i r d  Wor l d . T h i s ,  it f e l t , c o u l d  b e s t  
be a c c o m p l i s h e d  by s u p p o r t i n g  the e x i s t i n g  n a t i o n a l i s t  
g o v e r n m e n t s , b y  p r o v i d i n g  m i l i t a r y  and e c o n o m i c  a s s i s t a n c e  
and by d e v e l o p i n g  p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c  a n d  c u l t u r a l  ties 
w i t h  the p e o p l e s  of these c o u n t r i e s .H o w  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t hese c h a n g e s  a f f e c t e d  I n d o n e s i a / an d  h e n c e  the c o u r s e  
of S o v i e t - I n d o n e s i a n  r e l a t i o n s ,h a s  b e e n  d e t a i l e d  in 
the s t u d y , w h i c h  wo u l d  r e p r e s e n t  a n o t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
s i n c e  t h e r e  is no s p e c i f i c  c a s e  s t u d y  of S o v i e t - T h i r d  
W o r l d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  to Indonesia.
3 . Th e  s t u d y  ha s  also a t t e m p t e d  to h i g h l i g h t  s o m e  of the 
r e c e n t  S o v i e t  l iterature on the s u b j e c t  a n d  p e r i o d  u n d e r  
s u r v e y . I t  is cl e a r  that m a n y  c h a n g e s  ha v e  ta k e n  p l a c e
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in p e r s p e c t i v e  and p o s i t i o n  an d  this c a n  be e x p l a i n e d  
by the b e n e f i t  of h i n d s i g h t  an d  the c h a n g i n g  S o v i e t  
v i e w  of the T h i r d  World.
4 . F i n a l l y , t h e  s t u d y  has a t t e m p t e d  to i l l u m i n a t e  the 
u n i q u e n e s s  of the S o v i e t  e x p e r i e n c e  in I n d o n e s i a  a n d  
the f a ctors a c c o u n t i n g  for this.
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